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Abstract
The offshore petroleum industry is of critical importance to the global economy.
Offshore petroleum installations are considered elements of critical national
infrastructure in many nation-States and their security may have significant implications
for national security and economic wellbeing. Violence at sea is a very common
occurrence today and major petroleum producing and consuming States are concerned
about the protection of offshore petroleum installations from attacks and unlawful
interferences, especially acts of terrorism. In recent years, the international community
has taken a number of regulatory measures to enhance the security of the maritime
transport and offshore petroleum sectors.
The thesis examines the types of security threats to offshore petroleum installations, the
types of attacks that have been carried out against offshore installations, and factors that
make offshore installations attractive targets including their vulnerabilities and potential
impacts that can result from deliberate attacks on these vital facilities. This thesis also
analyses the international legal framework for maritime and offshore petroleum security
with the aim of determining whether the international legal framework adequately
addresses the protection and security of offshore petroleum installations. Specifically, it
analyses the law of the sea framework established under the umbrella of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 as well as other international legal
instruments and regulatory measures pertaining to the security of offshore installations.
The original contribution made by this thesis includes the compilation of a
comprehensive chronology of attacks on and interferences with offshore petroleum
installations, the analysis of various security threats faced by offshore petroleum
installations, examination of factors that make offshore petroleum installations
attractive targets, and a detailed analysis of the international regulatory framework.
The thesis concludes that there are gaps and limitations in the current international
regulatory framework for the protection and security of offshore petroleum installations.
It argues that there is a scope for improvement in the international legal framework and
that further regulatory changes are necessary at the international level in order to
enhance security of offshore petroleum installations. The thesis also provides several
specific suggestions that would improve the international legal framework for the
protection and security of offshore petroleum installations.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
I have spent decades working in the oil industry, with companies that would fly me in
with a jet and spend two million dollars to resolve a crisis situation. I’ve had many
opportunities to get to know the issues of independence, oil manipulation, and the
differences in perspectives between the Western world and the rest of the globe. I
knew the time would come when our oil dependence would be considered a critical
1

target for attack.

1. Introduction
This introductory chapter explains how the thesis is developed in the succeeding
chapters. The chapter provides an overview of the global offshore petroleum industry
and a background to violence associated with the petroleum industry and its offshore
sector. It also introduces the concept of ‘offshore petroleum security’, discusses past
and present perspectives on offshore petroleum security, and highlights the global
concerns about security of offshore petroleum installations. The chapter also outlines
aims, scope, structure, and significance of the thesis.

2. Offshore Petroleum Security Context
Petroleum is one of the most important energy resources of the earth.2 It ‘drives the
economic engine of modern society’, 3 and will continue to do so in the foreseeable
future. The petroleum industry has its beginnings in the mid-nineteenth century. 4 In
those days, crude oil products had a number of applications, for example, as the coating
of boats, waterproofing of roofs, fuelling of home lamps, and as the lubrication of

1

Neal Adams, Terrorism & Oil (PennWell, 2003) 147.
Sometimes the terms ‘petroleum’ and ‘gas’ are used to identify different types of hydrocarbons. For the
purposes of this thesis, the term petroleum is synonymous with the phrase ‘oil and gas’, and used as a
collective term to refer to gaseous and liquid hydrocarbons including crude oil, condensate, natural gas,
compressed natural gas (CNG), liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and liquefied natural gas (LNG). Refined
petroleum products are generally excluded.
3
Peter Avis, ‘Oil Platform Security: Is Canada Doing All It Should?’ (Critical Energy Infrastructure
Protection Policy Research Series No 3-2006, Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies,
March 2006) 3.
4
Gal Luft, ‘On Oil’s 150th Anniversary, Is It Time to Consider New Energy Strategy?’, Houston
Chronicle (online), 30 August 2009 <http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/On-oil-s-150thanniversary-is-it-time-to-1744340.php> at 19 June 2011.
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weapons and tools. 5 In the early twentieth century, on the eve of World War I, oil
became a strategic commodity.6
World War I was the first truly mechanised war and oil played an important role in it.7
The oil supremacy of the Allies gave them an advantage and eventually helped to defeat
Germany. For example, the British Navy’s decision to convert to oil for its power
source (in place of coal) provided British ships with greater speed and endurance as
well as more efficient use of manpower compared to the coal-powered ships of its
adversaries. 8 World War I demonstrated that access to oil, possession of oil and the
ability to use oil are critical elements in national power. 9 The significance of oil
continued to influence strategic thinking after World War I and in the years leading up
to World War II.10
2.1 The global offshore petroleum industry

Today, petroleum is still one of the most strategic and most valuable export
commodities, worth billions of dollars a day. 11 Petroleum is central to security,
prosperity and the very nature of civilisation. 12 ‘Without viable and accessible
alternatives, entire economies suffer when increasing proportions of national budgets
must be used to purchase oil.’13
Petroleum continues to be the major component of the global energy portfolio,
representing more than half of the world’s total energy supply.14 As illustrated in Figure

5

Jay Schempf, Pioneering Offshore: The Early Years (PennWell, 2007) 8.
Eckart Woertz, ‘Demography and Political Violence in the Middle East’ (2007) 6 Gulf Monitor 16, 18.
See also Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (Free Press, first published
1991, 2008 ed) 151–2.
7
The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (Produced by Bernadette McDaid and Jonathan
Taplin, Homevision, 1992) episode 2.
8
Michael Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Owl Books, 2002) 30; Yergin,
above n 6, xiv.
9
The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, above n 7, episode 2.
10
Klare, above n 8, 31.
11
Australian Government, Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS), Offshore Oil &
Gas Risk Context Statement (2005) 5.
12
Yergin, above n 6, xiv.
13
Antonia Juhasz, The Tyranny of Oil: The World’s Most Powerful Industry – And What We Must Do to
Stop It (HarperCollins, 2008) 1.
14
International Energy Agency (IEA), Key World Energy Statistics 2010 (2010) 6.
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1 below, in 2010 oil accounted for about 33.6 per cent and natural gas accounted for
about 23.8 per cent of the global primary energy consumption.15

Figure 1: Global Primary Energy Consumption in 2010

Source: British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011 (2011) 41.

Tables 1 and 2 below provide a summary of the world’s ten largest oil producing States
and ten largest natural gas producing States respectively (based on both onshore and
offshore production). Russia is the world’s largest petroleum producing State and
accounts for about 15.5 per cent of total global petroleum production.16 Russia is also
the world’s largest exporter of natural gas and the second largest exporter of oil17 which,
combined, makes Russia the world’s largest exporter of petroleum (in addition to being
the world’s largest petroleum producer).
Table 1: Top Ten Oil Producing States
Thousand
barrels per day

Country

Share of total
global production

Russia

10 270

12.91%

Saudi Arabia

10 007

11.95%

United States

7513

8.66%

Iran

4245

5.19%

China

4071

5.19%

Canada

3336

4.16%

15

British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011 (2011) 41.
Russia accounts for 12.91 per cent of total global oil production and 18.4 per cent of total global gas
production.
17
IEA, above n 14, 11–13.
16
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Mexico

2958

3.74%

United Arab Emirates

2849

3.34%

Kuwait

2508

3.23%

Venezuela

2471

3.13%

Source: British Petroleum, Statistical Review of World Energy 2011
<www.bp.com/statisticalreview>.

Table 2: Top Ten Natural Gas Producing States
Billion cubic feet
per day

Share of total
global production

United States

59.1

19.33%

Russia

57.0

18.40%

Canada

15.5

4.99%

Iran

13.4

4.33%

Qatar

11.3

3.65%

Norway

10.3

3.32%

China

9.4

3.02%

Saudi Arabia

8.1

2.62%

Indonesia

7.9

2.56%

Algeria

7.8

2.51%

Country

Source: British Petroleum, Statistical Review of World Energy 2011
<www.bp.com/statisticalreview>.

The exploration and production of petroleum resources offshore started in the 1890s in
the United States (US) off the shores of Summerland in the State of California, just to
the east of Santa Barbara. 18 Offshore drilling was done from a set of oil derricks
constructed along a pier that jutted into the Pacific Ocean allowing oil prospectors to tap
the offshore extensions of onshore fields.19 However, the birth of the modern offshore
petroleum industry was on 4 October 1947, when the first commercial offshore oil well
was drilled out of sight of land in water depth of 6 metres about 12 nautical miles off the
Louisiana coast in the Gulf of Mexico in the US.20

18

Robert Gramling and William Freudenburg, ‘Attitudes Toward Offshore Oil Development: A Summary
of Current Evidence’ (2006) 49 Ocean & Coastal Management 442, 442.
19
Schempf, above n 5, 9–10.
20
Ibid 3. The name of the exploratory well was the Kerr-McGee-Phillips-Stanolind State of Louisiana,
Block 32, No 1: at 3. See also Gunther Clauss, Eike Lehmann and Carsten Ostergaard, Offshore
Structures: Conceptual Design and Hydromechanics (M J Shields trans, Springer-Verlag, 1992-94) vol 1,
47.
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Over the years, the industry has developed a diversity of offshore petroleum
installations. 21 They include fixed offshore petroleum installations such as jacket
structures, gravity-based structures (GBSs), tension-leg platforms (TLPs), tower
platforms; and mobile offshore petroleum installations such as floating storage and
offloading units (FSOs), floating production, storage and offloading units (FPSOs),
floating drilling, production, storage and offloading units (FDPSOs), spar platforms,
drill ships, jack-ups, submersibles, semisubmersible units, as well as offshore drilling
and production barges.22 The offshore petroleum industry continues to evolve with new
types of offshore petroleum installations being designed and built.23
Different terminology is often used in the literature to refer to offshore petroleum
installations. This includes terms such as ‘offshore platforms’, ‘offshore facilities’,
‘offshore structures’, ‘offshore units’ and ‘offshore rigs’. In this thesis, the term
‘offshore petroleum installation(s)’ 24 is a general term used to refer to any type of
offshore petroleum installation utilised in the offshore petroleum industry for the
purpose of drilling for, production, storage, loading and offloading of petroleum, but
excluding offshore pipelines.
Offshore petroleum is of critical importance in meeting global energy needs. The
increasing global demand for energy resources and major technological advances have
resulted in a significant shift of petroleum operations from land to offshore locations.25
States and oil corporations are turning to the sea for offshore petroleum resources more
than ever before.26 Approximately 30 per cent of the total global petroleum production

21

See generally William Graff, Introduction to Offshore Structures: Design, Fabrication, Installation
(Gulf Publishing Co, 1981); Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 20.
22
The physical nature and characteristics of different types of offshore petroleum installations are
examined in more detail in Chapter 4.
23
In the near future, the offshore petroleum industry will have floating liquefied natural gas plants/units
(FLNGs). In 2011, Shell announced that it will go ahead with the world’s first FLNG plant which is
expected to be completed by 2017 and to be used to develop both the Prelude and Concerto fields in the
Browse Basin about 475 kilometres offshore Australia: Australian Government, Minister for Resources
and Energy, ‘Australia Home to World’s First Floating LNG Project’ (Media Release, 20 May 2011)
<http://minister.ret.gov.au/MediaCentre/MediaReleases/Pages/AustraliaHometoWorld'sFirstFloatingLNG
Project.aspx> at 25 May 2011; Peter Ker, ‘Floating LNG Plant to Unlock Gas Reserves’, Weekend
Business, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 21 May 2011, 1.
24
The term ‘offshore petroleum installation’ may be used synonymously in this thesis with the terms
‘offshore installation’ or simply ‘installation’.
25
Most regions around the world have experienced a shift in production to offshore fields. See IEA,
World Energy Outlook 2008 (2008) 221.
26
Martin Murphy, ‘Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism’ (2007) 47(338) Adelphi Papers 1, 75.
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comes from the offshore sector.27 This figure is expected to increase significantly due to
depleting onshore fields and rapidly expanding offshore petroleum exploration and
development.28
Between 1991 and 2006, offshore oil production rose by more than one-third and
offshore natural gas production more than doubled. 29 The main offshore petroleum
producing regions include the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea, the South China Sea, the
Gulf of Guinea, the Persian Gulf, and the Caspian Sea.30 The Arctic is emerging as a
major petroleum producing region.31
Offshore petroleum installations are now a common feature of many of the world’s
continental shelf areas. There are now over 1300 offshore drilling rigs,32 more than 200
floating production units (FPUs), 33 and thousands of fixed offshore production
platforms in the world.34 The number of offshore petroleum installations is constantly
increasing in practically all petroleum producing regions; more than 1600 new fixed
offshore platforms are forecast to be installed over the five-year period from 2009 to
2014.35

27

IEA, above n 25, 251; Modec, About Offshore Oil & Gas Industry
<http://www.modec.com/about/industry/oil_gas.html> at 22 January 2011; Reuters, Factbox – Offshore
Increasingly Important to Oil Industry (6 July 2010)
<http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE6640YV20100706> at 22 January 2011; Donald Rothwell and
Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Hart Publishing, 2010) 287.
28
See, eg, International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2009 (2009) 432. See also Lee Cordner,
‘Managing Regional Risk: Offshore Oil and Gas Safety and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region’ (2011)
3(1) Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs 15.
29
Douglas-Westwood Ltd, World Offshore Oil & Gas Production and Spend Forecast 2007-11 (2007),
cited in PennWell Corporation, International Petroleum Encyclopedia (PennWell, 2008) 360.
30
While offshore oil and gas fields are distributed across the world, only three regions namely the North
Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the South China Sea, attract more than half of all offshore spending:
Douglas-Westwood Ltd, above n 29, cited in PennWell Corporation, above n 29, 360.
31
See, eg, IEA, above n 28, 467.
32
Rigzone, Rig Report: Offshore Rig Fleet by Rig Type (2011)
<http://www.rigzone.com/data/rig_report.asp?rpt=type> 6 September 2011.
33
For example, as of mid-2007, there were 197 floating production systems operating, which included
118 floating production, storage and offloading units (FPSOs), 40 production semisubmersibles, 20
tension-leg platforms (TLPs), 15 production spars, and four production barges: PennWell Corporation,
above n 29, 357.
34
There are more than 3500 fixed production platforms in the Gulf of Mexico alone: US National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil
Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling (Report to President, January 2011) 3.
35
Infield, Fixed Platforms Market Report (2011) <http://www.infield.com/market-forecast-reports/fixedplatforms-market-report> at 20 June 2011.
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2.2 Violence associated with the petroleum industry

During its 150-year history, oil has been a source of both prosperity and volatility,36 and
public attitudes towards petroleum activities have always been diverse.37 Historically,
the oil industry has been the subject of many local protests, environmental
controversies, and political violence.38
Along with the rapid evolution of the petroleum industry in the last century,
international oil companies were also acquiring a negative image, especially those
operating in developing States.39 Major oil companies have always had a colonialist and
imperialist image, and were perceived as having no respect for a State’s sovereignty,
accumulating financial capital by looting the wealth of the host States, serving political
and strategic objectives of foreign governments, promoting corruption, and disregarding
the interests of the host States and the long-term wellbeing of their people.40
Oil companies that operate in economically and politically unstable countries often find
that local community members believe that they are suffering from the consequences of
petroleum activities in their territories without receiving any benefits. 41 This creates
tension between oil companies and local communities, 42 which can eventually
materialise in attacks on petroleum installations. Nigeria is a good example of this type
of situation where the angry members of local community groups carry out attacks on
petroleum installations.43 The fact that local governments receive large proportions of

36

Gal Luft, ‘Oil’s 150th Anniversary: Whose Happy Birthday?’ (2009) August Journal of Energy
Security [2] <http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=208:oils-150thanniversary-whose-happy-birthday&catid=98:issuecontent0809&Itemid=349> at 2 September 2009.
37
For a detailed discussion on attitudes towards the offshore petroleum industry see Gramling and
Freudenburg, above n 18, 442.
38
See, eg, Brynjar Lia and Ashild Kjok, ‘Energy Supply as Terrorist Targets? Patterns of “Petroleum
Terrorism” 1968-99’ in Daniel Heradstveit and Helge Hveem (eds), Oil in the Gulf: Obstacles to
Democracy and Development (Ashgate, 2004) 100.
39
Mustafa Alani, ‘Risks and Threats Facing Oil Company Operations in Developing Countries: An
Overview’ (2007) 6 Security & Terrorism Research Bulletin 34, 34.
40
Ibid. See also Peter Maass, Crude World: The Violent Twilight of Oil (Vintage Books, 2009).
41
See generally Maass, above n 40.
42
For example, in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the resentment towards Royal Dutch Shell, which
accounts for the majority of petroleum operations in the country, has grown to the point where the
company is considered a ‘public enemy number one’: Mikhail Kashubsky, ‘Offshore Energy Force
Majeure: Nigeria’s Local Problem with Global Consequences’ (2008) 160 Maritime Studies 20. See also
Michael Watts (ed), Curse of the Black Gold: 50 Years of Oil in Niger Delta (Powerhouse Books, 2008).
43
See, eg, Jennifer Giroux, ‘Turmoil in the Delta: Trends and Implications’ (2008) 2(8) Perspectives on
Terrorism 11; Arild Nodland, ‘Guns, Oil, and “Cake”: Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea’ in Bruce
Elleman, Andrew Forbes and David Rosenbert (eds), Piracy and Maritime Crime (Naval War College
Press, 2010) 191; Watts (ed), above n 42; International Crisis Group, ‘The Swamps of Insurgency:
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their revenues from oil developments further exacerbates the situation and renders oil
companies and oil installations very tempting targets for attack.44
2.2.1 Petroleum-related targets and attacks

In many petroleum producing States, socially or politically disgruntled groups and other
‘violent non-State actors’ 45 have targeted petroleum installations to showcase their
causes. 46 In some countries, petroleum installations have been victims of attacks for
many years due to violent civil wars and ethnic conflicts.47 There are many recorded
attacks on the oil and gas industry in various countries around the world. For example,
between 1990 and 2005, there were 330 reported attacks on the oil and gas industry.48
Attacks on pipelines and oil company workers are among the most common.49
Attacking offshore petroleum installations is not a new phenomenon. In fact, it has a
history of over one hundred years. The first documented attack on an offshore oil
installation took place in August 1899, in the US. The incident had become known as
the ‘Montecito Mob’ because it occurred in Montecito, an affluent suburb of Santa
Barbara, California.50 On 2 August 1899, soon after an oil company began to construct
an oil derrick off the shores of Montecito, a local mob took direct action. They attacked
the rig and demolished it in order to prevent further expansion of the oil industry in
Santa Barbara. 51 At the time, Santa Barbara was positioning itself as a tourist and

Nigeria’s Delta Unrest’ (Africa Report No 115, International Crisis Group, 3 August 2006); Cindy Combs
and Martin Slann, Encyclopedia of Terrorism (Facts on File, 2002) 140.
44
Michael Economides, ‘Foreword’ in Neal Adams, above n 1, xvi.
45
‘Violent non-State actors’ is the term that is used by Jennifer Giroux and Caroline Hilpert: Jennifer
Giroux and Caroline Hilpert, ‘The Relationship Between Energy Infrastructure Attacks and Crude Oil
Prices’ (2009) October Journal of Energy Security
<http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=216:the-relationship-betweenenergy-infrastructure-attacks-and-crude-oil-prices&catid=100:issuecontent&Itemid=352> at 6 November
2009.
46
Economides, above n 44, xvi.
47
Herbert Cooper, ‘Addressing Energy Supply Vulnerabilities’ (2006) 102(4) CEP Magazine 24, 25.
48
Jeffrey Simonoff, Carlos Restrepo and Rae Zimmerman, ‘Trends for Oil and Gas Terrorist Attacks’
(Research Report No 2, Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 30 November 2005). The
report indicates that eight countries namely Algeria, Colombia, Ecuador, Iraq, Pakistan, Philippines,
Russia and Turkey had at least five incidents of attacks related to oil and gas installations between 1990
and 2005: at 3.
49
See Lia and Kjok, above n 38, 104; National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
(MIPT), ‘Database: Terrorism Statistics for 2002’ (The MIPT Terrorism Annual 2002, National
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2004) 61–2.
50
Gramling and Freudenburg, above n 18, 442–3.
51
Ibid; Harvey Molotch, William Freudenburg and Krista Paulsen, ‘History Repeats Itself, But How?
City Character, Urban Tradition, and the Accomplishment of Place’ (2000) 65(6) American Sociological
Review 791, 804.
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retirement destination which continuously generated tension between local residents and
the oil industry.52
A number of violent incidents involving offshore petroleum installations have occurred
throughout the history of the offshore petroleum industry including the occupation of
offshore installations by striking workers, abduction of offshore workers taken hostage
by local gangs storming offshore installations, and attacks on offshore workers in transit
to or from offshore installations.

53

However, compared to onshore petroleum

installations, attacks on offshore petroleum installations are relatively rare. Between
1975 and 2011, approximately 60 security incidents involving offshore petroleum
installations were identified in the course of this research. 54 The types of offshore
installations that have been attacked include fixed offshore production platforms,
mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs), FPSOs, FSOs, offshore oil export terminals,
and other types of offshore installations such as oil derricks, wellhead platforms, and
flow stations. Security incidents involving MODUs are the most common. To date,
there have been at least two reported attacks on offshore pipelines.55
2.2.2 Sources of attacks on offshore petroleum installations

The attacks on offshore petroleum installations may come from a variety of sources,
whether individuals or groups, internal or external, domestic or transnational. Security
threats to offshore petroleum installations can be categorised in different ways. In this
thesis, security threats are grouped into the following eight categories: piracy, terrorism,
insurgency, organised crime, vandalism, civil protest, internal sabotage, and inter-State
hostilities. Chapter 2 analyses each of these categories of threats in some detail, but it is

52

When oil came to the Santa Barbara area, the city was already becoming a tourist and retirement
destination, and it, like southern California in general, was promoted widely for health restoration and the
good life: Molotch, Freudenburg and Paulsen, above n 51, 804.
53
DOTARS, above n 11, 25. See also American Petroleum Institute (API), Security Vulnerability
Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries (2nd ed, 2004) 5; David Osler,
‘Keeping Pin in a Timebomb of Oil and Gas’, Lloyd’s List DCN (Sydney), 18 August 2005, 9. For details
of offshore attacks see Appendix B. See also Mikhail Kashubsky, ‘A Chronology of Attacks on and
Unlawful Interferences with, Offshore Oil and Gas Installations, 1975-2010’ (2011) 5(5-6) Perspectives
on Terrorism 139.
54
See Appendix B.
55
On 13 September 1983, an underwater oil pipeline at Puerto Sandino in Nicaragua was blown up by a
special team allegedly from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) using underwater high explosives.
The same pipeline was blown up again on 14 October 1983: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep No 70, 14, 38;
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America)
(Oral Arguments) [1986] ICJ Rep No 70, 3, 21.
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important to note here that each category of offshore security threats has different
capabilities, motivations, strategies and tactics; and therefore presents a different degree
of risk to offshore petroleum installations.
Overall, attacks on and interferences with offshore petroleum installations have
generally increased in recent years. The majority of offshore security incidents have
occurred since the beginning of 2004.56 It appears that with the growing demand for
hydrocarbon resources, tight international energy markets and the rise in the number of
liberation movements, terrorist organisations, and insurgency groups, offshore
petroleum installations have become more justifiable and commonly selected targets.57
Accordingly, offshore petroleum security has become a significant concern for many
States.
2.3 The concept of ‘offshore petroleum security’

The term ‘offshore petroleum security’ is fairly vague and can have more than one
meaning, but this concept is inevitably linked to the concepts of ‘energy security’ and
‘maritime security’. To demonstrate the links between these concepts, it is first
necessary to define the terms ‘energy security’ and ‘maritime security’.58
‘Energy security’ is defined by the International Energy Agency (IEA) as ‘adequate,
affordable and reliable supplies of energy’.

59

Similarly, the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP) defines energy security as ‘the availability of energy
at all times in various forms, in sufficient quantities and at reasonable and/or affordable
prices’. 60 Schmid, in his analysis of the term ‘energy security’, argues that by
implication it also includes security of all infrastructure that ‘lie[s] between the point
energy is extracted and the consumer’ such as pipelines, refineries, and ships.61

56

In particular, 42 of 60 incidents (70 per cent) have occurred since 1 January 2004.
Alani, above n 39.
58
Compared to the difficulties with defining ‘terrorism’, these concepts are less controversial.
59
IEA, World Energy Outlook 2007 (2007) 160.
60
Alexander Barnes et al, ‘Energy Security’ in United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World
Energy Assessment: Energy and the Challenge of Sustainability (2000) 111, 112. In Australia, energy
security is defined as ‘the adequate, reliable and affordable supply of energy to support the functioning of
the economy and social development’, which is similar to both IEA’s and UNDP’s definitions: Australian
Government, Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism (DRET), National Energy Security
Assessment 2009 (2009) 5.
61
Alex Schmid, ‘Terrorism and Energy Security: Targeting Oil and Other Energy Sources and
Infrastructures’ in James Ellis (ed), Terrorism: What’s Coming – The Mutating Threat (2007) 28, 28–9.
Schmid further states that energy security ‘also refers to a complex set of inter-related political and
57
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In relation to ‘maritime security’, there is still an absence of a commonly accepted
definition.62 In fact, the term ‘maritime security’ can have different meanings depending
on who is using it or in what context it is being used.63 For example, Hawkes defines
maritime security from the shipping industry perspective as ‘those measures employed
by owners, operators, and administrators of vessels, port facilities, offshore installations,
and other marine organizations or establishments to protect against seizure, sabotage,
piracy, pilferage, annoyance or surprise’. 64 From a military perspective, maritime
security has traditionally been focused on defence and protection of the territorial
integrity of a State.65 Banlaoi argues that ‘the term maritime security encompasses such
a broad concept that a panoply of notions like maritime safety, port security, freedom of
navigation, … security from piracy attacks, and security from maritime terrorism can be
included as part of the concept of maritime security’.66
Rahman in his analysis of the concepts of maritime security has identified five
perspectives through which ‘maritime security’ may be viewed in a non-traditional (i.e.
non-strategic) sense, namely: security of the sea itself, ocean governance, maritime
border protection, military activities at sea, and security regulation of the maritime
transportation system.67 In this thesis, the concept of maritime security is used not as a

market-related issues that impact on the day-to-day global economic and political operating
environments’: at 30.
62
For a detailed discussion on the concept of ‘maritime security’ see Chris Rahman, ‘Concepts of
Maritime Security: A Strategic Perspective on Alternative Visions for Good Order and Security at Sea,
with Policy Implications for New Zealand’ (Discussion Paper 07/09, Centre for Strategic Studies: New
Zealand, July 2009). See also Natalie Klein, Joanna Mossop and Donald Rothwell, ‘Australia, New
Zealand and Maritime Security’ in Natalie Klein, Joanna Mossop and Donald Rothwell (eds), Maritime
Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand (Routledge, 2010)
1, 5–9; Rommel Banlaoi, ‘Maritime Security Outlook for Southeast Asia’ in Joshua Ho and Catherine
Raymond (eds), The Best of Times, the Worst of Times (World Scientific Publishing, 2005) 59, 59–60;
Peter Cozens, ‘Maritime Security and Oceans Policy’ in Natalie Klein, Joanna Mossop and Donald
Rothwell (eds), Maritime Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New
Zealand (Routledge, 2010) 155, 157.
63
Klein, Mossop and Rothwell, above n 62, 5.
64
Maximo Mejia Jr, ‘Maritime Gerrymandering: Dilemmas in Defining Piracy, Terrorism and Other Acts
of Maritime Violence’ (2003) 2 Journal of International Commercial Law 153, 155, citing Kenneth
Hawkes, Maritime Security (Cornell Maritime Press, 1989), cited in Natalie Klein, Joanna Mossop and
Donald Rothwell (eds), Maritime Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and
New Zealand (Routledge, 2010) 6.
65
See Klein, Mossop and Rothwell, above n 62, 5.
66
Banlaoi, above n 62, 59.
67
Rahman, above n 62, 31–42. Rahman acknowledges that these five perspectives ‘are arbitrary and
non‐exclusive: they are interrelated and overlap and, to a certain degree, represent different aspects of the
same problem – effective management of the oceans and good order upon them’: at 31.
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traditional ‘military-orientated’ notion, but as a much broader concept which includes
economic, political, and ecological dimensions.
The concepts of ‘energy security’ and ‘maritime security’ are interrelated. Bergin and
Bateman argue that energy security is closely related to and has significant implications
for maritime security, particularly in countries that are heavily reliant on domestic
offshore petroleum production. 68 Equally, maritime security can have significant
implications for energy security. According to Nincic, ‘[s]ince one-quarter to one-third
of the world’s oil and gas reserves are believed to lie offshore, and approximately twothirds of the world’s oil trade is transported by sea, the issue of energy security is to a
large extent one of maritime security’. 69 Similarly, Forbes has stated (specifically
referring to Australia) that ‘[i]n order to maintain energy security, Australia has three
concerns: security of offshore energy infrastructure, protection of Australian seaborne
energy flows; and protection of global energy flows’,70 demonstrating that there is a link
between energy security, maritime security and offshore petroleum security.
Furthermore, the fact that offshore oil and gas is an important aspect of national energy
security for several coastal States, 71 suggests that there is a link between energy
security, maritime security and offshore petroleum security.
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that ‘offshore petroleum security’ is part
of both ‘maritime security’ and ‘energy security’. Maritime security and energy security
are both much broader concepts than offshore petroleum security, but these three
concepts are closely related and they overlap. In this thesis, ‘offshore petroleum
security’ is used to refer to security of the offshore petroleum industry, and more
specifically to the protection and security of offshore petroleum installations from
various threats, attacks and unlawful interferences.

68

Anthony Bergin and Sam Bateman, ‘Future Unknown: The Terrorist Threat to Australian Maritime
Security’ (Strategy Report, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 2005) 32; Sam Bateman and
Anthony Bergin, ‘Sea Change: Advancing Australia’s Ocean Interests’ (Strategy Report, Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, March 2009) 36.
69
Donna Nincic, ‘Troubled Waters: Energy Security and Maritime Security’ in Gal Luft and Anne Korin
(eds), Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook (ABC-CLIO, 2009) 31,
31.
70
Andrew Forbes, ‘Australian Energy Security: The Benefits of Self Sufficiency’ (2008) 23 Papers in
Australian Maritime Affairs 11, 16.
71
See Rahman, above n 62, 9.
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2.4 Past and present perspectives on offshore petroleum security

Security of the offshore petroleum industry has been considered and debated for more
than two decades,72 and a small group of security experts and analysts has warned about
threats and vulnerabilities faced by offshore petroleum installations.73 In 1976, Denton
argued that ‘[o]ffshore energy assets are essentially unprotected and are vulnerable to
overt, clandestine, or covert attack’.74 He also noted that ‘[t]he question of responsibility
within the government for protection of offshore energy assets, specifically oil
production facilities, has not been resolved, although it has been raised periodically’.75
MacBain, a retired US Navy Commander, in 1980, wrote:
Even more tempting energy targets are offered by the 2,000 oil platforms and 7,000
miles of pipelines in the Gulf of Mexico. Many platforms are in remote locations,
unmanned and unvisited for days at a time, and, according to many experts, lacking
adequate protection against assault.76

The movie industry had also illustrated the security threats to offshore petroleum
installations. In the 1980 film, North Sea Hijack, 77 a group of terrorists posing as
reporters hijacked an offshore supply vessel, placed underwater explosives on two
offshore platforms in the North Sea and made a demand for ransom, in response to
which the British Government, reluctantly, sent a unique commando unit to stop them.78
Breemer pointed out in 1983 that those who were skeptical about the need for improved
offshore petroleum security measures often argued that there is no or very little

72

This issue, though, received little or no public attention.
Some of the earlier publications that discussed the issue of potential attacks on offshore petroleum
installations include Brian Jenkins et al, ‘A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks and Other Criminal Actions
Against Maritime Targets’ (Rand Paper Series, RAND Corporation, September 1983); Jan Breemer,
‘Offshore Energy Terrorism: Perspectives on a Problem’ (1983) 6 Terrorism 455; Robert Denton,
‘Protection of Offshore Energy Assets’ (1976) December Naval Engineers Journal 87; Robert Charm,
‘Terrorists See Offshore as Tempting Target’ (1983) January Offshore 62; John Ebersole, ‘International
Terrorism and the Defense of Offshore Facilities’ (1975) September US Naval Institute Proceedings 54;
Merle MacBain, ‘Will Terrorism Go to Sea?’ (1980) 23(1) Sea Power 15; Maynard Stephens, ‘The Oil
and Natural Gas Industries: A Potential Target of Terrorists’ in Robert Kupperman and Darrell Trent
(eds), Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response (Hoover Institution Press, 1979) 200; Christian Kessler,
‘Legal Issues in Protecting Offshore Structures’ (Professional Paper No 146, Center for Naval Analyses,
June 1976).
74
Denton, above n 73, 87.
75
Ibid 90.
76
MacBain, above n 73, 20.
77
North Sea Hijack (Directed by Andrew McLaglen, Cinema Seven Productions, 1980).
78
See The Internet Movie Database, North Sea Hijack <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0081809/> at 6 June
2010.
73
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evidence that ‘an acute threat of such incidents does, in fact, exist’.79 It appears that
prior to 2001, steps and even calls to enhance security arrangements of offshore
petroleum installations were generally seen as unwarranted in light of the lack of a
history of offshore attacks. This perception has now changed as a result of several
factors discussed in the next section (section 2.5).
For the past ten or so years the international community has been concerned about
security. The transport and energy sectors received the most political and public
attention, and have been at the centre of the international debate. Events such as the
attacks on USS Cole in October 2000 80 and MV Limburg in October 2002 81 were
significant and raised serious concerns about maritime security. However, pirate,
insurgent, terrorist and other forms of unlawful activities have taken place in the
maritime domain and against the petroleum industry, both before and since. 82 For
various reasons, the earlier attacks on maritime and offshore petroleum targets were of
little strategic and political importance and received only occasional or cursory
attention,83 perhaps with the exception of the attacks on Santa Maria in January 196184
and Achille Lauro in October 1985.85

79

Breemer, above n 73, 456.
On 12 October 2000, in Yemen, a small boat loaded with explosives rammed the US destroyer USS
Cole and blew up alongside it, killing 17 and injuring 39 sailors. Affiliates of Al-Qaeda were suspected of
and blamed for the attack: Cindy Combs and Martin Slann, Encyclopedia of Terrorism (Facts on File,
revised ed, 2007) 416.
81
On 6 October 2002, in Yemen, the French tanker MV Limburg, was attacked by an explosive-laden
boat and substantially damaged by the explosion. A Bulgarian crew member was killed by the explosion,
and Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack: Barry Rubin and Judith Rubin, Chronologies of
Modern Terrorism (M E Sharpe, 2008) 316; Shawn Woodford, ‘Al-Qaeda and Saudi Arabia: A
Chronology’ in Erich Marquardt (ed), Saudi Arabian Oil Facilities: The Achilles Heel of the Western
Economy (Jamestown Foundation, 2006) 35, 38.
82
See, eg, Jenkins et al, above n 73.
83
Tamara Shie, ‘Ports in a Storm? The Nexus Between Counterterrorism, Counterproliferation, and
Maritime Security in Southeast Asia’ (2004) 4(4) Issues & Insights 1, 8.
84
On 22 January 1961, the Portuguese cruise ship Santa Maria was seized by a group of rebels with a
goal to protest the dictatorship of Portugal’s Antonio Salazar. After the incident, this became headline
news around the world and the rebels surrendered. For further details about this incident see Dennis
Bryant, ‘Historical and Legal Aspects of Maritime Security’ (2004-2005) 17(1) University of San
Francisco Maritime Law Journal 1, 1–2; Samuel Menefee, ‘Piracy, Terrorism, and the Insurgent
Passenger: A Historical Perspective’ in Natalino Ronzitti (ed), Maritime Terrorism and International Law
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1990) 43, 56–8; Jenkins et al, above n 73, 7–8.
85
On 7 October 1985, four Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) terrorists hijacked the Italian cruise liner,
Achille Lauro, in the Mediterranean, with 80 passengers and 320 crew members aboard. The hijackers
had killed one American passenger and subsequently surrendered to Egyptian authorities. The airplane
chartered by the Palestinians to flee Egypt was intercepted by US warplanes and forced to land in Italy,
where the hijackers were arrested by the Italian authorities and subsequently tried. The incident raised a
number of legal questions and generated a great deal of public and political attention. As a result, the
80
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2.5 Global concerns about offshore petroleum security

The tightening petroleum market, high oil prices, instability in some petroleum
producing States, fears of a scramble for oil and gas resources, perceived future
shortages of petroleum supplies, geopolitical challenges, as well as the threat of
contemporary terrorism have contributed to a renewed focus on energy security in
recent years. The offshore petroleum industry has become of greater strategic and
economic importance, 86 particularly in light of ‘current and forecast pressures in the
international energy situation’.87
Offshore petroleum installations are considered to be elements of critical national
infrastructure in many countries, 88 but at the same time they are vulnerable and
attractive targets for attacks. 89 Factors that make offshore petroleum installations
attractive as potential targets are analysed in Chapter 3. They range from lax security
arrangements to the ability to cause petroleum price fluctuations and supply shortages.
The offshore petroleum industry and governments are increasingly concerned about
offshore petroleum security. These concerns have been hyped by the offshore disasters
that occurred in the past few years.90
Violence at sea is very common today, 91 and attacks involving offshore petroleum
installations have also become more common. Risks associated with security of
international community has decided to adopt a convention on ‘maritime terrorism’, which is discussed in
Chapter 5. See Natalino Ronzitti (ed), Maritime Terrorism and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff,
1990) vii. See also Richard Shaw, ‘News from IMO: Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the SUA
Convention and Protocol’ (2005) 3 CMI Newsletter 8, 8.
86
Australian Government, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), Securing Australia’s
Energy Future (2004) 116–17; Australian Government, Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources
(DITR), Offshore Petroleum Exploration and Development Fact Sheet (2006)
<http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrinternet/cmscontent.cfm?objectID=5DC172AA-9E42-4FE9AB03F0C718B453A5> at 26 July 2006.
87
Martin Tsamenyi and Kwame Mfodwo, ‘Developing Capacity for Addressing Safety, Security and
Marine Pollution Concerns Arising from the Oil and Gas Industry’ (Paper presented at the National
Conference on Positioning the Transport Sector for the Successful Exploration of Ghana’s Oil & Gas,
Accra, 15 July 2009) 3.
88
For example, in Australia, ‘critical infrastructure’ is defined as those physical facilities, supply chains,
information technologies and communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered
unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact on the social or economic wellbeing of the
nation, or affect Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security. See
Australian Government, Attorney-General’s Department (AGD), National Guidelines for Protecting
Critical Infrastructure from Terrorism Fact Sheet (2006).
89
DOTARS, above n 11.
90
Such as the Usumacinta and Kab-101 accident in the Gulf of Mexico in 2007, the Montara incident in
the Timor Sea in 2009, the Deepwater Horizon explosion in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, and the
sinking of Aban Pearl in the Caribbean Sea in May 2010.
91
Sam Bateman, ‘Securing Australia’s Maritime Approaches’ (2007) 3 Security Challenges 109, 119.
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offshore petroleum installations should not be overlooked. In today’s volatile petroleum
security environment more attention should be paid to ‘violent non-State actors’ who
are able to leverage oil market dynamics and use it as a global public relations tool by
targeting petroleum installations.92 As pointed out by Giroux and Hilpert:
Capitalizing on modern energy security and crude oil market characteristics, today’s
[violent non-State actors] operating in oil and gas producing and/or transit regions are
quickly learning that attacks aimed at [energy infrastructure] can not only be an
effective way to target state and international energy assets, cause economic damages,
and garner broad media attention, but also a way to effect global turbulence in the form
of oil market volatility. Hence, these micro-actors are functioning in an environment
that enables them to become global players.93

Security of the offshore petroleum industry can have significant implications for
national security and economic wellbeing of many States, especially major petroleum
producing and consuming States, as well as for the wider international community.94
Any major disruptions in offshore petroleum supplies or physical damage to offshore
petroleum installations caused by a terrorist act or other forms of violence may have
significant economic, social, political and environmental impacts.95 However, due to the
large number of offshore petroleum installations and the variety of sources of attacks,
the protection of offshore installations is an exceptionally challenging task. Apart from
physical security measures, adequate international rules and national legislative
frameworks for offshore petroleum security are also important.
2.6 International legal responses

Several international legal instruments that pertain to the security of offshore petroleum
installations have already been in place for some time including the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC),96 the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 (1988 SUA

92

Giroux and Hilpert, above n 45.
Ibid.
94
Tsamenyi and Mfodwo, above n 87, 3. See also DOTARS, above n 11.
95
DITR, above n 86. See also DOTARS, Offshore Security Assessment Guidance Paper (2005).
96
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833
UNTS 3, (entered into force 16 November 1994) (‘LOSC’).
93
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Convention)97 and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf 1988 (1988 SUA Protocol).98
In the wake of terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11
September 2001 (9/11), new regulatory measures have been adopted by the
international community to enhance maritime security. They include the International
Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code),99 the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 2005 (2005 SUA
Convention)100 and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf 2005 (2005 SUA Platforms
Protocol). 101 These regulatory measures represent a positive step towards enhancing
maritime security and, consequently, enhancing the security of offshore petroleum
installations. The critical question addressed in this thesis is how effective these legal
instruments are in ensuring the security of offshore petroleum installations. Further
regulatory action may be needed to improve the international legal framework for the
protection and security of offshore petroleum installations.

3. Thesis Aims
The aims of the thesis are to: a) identify past attacks on and interferences with offshore
petroleum installations; b) identify and assess security threats to offshore petroleum
installations and analyse the nature of those threats; c) examine factors that make
offshore petroleum installations attractive targets; and d) analyse the international legal
framework for offshore petroleum security. In other words, the thesis aims to answer
three key questions: 1) who attacks offshore petroleum installations? 2) why are

97

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988,
opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 201 (entered into force 1 March 1992) (‘1988 SUA
Convention’).
98
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the
Continental Shelf 1988, opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 304 (entered into force 1
March 1992) (‘1988 SUA Protocol’).
99
Amendments to the Annex to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, opened for
signature 12 December 2002, [2003] ATNIF 11 (entered into force 1 July 2004), annex (International
Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities) (‘ISPS Code’).
100
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 2005,
opened for signature 14 February 2006, IMO Doc LEG/CONF.15/21 (entered into force 28 July 2010)
(‘2005 SUA Convention’).
101
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the
Continental Shelf 2005, opened for signature 14 February 2006, IMO Doc LEG/CONF.15/22 (entered
into force 28 July 2010) (‘2005 SUA Platforms Protocol’).
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offshore petroleum installations attacked? and 3) how does the international law address
the protection and security of offshore petroleum installations?

4. Thesis Scope
Against the background presented above, this thesis analyses the global offshore
petroleum security environment and the international regulatory framework for the
protection and security of offshore petroleum installations.
The analysis of the global offshore petroleum security environment includes
examination of security threats faced by offshore petroleum installations, attractiveness
of offshore petroleum installations as potential targets including the vulnerabilities of
offshore petroleum installations, scenarios of offshore attacks, and potential impacts
that can result from attacks on offshore installations.
Security of offshore petroleum installations is part of maritime security;102 therefore it is
not adequate to simply analyse, in isolation, the international regulatory framework for
the protection and security of offshore petroleum installations without analysing aspects
of the general maritime security regulatory framework. Accordingly, the relevant
international legal instruments and initiatives addressing maritime security will be
discussed in the context of the security of offshore petroleum installations. The analysis
of the international regulatory framework includes the analysis of the legal status of
offshore petroleum installations in international law followed by an examination of
international legal instruments pertaining to maritime security adopted prior to 9/11and
regulatory maritime security measures adopted after 9/11.

5. Thesis Limitations
This thesis focuses only on the security of offshore petroleum installations. Offshore
supply and support vessels, tankers, and offshore pipelines are afforded marginal
consideration in this thesis because they are important components of the offshore
petroleum industry and their security can have implications for the security of offshore
installations. Similarly, examples of attacks and security incidents primarily focus on

102

For example, ships can be used in attacks on offshore petroleum installations.
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those involving offshore petroleum installations but, in some instances, attacks on ships
and onshore petroleum facilities are also discussed where appropriate.103
Although inter-State hostilities are identified and discussed in Chapter 2 as one of the
security threats to offshore petroleum installations, the regulatory aspects addressing
this threat will not be examined in the thesis. The reason is that the international
regulatory framework for the protection and security of offshore petroleum installations
focuses on non-State actors while hostile actions of States are regulated by distinct
international legal rules such as the Charter of the United Nations,104 and other legal
instruments and rules that deal with issues such as armed conflict and self-defence.
The regulatory framework for offshore pipelines is not analysed because pipelines are
generally treated in international law in the same manner as submarine cables, rather
than being associated with offshore installations. 105 Although this thesis inevitably
discusses certain aspects of national regulatory frameworks of some States, this is not
done in detail and only where relevant and necessary to illustrate State practice in
relation to implementation and treatment of certain aspects relating to offshore
petroleum security regulation.106

6. Approach and Methodology
The principal research method used in this thesis is library research which comprises the
identification, collection, review, and assessment of primary and secondary literature.
The primary resources relied on include international conventions and other legal
instruments, international case law, and official reports and documents of international
organisations, national government agencies and industry associations. Secondary
sources include books, articles published in international journals in both print and
electronic forms, newspaper articles, newsletters, press releases, and databases as well
as other selected papers available on the internet.
103

Consideration of attacks on onshore petroleum infrastructure is important for the purposes of better
understanding the reasons for attacking petroleum installations and potential consequences that can be
generated by such attacks. Attacks on other maritime targets such as ships are considered where it is
necessary to analyse tactics and capabilities of adversaries or scenarios of attacks.
104
Charter of the United Nations, adopted 26 June 1945, 59 Stat 1031 (entered into force 24 October
1945).
105
See Stuart Kaye, ‘International Measures to Protect Oil Platforms, Pipelines, and Submarine Cables
from Attack’ (2007) 31(2) Tulane Maritime Law Journal 377, 379.
106
For example, these can include issues such as State practice in treating offshore installations as
offshore ports or State practice with respect to the establishment of safety zones around offshore facilities.
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6.1 Data collection, interpretation and reliability

Data on incidents and past attacks involving the petroleum and maritime industries
(particularly data of attacks involving offshore petroleum installations) was collected
from both primary and secondary sources including publicly available historical,
statistical and other data from various databases, official documents and reports of
national and international governmental and non-governmental organisations.107
One difficulty with data interpretation relates to problems with definitions of concepts
such as ‘piracy’ and ‘terrorism’ because there are many different definitions of these
activities (as discussed in Chapter 2 below).108 In particular, the difficulty in analysing
attacks on and threats to petroleum infrastructure relates to the fact that a number of the
‘terrorist incidents’ listed in various databases and other sources are committed by
indeterminate extremists, individual fanatics, insurgents, and tribal groups, and some
attacks are attributed to other unknown groups. 109 It has been suggested that any
statistics which rely heavily on terrorism databases are subject to uncertainty.110
Another issue with data interpretation is that databases and reports usually employ
different parameters and criteria for inclusion in compiling their statistics. As noted by
Chew, even when two independent organisations produce the same totals, ‘the
individual parameters that contribute to that final figure are likely to be quite
different’.111 Gaibulloev and Sandler suggest that different databases rely on different
sources and ‘judgment calls’ and that an event listed in one database, may or may not be
107

The sources include the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships annual and quarterly reports; International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC) circulars titled Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; reports
such as Country Reports on Terrorism and Patterns of Global Terrorism which are produced annually by
the US Department of State; Worldwide Threat to Shipping Reports produced by the US Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI); Anti-Shipping Activity Messages published by the Federation of American Scientists
(FAS); A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks and Other Criminal Actions Against Maritime Targets
published by RAND Corporation; reports based on the MIPT database; Reports on Terrorism published
by the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCC); the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS)
database maintained by the NCC; the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, as well as several studies undertaken
by academics and security analysts such as a 2005 study of the Institute for Information Infrastructure
Protection (IIIP) titled Trends for Oil and Gas Terrorist Attacks.
108
The concepts such as piracy, terrorism and insurgency are analysed in Chapter 2.
109
Daniel Masters, ‘The Origin of Terrorist Threats: Religious, Separatist, or Something Else?’ (2008)
20(3) Terrorism and Political Violence 396, 407.
110
Lia and Kjok argue, in their commentary on patters of petroleum terrorism, that this is ‘partly because
of the absence of a generally accepted definition of terrorism, and partly because different databases give
unequal coverage of various geographical areas’: Lia and Kjok, above n 38, 101.
111
Frederick Chew, ‘Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Regional Interests’ [2005] Geddes Papers 73, 74.

20

Chapter 1

Mikhail Kashubsky

listed in other databases. 112 For instance, some databases and chronologies list only
successful attacks and exclude attempted or planned attacks. Some sources include only
significant attacks (usually measured in terms of human casualties) while many other
minor attacks are not included.
Overall, the quality, accuracy, depth and volume of open source reporting can vary
greatly from country to country, from agency to agency, and from database to database.
Individual databases and chronologies of terrorist attacks (on their own) do not
necessarily provide a reliable base, especially for quantitative analysis, and the accuracy
of information contained in databases is also questionable. Sometimes inconsistent and
contradicting facts are reported. For example, some incidents have been reported as
occurring at different times or with differing facts, which makes it hard to interpret the
data and adds to the ambiguity of information. The types of offshore installations
attacked as well as the perpetrators who carried out attacks and the methods of attacks
are often not specified.
Underreporting is also a problem that impacts on reliability and accuracy of data. It is
possible that not all security incidents are reported by petroleum companies and some
attacks may have been unreported, which hides the full extent of the offshore petroleum
security problem. Information in most databases is often incomplete and sometimes not
all details of attacks are reported. It is possible that oil companies attempt to conceal or
at least downplay some minor terrorist incidents against their installations for reasons
such as fear of losing market confidence or raising insurance premiums. Vested interests
could cause agencies (and companies) to skew data depending on the nature of an
agency.113 Accordingly, the exact number of attacks on and interferences with offshore
petroleum installations is unknown.

7. Thesis Structure
The thesis consists of seven chapters. This introductory chapter (Chapter 1) provides an
overview of the thesis and explains how it is developed in the succeeding chapters. It
provides a background to violence associated with petroleum installations, explains the
112

Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler, ‘The Impact of Terrorism and Conflicts on Growth in Asia,
1970-2004’ (Discussion Paper No 113, Asian Development Bank Institute, 2008) 8.
113
Chew, above n 111, 74. See also Torbjorn Thedeen, ‘Setting the Stage: The Vulnerability of Critical
Infrastructures’ in Konstantin Frolov and Gregory Baecher (eds), Protection of Civilian Infrastructure
from Acts of Terrorism (Springer, 2006) 33, 40.
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concept of ‘offshore petroleum security’, illustrates past and present perspectives on
offshore petroleum security, and highlights the global concern about offshore petroleum
security. It also outlines the aims, scope, structure, and significance of the thesis, and
identifies some issues relating to research methodology and data collection.
Chapter 2 examines various types of security threats to offshore petroleum installations
and the nature of those threats. It categorises threats and assesses motivations and
objectives, offshore capabilities and tactics of offshore security threats as well as
geographical and other enabling factors relating to each threat category. Security threats
are then rated, based on the relative degree of risk they pose to the security of offshore
petroleum installations. Links and relationships between different categories of offshore
security threats are also briefly addressed in this chapter.
Chapter 3 analyses the attractiveness of offshore petroleum installations as potential
targets. The analysis includes examination of vulnerabilities of offshore petroleum
installations to deliberate attacks, potential impacts of attacks on offshore installations
and other characteristics of offshore petroleum installations that make them attractive
targets. The chapter also includes the analysis of possible offshore attack scenarios and
addresses some aspects relating to the risk assessment in the offshore and maritime
security context.
Chapter 4 examines the legal status of offshore petroleum installations in international
law. In particular, the chapter analyses whether offshore installations can be treated as
ships in certain contexts and whether offshore installations can be treated as ports. The
analysis is based on examination of approaches adopted in various international
conventions and legal instruments, and State practice concerning the legal status and
treatment of offshore petroleum installations as ships and ports. Various types of
offshore petroleum installations and their characteristics are also examined in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 focuses on the international regulatory framework for offshore petroleum
security prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. The chapter examines provisions of
international legal instruments that pertain to security of offshore petroleum
installations. The chapter also examines jurisdictional aspects, and the rights and
responsibilities of coastal, flag and other States in the various maritime zones of
jurisdiction in the context of offshore petroleum security.
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Chapter 6 analyses the international legal framework for maritime security and offshore
petroleum security after 9/11. In particular, the chapter examines regulatory measures to
enhance maritime security adopted after 9/11 and analyses to what extent these new
maritime security measures apply to offshore petroleum installations.
The final chapter, Chapter 7, summarises what has been addressed in the previous
chapters and highlights the principal findings of the study. It provides several specific
suggestions for improvement of the international regulatory framework for offshore
petroleum security. Finally, the chapter identifies several areas for further research.

8. Significance of the Research
This thesis is significant for two main reasons. First, in light of the world’s increasing
dependence on offshore petroleum resources and the apparent growing number of
attacks directed against offshore petroleum installations, this thesis provides a
comprehensive assessment of the global offshore petroleum security landscape
including an extensive chronology of attacks on offshore petroleum installations,
analysis of security threats faced by offshore petroleum installations, and the
attractiveness of offshore petroleum installations as potential targets. The thesis
examines the international regulatory framework for offshore petroleum security and
provides several specific suggestions for improvement in the current international
regulatory framework. The conclusions drawn from the analysis provide useful lessons
for the international community and individual States with significant offshore
petroleum resources and operations. It may assist the international community, the
offshore industry and policy makers in developing stronger international and national
regulatory frameworks for the protection and security of offshore petroleum
installations.
Second, much of the academic literature in this area has so far focused on maritime
security generally. Whilst there are some publications that deal with security of the
offshore petroleum industry,114 there is still a gap in the literature on the topic of the
security of offshore petroleum installations. This thesis comprehensively examines the
global offshore petroleum security environment and the international legal framework

114

See, eg, Adams, above n 1; Lia and Kjok, above n 38; Kaye, above n 105; Hossein Esmaeili, The
Legal Regime of Offshore Oil Rigs in International Law (Ashgate Dartmouth, 2001).
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for the protection and security of offshore petroleum installations. To this end, the thesis
progresses current knowledge beyond the generalist views which permeate the literature
by providing a more specific and in-depth analysis of this topic.
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CHAPTER 2
OFFSHORE SECURITY THREATS AND THEIR NATURE
1. Introduction
Safeguarding offshore petroleum installations from any external and internal threats has
become one of the top priorities of national security of many States, especially those
with significant offshore oil and gas operations that are vital to their national economic
wellbeing.1 As mentioned in the introductory chapter, offshore petroleum exploration,
production and export installations are considered to be part of critical national
infrastructure of many petroleum producing States. These critical facilities are at risk
from a variety of threats. In order to devise appropriate security strategies and the
regulatory framework, and to provide adequate protection for the offshore petroleum
installations, key decision-makers must have a clear understanding of the threats faced
by offshore installations and their vulnerabilities. Accordingly, a detailed analysis of the
actual and potential threats is necessary, and a detailed study of offshore security threats
is the focus of this chapter.2 The aim is to identify the types of offshore security threats,
categorise them, develop and adopt a consistent approach for the analysis of their
nature, and consider their implications for security of offshore petroleum installations.
First, the term ‘offshore security threat’ is defined. Security threats to offshore
petroleum installations are then identified and categorised. Next, the case is made for
the approach to risk analysis, and the framework for the analysis of the nature of
different categories of threats is formulated. In doing so, a workable set of factors is
selected against which different categories of security threats can be assessed and
compared. Specific examples of unlawful interferences, security incidents and past
attacks on petroleum installations are provided throughout the chapter to support the

1

Jianxiang Bi, ‘The Quest for the Oil and Gas Infrastructure Protection in Central Asia: Time Bombs and
Policy Options’ (Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection Policy Research Series No 2-2006, Canadian
Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies, March 2006); Australian Government, Department of
Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS), Offshore Oil & Gas Risk Context Statement (2005) 11.
2
An understanding of the vulnerabilities of offshore petroleum installations and the potential
consequences of attacks on offshore installations is also important, but these aspects will be examined in
Chapter 3.
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analysis.3 In the last part of the chapter, each category of offshore security threats is
rated, based on the degree of risk they pose to offshore petroleum installations.

2. Offshore Security Threats and Their Nature
The term ‘threat’ can be defined as ‘the intention and capability of an adversary to
undertake actions that would be detrimental to valued assets’.4 It can also be defined as
‘any indication, circumstance, or event with the potential to cause loss of, or damage to
an asset’.5 Offshore security threats are those threats that pose a risk to operations of
offshore petroleum installations. Any unlawful interference with offshore petroleum
operations or an act of violence directed towards offshore installations is considered an
‘offshore security threat’ in this thesis. The petroleum industry has always faced a range
of threats from a number of sources.6 Most of the security threats to offshore petroleum
installations today are ‘asymmetric threats’.7
2.1 Different types and categories of offshore security threats

Offshore security threats may be classified in several ways based on different criteria.
One such classification is based on the geographical criterion, such as local or global,
national or transnational. Offshore security threats may be classified as external or
internal or combined (i.e. external and internal).8 The attacks may come from various
sources: individuals or groups, internal or external, or a combination of both; for
instance, when insiders are colluding with external adversaries. Offshore security
threats can also be categorised as military or non-military, State actors or non-State
3

The examples of attacks and security incidents will be mainly those involving offshore petroleum
installations, but some examples of attacks on onshore petroleum installations and attacks involving ships
will also be provided.
4
American Petroleum Institute (API), Security Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum
and Petrochemical Industries (2nd ed, 2004) 5.
5
Ibid.
6
Amanda East and Bill Bailey, Australia’s Oil Refinery Industry – Importance, Threats, and Emergency
Response (2008) Security Management, 3
<http://www.securitymanagement.com.au/content/file/East+Bailey_Oil%20refiningIndustry_ECU.pdf >
at 30 January 2009.
7
There are many different definitions of the term ‘asymmetric threat’, but Charles Primmerman argues
that an asymmetric threat must satisfy three criteria: ‘First it must involve a weapon, tactic, or strategy
that a state or non-state enemy both could and would use against [a given country] ... Second, it must
involve a weapon, tactic or strategy that [a given country] would not employ … Third, it must involve a
weapon, tactic, or strategy that, if not countered, could have serious consequences’: Charles Primmerman,
Thoughts on the Meaning of “Asymmetric Threats” (2006) 5.
8
This is just one of several ways to categorise offshore security threats. See S Bajpai and Jai Gupta,
‘Securing Oil and Gas Infrastructure’ (2007) 55 Journal of Petroleum Science and Engineering 174, 174.
See also Philippe Bouvier, Oil & Gas Industry – Towards Global Security: A Holistic Security Risk
Management Approach (Thales White Paper, 2007) 3.
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actors.9 Reports from international organisations and government agencies confirm that
various threat categories target petroleum installations.10 In the US National Strategy for
Maritime Security, maritime threats are grouped into four categories namely nationStates, terrorists, transnational criminals and pirates.11 The types of threats faced by the
offshore petroleum industry are similar to those the maritime industry faces, largely
because of the maritime nature of the offshore petroleum industry. However, oil and gas
companies are now also facing new unconventional types of threats,12 such as cyber
threats.
In assessing the offshore petroleum threat environment it is important to consider all
types of offshore security threats (actual and potential, real and perceived). 13 The
analysis of security incidents involving offshore petroleum installations has revealed
that the attacks on and interferences with offshore installations have been committed by
various types of perpetrators. 14 In this thesis, security threats faced by offshore
petroleum installations are grouped into the following eight categories based on the type
of activity: 1) piracy, 2) terrorism, 3) insurgency, 4) organised crime, 5) vandalism, 6)
civil protest, 7) internal sabotage, and 8) inter-State hostilities. It should be noted that
some of these categories may overlap; therefore, relationship and possible cooperation
between different categories of threats are mentioned where relevant.
2.2 Different degree of risk posed by different threats

Each category of offshore security threats has different capabilities, motivations,
strategies and tactics; and therefore presents a different degree of risk to offshore

9

Some writers suggest that sources of threats can be economic, physical and environmental. See, eg,
Fraryal Leghari, ‘Proposed Gulf-Asian Energy Pipeline Grid: Security Implications’ (2007) 6 Security &
Terrorism Research Bulletin 16; Frank Umbach, ‘Global Energy Supply and Geopolitical Challenges’ in
Francois Godement, Francoise Nicolas and Taizo Yakushiji (eds), Asia and Europe: Cooperating for
Energy Security (2004).
10
Bouvier, above n 8, 3.
11
The document also acknowledges that a variety of threats to the maritime domain continues to grow in
number and capability: United States (US) Government, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), The
National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005) 3.
12
Bouvier, above n 8, 3.
13
DOTARS, Offshore Security Assessment Guidance Paper (2005) 14. See also Paul Parfomak and John
Frittelli, ‘Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attack and Protection Priorities’ (Congressional Research
Service Report for Congress, US Congress, 2007) 2.
14
These include terrorists, insurgents, pirates, criminal syndicates, environmental activists, anti-oil
activists and other protesters, hostile nation-States, and sometimes unknown perpetrators. See Appendix
B for chronology of attacks on and interferences with offshore oil and gas installations. See also Mikhail
Kashubsky, ‘A Chronology of Attacks on and Unlawful Interferences with, Offshore Oil and Gas
Installations, 1975-2010’ (2011) 5(5-6) Perspectives on Terrorism 139.
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petroleum installations. Accordingly, it is necessary to determine the level of risk posed
by each category of offshore security threat. In the security context, risk can be
expressed in terms of a combination of ‘threat’ and ‘harm’, which is a simple approach
that requires examination of only two factors, but the linkage between the level of threat
and harm is not necessarily emphasised or direct. 15 Risk can be defined as ‘an
expression of the likelihood that a defined threat will target and successfully attack a
specific security vulnerability of a particular target or combination of targets to cause a
given set of consequences’. 16 It is a measurement of two factors: likelihood of a
successful attack against a target (i.e. probability) and potential consequences of a
successful attack against a target (i.e. gravity).17 In other words, risk is a combination of
the probability of an event occurring and the gravity of its consequences. For example,
an event may have a high likelihood of occurring but may be of insignificant
consequence.
2.3 Framework for assessment of offshore security threats

Having categorised different threats in section 2.1 above, it is now necessary to adopt a
framework for the analysis of security threats and select a set of factors against which
each category of threats can be examined. As argued by Hansen, ‘[i]n understanding
maritime security threats from groups conducting unlawful acts, it is important to
understand their motivation, organizational structure and tactics’.18 The key challenge in
determining the likelihood and potential gravity of an attack is ‘reducing uncertainty
about specific types of attacks and potential attackers’.19
With proper understanding and knowledge of various threat groups, the dangers they
represent, their goals, intentions, offshore capabilities, opportunities and possible
actions, appropriate protection measures and risk management strategies can be

15

Carl Gibson et al, Security Risk Management (Standards Australia, 2006) 166.
API, above n 4, 3; API, Security Guidelines for the Petroleum Industry (3rd ed, 2005) 20, citing
American Institute of Chemical Engineers Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Managing
and Analyzing the Security Vulnerabilities of Fixed Chemical Sites (2002).
17
API, above n 4, 3. See also DOTARS, above n 1, 22.
18
Hans Tino Hansen, ‘Distinctions in the Finer Shades of Gray: The “Four Circles Model” for Maritime
Security Threat Assessment’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds), Lloyd’s MIU
Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2008) 73, 75. Hansen further suggests that the significance
of the distinction and interrelationship between different threats is important ‘from the perspective of
industries, governments, and international organizations that confront these groups’: at 82.
19
Parfomak and Frittelli, above 13, 24.
16
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adopted.20 In this chapter, each of the eight categories of threats identified in section 2.1
above will be examined and assessed against the following set of factors: a)
geographical and other enabling factors, b) motivations and objectives, and c) offshore
capabilities and tactics. These factors will now be briefly discussed to demonstrate why
they are important in assessing offshore security threats.
2.3.1 Geography and enabling factors

Geographical considerations are relevant to the assessment of security threats and these
factors should be taken into account. 21 The security environment of the petroleum
industry is largely dependent on the overall security and stability of a given State or
region. Therefore, security of petroleum installations should not be considered in
isolation from the security and political environment of that State or region.22 Attacks
on petroleum installations occur in many countries, but petroleum companies face
different security risks depending on the region they operate in. 23 For example, oil
companies that operate in high security risk areas such as conflict zones, and those that
operate in economically and politically unstable countries are always at a higher risk of
attack.24 In addition, some types of security threats, such as piracy, are limited only to
certain geographical areas.25 Therefore, geography and other enabling factors, such as

20

See, eg, Tanner Campbell and Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Maritime Terrorism, Piracy and Crime’ in Rohan
Gunaratna (ed), Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific: Threat and Response (2003) 70, 86; Torbjorn Thedeen,
‘Setting the Stage: The Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructures’ in Konstantin Frolov and Gregory
Baecher (eds), Protection of Civilian Infrastructure from Acts of Terrorism (Springer, 2006) 33, 35.
21
See Martin Tsamenyi and Kwame Mfodwo, ‘Developing Capacity for Addressing Safety, Security and
Marine Pollution Concerns Arising from the Oil and Gas Industry’ (Paper presented at the National
Conference on Positioning the Transport Sector for the Successful Exploration of Ghana’s Oil & Gas,
Accra, 15 July 2009) 12.
22
Mustafa Alani and Nicole Stracke, ‘Insurgent Attacks on Iraq’s Oil Sector’ (2007) 6 Security &
Terrorism Research Bulletin 38, 41.
23
For example, security challenges faced by petroleum companies in economically and politically
unstable countries including countries in armed conflict (i.e. high-risk areas) are different from those
faced by petroleum companies in economically and politically stable countries including countries at
peace (i.e. low-risk areas). See Mark Lindsay, ‘The Security Threat to Oil Companies In and Out of
Conflict Zones’ (2005) 3(2) Exploration and Production: The Oil and Gas Review
<http://www.touchoilandgas.com/security-threat-companies-conflict-a688-1.html> at 30 October 2008.
See also Martin Rudner, ‘Protecting Canada’s Energy Infrastructure Against Terrorism: Mapping a
Proactive Strategy’ (Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection Policy Research Series No 1-2007-2008,
Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies, March 2008) 4.
24
Lindsay, above n 23.
25
For example, Murphy argues that when considering threats such as piracy and maritime terrorism ‘the
most important thing to understand is what is happening locally and regionally’: Martin Murphy, Small
Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World (Hurst & Co,
2009) 65.
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the presence of armed conflict, are relevant for the purposes of assessing security threats
to offshore petroleum installations.26
2.3.2 Motivations and objectives

Motivations for violent actions against offshore petroleum installations vary. Attacks on
and unlawful interferences with offshore installations can be carried out for political,
religious, financial, ideological or other reasons.27 Perpetrators do not always state their
intentions and objectives, and it may be difficult to understand their motives. Some of
the most common motives for attacking and interfering with offshore installations
include achieving resource control and fairer allocation of petroleum revenues, such as
in the case of attacks by insurgents in Nigeria,28 raising the awareness of pollution, such
as in the case of actions by Greenpeace,29 financial gain, for example, in the case of
piracy, and causing disruptions of petroleum supplies and oil price fluctuations.30 For
example, if financial gain is the primary objective of the attackers, they may seek to
carry out attacks with minimal damage to offshore installations and avoid unnecessary
human casualties.31 Therefore, a general understanding of motivations of the attackers is
important in analysing offshore security threats.

26

However, al-Shishani argues that ‘the risk of targeting oil interests is not confined to certain
geographical locations, as it is associated with a strategy of opening “new fronts”’: Murad al-Shishani,
‘Al Qaeda & Oil Facilities in the Midst of the Global Economic Crisis’ (2009) April Journal of Energy
Security <http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=190:al-qaeda-aampoil-facilities-in-the-midst-of-the-global-economic-crisis&catid=94:0409content&Itemid=342> at 9 July
2009.
27
Bajpai and Gupta, above n 8, 175.
28
For example, between 2006 and 2010, the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND)
insurgency group carried out at least thirteen attacks on offshore petroleum installations in the Niger
Delta region of Nigeria as part of their campaign against the petroleum industry to achieve fair
distribution of petroleum profits and compensation from oil companies. See generally Michael Watts
(ed), Curse of the Black Gold: 50 Years of Oil in Niger Delta (Powerhouse Books, 2008); Mikhail
Kashubsky, ‘Offshore Energy Force Majeure: Nigeria’s Local Problem with Global Consequences’
(2008) 160 Maritime Studies 20; Peter Maass, Crude World: The Violent Twilight of Oil (Vintage Books,
2009) 53–80. For examples of attacks on offshore petroleum installations by MEND see Appendix B.
29
For example, on 30 April 1995, Greenpeace activists boarded Shell’s Brent Spar floating offshore oil
storage platform in the North Sea and occupied it for more than three weeks, ‘as part of an ongoing
campaign to stop ocean dumping’, which prevented the company from carrying out decommissioning
operations: Greenpeace, The Brent Spar (21 June 2007)
<http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/history/the-brent-spar/> at 8 July 2010. For other
examples of interferences of environmental activists with offshore installations see Appendix B.
30
See, eg, Brynjar Lia and Ashild Kjok, ‘Energy Supply as Terrorist Targets? Patterns of “Petroleum
Terrorism” 1968-99’ in Daniel Heradstveit and Helge Hveem (eds), Oil in the Gulf: Obstacles to
Democracy and Development (Ashgate, 2004) 100, 117; John Thackrah, Dictionary of Terrorism
(Routledge, 2nd ed, 2004) 166.
31
See, eg, Parfomak and Frittelli, above n 13, 3.
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2.3.3 Capabilities and tactics

Capabilities and tactics of perpetrators vary. Offshore capabilities of perpetrators have a
bearing on the types of attacks they might attempt. 32 Attacking some offshore
installations can be quite complex requiring extensive offshore capabilities, planning
and preparation. Some adversaries have well-developed offshore attack capabilities
using a variety of methods and means including various kinds of weapons ranging from
pistols to rocket-propelled grenades to improvised explosives devices, sophisticated
equipment including high-speed boats and navigational tools.33 For example, a group of
insurgents with experience and training in attack tactics, access to advanced equipment
and weapons may mount an entirely different type of attack against the same offshore
petroleum installation than a group of environmental activists who do not necessarily
have specialised training or access to advanced equipment.
Tactics used by various perpetrators include bomb threats and threats of attacks,
unauthorised boarding and armed intrusion of offshore installations, abduction of
workers, hostage-taking, and the use of explosives and bombings of offshore
installations. The most common tactic appears to be armed intrusion and abduction of
offshore workers.34 It has been suggested that the future attack tactics may include using
ships as weapons to ram offshore installations and conducting underwater attacks. 35
Different threat groups may employ different attack tactics. For example, an organised
criminal group will not necessarily use explosives to attack an offshore installation, but
may simply make a threat of attack to extort money from a company that operates the
installation. Accordingly, in assessing offshore security threats, it is important to have
an understanding of offshore capabilities and tactics of different categories of threats.
It was demonstrated in this section that motivations, capabilities, and tactics of
perpetrators as well as geographical factors are important for the analysis of offshore
security threats and assessment of the degree of risk that threats pose to offshore
installations. In the following part of the analysis (sections 2.4 to 2.11 below) each of
the eight categories of offshore security threats identified above (namely: piracy,
terrorism, insurgency, organised crime, vandalism, civil protest, internal sabotage, and
32

Parfomak and Frittelli, above n 13, 2.
DHS, above n 11, 4.
34
Kashubsky, above n 14, 140. See also Appendix B for details of attacks on offshore petroleum
installations.
35
Bouvier, above n 8, 3.
33
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inter-State hostilities) will be examined in more detail including their motivations,
capabilities, tactics and relevant geographical factors.
2.4 Piracy

Piracy has been identified as one of the security threats to offshore petroleum
installations. This threat will now be defined, followed by the analysis of geographical
and enabling factors, motivations and objectives, and capabilities and tactics of this
category of threat. Specific examples of piracy attacks on offshore petroleum
installations will also be provided. The adequacy of the international legal framework in
addressing piracy in the context of offshore installations will be analysed in Chapter 5.
The legal definition of piracy in international law is contained in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC), which defines piracy as consisting of
any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and
directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property
in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in
the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship
or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b). 36

Several issues arise in relation to the above definition of piracy. These issues will be
analysed in Chapter 5, but for the purposes of the present analysis it is sufficient to say
that to qualify as piracy an act must be committed by crew or passengers of a private
ship, for private ends, on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State. The crucial element of the LOSC definition of piracy is that piracy is an act which
occurs on the high seas (and also within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by virtue of
Article 58(2) of the LOSC).37 Therefore, from an international law perspective and in

36

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833
UNTS 3, (entered into force 16 November 1994) (‘LOSC’) art 101. The same definition is used in Article
15 of the Convention on the High Seas 1958. See Convention on the High Seas 1958, opened for
signature 29 April 1958, 450 UNTS 82 (entered into force 30 September 1962) art 15.
37
It should be noted that by virtue of Article 58(2) of the LOSC, provisions of Article 101 apply to the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which means that an act of piracy can also be committed in the EEZ of a
coastal State.
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the context of offshore petroleum security, an act of piracy cannot be committed against
an offshore installation located in the territorial sea (assuming that it can be committed
against an offshore petroleum installation at all).38
2.4.1 Geography and enabling factors

Piracy is a security threat that is usually defined by geography.39 It requires the presence
of other factors such as an unstable political environment, weak government, low level
of economic development, poverty, social or cultural acceptability, lack of effective law
enforcement, and the opportunity for reward in order to prosper.40 As observed by Fort,
‘piracy overlays seamlessly onto this template of transnational threats with the maritime
domain providing an environment ripe for exploitation’.41 Relatively few places offer
such a combination of factors. These include parts of Southeast Asia, parts of Africa,
and some parts of South America. While the majority of the world’s maritime piracy
has occurred in Asia, by 2007 the Gulf of Guinea had emerged as an important locality
for piracy and attacks on offshore installations which represents an expansion of this
threat to offshore petroleum installations.42 Piracy on the east coast of Africa has also
affected the offshore petroleum industry. For example, it has been reported that a
number of oil companies have signed contracts with the Kenyan government for
exploration in the offshore Lamu Basin, but there is a real concern about the threat
posed to offshore petroleum installations by Somali pirates operating in the area.43

38

As noted by Rothwell and Stephens, ‘an equivalent act of violence which took place within the
territorial sea would not be piracy for the purposes of international law’: Donald Rothwell and Tim
Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Hart Publishing, 2010) 162.
39
Tamara Shie, ‘Ports in a Storm? The Nexus Between Counterterrorism, Counterproliferation, and
Maritime Security in Southeast Asia’ (2004) 4(4) Issues & Insights 1, 14.
40
See Martin Murphy, ‘Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism’ (2007) 47(338) Adelphi Papers 1,
15–17; Rommel Banlaoi, ‘Maritime Security Outlook for Southeast Asia’ in Joshua Ho and Catherine
Raymond (eds), The Best of Times, the Worst of Times (World Scientific Publishing, 2005) 59, 62–3;
Tamie Balaga, ‘Is Piracy a Threat to Australian Seaborne Trade?’ (2009) 27 Papers in Australian
Maritime Affairs 311, 316.
41
Brian Fort, ‘Transnational Threats and the Maritime Domain’ in Graham Ong-Webb (ed), Piracy,
Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits (2006) 23, 28.
42
Donna Nincic, ‘Maritime Piracy: Implications for Maritime Energy Security’ (2009) February Journal
of Energy Security [7]
<http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=180:maritime-piracyimplications-for-maritime-energy-security&catid=92:issuecontent&Itemid=341> at 1 March 2009.
43
Steven Jones, Exploration Issues (18 May 2011) Maritime Security Review
<http://www.marsecreview.com/2011/05/exploration-fears/> 30 June 2011.
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2.4.2 Motivations and objectives

Piracy is considered an economic crime, committed for financial gain.44 However, it is
important to note that this form of maritime crime can also be carried out by some
groups that are politically motivated, yet carrying out the act itself at a tactical level for
largely financial reasons.45 Considering that the primary objective of piracy is financial
gain, attacking an offshore petroleum installation would probably not be a cost-effective
operation for pirates as it will likely yield little or no direct financial benefit for the
attackers,46 unless their intention is to kidnap offshore workers for ransom, which seems
to have become a trend.47 Isolated stationary offshore installations could be considered
attractive targets for theft or kidnap purposes. 48 Since piracy is an economically
motivated crime, the destruction is not the goal.49 Any damage to an offshore petroleum
installation resulting from a pirate attack would usually be incidental to the financial
objective of pirates. Nevertheless, the dangers of piracy include a direct threat to the
lives and welfare of offshore workers and the potential for incidental environmental
pollution, as well as damage to equipment resulting from a pirate attack.50
2.4.3 Capabilities and tactics

In general, there can be two types of piracy namely the ‘low-level’ piracy and ‘highlevel’ piracy.51 Low-level piracy is usually committed by poor, ill-equipped fishermen
or villagers from coastal areas whose activities are often the result of relative

44

Mark Valencia, ‘The Politics of Anti-Piracy and Anti-Terrorism Responses in Southeast Asia’ in
Graham Ong-Webb (ed), Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits (2006) 84, 87.
See also Testimony before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of
Representatives, Washington DC, 4 February 2009, 1 (Peter Chalk, Senior Policy Analyst). Chalk stated
in his testimony that ‘piracy is, above all, an economically driven phenomenon’: at 1.
45
Hansen, above n 18, 76.
46
See, eg, Stuart Kaye, ‘International Measures to Protect Oil Platforms, Pipelines, and Submarine Cables
from Attack’ (2007) 31(2) Tulane Maritime Law Journal 377, 415.
47
For example, as demonstrated below, one offshore worker was kidnapped in the attack on Bulford
Dolphin drilling rig on 1 April 2007, eight offshore workers were kidnapped in the attack on the floating
production, storage and offloading unit (FPSO) Mystras on 3 May 2007, and one worker was kidnapped
in the attack on Trident VIII offshore rig on 5 May 2007: David Pearl and Sarah Aboufasha, Worldwide
Threats to Shipping: Marine Warning Information (2007) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
<http://www.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/MISC/wwtts/wwtts_20070502100000.txt> at 22
September 2008; International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report
for the Period 1 April - 30 June 2007 (2007) 43.
48
DOTARS, above n 1, 17.
49
Llew Russel (ed), ‘Attacks Prompt Vital New Onboard Vigilance Regime’ (2004) 1 Shipping Australia
10, 10.
50
Valencia, above n 44, 87.
51
This is an unofficial typology adopted for the purposes of this discussion.
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desperation and their attacks are mostly opportunistic.52 In contrast, high-level piracy is
usually committed by well organised, highly professional and skilled groups of people
with sophisticated weapons, advanced technology and equipment including mother
ships and high-speed boats which enable them to operate far offshore.53 Pirates have
already shown the ability to successfully attack offshore petroleum installations as
demonstrated below.
In the last five years, there have been at least five pirate attacks involving offshore
petroleum installations.54 Four of them took place in the Gulf of Guinea and one near
India. On 22 March 2007, Aban VII jack-up rig was boarded by pirates in speedboats
near the southwest coast of India (outside India’s territorial sea)55 while under tow.56
Pirates were seen preparing to transfer some equipment from the rig to their speedboats
and the alarm was raised. Pirates jumped overboard and escaped in their speedboats.57
On 1 April 2007, Bulford Dolphin mobile offshore drilling rig about 65 kilometres off
the coast of Nigeria was attacked by gunmen, believed to be pirates.58 The attackers
boarded the rig via an offshore support vessel which was secured alongside the offshore
installation at the time of the incident.59 One expatriate worker was abducted and taken
ashore from the installation, but released three days later.60
On 3 May 2007 in Nigeria, the floating production storage and offloading unit (FPSO)
Mystras was attacked about 55 nautical miles 61 offshore by gunmen, believed to be

52

Hansen, above n 18, 80.
As Richardson notes, the main distinguishing feature of past and present piracy is that ‘the
contemporary skull and cross bone operations can, and increasingly do, exploit modern technology and
weapons’: Michael Richardson, ‘The Threats of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia’ (2004)
6 Maritime Studies 18, 18.
54
In the course of this research, six piracy attacks on offshore installations have been identified.
55
Reported coordinates – 08°43.0'N, 076°14.0'E.
56
IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report 1 January – 31 December 2006 (2007)
53.
57
Ibid.
58
The exact coordinates were not reported.
59
IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 April – 30 June 2007 (2007)
42; International Maritime Organization (IMO), Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships: Issued Monthly - Acts Reported During April 2007, IMO Doc MSC.4/Circ.102 (19 June 2007)
annex 1 (‘Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Allegedly Committed Against Ships Reported by Member
States or International Organizations in Consultative Status’).
60
Bergen Risk Solutions, Niger Delta Maritime Security Quarterly Review (9 July 2007) 19
<http://www.bergenrisksolutions.com/index.php?dokument=294> at 2 January 2011.
61
Reported coordinates – 03°59.0'N; 007°17.0'E. However, some sources report that the distance from
land was 55 kilometres, not 55 nautical miles.
53
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pirates. 62 The attackers boarded the offshore installation using the anchor chain and
kidnapped eight foreign workers from the FPSO and a nearby offshore support vessel.
The workers were released the following day.63 Again, two days later, on 5 May 2007 in
Nigeria, Trident VIII offshore rig was attacked and boarded by gunmen, believed to be
pirates, and one crew member was kidnapped.64 More recently, on 5 January 2010, a
group of pirates attacked the floating storage and offloading unit (FSO) Westaf off
Lagos, Nigeria.65 Seven crew members were taken to hospital as a result of the attack.
The attackers stole cash, crew belongings and expensive equipment.66
The above examples demonstrate that piracy attacks on offshore petroleum installations
have been geographically limited to two regions: West Africa and South Asia. It is also
apparent that the primary motive of the attacks was financial. Two of the
abovementioned incidents involved a theft of equipment and property, and on three
occasions offshore workers were abducted (apparently for ransom), but released after a
short period of time. The attacks also indicate sophisticated offshore capabilities of the
perpetrators with some attacks occurring more than 50 kilometres offshore such as in
the case of the attacks on Bulford Dolphin drilling rig on 1 April 2007 and the FPSO
Mystras on 3 May 2007.
Security analysts regard maritime piracy as a growing security threat to the offshore
petroleum industry and offshore installations, especially in the Gulf of Guinea. 67
However, considering that piracy is motivated by financial gain and confined to certain
geographical areas, its gravity and probability risk factors are both low, and therefore it
represents a relatively minor risk to offshore petroleum installations.
2.5 Terrorism

Terrorism is another security threat to offshore petroleum installations. The concept and
definitions of ‘terrorism’ will first be discussed, followed by a discussion of capabilities
and tactics, motivations and objectives, and geographical factors relating to terrorism in
62

Pearl and Aboufasha, above n 47; IMB, above n 47, 43.
Ibid.
64
IMB, above n 47, 43. Exact coordinates of this incident are unreported.
65
Exact coordinates were not reported.
66
Chief’s Briefs by Oyibos OnLine, Gulf of Guinea 20th – 26th March 2010 Weekly Intelligence Summary
(2010) <http://www.chiefsbriefs.com/?p=3431> at 3 December 2010.
67
Lindsay, above n 23. See also Robert Elliott, ‘Piracy on the High Seas’ (2007) 51(6) Security
Management 40, 40-41.
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the context of offshore installations, with some examples of terrorist attacks against
petroleum installations (both onshore and offshore).
The difficulty with ‘terrorism’ is that there is no agreed definition of the concept. At the
international law level, even though virtually all forms of terrorism are prohibited by
various international conventions68 and other instruments,69 there is no comprehensive
convention on terrorism and no international consensus on the legal definition of
terrorism.70
There are some common elements in various definitions. First, terrorism is an ‘act’;
second, it involves ‘the use, or threat of use of violence’; third, it is directed ‘against
civilian population or government’; fourth it uses a tactic of ‘fear, intimidation or
coercion’; and fifth, it services some kind of ‘political, social or ideological objective’.
It is important to highlight that two elements that are not common to various definitions
of terrorism are: a) that terrorism is ‘usually committed by non-State actors’71 and b)
that terrorism can include ‘violence against property’.72 In relation to the element that
68

See, eg, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970, adopted 16 December
1970, 860 UNTS 12325 (entered into force 14 October 1971); Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1971, adopted 23 September 1971, 974 UNTS 14118
(entered into force 26 January 1973); International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979,
adopted 17 December 1979, 1316 UNTS 205 (entered into force 3 June 1983); Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988, opened for signature 10
March 1988, 1678 UNTS 201 (entered into force 1 March 1992); International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997, opened for signature 12 January 1998, 2149 UNTS 284 (entered
into force 23 May 2001); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
1999, opened for signature 9 December 1999, 39 ILM 270 (entered into force 10 April 2002);
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 2005, adopted 13 April 2005,
UN Doc. A/RES/59/290 (not yet in force).
69
Such as the United Nations (UN) Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism 1994
UNGAOR 49th sess, Agenda Item 142, UN Doc A/RES/49/60 (17 February 1995); United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1189, UN Doc S/RES/1189 (13 August 1998), UNSC Resolution
1373, UN Doc S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001), UNSC Resolution 1566, UN Doc S/RES/1566 (8
October 2004).
70
UN, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility – Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change GA 59th sess, Agenda Item 55, UN Doc A/59/565
(2 December 2004) 48. According to the report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, the lack of agreement on a clear and generally accepted definition of
terrorism ‘undermines the normative and moral stance against terrorism and has stained the United
Nations image’: at 48.
71
For example, Borgu defines terrorism as ‘the use, or threat of use, of violence primarily directed against
civilians, and undertaken by non-state actors for a wider political purpose’: Aldo Borgu, ‘Understanding
Terrorism: 20 Basic Facts’ (Strategic Insights, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 2004) 2.
Similarly, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) acknowledges that an act of
terrorism ‘can be perpetrated by persons who belong to any ethnic, religious or ideological group’:
CSCAP, ‘Enhancing Efforts to Address the Factors Driving International Terrorism’ (Memorandum 10,
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, December 2005) 1.
72
For example, the definitions of terrorism used by the UNSC and the definition in the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 do not make any reference to
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terrorism is ‘usually committed by non-State actors’, the absence of the reference to
perpetrators in many definitions of terrorism indicates that terrorism may also be
committed by or on behalf of States.73 In relation to the element that terrorism includes
‘violence against property’, it appears that violence against property is an important
aspect of terrorism particularly in the context of offshore petroleum installations; 74
however, not all violence against property is necessarily terrorism.75 For the purposes of
this analysis, the definition of terrorism used by the Australian National Counter
Terrorism Committee (NCTC), which includes violence against property, will be
adopted. The NCTC defines a ‘terrorist act’ as:
an act or threat, intended to advance a political, ideological or religious cause by
coercing or intimidating an Australian or foreign government or the public, by causing
serious harm to people or property, creating a serious risk to the health and safety to the
public, or seriously disrupting trade, critical infrastructure or electronic systems.76

‘violence against property’. By contrast, the definitions used by the Australian National Counter
Terrorism Committee (NCTC) and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) include ‘violence
against property’ in their definitions of terrorism: International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, opened for signature 9 December 1999, 39 ILM 270 (entered into force 10 April
2002) (‘Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism’) art 2(1)(b); cf Australian
Government, NCTC, National Counter Terrorism Plan (2nd ed, 2005) 4; US Government, Department of
Justice, FBI, Terrorism 2002-2005 (2006) iv.
73
For example, the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) defines terrorism
as ‘the use, or threat of use, of anxiety including, extra-normal violence for political purposes by any
individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established government authority, when such
action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate
victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its
institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications transcend national
boundaries’, quoted in Lia and Kjok, above n 30, 101 (emphasis added). See also Peter Rosendorff and
Todd Sandler, ‘The Political Economy of Transnational Terrorism’ (2005) 49(2) Journal of Conflict
Resolution 171, 174.
74
Nagtzaam and Lentini note that the inclusion of ‘violence against property’ in the definitions of
terrorism is relevant to consider, in light of actions of environmental activists and animal rights groups,
which can include terrorism and other forms of political violence: Gerry Nagtzaam and Pete Lentini,
‘Vigilantes on the High Seas?: The Sea Shepherds and Political Violence’ (2008) 20(1) Terrorism and
Political Violence 110, 113.
75
Violence directed solely against property better fits the profile of ‘vandalism’. Vanderheiden argues
that ‘[t]errorist acts are ... conventionally regarded as acts or threats of illegitimate killing ... and therefore
... treat differently acts of violence against mere property from that against persons’: Steve Vanderheiden,
‘Eco-Terrorism or Justified Resistance? Radical Environmentalism and the “War on Terror”’ (2005)
33(3) Politics and Society 425, 429.
76
NCTC, above n 72, 4. Similarly, FBI defines terrorism as ‘the unlawful use of force or violence against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof,
in furtherance of political or social objectives’: FBI, above n 72, iv. See also API, above n 16, 3.
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Terrorism can be categorised in a number of different ways.77 In the context of offshore
petroleum security, the most relevant categories of terrorism are maritime terrorism78
and petroleum terrorism.79 However, cyber-terrorism is also a relevant sub-category of
terrorism in the context of offshore petroleum security and should be taken into
account.80 Individual opportunists and groups sympathetic to terrorist causes can carry
out cyber attacks directed against offshore petroleum installations. 81 Fortunately, to
date, there have been no reported cyber attacks against offshore petroleum
installations.82
Maritime terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon compared to piracy. 83 Terrorist
activity in the maritime domain began to emerge in the 1960s-70s; however, from the
mid-1990s maritime terrorism began to show signs of increasing frequency and levels
of sophistication. 84 Several terrorist groups including the Palestine Liberation Front
(PLF),85 the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),86 Hezbollah,87 the Abu Sayyaf
77

For instance, terrorism can be classified by its origin and reach (such as international/transnational
terrorism and domestic terrorism); by ideology (for example, ethno-nationalist terrorism and religious
extremist terrorism); by the nature of targets (such as eco-terrorism, cyber-terrorism, maritime terrorism,
and petroleum terrorism); or by tactics and types of attacks (such as suicide terrorism and bio-terrorism).
78
The CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Cooperation defines maritime terrorism as ‘the use of
violence at sea or to a ship or fixed platform for political ends, including any use of violence for the
purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear’: CSCAP, ‘Cooperation for Law and
Order at Sea’ (Memorandum 5, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, 2001) 15. Although
relatively broad, this definition captures the essential qualities of the issue in question.
79
According to Lia and Kjok, the concept of ‘petroleum terrorism’ refers to ‘attacks by terrorist or rebel
groups directed against, or significantly affecting, petroleum infrastructure’: See Lia and Kjok, above n
30, 101.
80
See Dorothy Denning, ‘Activism, Hactivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for
Influencing Foreign Policy’ in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds), Networks and Netwars: The
Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (RAND Corporation, 2001) 241; Clay Wilson, ‘Computer Attack
and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress’ (Congressional Research Service
Report for Congress, US Congress, 2005) 7; Clay Wilson, ‘Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism:
Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress’ (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, US
Congress, 2008) 4; John Rollins and Clay Wilson, ‘Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and
Policy Issues’ (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, US Congress, 2007) 3; DHS, above
n 11, 5.
81
Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Transnational Terrorism:
The Threat to Australia (2004) 18.
82
See also discussion in Chapter 3 on potential cyber attacks on offshore petroleum installations.
83
Catherine Raymond, ‘Maritime Terrorism, A Risk Assessment: The Australian Example’ in Joshua Ho
and Catherine Raymond (eds), The Best of Times, the Worst of Times (World Scientific Publishing, 2005)
179, 180.
84
In the 1980s, various operations conducted by terrorist groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) (however, it should be noted that LTTE is an insurgent group rather than a terrorist
organisation), Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Palestine Liberation Front (PLF). See Rupert HerbertBurns, ‘Terrorism in the Early 21st Century Maritime Domain’ in Joshua Ho and Catherine Raymond
(eds), The Best of Times, the Worst of Times (World Scientific Publishing, 2005) 155, 163.
85
The PLF is a Palestinian militant group, which is designated as a terrorist organisation by various
countries.
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Group (ASG),88 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),89 and of course Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have
recognised the inherent advantages of operating at sea.90
To date, only two terrorist attacks have been carried out against offshore petroleum
installations. On 24 April 2004, in Iraq, terrorists carried out two near-simultaneous
suicide boat attacks on offshore oil terminals in the Persian Gulf. 91 The first attack was
against Al Basrah Oil Terminal (ABOT) and the second attack, which took place about
20 minutes later, was against Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT).92 The attacks
were allegedly carried out by a Zarqawi network based in Iraq and closely linked to AlQaeda.93
In the attack on ABOT, two zodiac-type speedboats piloted by suicide bombers
approached the offshore terminal at high speed. The lead boat aimed at the terminal and
was fired upon, after which it detonated before it could hit the terminal. The second boat
was also fired upon, killing terrorists. The boat still rammed MV Takasuza oil tanker
moored at the terminal, but failed to explode.94 ABOT, capable of exporting up to 900
86

The LTTE, also known as the Tamil Tigers, is (or rather was) a separatist group in Sri Lanka. Although
LTTE is often referred to in the literature as a ‘terrorist organisation’ and has been designated as a
‘terrorist organisation’ by some States such as the US, it better fits the profile of a separatist insurgent
group. In this chapter, it is mainly discussed in the context of an ‘insurgency’ threat, below.
87
Hezbollah is a Muslim militant group and political party based in Lebanon. Several States classify
Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation, in whole or in part.
88
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is an Islamic terrorist/criminal group operating in the Philippines.
89
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a jihadist group based in Indonesia with links to Al-Qaeda. JI is considered
part of Al-Qaeda’s international terrorist network, but it is in fact a distinct organisation with its own
objectives and localised goals. See Angel Rabasa et al, Beyond Al-Qaeda Part I: The Global Jihadist
Movement (2006) 147.
90
See, eg, Peter Chalk, ‘Maritime Terrorism in the Contemporary Era: Threat and Potential Future
Contingencies’ (The MIPT Terrorism Annual 2006, National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of
Terrorism, 2006) 29–30; DFAT, above n 81.
91
John Daly, ‘Terrorism and Piracy: The Dual Threat to Maritime Shipping’ (2008) 6(16) Terrorism
Monitor 4; Peter Lehr, ‘Maritime Terrorism: Locations, Actors, and Capabilities’ in Rupert HerbertBurns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press,
2008) 55, 61.
92
Ibid. See also Appendix B for details of attacks on Al Basrah Oil Terminal (ABOT) and Khawr Al
Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT).
93
James Russel, ‘Maritime Security in the Gulf: Addressing the Terrorist Threat’ (2006) 2 Security &
Terrorism Research Bulletin 9, 11.
94
Lehr, above n 91, 60. However, Lehr notes that according to the report of the Jewish Institute for
National Security Affairs (JINSA), both boats exploded before they could reach their targets. See
Jonathan Howland, Countering Maritime Terror, US Thwarts Attacks, Builds Up Foreign Navies (17 June
2004) JINSA Online <http://www.jinsa.org/articles/print.html/documentid/2567> cited in Lehr, above n
91, 60, n 12. See also Red Orbit, Iraqi Oil Terminal is Closed After Attack (25 April 2004)
<http://www.redorbit.com/news/general/53790/iraqi_oil_terminal_closed_after_attack/> at 20 September
2008; Ali Koknar, ‘Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for NATO’ (2005) Energy Security [18]
<http://www.iags.org/n0124051.htm> at 17 March 2009. See also Nicolas Pyke, ‘Suicide Bomber Boats
Explode in Attack on Basra Oil Terminal’, The Independent (online), 2004
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000 barrels of oil per day (bpd), was shut down for two days.95 The attack on KAAOT
happened about 20 minutes earlier.96 Terrorists used a dhow, which was intercepted by
a coalition forces vessel as it approached the exclusion zone around the offshore
terminal. The dhow exploded when the US Navy personnel attempted to board it. Two
US Navy sailors and one US Coastguardsman were killed in the attack and four others
were injured.97 No physical damage to the terminal was reported, but the terminal was
immediately shut down by the authorities.98
Earlier, in the summer of 2002, Saudi Arabian authorities thwarted an attempt by AlQaeda to attack the Ras Tanura offshore oil export terminal in the Persian Gulf, which
is the largest offshore oil terminal in the world.99 In June 2011, Indian media reported
that the Indian Intelligence Bureau had warned about a terrorist plot to attack India’s
offshore petroleum installations including single point moorings (SPMs) using
explosive-laden ships.100
2.5.1 Geography and enabling factors

The above examples of attacks demonstrate that terrorist attacks on offshore petroleum
installations have so far been geographically limited to one country – Iraq. However,
this does not necessarily mean that terrorism is a geographically specific threat.
Although many terrorist groups seem to be geographically confined to certain areas
such as the PLF in Palestine, LTTE in Sri Lanka,101 Hezbollah in Lebanon, ASG in the
Philippines, and JI in Indonesia, transnational terrorism (unlike piracy) does not have
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/suicide-bomber-boats-explode-in-attack-onbasra-oil-terminal-756454.html> at 20 September 2008; John Daly, ‘The Threat to Iraqi Oil’ (2004) 2(12)
Terrorism Monitor.
95
Red Orbit, above n 94.
96
Lehr, above n 91, 61. See, eg, Daly, above n 91.
97
Lehr, above n 91, 61.
98
Pyke, above n 94. See also Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, Oil Installations as an Attractive Target
for Terrorism (5 November 2009) International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 11
<http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Oil_Installations_as_a_Targe
t.pdf> at 7 August 2010; Red Orbit, above n 94.
99
Russel, above n 93, 10. See also M C Lee, ‘A Commentary Upon Recent National and International
Provisions Relating to Maritime Security’ (Paper presented at the Maritime Law Seminar, Federal Court
of Australia, 12 December 2006) 21; Alex Schmid, ‘Terrorism and Energy Security: Targeting Oil and
Other Energy Sources and Infrastructures’ in James Ellis (ed), Terrorism: What’s Coming – The Mutating
Threat (2007) 28, 33.
100
Shoaib Ahmed, Threat to Offshore Rigs: Another 26/11 Planned? (21 June 2011) IBN Live
<http://ibnlive.in.com/news/threat-to-offshore-rigs-another-2611-planned/161474-3.html> at 1 July 2011.
101
It is important to note that in May 2009, the Sri Lankan government declared a victory over the LTTE:
Chietigj Bajpaee, ‘Uncertainty Rather than Stability Follows Defeat of Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers’ (2009)
7(26) Terrorism Monitor 6, 6.

41

Chapter 2

Mikhail Kashubsky

strict geographical limitations or boundaries. 102 For instance, Al-Qaeda is known to
have cells spread around the world. Security experts and policy analysts argue that the
most substantive threat to the safety of the world today is from terrorist organisations
with international links and goals that extend from a specific local area to the
international arena.103 This means that a terrorist attack against an offshore petroleum
installation can occur in any country. Apart from geographical aspects, Murphy argues
that other enabling factors that contribute to the effective operation of terrorist groups
include legal and jurisdictional weakness, inadequate security arrangements, maritime
tradition and State support. 104
2.5.2 Motivations and objectives

The most obvious motives of terrorist groups are political and ideological such as the
desire to achieve major political change. Terrorists are usually highly motivated to
create public fear and ‘gain the sympathy of the people by striking out at symbols of
government and power’.105 Breemer has noted that the motivation of terrorists may be
inherent in the propaganda of attacking petroleum installations. 106 Gaining public
attention and wide media coverage is often an important terrorist priority, and a terrorist
attack on a major offshore petroleum installation could certainly achieve that result.107
Causing many casualties is also often one of the motivations of terrorists.108 However, if
inflicting mass casualties is the main motivation, an offshore installation would not
necessarily be a high priority target simply because relatively few people work on
offshore installations compared to other targets available on land, and some offshore
installations are completely unmanned.
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Nevertheless, the geographical factors are still relevant.
Boaz Ganor, ‘Cooperation is Not Sufficient: A New International Regime is Needed to Counter Global
Jihadi Terrorism’ in James Ellis (ed), Terrorism: What’s Coming – The Mutating Threat (2007) 48;
DOTARS, above n 1, 10. Dupont is also critical of ‘geographic determinism’ arguing that ‘in the age of
globalisation and transnational threats, geography matters far less than it once did because of the
compression of space and time’: Alan Dupont, ‘Transformation or Stagnation: Rethinking Australian
Defence’ (2003) 57(1) Australian Journal of International Affairs 55, 57.
104
Murphy, above n 40, 46.
105
Robert Charm, ‘Terrorists See Offshore as Tempting Target’ (1983) January Offshore 62, 65. See also
API, above n 4, 128.
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See, eg, Jan Breemer, ‘Offshore Energy Terrorism: Perspectives on a Problem’ (1983) 6 Terrorism
455, 460.
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Peter Tweedt, Meeting Terrorism through Regulation and Compliance (US Minerals Management
Service Division Papers, 2002) 2.
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103

42

Chapter 2

Mikhail Kashubsky

Terrorists have targeted offshore installations in a deliberate attempt to inflict maximum
damage and disruption to the operation of installations. 109 It appears that terrorists
understand the importance of the economic aspects of targeting petroleum
installations. 110 They recognise that petroleum is the ‘Achilles heel’ of the modern
world economy and that attacks on petroleum installations and disruption of petroleum
supplies could have severe economic consequences.111 On a number of occasions AlQaeda has threatened to cut the ‘economic lifelines’ of industrialised societies,
specifically focusing on the petroleum industry. 112 In 2004, Al-Qaeda proclaimed a
strategy of harming western economies by disrupting oil supplies.113 In February 2006,
a prominent religious scholar and an Al-Qaeda affiliate, Sheik Abd al-Aziz bin Rashid
al-Anzi, published on the internet the ‘fatwa’ in the form of the instruction manual
entitled ‘The Religious Rule of Targeting Oil Interests’, 114 where he declared that
‘targeting oil interests is legitimate economic jihad’ as long as the benefits of the
destruction outweighed the costs, and that ‘economic jihad in this area is the best
method to hurt the infidels’.115 The main four oil targets identified by bin Rashid in the
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As noted above, on 24 April 2004, terrorists carried out near-simultaneous attacks on ABOT and
KAAOT off Iraq’s coast. See also DFAT, above n 81, 13.
110
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60(3) Naval War College Review 23, 27–8. See also Raphael Perl, ‘Trends in Terrorism: 2006’
(Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, US Congress, 2006) 8; Nicole Stracke, ‘Economic
Jihad: A Security Challenge for Global Energy Supply’ (2007) 6 Security & Terrorism Research Bulletin
26, 26.
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(2007) <http://www.ogi-tm.com/ogi_threats_st.php> at 11 December 2008.
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Bruce Peck, ‘The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Needed Changes to Counter Today’s Threats to
Energy Security’ (US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2006) 4.
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February 2006. Its full title is ‘Targeting Petroleum-Related Interests and a Review of the Law Pertaining
to the Economic Jihad’. See Jack Williams, ‘Al-Qaida Threats and Strategies: The Religious Justification
for Targeting the International Energy Economy’ (Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection Policy
Research Series No 3-2007-2008, Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies, March 2008) 38–
41.
115
According to the fatwa, targeting petroleum installations is permitted unless their ownership is
Muslim, but it was acceptable to destroy Muslim property if it had fallen into the hands of the enemy. See
Abd al-Aziz bin Rashid al-Anzi, Targeting Petroleum-Related Interests and a Review of the Law
Pertaining to the Economic Jihad (2004), quoted in Evan Kohlmann, Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia: Excerpts
from “The Laws of Targeting Petroleum-Related Interests” (2006) Global Terror Alert
<http://www.globalterroralert.com/images/documents/pdf/0306/oiljihad0306.pdf> at 16 September 2010.
See also Schmid, above n 99, 28; Stracke, above n 110, 27; Shawn Woodford, ‘Al-Qaeda and Saudi
Arabia: A Chronology’ in Erich Marquardt (ed), Saudi Arabian Oil Facilities: The Achilles Heel of the
Western Economy (Jamestown Foundation, 2006) 35, 44.
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manual are oil wells, pipelines, oil installations and the petroleum industry personnel.116
Evidently, targeting the petroleum industry has become a major element of Al-Qaeda’s
global strategy.
It is also apparent that the primary motivation of terrorists for attacking petroleum
installations is causing damage to and destruction of installations and maximum
disruption to petroleum supplies with consequential economic damage. Al-Qaeda and
its affiliates have carried out multiple attacks (including the two offshore attacks
mentioned above) against petroleum installations, disrupting petroleum production with
consequential damages to the economy. 117 However, so far, terrorist attacks have
focused almost entirely on onshore petroleum installations. The increased focus of
terrorist groups on offshore petroleum installations could be part of their new agenda –
economic jihad.118
2.5.3 Capabilities and tactics

Some terrorist groups have proven capable of launching devastating and sophisticated
terrorist maritime attack campaigns.119 Campbell and Gunaratna have noted that there
has been an increase in maritime capabilities of terrorist groups and the frequency of
maritime attacks.120 However, not all terrorist groups operate in the maritime domain
and maritime attacks represent a very small percentage of all terrorist attacks.121 While
there may be several reasons for this,122 one plausible explanation is that only a few
terrorist organisations have the capability to carry out maritime attacks, even in their
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own regions of operation. 123 The two terrorist groups that are responsible for most
maritime attacks are Al-Qaeda (together with its affiliates) and LTTE, which have
attacked both warships and commercial vessels. 124 As noted above, the attacks on
ABOT and KAAOT on 24 April 2004 in the Persian Gulf are the only two terrorist
attacks that have been carried out against offshore petroleum installations.
An attack strategy that would focus primarily on offshore petroleum installations would
not be easy as it would require coordination, persistence, understanding of energy
market dynamics, and substantial resources that most terrorist groups lack.

125

Nevertheless, capabilities of terrorist groups to carry out attacks on offshore petroleum
installations should not be underestimated. 126 Undoubtedly, terrorists can develop or
improve their skills, and get the means to carry out attacks against offshore
installations.127
So far, the main tactic of terrorists appears to be suicide attacks using explosive-laden
boats. The tactics of the attacks on ABOT and KAAOT involved the use of explosiveladen boats, which resemble the attacks on USS Cole in 2000 and on Limburg oil tanker
in 2002. Terrorists’ tactics and strategies are constantly evolving. Enhanced security of
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offshore petroleum installations may force terrorists to improve capabilities or adopt
new tactics and methods of operation.128
It can be concluded that terrorism is largely motivated by the struggle for major political
change and that causing or threatening massive destruction, including economic damage
and casualties, are the modus operandi of terrorism, so that the gravity risk factor of this
threat is high. Considering that there have been only two terrorist attacks on offshore
installations, the likelihood factor of this threat is low.129 Nevertheless, the threat of
terrorism is not geographically limited and the overall risk posed to offshore petroleum
installations by terrorism is still significant.
2.6 Insurgency

Insurgency poses another security threat to offshore installations.130 In this section, the
concept of ‘insurgency’ will first be defined, similarities and key differences between
insurgency and terrorism and piracy will be briefly discussed, followed by the analysis
of geographical factors, motivations of insurgency and offshore capabilities of insurgent
groups.
Insurgency can be defined as ‘an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a
constituted government through one of subversion and armed conflict’. 131 The US
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) defines insurgency as ‘a protracted political-military
activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country
through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organisations’.132
There is considerable controversy as to definitions of insurgency, but insurgency is
different from terrorism.133 The media tends to generalise the concepts of terrorism and
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insurgency, particularly in the context of maritime security.134 Insurgency is often given
the same ‘blanket label of terrorism’ and sometimes the terms insurgents (which
includes rebels and guerrillas)135 and terrorists are used synonymously,136 which only
obscures their nature and purpose.137
In fact, insurgency and terrorism are distinct phenomena. 138 There a number of
differences between insurgency and terrorism. 139 Morris argues that ‘the distinction
between terrorism and insurgency is not merely theoretical’ because combating these
threats requires different strategies.140 The common attribute of most insurgent groups is
their desire to control a particular geographical area, 141 and it is this aspect that
‘differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organisations, whose objectives do
not [always] include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a
given area or country’. 142 Insurgents are usually field fighting forces, organised in
military fashion, and are generally larger in size than terrorist cells. 143 Unlike most
terrorists, insurgents are actually engaged in informal warfare, 144 and activities of
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insurgents are usually aimed at weakening government control and legitimacy while
increasing insurgent control and legitimacy.145
Another distinction that needs to be made is between insurgency and piracy. The key
difference between insurgency and piracy is the motivation of the perpetrators. It is
generally accepted that piracy is an act committed for private ends, while insurgency
serves political or public ends. From the international law perspective, the phrase ‘for
private ends’ in Article 101 of the LOSC and Article 15 of the Convention on the High
Seas 1958, effectively excludes from the definition of piracy insurgents who direct their
acts solely against the State whose government they seek to overthrow (and also all
those acts that have no personal motive, whether monetary or otherwise).146
Insurgent groups have successfully carried out attacks on petroleum installations
including offshore installations, 147 seriously disrupting production and oil exports.148
Between 1975 and 2011 there have been at least nineteen attacks on offshore petroleum
installations by insurgents.149
2.6.1 Geography and enabling factors

Insurgent groups are generally limited to a certain geographical area of operation
primarily because of their objectives, such as gaining independence or the overthrow of
an unwanted government.150 Some insurgent groups, such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka,151
are driven by a struggle to secure territorial settlement and local ethnic conflicts, which
indicates that ‘geography still plays an important role’ in the assessment of this threat
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category. 152 Similarly to piracy, insurgency usually requires a set of factors that
encourage and sustain it. These include hostile environments, weak governments,
political instability, corruption, poverty and ethnic conflicts. This kind of scenario
serves as a ‘breeding ground’ and sanctuary for insurgencies as well as terrorist groups
and pirates.153 Murphy argues that the ‘principal reason why there have been so few
maritime insurgencies is that in very few places around the world has political conflict
coincided with favorable maritime geography’.154
Insurgent attacks on onshore petroleum installations have occurred in a number of
countries including Iraq, Turkey, Russia, Sudan, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Colombia,155
but most of the past attacks on offshore petroleum installations by insurgents took place
in the Gulf of Guinea and, more specifically, in Nigeria’s offshore waters.156 Insurgency
is a security threat which appears to be limited by geographical factors.
2.6.2 Motivations and objectives

Motivations of insurgents groups vary, but obtaining political-economic concessions
from central government appears to be one of the most common objectives. Insurgents
often focus their attacks on petroleum installations to advance their agenda.157 Insurgent
groups in Nigeria have waged a violent campaign against oil installations in the country
for some time.158 Nigerian insurgents, especially the Movement for the Emancipation of
Niger Delta (MEND), are well-known for their attacks directed almost entirely against
the petroleum industry.159 As a result, they are often referred to as the ‘oil militants’.160
152
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Insurgents in Nigeria are usually motivated by unfair profit sharing from oil and gas
exports,161 where local communities demand a larger share of the country’s oil wealth
and insurgent groups such as MEND try to achieve their goals by attacking petroleum
installations and consequentially reducing Nigeria’s oil exports. There is a similar
situation in Colombia where insurgent groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC)162 recognise the importance of the oil exports and therefore attack
petroleum installations to further their political objectives. Some security experts
suggest that insurgents regard the petroleum industry as a source of revenue to the
government that they oppose and, therefore, they attack oil companies and petroleum
installations in order to reduce this revenue.163
Killing civilians is rarely a motivation of insurgents (which is one of the factors that
distinguishes insurgency from terrorism). For example, a MEND spokesperson claims
that MEND condemns the deliberate targeting of civilians by any persons or groups and
that their bombings and attacks are always preceded by a warning in order to prevent
unnecessary casualties.164
Insurgent groups also have financial motivations and often look for targets that have the
potential to yield financial return to advance their larger political agendas. Kidnapping
of oil company workers for ransom has evolved to an everyday practice of some
insurgent groups, particularly Nigerian and Colombian insurgents, and analysts predict
that this practice is likely to continue.165 Almost all of the past attacks by insurgents on
offshore petroleum installations involved abduction of offshore workers but, in most
instances, offshore workers were released after a relatively short time. For example, on
7 November 2010 in Nigeria, a group of MEND insurgents attacked High Island VII
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offshore drilling jack-up rig located about 12 kilometres offshore.166 Nineteen offshore
crew members were kidnapped but were released ten days later.167 Oil companies tend
to pay ransoms to insurgent groups for the release of abducted offshore employees.
Petroleum companies have the financial resources, which makes them attractive
economic targets.168 Sometimes, insurgents extort money from the oil companies in the
form of ‘protection payments’ in exchange for a guarantee not to attack their petroleum
installations.169 Murphy notes that while this type of violence emerges out of political
discontent, ‘it also has a large criminal component’. 170 Generating a greater public
awareness of their cause is usually also an important objective of the insurgent
groups,171 which can be achieved by attacking offshore petroleum installations.
2.6.3 Capabilities and tactics

Many insurgent groups seem to have adequate capabilities to carry out attacks against
maritime and offshore petroleum installations. The Sri Lankan LTTE, for example, had
developed the techniques of maritime attacks into a fine art,172 using very sophisticated
technologies, with a level of sophistication approaching that of a navy,173 such as stealth
mechanisms and multiple-engine high-speed craft capable of running faster than navy
vessels.174 The LTTE’s Sea Tigers division was often credited with possessing the most
advanced maritime attack capabilities of any insurgent or terrorist group in the world.
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In Nigeria, insurgent groups, such as MEND, have also demonstrated sophistication and
operational capabilities in the offshore environment. For example, on 2 June 2006,
about 30 armed militants boarded a semisubmersible rig, Bulford Dolphin, about 65
kilometres offshore and abducted eight offshore workers. 175 On 26 October 2007 in
Nigeria, gunmen in speedboats attacked the FPSO Mystras and took hostage six oil
workers.176 Mystras was located about 85 kilometres offshore.177 On 19 June 2008 in
Nigeria, Shell’s MEND insurgents attacked the FPSO Bonga located about 120
kilometres offshore. 178 In the attack on Bonga, insurgents apparently travelled more
than 120 kilometres during the night through strong currents, carried out the attack,
which lasted almost four hours, and travelled back another 120 kilometres. The attack
on Bonga raised concerns and even fears for the security of deep-sea offshore
installations in the region, which had previously been considered out of the reach of
militant groups. 179 Attacks such as those on Bulford Dolphin, Mystras, and Bonga
demonstrate significant capabilities of insurgents in Nigeria to conduct attacks on
offshore installations far offshore.
The most common tactic of insurgents appears to be armed intrusion of offshore
installations and abduction of offshore workers. Some incidents involve the capture of a
potentially large number of people and enable the insurgents to control petroleum
installations.180 Insurgents often employ comprehensive means of attacks that include
the use of various kinds of explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades and machine
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guns.181 In some cases, insurgents have used explosives and rocket-propelled grenades
to inflict physical damage to offshore petroleum installations. 182 On 29 June 2009,
MEND insurgents in Nigeria attacked Forcados offshore oil terminal and detonated
explosives damaging the installation. 183 Part of the installation caught fire after a
massive explosion.184
It can be summarised that insurgency is motivated by political struggle and insurgents
often cause destruction, damage and casualties by their attacks on offshore installations,
so the gravity factor of this threat is high. In addition, some attacks against offshore
installations were carried out by insurgents,185 so the ‘likelihood’ factor of insurgency is
also high. The overall risk posed to offshore petroleum installations by insurgency is
significant, but only in countries where insurgency exists and where insurgency groups
operate in the maritime domain. So far, the Gulf of Guinea appears to be the only region
where insurgents have attacked offshore installations and where insurgency poses a
serious threat to offshore petroleum installations.
2.7 Organised crime

Attacks on petroleum installations are not confined to acts of piracy, terrorism or other
manifestations of political violence. Criminal groups and syndicates may cause
interferences with offshore petroleum operations, and therefore organised crime poses a
security threat to petroleum companies and offshore petroleum installations.186 In this
section, ‘organised crime’ will first be defined, followed by a brief discussion of the
types of crimes that may be committed by organised criminal groups against offshore
petroleum installations with examples of past security incidents involving organised
crime and petroleum installations (both offshore and onshore). Following that,
geographical and enabling factors, motivations and objectives, and capabilities and
tactics of organised crime will be analysed in the context of offshore petroleum security.
The term ‘organised crime’ usually refers to
181
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large-scale and complex criminal activities carried out by tightly or loosely organized
associations and aimed at the establishment, supply and exploitation of illegal markets
at the expense of society. Such operations are generally carried out with a ruthless
disregard of the law, and often involve offences against the person, including threats,
187

intimidation and physical violence.

Organised crime can also be referred to as ‘a form of economic commerce by illegal
means, involving the threat and use of physical force, extortion, corruption, blackmail
and other methods, and the use of illicit goods and services’. 188 The United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2000 (UNTOC)189 does not define
the term ‘organised crime’. The UNTOC defines ‘serious crime’ as ‘conduct
constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four
years or a more serious penalty’,190 and an ‘organised criminal group’ is defined in the
UNTOC as:
a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in
concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established
in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial
or other material benefit.191

Organised crime can have implications for the petroleum industry. The types of crimes
that have relevance to the petroleum industry include oil theft, extortion, armed robbery,
theft of property and other forms of criminal profiteering. There have been at least two
reported attacks on offshore installations involving organised criminal groups
(excluding acts of piracy).192
The stealing of petroleum by criminal gangs for the purposes of illicit refining and
subsequent use or for sale is a common practice in some countries, especially in
187
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Nigeria. 193 Oil can be illegally extracted from pipelines by drilling holes or opening
valves (also known as ‘oil siphoning’), or from storage facilities, pumping stations or
even offshore production installations. The stolen oil is then refined or sold as crude on
the ‘black market’ to illegal oil traders who, in turn, sell it to local refineries and on the
international oil market.194 The oil theft is often referred to as ‘illegal bunkering’. This
type of criminal activity is very common in Nigeria, where it is estimated that about 10
to 15 per cent of all oil output produced gets stolen and even military and police are
involved in this illegal activity.195 Stolen oil amounts to several millions of US dollars
per day in lost profits and revenue to oil companies and generates sizable returns for
those involved in oil theft. 196 ‘Illegal oil bunkering is effectively Nigeria’s most
profitable private business.’197
Mexican organised criminal syndicates may have expanded their operations from the
illicit drug trade to the illicit oil trade. They have tapped oil pipelines and built tunnels
and independent pipelines to support growing theft of oil that is sold on the domestic as
well as the US markets.198 For example, following the explosion of a pipeline belonging
to Pemex on 19 December 2010 in Mexico, 199 the investigation indicated that the
explosion was caused by an attempt to illegally extract fuel from the pipeline.200 So far,
there have not been any reported oil thefts associated with offshore petroleum
installations, but this may change in the future.
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Oil companies are attractive targets for extortion, which is one of the main streams of
criminal gang activities in some countries. It has been suggested that extortion is ‘a
notoriously underreported crime’.201 While criminal gangs usually have no direct stake
in attacking offshore installations, their eventual involvement in the protection racket
for the petroleum industry, with related threats and small disruptions (to justify the
payment of protection fees), should not come as a surprise. 202 Offshore petroleum
installations have been a subject of ‘protection rackets’.203 One recent incident that fits
this category is the attack on 17 November 2010 against an offshore installation at the
offshore Moudi oil terminal in the Cameroon’s EEZ in the Gulf of Guinea by a ‘hybrid
criminal/separatist’ group called Africa Marine Commando (AMC), which resulted in
six fatalities and disruption of operations. 204 It had been reported that AMC had
contacted companies that operate those offshore installations several days prior to the
attack demanding payment of ‘security tax’. 205 The Cameroonian security services
reported that the group had threatened further attacks unless they received money.206
Armed robbery and theft of property are also among the types of organised criminal
activities that could be perpetrated against offshore petroleum installations. As
discussed in section 2.5 above, from an international law perspective, an act of piracy
can only be committed on the high seas and in the EEZ.207 Therefore, an equivalent act
of violence within the territorial sea or internal waters would not be piracy for the
purposes of international law, 208 but it would more likely be categorised as armed
robbery.209
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Theft of property and stores from offshore installations is also possible. Since most
offshore installations have sensitive and expensive equipment on board, it is possible
that such equipment may be a target of criminals who may try to steal it from an
offshore installation with the intention of returning it back to the oil company in
exchange for monetary payment or selling it to third parties. However, this type of
criminal activity seems to be unlikely because it may be easier to kidnap company
workers for ransom rather than steal company equipment. The attack on the mobile
offshore drilling rig Allied Centurion in Malaysia 210 on 26 December 2008 is an
example of armed robbery and theft involving offshore petroleum installations. Six
armed men boarded Allied Centurion and stole stores and property from the rig and, in
the process, injured one crew member.211
Other types of criminal profiteering, such as manipulation of shares or oil futures
markets, could also have some relevance to the operations of petroleum companies. In
August 2008 in the United States (US), a Canadian national was sentenced to thirteen
years imprisonment for planning to blow up the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, in early
January 2000, with a series of explosions in order to profit from the expected rise in oil
and gas futures he intended to purchase.212 It is plausible that an organised criminal
group could perpetrate a similar type of attack against offshore installations for financial
gains.
2.7.1 Geography and enabling factors

Organised crime is a security threat that appears to be geographically specific and
limited to certain countries and regions. Political and economic instability in a country
often creates an ideal environment for further expansion of organised crime, 213 and
therefore organised crime can be a serious security threat to petroleum companies and
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petroleum installations in economically and politically unstable countries.214 Organised
crime can be a significant security challenge as it is possible that crime-related security
problems could easily spill over into the petroleum industry and materialise in attacks
on petroleum installations, which has happened in countries such as Nigeria, Mexico,
Colombia and Russia. Organised crime often also has wider criminal connections and
roles in corruption with negative consequences for the overall stability and security in a
given area or region.215
2.7.2 Motivations and objectives

The main motivation of organised criminal groups and syndicates is financial gain. The
petroleum industry provides opportunities for organised crime to generate financial
gains through illegal activities involving the industry, 216 and interferences with the
operations of oil companies.217 Organised criminal groups do not desire media, public,
or government attention. 218 Causing damage to petroleum installations or inflicting
human casualties is usually not a motivation of organised crime, but criminal groups
can resort to such measures to achieve their ultimate objective of financial gain. Human
casualties can be incidental to organised criminal activities. For example, on 19
December 2010 in Mexico, at least 27 people were killed by oil pipeline explosion,
which apparently was caused by an attempt to illegally extract oil from the pipeline.219
2.7.3 Capabilities and tactics

Some organised criminal groups such as the Bhudil Senil Syndicate220 in Indonesia and
Los Zetas Cartel 221 in Mexico have very sophisticated capabilities. They are highly
organised and well armed.222 The most common ways of criminal gangs for profiting
from the petroleum industry are oil theft and extortion. Organised criminals often use
214
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violence or threats of violence as a tactic or method to obtain financial gain. For
example, oil company executives and their family members have been kidnapped by
criminal gangs who demanded ransom for their release. On 24 June 1995, an unknown
group abducted the son of a British Exxon employee in Formeque, Colombia and
demanded a ransom of US$500 000.223 In some cases, company employees have been
murdered in connection with organised crime. On 29 May 1978, in Colombia, the
general manager of Texas Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Texaco, was kidnapped
in Bogota and subsequently killed by his kidnappers on 3 January 1979, when police
stumbled upon their hideout while searching for stolen weapons.224
As discussed earlier in this section, oil theft, extortion, murder and manipulation of oil
futures are the types of crimes that could be perpetrated by organised criminal groups
(and individual criminals)225 against the petroleum industry and offshore installations.
In general, it appears that organised crime poses only a marginal threat to offshore
installations. Organised crime is financially motivated and its direct effects on the oil
industry are geographically limited to very few countries, so the probability and gravity
risk factors of this threat category are low, and the overall risk posed by organised crime
is minor.
2.8 Vandalism

Vandalism is another security threat to offshore petroleum installations.226 Vandalism
can be defined as ‘action involving deliberate destruction of or damage to public or
private property’. 227 In the context of offshore petroleum security, vandalism can be
referred to as ‘damaging cargo, support equipment, infrastructure, systems or
facilities’.228 This category of threat includes violent actions of radical environmental
and animal rights groups and acts by members of local populations intended to cause
damage to company property, including offshore petroleum installations.
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In the US, there is a growing threat of aggression from radical environmental groups
such as the Earth Liberation Front (ELF),229 the Animal Liberation Front (ALF),230 and
other radical animal rights groups.231 Although some environmental groups, and ELF in
particular, have been designated as eco-terrorists or domestic terrorist organisations
(even though, strictly speaking, eco-terrorism is a subcategory of terrorism), they should
be distinguished from terrorism because they aim to destroy property but direct no
violence towards persons.232 In fact, some of these groups reject the label ‘eco-terrorist’
and prefer the term ‘economic sabotage’ or ‘ecotage’. 233 However, violent acts of
radical environmental groups such as ELF and ALF could be described as ‘vandalism’,
and in this chapter they are treated as such.
There have been instances of vandalism involving onshore petroleum installations in
several countries including Canada and the US.234 For example, on 24 April 1984, in
Canada, an act of sabotage or vandalism of a storage tank caused the release of
approximately 143 000 gallons of gasoline in Deception Bay, Quebec.235 On 25 June
1991, vandalism of storage tanks in Baytown, Texas, caused the release of 84 000
gallons of waste oil from a number of aboveground storage tanks.236 On 10 October

229

Earth Liberation Front (ELF) is a radical environmental movement established in 1992 in England
with several branches in the US. ELF’s main goal is to defend the Earth by means of direct guerrilla
action. See ELF <http://earth-liberation-front.org/> at 9 November 2008. ELF is considered a domestic
terrorist group by the FBI.
230
Animal Liberation Front (ALF) is considered a domestic terrorist organisation which carries out
terrorist activities directed at university research centres that use animals in experiments. It also targets
industries that they believe harm animals.
231
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health, US Congress, 12 February 2002,
(James Jarboe, Domestic Terrorism Section Chief, FBI Counterterrorism Division)
<http://www2.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/jarboe021202.htm> at 15 April 2011. Another similar
environmental movement is Earth First!, which is an international movement composed of small,
regionally-based groups that apply ‘direct pressure’ through a combination of activities including
education, litigation, and creative civil disobedience.It engages in acts of violence against property, but
considers humans not to be legitimate targets. Earth First!, About Earth First!
<http://www.earthfirst.org/about.htm> at 1 October 2009.
232
Vanderheiden, above n 75, 426.
233
Ibid 426–7.
234
See Alicia Watts-Hosmer, Colby Stanton, and Julie Beane, ‘Intent to Spill: Environmental Effects of
Oil Spills Caused by War, Terrorism, Vandalism, and Theft’ (Paper presented at 1997 International Oil
Spill Conference, Fort Lauderdale, USA, 7-10 April 1997) 157, 160-61
<http://www.iosc.org/papers/01058.pdf> at 5 October 2010.
235
Oil Spills Intelligence Report 1982-1985, International Summary and Review, cited in Watts-Hosmer,
Stanton, and Beane, above n 234, 160.
236
Watts-Hosmer, Stanton, and Beane, above n 234, 160.

60

Chapter 2

Mikhail Kashubsky

1993, in Sandyville, Ohio, oil production tanks were vandalised, causing the release of
19 000 gallons of crude oil.237
There have also been several attacks on vessels by environmental and animal rights
groups that could be characterised as vandalism. One of the most known radical animal
rights groups is the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (SSCS),238 which has carried
out a number of attacks against maritime targets around the globe, namely illegal
commercial fishing and whaling operations.239 For example, in February 1980, SSCS
operatives sunk the Cypriot-registered whaling ship Sierra, in Lisbon harbour using
limpet mines. 240 SSCS has not attacked or interfered with any offshore petroleum
installations so far, but instead has been focusing on whaling ships. 241 Apart from
violent actions of the SSCS, there have been only a few attacks carried out against
maritime targets by radical environmental groups.242 For example, on 23 June 1974 in
the United Kingdom (UK), the Band of Mercy group, calling themselves ‘animal
lovers’, set fire to the 32-foot British vessel Mizpah and totally destroyed it, claiming
later that the reason for the attack was that the ship was regularly used to hunt seals.243
On 4 August 1975, a group called ‘Jaws’ placed a bomb on the hull below the waterline
of the Bahamian vessel Goldfinger II; the explosion blew a hole and caused the engine
room to be flooded.244 It was claimed that Goldfinger II was bombed to protest against
the Bahamian Government’s attitude towards American fisherman.245
There has so far been at least one reported incident involving offshore installations that
can be categorised as vandalism. On 2 August 1899, in the US, when an oil company
began to construct an oil derrick off the shores of Montecito, an affluent suburb of Santa
237
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Barbara, California, a local mob took direct action. They attacked the rig and
demolished it.246 The next day these activists were described approvingly on the front
page of the local newspaper as ‘a party of the best known society men of Santa Barbara
armed to meet any resistance’.247 The incident had become known as the ‘Montecito
Mob’.
2.8.1 Geography and enabling factors

Vandalism does not seem to be limited by geographical factors. Vandalism involving
onshore petroleum installations has occurred in the US and Canada. Vandalism
involving ships has happened in the UK, Portugal, and Bahamas. The Montecito Mob
incident on 2 August 1899, which took place in the US, appears to be the only reported
incident involving vandalism and offshore petroleum installations. Despite the lack of
history of vandalism against offshore petroleum installations, it can occur in any
country.
2.8.2 Motivations and objectives

As the definition of ‘vandalism’ suggests, its main motivation is deliberate destruction
of or damage to property. Motivations and objectives of groups and individuals that
commit acts of vandalism against petroleum installations can vary. For example, the
main objective of the Environmental Life Force is ‘to defend of the earth by means of
direct guerrilla action’, 248 which often involves the use of violence against property.
Inflicting human casualties is not a motivation of those involved in vandalism. For
example, ELF claims that while its actions have caused considerable property damage,
‘there has never been an injury or death stemming from an ELF action’.249
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2.8.3 Capabilities and tactics

Perpetrators of vandalism could use a variety of tactics to accomplish their objectives
including arson and the use of explosives.250 One of the most common vandalism tactics
is tempering with valves at production, storage and transportation facilities in order to
release oil.251 SSCS has used limpet mines to sink or cause damage to ships.252 The
affiliates of ELF have used incendiary devices against car dealerships, petrol stations,
construction sites and housing developments.253 Petroleum installations are also among
the potential targets of the environmental radicals; however, it is unlikely that
perpetrators of vandalism have extensive offshore capabilities in order to carry out acts
of vandalism against offshore petroleum installations.
Vandalism presents a minor threat to offshore petroleum installations. It is a nongeographically specific category of threat. The likelihood factor of this threat is low.
Causing property damage or destruction is one of the motives of vandalism, so the
gravity risk factor of this threat is low. Overall, this category of threat poses a minor
risk to the offshore petroleum industry and to offshore petroleum installations in
particular.
2.9 Civil protest

Interferences with offshore petroleum operations can also be caused by non-violent
environmental activists, indigenous activists, labour activists and striking workers, and
anti-government protesters. 254 Therefore, activities of these groups pose a threat to
offshore petroleum installations and this category of threat can be referred to as ‘civil
protest’. There have been at least ten security incidents255 where operations of offshore
petroleum installations were affected by actions of protesters and activists.
Environmental activists are responsible for most security incidents involving
interferences with offshore petroleum installations.
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For example, on 25 July 1981, Greenpeace activists attempted to board a Shell-operated
oil rig located about 170 nautical miles off the coast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts in the
US, in order to express their opposition to drilling during a Shell news conference on
the rig. Greenpeace representatives sought to explain their concern that ‘the drilling
would result in oil spills endangering the nearby Georges Bank, home for much of the
world’s supply of cod, haddock and food fish’.256 Shell denied the group access to the
drilling rig. On 23 August 2001, in Nigeria, a local community group of anti-oil
activists boarded Shell’s production platform and the nearby Trident VIII jack-up
drilling rig. The rig’s crew was safely evacuated to Port Harcourt and the activists
withdrew.257
Indigenous people living in areas where petroleum operations take place and local
residents should also be included in the consideration of offshore security threats.
Dissatisfaction by indigenous people and local populations can become a significant
security threat to petroleum installations if it is not managed properly.258 In December
2002, in Ecuador, when oil geologists arrived to conduct seismic surveys accompanied
by soldiers as a protection measure, within hours of their arrival, the soldiers and oil
workers were surrounded by Sarayacu Indians armed with spears. 259 The soldiers
surrendered without a single shot being fired or a spear thrown and after several days of
negotiations, they were released in exchange for a government promise not to let oil
companies enter the territory without permission from the Sarayacu people.260 These
types of indigenous activist actions and protests, although non-violent in most cases,261
pose a security threat to offshore installations because they cause interferences with
company operations, interruptions to petroleum production and sometimes can result in
companies having to abandon activities in the area.
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Members of local populations also represent security threats to offshore petroleum
installations because they can cause disruptions to and interferences with normal
operations of offshore installations. For example, fishermen seeking hand-outs and
travelling by small boats to offshore installations pose a security threat. Owners and
operators of offshore petroleum installations have expressed concerns about access by
local fishing boats to the areas adjacent to the rigs.262 Fishermen can cause interferences
with petroleum operations simply by fishing in proximity to offshore petroleum
installations.
2.9.1 Geography and enabling factors

Civil protest is a threat category which appears to be non-geographically specific. Civil
protest involving offshore petroleum installations can occur and has occurred in both
developing and developed countries. Environmental groups and civil protesters have
been active in the US, Canada and Europe. Labour activists and indigenous protesters
have had a major impact on oil and gas activities in some South American countries
including Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. Oil installations in Nigeria have been subjected to
a number of environmental and labour protests, particularly protests of the Ogoni and
Ijaw people. Environmental and animal rights groups, such as Greenpeace, have
conducted operations on a global scale. Greenpeace has taken action involving offshore
petroleum installations in the US, the UK, and Mexico.263
2.9.2 Motivations and objectives

The motivations of environmental groups and other civil protesters vary considerably.
For example, labour activists’ motivations mostly relate to better working conditions,
increased pay levels, issues relating to redundancies and unfair dismissal, 264 as
illustrated by the April 2003 incident in Nigeria where about one hundred oil workers
were held hostage aboard offshore installations by striking Nigerian workers.265
The objectives of some indigenous people are usually to completely stop or prevent
petroleum activities in their area of habitat. Affected local residents and indigenous
people have mobilised to stop major energy projects and sometimes have confronted the
262
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operators of such projects, emphasising the environmental damage the industry
causes.266 Other civil protesters seek to receive monetary compensation and reparations
from oil companies for pollution caused by their activities. For example, on 25 May
1998 in Nigeria, over one hundred unarmed and peaceful Ilaje protesters went to
Chevron’s Parabe oil production platform about nine nautical miles offshore. 267 The
protesters occupied the platform to protest environmental and distribution issues, and to
demand monetary compensation for environmental and economic grievances and
jobs.268
The ultimate objective of many environmental groups is to minimise human
interferences with nature. In the context of offshore petroleum, this could be reduction
of offshore exploration and exploitation activities, and/or reduction of pollution from
the petroleum industry by causing interferences with operations of offshore
installations. Publicity is also an important motivation of environmental activists. The
main objective of Greenpeace with respect to the petroleum industry is to end deepwater
oil drilling and increase the support for clean energy. 269 This is illustrated by their
slogan ‘Go Beyond Oil’, which it has used consistently in their latest protests against
the industry.
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organised with access to funding, ideologically charged and motivated, and could cause
unpleasant interferences with petroleum operations.273 A good example of this is the
Brent Spar incident in the North Sea. 274 On 30 April 1995, Greenpeace activists
occupied the platform for more than three weeks in an attempt to prevent Shell from
dumping this disused, obsolete platform in the ocean.275
2.9.3 Capabilities and tactics

The capabilities and tactics of groups or individuals engaged in civil protest vary. Some
environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, have well-developed maritime capabilities.
The groups own a number vessels and speedboats and are capable of conducting
operations at long distances offshore, including the high seas.276 Greenpeace has already
demonstrated its capability to cause interferences with offshore petroleum installations
on several occasions. In 2010 alone, Greenpeace conducted three protest actions
specifically involving offshore petroleum installations. They were the protest actions
involving the boarding of the drilling rig Stena Don on 31 August 2010 operating in
Arctic waters offshore Greenland, 277 the boarding of the drill ship Stena Carron on 21
September 2010, 278 and the boarding of the deepwater oil rig Centenario on 22
November 2010 in Mexico.279
The tactics of civil protesters are usually limited to unauthorised boarding and
occupation of offshore petroleum installations for the purpose of causing interferences
with offshore operations. In some cases, actions of civil protesters and activists have led
273
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to workers being held captive for a period of time.280 For example, on 13 December
1997, in Nigeria, employees and villagers kidnapped four foreign oil workers and at
least nine Nigerian workers off the coast of Nigeria, but released the workers in stages
on 17 and 18 December 1997.281 In any case, the tactics employed by civil protesters
and activists are non-violent.
It can be concluded that civil protest by environmental, labour, indigenous and other
activists is not of major threat to offshore petroleum installations, but it can cause
disruptions to operations of offshore installations. Therefore, it is important for the
offshore petroleum industry participants to be wary of the threat that environmentalists
and other types of activists pose, and the interferences they can cause. 282 As far as
environmental groups are concerned, Greenpeace poses the largest threat to offshore
installations. Fortunately, civil protest is a non-violent type of security threat. The
relatively low number of offshore security incidents involving activists indicates that
this threat represents a marginal risk to offshore petroleum installations.
Civil protest is a non-geographically specific category of threat. Environmental activists
have been responsible for the majority of interferences with offshore petroleum
operations, so the likelihood factor of this threat is high. However, causing destruction
of installations or human casualties is not a motive and interferences caused by civil
protests and environmental activism usually do not involve violence, so the gravity risk
factor of this threat is low. Overall, this category of threat poses a moderate risk to the
offshore industry.
2.10 Internal sabotage

Internal sabotage is also a potential security threat to offshore petroleum installations.
Sabotage can be defined as ‘the deliberate destruction or damage of equipment’ by
dissatisfied employees. 283 The threat of internal sabotage comes from ‘insiders’.
Company employees (including former employees), contractors, offshore service
providers, and other trusted persons affiliated with the offshore petroleum industry,
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including offshore security personnel, can all be considered ‘insiders’ of the industry.
For the purposes of this analysis, intentional disclosure of sensitive/confidential
information to third parties is also considered to be a form of internal sabotage.
Assistance provided by insiders to third parties in carrying out or planning an attack on
an offshore installation may also be included in the concept of ‘internal sabotage’.
Malicious actions of disgruntled, dishonest or terminated employees or other insiders
can cause serious disruption to petroleum installations and operations.284
Internal sabotage is a unique category of threat. It is very different from all other threats
discussed above but, at the same time, it overlaps with all other categories of threats.
Therefore, it is more appropriate to place ‘internal sabotage’ into a separate category of
its own, rather than including it as a subcategory of one of the other threat categories
discussed above. 285 There have several incidents of ‘internal sabotage’ involving
onshore petroleum installations, but to date, there has been no reported internal sabotage
involving offshore installations. Based on the examples of onshore incidents involving
internal sabotage and petroleum installations, it is possible that internal sabotage can
occur in the offshore petroleum industry.
2.10.1 Geography and enabling factors

This threat category does not have geographical boundaries. It exists in both developed
and developing countries, politically and economically stable and unstable countries.
For example, in 1988 in the US, a disgruntled former employee of an oil company in
Louisiana accessed the oil field site at night and disabled all twelve pumping units at the
field, and subsequently set an oilfield storage tank on fire resulting in eventual
explosion. It took two weeks to repair the wells and the financial losses were estimated
of over US$2 million.286
2.10.2 Motivations and objectives

Motivations for committing an act of internal sabotage could be revenge, monetary
gain, mental instability, dissatisfaction with an employer, or personal commitment to a
284
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cause.287 On 18 March 2003 in Marib, Yemen, a carpenter who worked at the oil rig
shot and killed three oil workers and wounded a fourth before killing himself. His
motives appeared to be personal as his colleagues told investigators that he was
suffering from depression and had no political interests.288 In some cases, financial gain
can be the primary motivation and an insider may be willingly selling sensitive
information to third parties including terrorists.
2.10.3 Capabilities and tactics

The main ‘capability’ of insiders is that they have specialised knowledge about the
company and the offshore installation, including its vulnerabilities and security
arrangements. Insiders can exploit privileged access to offshore security zones to
circumvent security safeguards and carry out an insider attack. Specific tactics may
include sabotage of offshore control equipment resulting in a system shutdown,
tampering with essential equipment resulting in system failure, tampering with supplies,
disabling critical equipment or systems, unauthorised access to restricted areas, use of
equipment with malicious intentions, and arson.289
A disgruntled employee may cause the damage personally or in collaboration with
others, including providing intelligence to terrorists or criminal gangs by deliberately or
inadvertently revealing sensitive information.290 The possibility of insider involvement
with other threat groups, such as terrorists, should never be ignored. 291 Insiders can
potentially disclose valuable information to adversaries which can be used in the attack,
including detailed information of each offshore installation in the area with
photographs, layouts, schematics, crew information and details of security
arrangements. Former employees or contractors who have worked on offshore
petroleum installations could retain useful knowledge and sensitive information that
could be used in planning and carrying out an offshore attack. 292 For example, in
February 2006, Iraqi security forces arrested a number of oil protection security guards
who were accused of helping insurgents plan attacks on oil installations in the Kirkuk
287
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area. 293 Similarly, on 28 March 2006 in Saudi Arabia, security forces found and
disarmed two explosive‐laden vehicles that were located at a house occupied by an
employee of an oil company and which displayed the company’s logo.294 This clearly
indicates the involvement of company ‘insiders’ in planning the attack.
It is possible that some offshore employees may be accomplices or members of a
terrorist group, posing as legitimate offshore workers with intent to infiltrate the
industry and carry out attacks against offshore installations. As pointed out by Balaga,
‘there have been several incidents where pirates have been more creative in their
attempts to board, for example, by blending in with a group of port officials or by
masquerading as crew members’.295 The number of daily offshore workers including
platform crew, delivery personnel and offshore support personnel, as well as high
turnover rate of staff and diverse nationalities of offshore workers, increases the
potential for internal sabotage, disclosure of confidential information to external threat
groups, and infiltration by adversaries.296
A trusted insider could also represent an attractive object for recruitment by a terrorist
group with future intent to use their knowledge to carry out an attack against an offshore
installation. 297 As Cook suggested in his study on the global energy market, it is
possible that insiders and people in a position of trust in the oil industry could
conceivably be converted to the ideology of terrorists such as radical Islam. 298 The
famous Soviet KGB phrase ‘Comrades, the enemy is among us!’ is very relevant in this
context, particularly in today’s age of information, industrial espionage, and global
terrorism. This category of offshore security threat supports the argument that some
significant threats to offshore installations may come from within the industry (or from
within the country), rather than from external sources.
In regard to the threat of internal sabotage, the motivations of insiders for committing
acts of internal sabotage may be financial gain, personal commitment to a cause, hatred
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or revenge. Insiders can rely on their knowledge and exploit privileged access in order
to perpetrate potentially devastating sabotage-type attacks on offshore installations.
There have been several reported instances of participation of insiders in attacks against
the petroleum industry, so it is reasonable to say that the gravity risk factor of this threat
is medium, and its probability factor is also medium. The overall risk posed by internal
sabotage is moderate.
2.11 Inter-State hostilities

Certain conduct or actions of individual nation-States may also represent a threat to the
security of offshore petroleum installations. The potential security threats to the
petroleum industry can be in the form of inter-State armed conflicts and wars, maritime
boundary disputes, and State terrorism. ‘Inter-State hostilities’ can cause significant
interferences with offshore petroleum operations and can result in damage to or
destruction of offshore installations. Although this category of threat does not fall
within the scope of the international regulatory framework for the protection and
security of offshore petroleum installations and is not covered in this thesis, it is
addressed here for the sake of completeness.
Petroleum installations are usually an attractive strategic military target during wars and
armed conflicts. Destruction of an enemy’s petroleum installations has the potential to
deprive the enemy of energy supplies and fuel needed to carry out the war and to
devastate the country’s economy, crippling the domestic industries. 299 During World
War II, Nazi Germany’s need for oil compelled Hitler to divert some of his troops from
the northern part of the Soviet front to push through southern Ukraine in order to get
secure access to the oil fields near Baku in the Caspian Sea region, the Soviet oil centre,
which would ensure a reliable supply of oil for the German forces and would cut off the
Soviet supply. 300 It is considered that Nazi Germany’s failed quest to occupy the
Caspian Sea oil region in late 1942 was its first great military setback.301
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Attacks against petroleum installations were also a factor in the Iran-Iraq war of 198088. Oil installations were prime targets from the beginning of the conflict, as both Iran
and Iraq attacked each other’s oil refineries, storage facilities, offshore loading
terminals and other platforms in the Persian Gulf.302 During the war, Iran seized all
offshore platforms in the Dorra oil field managed by the Arabian Oil Company
(AOC),303 and at the conclusion of the war, prior to returning control of the field to the
AOC, explosives were placed on the conductor-casing pipe and detonated, considerably
damaging the conductor.304 In March 1983, Iraqi planes attacked the Iranian offshore
platform at the Nowruz oil field; the damaged platform collapsed, and the oil slick
caught fire.305 Iran’s Kharg Island loading facility and tankers loading there were also
targeted by Iraqi airplanes.306
Another example of hostile State action involving offshore petroleum installations is the
US Navy attack on Iranian offshore installations in 1987 and 1988.307 On 19 October
1987, the US Navy attacked Iranian R-4 and R-7 offshore oil production platforms in
the Reshadat response to an alleged Iranian missile strike on a US-flagged Kuwaiti oil
tanker, Sea Isle City. 308 On 18 April 1988, the US attacked and destroyed Iranian
offshore oil platforms, Salman and Nasr, shortly after the US frigate, USS Samuel B
Roberts was damaged by a mine allegedly belonging to Iran.309 Around the same time,
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Iraq also destroyed several oil platforms at the northern end of the Gulf. The total
estimated economic damage to the Iranian offshore industry was about US$1 billion.310
Similarly, during the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91, almost the
entire petroleum industry of Kuwait was disabled as a result of attacks by Iraqi forces
on the country’s oil fields and other petroleum infrastructure.311 In the last days of the
occupation, Iraqi troops deliberately lit hundreds of fires, blowing up or damaging
approximately 75 per cent of Kuwait’s oil wells. 312 It took almost a whole year to
extinguish all oil well fires and an additional three years for reconstruction of the
industry.313
Even in peace time offshore installations could be potential targets for military strikes,
as illustrated by the incident in Iran in August 2006. On 22 August 2006, the Iranian
Navy fired on and seized control of Orizont offshore drilling rig, owned by the
Romanian oil company, in the Salman field in Iranian waters. 314 At the time of the
incident, there were 26 Romanian offshore workers on board the installation. The
incident was the result of a contractual dispute between petroleum companies and
Iranian troops took direct enforcement action.315
States and international oil companies are competing for access to offshore petroleum
resources. With the coming into force of the LOSC in 1994, conflicting claims to
disputed territories have grown steadily.316 Coastal States are now able to claim an EEZ
extending to 200 nautical miles from their territorial sea baselines, and the continental
shelf areas to a maximum distance of 350 nautical miles from the baseline or 100
310
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nautical miles from the 2500 metres water depth, in which they enjoy exclusive
sovereign rights to exploit oil and gas resources of the seabed. 317 The increasing
competition for offshore petroleum exploitation has already resulted in a number of
offshore boundary disputes and contested claims to offshore areas that contain
significant petroleum reserves.318 Some of these disputes have been settled peacefully,
while others remain a source of conflict and have involved military action or the threat
of military action (which is sometimes referred to as ‘gunboat diplomacy’). 319 Such
maritime boundary disputes and gunboat diplomacies pose a threat to the offshore
petroleum industry because they can halt petroleum operations and, in the most extreme
cases, may result in military attacks on offshore petroleum installations operating in
disputed offshore areas.
There are many regional examples of offshore areas with significant petroleum
prospects being deadlocked for years or decades as a consequence of overlapping
maritime claims. 320 Maritime boundary disputes over access to offshore oil and gas
currently exist in the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea region, in Latin America, and the
Asia-Pacific region. For example, the Caspian Sea is currently subject to disputes
between several States over substantial offshore hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian
basin. In July 2001, Iran deployed a warship and fighter planes to the disputed area in
waters claimed by both Azerbaijan and Iran in order to evict an oil exploration vessel
operating on behalf of British Petroleum under a production sharing agreement (PSA)
granted by Azerbaijan.321
In the Persian Gulf, there are a number of contested offshore areas that have large
petroleum reserves. For example, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait each claim partial
ownership of a huge offshore Dorra natural gas field (also known as the Arash field).322
It is also known that the 1980-88 war between Iraq and Iran, and Iraq’s invasion of
317
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Kuwait in 1990 were also partly due to disputes over oil-producing regions and
competing interests for petroleum resources.323
In Latin America, overlapping offshore claims have also resulted in incidents involving
military action. In the past, the Venezuelan Navy has boarded oil platforms of Trinidad
and Tobago, and fired on Trinidadian vessels in an area claimed by both countries in the
Caribbean Sea.324 In June 2000, the Surinamese Navy gunboats drove out an Americanowned and operated oil drilling rig, CE Thornton, from a disputed area of the
continental shelf claimed by both Guyana and Suriname.325 The oil rig was contracted
by the Canadian corporation CGX Energy, which had received a licence from the
Guyanese government to conduct exploratory drilling in the area.326
In the Asia-Pacific region, there are a number of unresolved maritime boundary
disputes, primarily over offshore petroleum resources. 327 For example, there is an
ongoing dispute between China and Japan over ownership of the Chunxiao natural gas
field (called Shirakaba by the Japanese) in the East China Sea,328 which has resulted in
several military confrontations between the two countries. In February 2005, Japanese
destroyers chased away Chinese exploration vessels in international waters that were
too close to the field claimed by Japan.329 In early 2005, China began drilling in the
Chunxiao field and by early September 2005, patrol planes of Japan’s Navy had
commenced regular flights over Chinese drilling rigs located near the disputed area.330
In response, China sent several missile-armed destroyers and frigates to the area, and at
some point, a gun turret on one of the Chinese ships was aimed at a circling Japanese
plane.331
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There is also a serious dispute between China and Vietnam over offshore petroleum
resources in the South China Sea. In the Gulf of Tonkin and the surrounding parts of the
South China Sea, China has repeatedly conducted offshore drilling for oil and gas in
areas claimed by Vietnam by historical occupation and under the LOSC rules.332 In the
1990s, China and Vietnam began oil exploration in two overlapping and disputed tracts
of the South China Sea known as Wan An Bet and Tu Chinh; and on at least two
occasions, China has deployed warships to stop a Vietnamese drilling rig from working
in the area.333
Another good example is the dispute between Malaysia and Brunei over overlapping
maritime claims. In 2003, both Malaysia’s and Brunei’s offshore licence holders
commenced petroleum operations in the disputed area. The situation escalated and
following a gunboat standoff, all offshore operations in the area were suspended. The
two countries have agreed that ‘they will not authorise petroleum operations until they
resolve their overlapping maritime claims’.334 Some of these disputes can take many
years to resolve or possibly lead to deadlocks. This was the case in the ThailandMalaysia dispute where ‘it took them over 11 years to agree finally on all of the matters
necessary to enable petroleum operations to commence’.335
As illustrated by the above examples, disputes over offshore petroleum resources and
maritime boundaries can result in violent military confrontations between neighbouring
States and cause regional instability.336 There is a growing concern that conflicts over
contested offshore resource areas will become even more heated in the years ahead as
onshore petroleum reserves are depleted and more attention is paid to offshore
reserves.337 The rising demand for petroleum products and their tight supply is likely to
force States to attempt to increase their energy self-sufficiency, which could eventually
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result in more clashes over access to and ownership of disputed offshore territories with
large oil and gas reserves.338
Terrorist acts committed by on behalf of nation-States also pose a threat to offshore
petroleum installations. In the event of a confrontation between nation-States, it is
possible that a State may employ terrorist sleeper groups to attack petroleum
installations of the enemy while maintaining plausible deniability.339 For example, in
the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, Iran made extensive use of ‘proxy-executed’ attacks
carried out by extremist groups against oil tankers and offshore petroleum installations
in the Persian Gulf. 340 Even in the absence of inter-State conflicts and maritime
boundary disputes, some States provide safe havens for criminals and terrorists, who
use those countries as bases of operations and training grounds to export illicit activities
into the maritime domain and into other parts of the world.341 Some foreign States have
been known to supply weapons, ammunition, military technology, equipment and
hardware as well as weapons expertise and warfare training to another hostile State or
terrorist group. 342 As mentioned earlier, the opportunity for pirates and maritime
terrorists to operate is often created by ‘the failure of weak states to deny them safe
havens and free movement at sea … and the accessibility of potential targets in the
waters of such states’.343 For example, the bombing and sinking of the Rainbow Warrior
by French agents in the port of Auckland, New Zealand on 10 July 1985, is regarded by
many New Zealanders as State terrorism.344 In this respect, it could also be said that, in
the case of State terrorism, there is a link between terrorism and nation-States.
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During 1981 to 1984, the US had engaged in both the covert and overt military and
paramilitary operations against Nicaragua.

345

The US directly supported anti-

government insurgents by providing financial and other assistance to them, supplying
weapons, devising their strategy and directing their tactics, which included the use of
terrorism-type tactics.346 It can be argued that this type of conduct on the part of the US
is a form of State terrorism. The types of attacks and hostile activities included mining
seaports, and attacks on oil installations and the naval base.347
2.11.1 Geography and enabling factors

‘Inter-State hostilities’ is a category of threats that is not limited by geographical
factors. Armed conflicts and wars can happen in any part of the world. According to the
US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the prospect of major regional conflicts
erupting and escalating in petroleum producing regions should not be discounted.348
Maritime boundary disputes, on the other hand, tend to be limited to certain
geographical areas such as the South China Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea and
the Arctic Ocean.
2.11.2 Motivations and objectives

In most cases, the objectives of States are political, strategic, and economic. During
armed conflict or war, offshore petroleum installations can be viewed as a strategic
military targets and the motivation may be to cause damage or destroy an offshore
installation in order to deprive the enemy of energy supplies and fuel needed to carry
out the war and to devastate the country’s economy. 349 In the case of disputes over
rights in offshore petroleum resources, the motivation may be economic or political
with the ultimate objective of securing access to petroleum resources that may be vital
to the national economy and energy security.
2.11.3 Capabilities and tactics

Clearly, the capabilities of armed forces of different States vary considerably. However,
most States have sufficient naval or air force capabilities to cause significant damage to
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or complete destruction of an offshore installation. Specific tactics employed by States
may include blocking access to offshore fields in order to prevent offshore activities in
disputed areas, and the use of force including navy attacks, air strikes, use of explosives
and seizure of offshore installations. In the event of armed conflict or war, there is a
potential that a State could resort to terrorism-type tactics by carrying out ‘proxy’
attacks on offshore petroleum installations of the enemy.350
Inter-State hostilities are not limited to any specific geographical area and can occur
anywhere in the world. In the context of oil and gas, the motivations of States are
usually strategic and economic, and the tactics can be either in the form of interferences
with offshore operations in the case of boundary disputes or deliberate targeting and
destruction of offshore installations during armed conflict. Accordingly, depending on
the circumstances, the gravity factor of this threat may be either low or high. Violent or
hostile conduct of States is usually regulated by certain rules of international law
including the rules on the use of force. States may be held responsible and accountable
for actions that contravene rules of international law; therefore, they may be reluctant to
resort to violence against offshore installations in the time of peace and may, instead,
prefer alternative methods of resolving disputes with other States. Therefore, the
probability factor is low during peace time, but it is high during armed conflict or war.
For the purposes of risk rating, on average the gravity factor of inter-State hostilities is
taken to be medium and the average probably factor is also medium. Overall, this threat
category represents a moderate threat to the offshore industry.
2.12 Summary of risks posed by different types of threats

Having examined offshore security threats and their nature, it is now appropriate to
assess the level of risk posed to offshore installations by each category of offshore
security threats. Table 3 below provides a summary of risks posed by offshore security
threats and their risk ratings. The table illustrates that insurgency and terrorism are the
most significant threats to offshore petroleum installations.
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Table 3: Risk Ratings of Offshore Security Threats
Threat Category

Gravity
factor

Probability
factor

Overall Risk
Rating

Geography

Piracy

Low

Low

Minor

Limited

Terrorism

High

Low

Significant

Unlimited

Insurgency

High

High

Significant

Limited

Organised crime

Low

Low

Minor

Limited

Vandalism

Low

Low

Minor

Unlimited

Civil protest

Low

High

Moderate

Unlimited

Internal sabotage

Medium

Medium

Moderate

Unlimited

Inter-State hostilities

Medium

Medium

Moderate

Unlimited

2.13 Links and overlaps between different threat categories

Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse links and possible cooperation
between different security threats in much detail, it is nevertheless useful to briefly
address and summarise the potential links and overlaps between different categories of
security threats.
There have been mixed arguments with respect to the potential links between piracy and
terrorism, and the conflation of piracy and terrorism.351 Some experts and analysts argue
that there is little evidence linking piracy and terrorism, while others argue that there are
enough indicators that point to the linkage between piracy and maritime terrorism.352
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Clearly, both piracy and maritime terrorism involve violence at sea. 353 However,
conflating the two terms is problematic because of the fundamental difference in
motivation of offenders (economic gain versus political gain).354 As discussed in section
2.4 above, the ultimate goal of pirates is financial gain, usually in a form of theft,
robbery, or kidnapping for ransom. Death or injury to the crew or damage to an offshore
installation in a piracy attack may be incidental to the objective of financial gain, while
in a terrorist attack death may be an objective in itself or one of the objectives.355 The
debate continues, but it is generally accepted that piracy is not terrorism. However, in
the context of offshore petroleum security, any cooperation between pirates and terrorist
groups does not mean that they will start mounting joint attacks against offshore
installations.
It should be noted that sometimes there are linkages and possible affiliations between
terrorist groups and insurgents, particularly when these groups have similar ideological
views or strategic objectives. 356 As discussed in section 2.6 above, there are several
differences between insurgency and terrorism. The main similarity between insurgency
and terrorism is the use of terror tactics.357 In addition to conventional military activity,
insurgency groups such as the Sri Lankan LTTE and Chechen insurgents have engaged
in terrorism to further their goals and increase awareness of their cause.358 For example,
353
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this may be interpreted as evidence that Al-Qaeda may also be cooperating with Nigerian insurgents such
as MEND in line with Al-Qaeda’s strategy of attacking the petroleum industry worldwide: Ali Koknar,
‘The Epidemic of Energy Terrorism’ in Gal Luft and Anne Korin (eds), Energy Security Challenges for
the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook (ABC-CLIO, 2009) 18, 23.
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Morris, above n 133, 42. Similarly, Borgu argues that terrorism is a tactic of the insurgent: Borgu,
above n 71, 6–7. Borgu further argues that the US-led ‘global war on terror’ as we know it, is not a war
on terrorism but a campaign against militant Islam, and that the challenge the US faces from Al-Qaeda is
‘more like a global Islamist insurgency rather than international terrorism’: at 7. Murphy notes that it is
important to remember that terrorism is a tactic, and that ‘many of the groups that employ it are better
viewed as insurgents than simply as terrorists’: Murphy, above n 40, 8.
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Hansen, above n 18, 77. See also Ibaba Samuel Ibaba, ‘Terrorism in Liberation Struggles:
Interrogating the Engagement Tactics of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta’ (2011)
5(3-4) Perspectives on Terrorism 18.
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the LTTE is often referred to in the literature as a ‘terrorist organisation’ and has been
designated as a ‘terrorist organisation’ by some countries such as the US,359 but it is
actually a separatist insurgent group rather than a terrorist organisation. According to
Rosenau, ‘the line between terrorism and insurgency is easily blurred, since most
insurgent groups also engage in terrorism’.360 Both terrorism and insurgency are forms
of violence employed by non-State actors usually to further some political objectives.361
Nevertheless, there is still a distinction between insurgent groups that use terrorist
tactics and terrorist organisations as such.362 Some insurgent groups tend to resist being
called terrorists, and are generally reluctant to use terrorism on a large scale.363
While piracy is different from insurgency, there are some links between these two
concepts. Murphy notes that the ‘presence of piracy is a possible indicator that the
conditions exist in the area for maritime insurgency or terrorism to take root’.364 The
practical difficulty of distinguishing insurgency from terrorism and piracy is that, often,
insurgents employ terrorist or piratical tactics to achieve their objectives. Some
insurgent groups, especially those operating in proximity to coastal areas (such as
MEND in Nigeria), have been active in piracy and used piratical methods to raise
money for their campaigns.365 As some experts contend, piracy is a form of criminal
violence while insurgency is a form of political violence.366 Insurgents often operate in
the same areas as pirates, and in some regions both piracy and insurgency are serious
problems which sometimes tend to overlap.367
A number of security experts have suggested that there is an increasing overlap between
contemporary terrorism and organised crime. 368 Sinai argues that piracy, criminal
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Department of State, above n 123, 236.
Rosenau, above n 133, 2–3. Rosenau argues that the term ‘insurgent’ connotes at least some degree of
legitimacy: at 3. Furthermore, terrorism is a tactic that can be perpetrated by persons who belong to any
ethnic, religious or ideological group. See CSCAP, above n 71, 1.
361
Tucker and Lamb, above n 133, 1.
362
Hashim, above n 133, 46.
363
Ibid.
364
Murphy, above n 110, 40.
365
Hansen, above n 18, 77. See also Murphy, above n 25, 161.
366
Murphy, above n 110, 24.
367
For example, Southeast Asia and West Africa.
368
See, eg, Carl Ungerer, ‘Trends in International and Domestic Terrorism’ (Paper presented at the
Safeguarding Australia Summit, Canberra, 3 October 2007) 5. Fort argues that organised crime and
terrorism should not be treated as ‘two separate and mutually exclusive categories’: Fort, above n 41, 26.
See also Annette Hübschle, ‘From Theory to Practice: Exploring the Organised Crime-Terror Nexus in
Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2011) 5(3-4) Perspectives on Terrorism 81, 84–7; Alex Schmid, ‘The Links
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maritime activity, and the use of the sea by terrorist groups are interconnected and ‘need
to be viewed as part of the increasingly frequent linkages between maritime criminal
activities and terrorism’.369 Terrorists often use the same supply, transport, and moneymoving networks used by criminal groups, 370 and they interact with the criminal
underworld for logistical support services.371 Terrorists have also been known to engage
in criminal activities when necessary, usually in order to secure funds and to support
their political agendas,372 but in the past they rarely sought direct or regular contact with
criminal syndicates.

373

In some cases, proceeds of organised crime go to an

interconnected nexus of insurgency, criminal organisations, complicit private
companies, and corrupt government officials.374
Apart from links between terrorism and organised crime, there are also links between
organised crime and piracy, as well as organised crime and insurgency. 375 Murphy
suggests that ‘in a busier and even less regulated maritime world, such functional
relationships between networks of common criminals and insurgents using terrorism
could thrive and their combined skills and resources could present greater challenges to
maritime security’. 376 The fact is that insurgency groups may engage in criminal
activities, sometimes in cooperation with organised criminal syndicates, to fund their

between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorist Crimes’ (1996) 2(2) Transnational Organized
Crime 66; Peng Wang, ‘The Crime-Terror Nexus: Transformation, Alliance, Convergence’ (2010) 6(6)
Asian Social Science 12; Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism (Oxford University Press, 1999) 211;
Tamara Makarenko, ‘The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational
Organised Crime and Terrorism’ (2004) 6(1) Global Crime 129.
369
Joshua Sinai, ‘Future Trends in Worldwide Maritime Terrorism’ (2004) 3(1) The Quarterly Journal
49, 51.
370
Perl, above n 110, 5–6.
371
Hayder Mili, ‘Tangled Webs: Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups’ in Jonathan Hutzley (ed),
Unmasking Terror: A Global Review of Terrorist Activities (Jamestown Foundation, 2007) vol 3, 91. See
also Perl, above n 110, 16.
372
Terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) have been engaged in
activities such as drug trafficking, weapons and human trafficking: Koknar, above n 94, [7]. Casteel also
suggests that that ‘terrorist groups saw organized crime as a tool to be used to meet their political
agenda’, quoted in Bullion, above n 153, 33.
373
Farrell, above n 123, 57. See also US Government, General Accounting Office (GAO), Terrorist
Financing: US Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use of Alternative Financing
Mechanisms (Report to Congressional Requesters, US Congress, 2003). O’Malley and Hutchinson also
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weak and unstable States: Pat O’Malley and Steven Hutchinson, ‘Actual and Potential Links Between
Terrorism and Criminality’ (Trends in Terrorism Series No 5, Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre,
2006).
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Giroux, above n 198, 19–20.
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Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, above n 44.
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Murphy, above n 40, 78. See also Hansen, above n 18, 79.
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operations.377 For example, oil theft (i.e. bunkering) provides an important source of
revenue for insurgents in the Niger Delta.378 Another example of the criminal-political
nexus can be illustrated by the Russian-Chechen conflict in the 1990s where Chechen
rebels were involved in a massive oil theft operation, providing steady income in
support of continued insurgency and paramilitary operations.379
In fact, all four groups of threats discussed above (i.e. piracy, terrorism, insurgency, and
organised crime) overlap to some extent. Violent non-State actors are motivated by a
range of objectives where the distinction between political and criminal motivations is
becoming increasingly blurred. 380 Hansen proposes a ‘four circles model’ for the
assessment of maritime security threats (see Figure 2 below), arguing that
understanding different categories of threats, as well as their distinctions and
interrelationship between them is important, and ‘this holistic approach will result in
greatly improved and useful threat intelligence’.381

Figure 2: The ‘Four Circles Model’ for Maritime Security Threat Assessment

Source: Hans Tino Hansen, ‘Distinctions in the Finer Shades of Gray: The “Four Circles Model” for
Maritime Security Threat Assessment’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds),
Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2008) 73, 78.

In the assessment of security threats to offshore petroleum installations, it is possible to
add an additional three or four circles to Hansen’s model. For example, the circles that
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can be added are ‘vandalism’, ‘civil protest’, ‘inter-State hostilities’ and ‘internal
sabotage’. As shown in Figure 3 below, vandalism and civil protest overlap with
terrorism and insurgency respectively, and with each other. A threat of inter-State
hostilities overlaps with terrorism to some extent, particularly in the case of terrorist
acts committed by or on behalf of States, but inter-State hostilities do not overlap with
any other categories of threats. The internal sabotage threat category can overlap with
any or all of the other categories of threats, but for ease of reading, it is shown
separately from all other threats in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Offshore Security Threats Nexus

4. Conclusions
Offshore petroleum installations have always faced and continue to face a number of
different security threats from violent and non-violent non-State actors as well as from
hostile States. The analysis in this chapter has revealed that offshore security threats
have become more complex and are often interrelated, which makes it more difficult to
categorise and analyse them. The analysis has also shown that not many groups of
adversaries have sufficient capabilities and skills to carry out complex attacks in the
offshore environment, let alone wage a campaign of attacks against offshore petroleum
installations. So far, only a few groups have demonstrated sufficient capabilities to carry
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out attacks on offshore installations or cause non-violent interferences with offshore
petroleum operations.382 Offshore capabilities of many other groups of adversaries are
questionable.
Different security threats require different sets of factors that enable them to exist.
Geographical considerations such as distance from ‘threat centres’, and other enabling
factors (which are also linked to geography) such as economic and political stability of
a given region, regional security environment, and the presence of armed conflicts play
an important role in the assessment of security threats to offshore petroleum
installations. Some threats are confined to specific geographical areas or regions, while
other threats do not have geographical limitations and have a global scope.383
Overall, the analysis in this chapter has shown that the two most significant security
threats to offshore petroleum installations are insurgency and terrorism. Terrorism,
generally, has a global scope and the risk of attacks against oil companies anywhere in
the world by international terrorists (especially those linked to Al-Qaeda) is perceived
to be high by many governments and security analysts. However, some experts argue
that in recent years the probability of occurrence of terrorist attacks against petroleum
installations (especially offshore installations) has been seriously overstated and
exaggerated, and that some of Al-Qaeda’s propaganda statements are often taken
uncritically and perceived as real threats.384 Despite speculations about terrorism as the
major emerging threat, to date, there have been only two unsuccessful terrorist attacks
on offshore installations. It can be argued that terrorism is not the most significant threat
to offshore installations even though it is perceived to be so.
Insurgency, arguably, represents a more significant threat to offshore petroleum
installations than terrorism because offshore installations have been attacked much
more frequently by insurgent groups engaged in armed conflict with their national
382

The Nigerian MEND is responsible for most of violent attacks against the offshore industry, while
Greenpeace is responsible for most of the non-violent interferences with the offshore petroleum industry.
383
Threats that are geographically-specific are: piracy, insurgency, and organised crime. Threats that are
not geographically-specific are: terrorism, vandalism, civil protest, internal sabotage, and inter-State
hostilities.
384
Pavel Baev, ‘Reevaluating the Risk of Terrorist Attack Against Energy Infrastructure in Eurasia’
(2006) 4(2) China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 33, 38. See also John Daly, ‘Saudi Oil Facilities: AlQaeda’s Next Target?’ (2006) 4(4) Terrorism Monitor
<http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=685&tx_ttnews[backPid]=181&no
_cache=1> at 29 July 2009.
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government, or involved in armed struggle against the oil industry, rather than by global
terrorist groups that do not have well-defined territorial objectives. However,
insurgency is a geographically-limited threat which only poses a risk in countries or
regions where insurgency movements exist. This suggests that countries with little or no
domestic insurgency are less likely to be exposed to attacks on their offshore petroleum
installations.
In conclusion, it is important to note that petroleum companies face different security
threats depending on a country or region they operate in, and accordingly, they face a
different level of risk of being attacked. Oil companies operating in economically and
politically unstable countries and in countries with some kind of civil unrest or armed
conflict are more prone to attacks on their offshore installations.385 This, however, does
not mean that companies operating in more stable countries are immune from attacks.
All petroleum producing States should ensure that their offshore petroleum installations
are adequately protected.

385

For example, the analysis of past attacks and security incidents involving offshore installations has
shown that the majority of attacks and violent incidents took place in Nigeria. In particular, out of 60
security incidents that had been identified in the course of this research, 37 took place in Nigeria. See
Appendix B.
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CHAPTER 3
ATTRACTIVENESS OF OFFSHORE PETROLEUM
INSTALLATIONS AS POTENTIAL TARGETS AND SCENARIOS
OF ATTACKS ON OFFSHORE PETROLEUM INSTALLATIONS
1. Introduction
With the increasing number of offshore hydrocarbon developments around the world,
the offshore petroleum industry and its importance and contribution to the global
economy become more widely appreciated. 1 At the same time, many petroleum
producing States (particularly those with significant offshore operations) and their
energy-hungry consumers that are highly dependent on stable petroleum supplies, have
become most deeply concerned with vulnerabilities of offshore petroleum installations
to intentional attacks and the potential impacts that can result from such attacks and
interferences.2
In the current economic climate and tight international energy markets, an attack on a
major offshore production platform or an offshore export terminal could have
immediate and devastating consequences for the global and national economies.
Recognising the inherent vulnerabilities of offshore petroleum installations and the
potential impacts that can be generated from attacks on offshore petroleum installations,
violent non-State actors appear to be showing more interest in attacking offshore
installations.3 It is apparent that, today, offshore petroleum installations have become
more attractive targets for attacks than previously.4 This chapter analyses factors that
make offshore petroleum installations attractive targets. This includes the analysis of
vulnerabilities of offshore petroleum installations to deliberate attacks and the
consequences that can result from attacks on offshore installations. In addition, the
chapter discusses possible attack scenarios against offshore petroleum installations.
1

See Rupert Herbert-Burns, ‘Tankers, Specialized Production Vessels, and Offshore Terminals:
Vulnerability and Security in the International Maritime Oil Sector’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam
Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2008) 133, 150.
2
John Thackrah, Dictionary of Terrorism (Routledge, 2nd ed, 2004) 165.
3
This is evidenced by the statements issued by Al-Qaeda and insurgent groups such as the Movement for
the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), and it is supported by attempted and successful attacks on
offshore petroleum installations by MEND and Al-Qaeda and their affiliates.
4
As illustrated in the introductory chapter, the number of security incidents involving offshore petroleum
installations has generally increased since the beginning of 2004. See discussion in section 1.1 of Chapter
1. See also Appendix B; Mikhail Kashubsky, ‘A Chronology of Attacks on and Unlawful Interferences
with, Offshore Oil and Gas Installations, 1975-2010’ (2011) 5(5-6) Perspectives on Terrorism 139.

89

Chapter 3

Mikhail Kashubsky

The analysis in the chapter starts with a brief discussion of general principles of security
risk assessments and some general offshore petroleum target selection considerations.
This analysis is important to establish the context for the chapter. The chapter then
continues with the examination of target attractiveness factors relating to offshore
petroleum installations. In doing so, vulnerabilities of offshore petroleum installations,
potential consequences of attacks on offshore installations, and some mitigating and
countervailing factors are discussed. Potential attack scenarios against offshore
petroleum installations, their credibility and issues relating to the likelihood of attacks
are discussed in the last part of the chapter.

2. General Security Risk Assessment Principles
It would be very costly and practically impossible (and even unnecessary) to protect all
offshore installations to the same extent. Accordingly, the use of security risk
assessment and risk management principles is an important aspect of the offshore
petroleum industry. Risk assessment is a highly refined process that can involve
specialised technical knowledge and expertise.5
Most risk management policies and principles are orientated towards concentrating
resources against a relatively limited number of attack scenarios, or allocating limited
resources amongst a large number of potential targets; but in general, the security risk
assessment process could include identifying potential perpetrators (which were
discussed in Chapter 2), vulnerabilities and risk sites, establishing risk boundaries,
evaluating ramifications, and developing prevention plans.6 It is sufficient to mention
that, as one of the foundational concepts of the risk analysis, a risk of attack exists when
a person or group has the capability and intent to present a threat of attack on a
vulnerable target in a manner which would have consequences of concern to people or a
country. 7 Some security analysts have suggested that ‘clear perspectives on the

5

Neal Adams, Terrorism & Oil (PennWell, 2003) 118. Audun Brandsater, ‘Risk Assessment in the
Offshore Industry’ (2002) 40 Safety Science 231; Lee Cordner, ‘Offshore Oil and Gas Industry Security
Risk Assessment: An Australian Case Study’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr
(eds), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2008) 169, 177–9.
6
Adams, above n 5, 118.
7
Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security, United States (US) House of Representatives,
Washington DC, 24 June 2008, 1 (Henry Willis).
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likelihood of specific types of maritime terrorist attacks are essential for prioritising
national offshore and maritime counter-terrorism activities’.8
To determine which offshore petroleum installations should receive the greatest
attention, it is necessary to undertake a security risk assessment. It is not the purpose of
this chapter to examine risk assessment principles or models in detail, but rather to
focus on some individual aspects of the risk assessment process such as target
attractiveness factors, vulnerabilities and potential consequences of attacks. In assessing
attractiveness of offshore petroleum installations, as well as the likelihood of attacks on
offshore petroleum installations, it is also important to take into account the target
selection considerations of perpetrators. Some of these target selection considerations
will now be discussed in the context of the offshore oil and gas industry.

3. Offshore Petroleum Target Selection Considerations
Target selection is a complex process that involves strategic, ideological and tactical
considerations; and it largely depends on the motivations and capabilities of
perpetrators.9 In the initial stages, several targets will usually be considered.10 From the
operational perspective, specific factors that can influence target selection include the
chances of an attack succeeding, access to location, existing security measures and
available escape routes.11 For example, an offshore petroleum installation that shows
signs of serious security arrangements or poses significant operational challenges may
be discounted in favour of easier targets.12
From the ideological perspective, relevant considerations can include the real
consequences of the attack, the effects on general uncertainty, fears of insecurity, and

8

Paul Parfomak and John Frittelli, ‘Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attack and Protection
Priorities’ (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, US Congress, 2007) 15.
9
Aaron Shull, ‘Assessment of Terrorist Threats to the Canadian Energy Sector’ (Critical Energy
Infrastructure Protection Policy Research Series No 4-2006, Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security
Studies, March 2006) 21.
10
See, eg, Australian Government, Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS), Offshore
Oil & Gas Risk Context Statement (2005) 13–14.
11
Brynjar Lia and Ashild Kjok, ‘Energy Supply as Terrorist Targets? Patterns of “Petroleum Terrorism”
1968-99’ in Daniel Heradstveit and Helge Hveem (eds), Oil in the Gulf: Obstacles to Democracy and
Development (Ashgate, 2004) 100, 103.
12
Robert Charm, ‘Terrorists See Offshore as Tempting Target’ (1983) January Offshore 62, 65.
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perceived risk within societies or industries targeted. 13 In the case of terrorism,
assuming that most terrorist groups want to inflict serious damage in either real or
symbolic terms, an attack on remote sections of pipelines may not be selected even
though attacks on pipelines are easier to execute.14 Instead, a more difficult target such
as an offshore export terminal may be selected, based on ideological motivations.
Pippard has commented that younger generation jihadists within Al-Qaeda, while highly
motivated and ready to die for their cause, seek high profile targets to justify their
death.15
From a strategic point of view, Al-Qaeda has already proclaimed a strategy of targeting
petroleum-related interests, which is confirmed by its statements such as ‘[w]e are
continuing the same policy to make the US bleed profusely to the point of
bankruptcy’,16 and ‘I call upon the mujahideen to focus their attacks on the stolen oil of
the Muslims’.17 These statements are supported by the religious ruling of Sheik Abd alAziz bin Rashid al-Anzi, which provides religious justification for attacking petroleum
installations.18 Such statements indicate that attacking petroleum installations is part of
the strategy of Al-Qaeda to inflict significant economic damage against western
economies.
Similarly, the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) has declared a
strategy of attacking petroleum installations in Nigeria including those located offshore
in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, in June 2008, shortly after the attack on Bonga

13

Magne Torhaug, ‘Petroleum Supply Vulnerability Due to Terrorism at North Sea Oil and Gas
Infrastructures’ in Konstantin Frolov and Gregory Baecher (eds), Protection of Civilian Infrastructure
from Acts of Terrorism (Springer, 2006) 73, 77.
14
Shull, above n 9, 21.
15
Tim Pippard, ‘“Oil-Qaeda”: Jihadist Threats to the Energy Sector’ (2010) 4(3) Perspectives on
Terrorism 3, 11. Pippard further notes that ‘operations targeting easily repaired oil pipelines may simply
lack the glamour required to satisfy the urge of younger Al-Qaeda martyrs’: at 11.
16
This statement was made by Osama bin Laden. See Brian Whitaker, ‘Al-Qaida is Bleeding US to
Bankruptcy, Bin Laden Claims’, The Guardian (online), 3 November 2004
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/nov/03/usa.alqaida> at 10 October 2010.
17
Excerpts from an interview with Al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, conducted on the fourth
anniversary of 11 September 2001 (9/11), The Middle East Media Research Institute, Newly-Released
Video of Al-Qaeda’s Deputy Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Interview with Al-Sahab TV (8 December
2005) <http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1550.htm#_edn1> at 13 October 2010.
18
According to the fatwa issued by Abd al-Aziz bin Rashid al-Anzi entitled Targeting Petroleum-Related
Interests and a Review of the Law Pertaining to the Economic Jihad, targeting oil-related interests is
legitimate economic jihad under the ruling: Evan Kohlmann, Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia: Excerpts from
“The Laws of Targeting Petroleum-Related Interests” (2006) Global Terror Alert
<http://www.globalterroralert.com/images/documents/pdf/0306/oiljihad0306.pdf> at 16 September 2010.
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floating production, storage and offloading unit (FPSO), the MEND commander issued
a media statement:
the truth is that [oil companies] are taking their production offshore, where they think that
the military will protect them, that is part of the reason we went there to tell them that no
place is safe for them in the Niger-Delta … I have told you that we will cripple the oil
facilities in the region … And because we have made our point by coming to where they
think we cannot get to, I decided to tell the other fighters that we should go. If not, we were
armed with enough Rocket Propelled Grenades and other weapons to bring it down … We
know everything about FPSO before we went there. Nobody should delude himself ...19

The above statement gives some insights into the target selection process of
perpetrators. However, another key factor that plays a role in offshore target selection is
attractiveness of a target (i.e. an offshore installation) being considered for an attack, as
well as the relative attractiveness of alternative targets.20 It is reasonable to assume that
from a strategic and ideological point of view, violent perpetrators are more interested
in targeting key offshore installations that are of significant strategic and economic
value, and which are generally more likely to cause considerable impacts if attacked.
More specifically, factors such as the volume of daily petroleum production or export
capacity may be determinative factors for attackers when selecting which particular
offshore installation to attack.21
Factors that make offshore petroleum installations attractive targets for attacks will now
be discussed in more detail. It is important to note that each offshore petroleum
installation has its own unique characteristics. Therefore, attractiveness factors of each
offshore installation may be different. The following section analyses attractiveness
factors that generally apply to all offshore petroleum installations.

19

Emma Amaize, Kingsley Omonubi and Uduma Kalu, Attack on Bonga – MEND Reveals How Its Men
Carried Out Raid (28 June 2008) All Africa <http://allafrica.com/stories/200806280011.html> at 16
September 2008, cited and quoted in Mikhail Kashubsky, ‘Offshore Energy Force Majeure: Nigeria’s
Local Problem with Global Consequences’ (2008) 160 Maritime Studies 20, 24.
20
Torhaug, above n 13, 79.
21
Murphy suggests that ‘it makes more sense for terrorist groups to attack production facilities, oil and
gas terminals and refineries than to target tankers’: Martin Murphy, ‘Contemporary Piracy and Maritime
Terrorism’ (2007) 47(338) Adelphi Papers 1, 57.
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4. Attractiveness of Offshore Petroleum Installations as Targets
There are a number of factors that make offshore petroleum installations attractive
targets. Attractiveness is a surrogate measure for likelihood of attack, and it is a
composite estimate of the perceived value of a target to a specific adversary. 22 The
attractiveness of each specific target should be evaluated based on the adversary’s
intentions or anticipated level of interest in the target.23 Violent non-State actors can
identify a number of benefits in attacking offshore petroleum installations.
Raymond has noted in regard to the maritime industry that ‘Australian maritime
commercial shipping and ports are not only attractive targets because they are Western
but also because an attack against [such targets] has the potential to do immense
damage in a number of different ways’.24 The same analogy can be made with respect to
offshore petroleum installations. For example, as Herbert-Burns has commented in
relation to vulnerabilities and the attractiveness of FPSOs:
From the perspective of the vulnerability of the facility (its location notwithstanding),
its high capital value, the quantity of oil in storage (the larger units can store 2 million
barrels of oil), and the oil being lifted from the seabed, this is an attractive target for
would-be terrorists or insurgents with sufficient offshore reach and operational
capabilities.25

Attractiveness of offshore petroleum installations is inevitably linked to vulnerabilities
of offshore installations and potential consequences of attacks. Factors that influence
the attractiveness of offshore petroleum installations can generally be grouped into two
categories: the type of target factors and the type of effect factors. The ‘type of target’
factors are essentially vulnerabilities of offshore petroleum installations and the ‘type of
effect’ factors are potential impacts of attacks. Vulnerabilities of offshore petroleum
installations are discussed in the following section and section 4.2 examines potential
impacts of attacks on offshore installations.

22

American Petroleum Institute (API), Security Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum
and Petrochemical Industries (2nd ed, 2004) 3–4.
23
Ibid.
24
Catherine Raymond, ‘Maritime Terrorism, A Risk Assessment: The Australian Example’ in Joshua Ho
and Catherine Raymond (eds), The Best of Times, the Worst of Times (World Scientific Publishing, 2005)
179, 200–201.
25
Herbert-Burns, above n 1, 150.
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4.1 Vulnerabilities of offshore petroleum installations (type of target factors)

Offshore petroleum installations have a number of vulnerabilities. ‘Vulnerability is any
weakness that can be exploited by an adversary to gain access and damage or steal an
asset or disrupt a critical function. It is a variable that indicates the likelihood of a
successful attack given the intent to attack an asset.’26 Vulnerability is also a measure of
the susceptibility to harm. 27 Vulnerabilities can result from weaknesses in current
management practices, physical design, operational practices, security measures,
location and other factors. 28
Vulnerabilities are important considerations in determining the attractiveness of
offshore petroleum installations as targets. In this thesis, vulnerabilities of offshore
installations are grouped into the following categories: 1) readily available information
about offshore petroleum installations; 2) sensitive equipment and components on board
offshore installations; 3) sensitive products and materials handled at offshore sites; 4)
dense concentration and interconnectivity of offshore installations; 5) location of
offshore petroleum installations; 6) insufficient security arrangements; 7) stationary
position of offshore installations; 8) high turnover and diversity of offshore staff; and 9)
cyber vulnerabilities of offshore installations.
4.1.1 Readily available information about offshore petroleum installations

It can be argued that readily available and easily accessible information about offshore
petroleum installations is an area of vulnerability. Technical information and
promotional literature on offshore petroleum installations is publicly available from
government agencies, oil companies, industry periodicals, official discussion papers and
academic research data. Such information is often easily accessible through the internet.
These sources often provide strategically useful information on topics such as details of
offshore oil and gas projects and offshore installations, functionality of offshore
petroleum installations, maps and diagrams sometimes giving precise locations of
existing offshore installations, and information on vulnerabilities of offshore petroleum

26

API, above n 22, 3.
DOTARS, Offshore Security Assessment Guidance Paper (2005) 42.
28
API, above n 22, 5; US Government, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (2006) 35.
27
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installations that often highlights their weakness and security deficiencies. 29 For
example, the aerial footage of Al Basrah Oil Terminal (ABOT), which is one of the
world’s most strategic oil export terminals, is readily available on the internet, and can
be used by perpetrators to plan attacks.30
As it was noted in the Al-Qaeda training manual recovered in Afghanistan: ‘Using
public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at
least 80 per cent of all information required about the enemy’.31 Locations of offshore
petroleum installations are often marked on navigational charts. In fact, as discussed in
Chapter 5, it is a requirement under international law for coastal States to give due
notice and disseminate information on location and position of offshore petroleum
installations in the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), on the continental
shelf and on the high seas.32 For instance, after the attack on Bonga FPSO in June 2008,
MEND had claimed that it has the map and chart of all offshore installations in the
Niger Delta and knows the topography of the area.33
4.1.2 Sensitive equipment and components on board offshore petroleum
installations

From a structural and technical standpoint, offshore petroleum installations are
vulnerable to deliberate attacks. Offshore installations usually have sensitive equipment
and components on board, especially production facilities such as fixed production
platforms and FPSOs. Sensitive components include process units, oil/water/gas
separation modules and associated control systems, power generators, water injection
pumps, gas compression units, product storage tanks, boilers, turbines, process heaters,
computer systems and network devices. These features represent an area of
vulnerability of offshore petroleum installations.
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Robert Denton, ‘Protection of Offshore Energy Assets’ (1976) December Naval Engineers Journal 87,
90; Stephen Ulph, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Islamist Insurgency’ in Erich Marquardt (ed), Saudi Arabian Oil
Facilities: The Achilles Heel of the Western Economy (Jamestown Foundation, 2006) 13, 15.
30
The video footage of Al Basrah Oil Terminal (ABOT) can be found at the following link
<http://wn.com/Al_Basrah_Oil_Terminal> at 30 January 2011.
31
See Ulph, above n 29, 15.
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833
UNTS 3, (entered into force 16 November 1994) (‘LOSC’) arts 24(2), 60(3), 147(2)(a); Convention on the
Continental Shelf 1958, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 499 UNTS 311 (entered into force 10 June
1964) (‘Continental Shelf Convention’) art 5(5). See also International Maritime Organization (IMO),
Safety Zones and Safety of Navigation around Offshore Installations and Structures, A Res 671(16),
Agenda Item 10, IMO Doc A Res.A.671(16) (19 October 1989).
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In addition, many offshore petroleum installations have accommodation quarters,
helicopter decks, mooring systems, off-loading pumping systems, and gas flare towers.
However, not many offshore installations have adequately integrated security
monitoring and defences into their systems in order to safeguard sensitive equipment
from an intentional malicious act. 34 As noted by Crocker, offshore petroleum
installations ‘comprise hundreds of one-off design elements, the loss of any of which
could bring operations to a sudden and costly halt’. 35 The potential adversaries may
choose to exploit these vulnerabilities and focus their assault on critical equipment or
systems of an offshore installation in order to render it non-operational or useless.
4.1.3 Sensitive products and materials handled at offshore sites

Another vulnerability of offshore petroleum installations relates to sensitive products
and materials processed, produced, stored and handled on offshore installations and at
offshore sites.36 The nature and chemical properties of petroleum and other materials
handled on board offshore installations offer the potential to create a large explosion
and fire from a small explosive device, which could cause substantial damage to an
installation.37 Perpetrators can also take advantage of the flammable fluids and gases as
well as other toxic materials handled and processed on offshore installations, and use
them as the explosive component of the attack.38 Oil and gas can burn at extremely high
temperatures for extended periods of time, and if it was accidentally or intentionally
ignited during an attack, it could completely melt down the installation.39
Physical properties of oil and gas wells are also an area of vulnerability of offshore
installations. Many offshore installations are able to produce petroleum from multiple
wells, simultaneously. In some cases, production from as many as 30 subsea wells can
be handled by a single installation.40 High-pressure wells generally have higher flow
rates, and blowout control operations for high-pressure wells usually require more time
34

Michael Penders and William Thomas, ‘Ecoterror: Rethinking Environmental Security After
September 11’ (2002) 16 National Resources & Environment 159.
35
Michael Crocker, ‘Platforms, Pipelines, and Pirates’ (2007) 51(6) Security Management 76, 82.
36
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37
David Osler, ‘Keeping Pin in a Timebomb of Oil and Gas’, Lloyd’s List DCN (Sydney), 18 August
2005, 9.
38
DHS, The National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005) 4.
39
Adams, above n 5, 118.
40
For example, when fully operational, a floating production, storage and offloading unit (FPSO) at Usan
oil field in Nigeria will be connected to 42 subsea wells (including 23 production wells and 19 water and
gas injection wells) by subsea lines and risers: Net Resources International, Usan Oilfield, Nigeria
Offshore Technology <http://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/usan/> at 27 October 2010.
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and effort. A ruptured offshore oil and gas well is much more difficult to control than an
onshore well of equivalent properties and capacity. 41 If a high-pressure well was
ignited, it would be very difficult to put out the fire and the extreme heat temperatures
will delay first response efforts.42
A fitting illustration of this type of vulnerability is the Deepwater Horizon incident in
April 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico, where a well blowout resulted in an explosion on
board an offshore installation and subsequent loss of the installation, eleven human
casualties, and the largest oil spill in the history of the United States (US). 43 The
response teams were unable to extinguish the burning drilling rig for about 1.5 days,
after which the installation had sunk. 44 A similar example is the Montara project
incident in the Timor Sea in November 2009, where an uncontrolled release of oil
occurred.45 During the operations to stop the leak, the Montara wellhead platform and a
nearby West Atlas offshore rig accidentally caught fire.46 The installations were burning
for two days until the fire was extinguished.47 While these incidents were not caused
deliberately, they demonstrate the volatile properties of offshore oil and gas wells.
4.1.4 Dense concentration and interconnectivity of offshore petroleum
installations

Some offshore petroleum installations are located in close proximity to one another and
are often interlinked. While it can make the protection of offshore installations easier,
on the other hand, dense concentration of some offshore petroleum installations is an
area of vulnerability.48 Close proximity of some offshore installations to one another
makes it easier for perpetrators to carry out simultaneous attacks, and can make
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installations more vulnerable to large-scale disruption.

49

Offshore petroleum

installations often form a technical interconnected network. 50 For example, as shown in
Figure 4 below, the Amenam-Kpono offshore project in Nigeria consists of three
wellhead platforms (AMD1, AMD2 and AMD3), two large production platforms (AMP1
and AMP2), a living quarters platform (AMQ) and two tripod platforms (AMT1 and
AMT2) bearing one flare.51 In addition, the entire field is linked to the floating storage
and offloading unit (FSO) Unity and another production platform (ODP1) at the nearby
Odudu offshore field. 52 Damage to or destruction of one of the main production
platforms caused by an attack could render the entire offshore project non-operational.
Sometimes offshore installations in adjacent offshore fields are tied into the same
petroleum gathering schemes using an interconnected pipeline system, which arguably
makes the entire system vulnerable to an attack.53
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See Martin Rudner, ‘Protecting North America’s Energy Infrastructure Against Terrorism’ (2006) 19
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October 2010.
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focused around the EA offshore field using a riser platform which serves as the hub of an extensive
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Figure 4: Amenam/Kpono Oil and Gas Export Project Schematic

Source: Total Nigeria, Amenam/Kpono First Oil (2004)
<www.ng.total.com/media/pdf/total_amenam_kpono.pdf> at 28 October 2010.

One example of such vulnerability, although not caused by a deliberate attack, is the
Piper Alpha disaster that occurred in the North Sea in 1988 where about 30 offshore
wells flowed after the explosion destroyed the platform.54 Piper Alpha was connected
by subsea pipelines to the neighbouring Claymore and Tartan platforms and MCP-01
gas processing platform.55 After the initial explosion, gas risers started to fail which
resulted in additional explosions and oil and gas from Tartan and Claymore platforms
continued to be pumped directly to Piper Alpha, fuelling the fire. 56 This factor
substantially increased the severity of the disaster.
4.1.5 Location of offshore petroleum installations

Remote location of most offshore petroleum installations is a vulnerability that can be
exploited by perpetrators.57 Some offshore installations are located over 100 kilometres
offshore. For example, Perdido floating spar platform operates about 200 nautical miles
offshore in the Gulf of Mexico, producing oil and natural gas.58 The isolated open-water
54
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56
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58
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Facility (31 March 2010)
<http://www.shell.com/home/content/media/news_and_media_releases/2010/perdido_starts_production_
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location of offshore installations makes them vulnerable to attacks. Lone offshore
installations in the remote areas are hard to defend because of large distances from the
interdiction and response capabilities.59 In the event of an attack, it may take some time
for maritime security forces to arrive and provide emergency assistance. As noted by
Herbert-Burns, the isolation of some offshore installations ‘has in effect induced greater
vulnerability as protective or reactionary assistance, if it were not already on-station,
would take time to reach the unit in the event of an assault’.60 Most offshore petroleum
installations are located on the continental shelf and in the EEZ at distances between 12
and 200 nautical miles from the coast. 61 This is the area of the sea where there is
freedom of international navigation and where much commercial fishing takes place. In
light of these issues, remote offshore petroleum installations are considered vulnerable
targets.
Whilst, generally, most offshore petroleum installations are located at a considerable
distance, as noted in the preceding paragraph, it is also true that some of the older ones
are located relatively close to land. This proximity factor means that offshore petroleum
installations that are located in close proximity to land are also vulnerable and attractive
targets. Such offshore installations may be more prone to attacks because attacks in
close proximity to land do not require having sophisticated maritime skills and
capabilities.62 For example, on 31 July 2000, about thirty-five armed young men from a
village in Nigeria’s Bayela State used a fairly primitive rowboat to reach an offshore
installation located not far from land.63 Gunmen boarded the installation and took 165
oil workers hostage, demanding that the company employ more Nigerian nationals and
pay a fee to the local community for exploiting its petroleum resources.64

31032010.html> at 6 February 2011; Net Resources International, Perdido Regional Host Development,
Gulf of Mexico, USA (2010) Offshore Technology <http://www.offshoretechnology.com/projects/perdido/> at 6 February 2011.
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Close proximity to land means that offshore petroleum installations are located in
waters where thousands of small craft, such as recreational fishing boats and other
motorised boats, move about on legitimate business,65 and any of those boats may carry
terrorists, insurgents and other adversaries.66 According to the Australian Government’s
report, offshore installation operators institute advance shutdown procedures at a
distance of ten nautical miles if an approaching vessel of significant size does not
respond to repeated radio communications.67
4.1.6 Insufficient security arrangements for offshore petroleum installations

Another area of vulnerability relates to insufficient security arrangements for offshore
petroleum installations. In recent years, security arrangements of many iconic onshore
targets, such as embassies, have been significantly hardened. However, not many
physical safeguards exist to protect offshore petroleum installations from deliberate
human intervention, such as sabotage or a terrorist attack.

68

Offshore petroleum

installations are highly visible, easily recognisable and relatively easily accessible types
of targets.69 Access control to offshore installations is often lax and many installations
lack essential self-defence capabilities. This arguably makes offshore petroleum
installations ‘soft targets’ that are relatively easy to attack.70
The protection of offshore installations poses some unique challenges. The vast number
of offshore installations makes it difficult, if not impossible, to provide endemic
security coverage round the clock. 71 In some areas, such as the Gulf of Guinea, the
capabilities of maritime security forces are insufficient to provide adequate protection to
offshore installations.72 Many offshore petroleum installations are unmanned and most
offshore installations have no security force. Unmanned offshore petroleum installations
may not necessarily be visited or even observed for days, which is the case with many
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wellhead platforms. 73 Therefore, tight access control is very important for offshore
installations located in the high-risk areas, especially in the case of unmanned offshore
installations.74
There are also weaknesses in the international legal framework for security of offshore
installations. For example, international law allows coastal States to establish safety
zones around offshore installations located on the continental shelf and in the EEZ to a
maximum breadth of 500 metres.75 However, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, the
concept of safety zones was adopted to minimise accidental collisions between ships
and offshore installations and a 500-metre breadth of safety zones is too narrow to
protect offshore petroleum installations from deliberate attacks.
4.1.7 Stationary position of offshore petroleum installations

Another significant vulnerability of offshore installations is their stationary position. It
has been reported that most vessels and offshore installations which have been attacked
had one common characteristic – they were not moving or were moving slowly at the
time of the attacks.76 Unlike ships, most offshore petroleum installations are unable to
manoeuvre away from danger.77 Fixed offshore petroleum installations, such as fixed
production platforms and fixed offshore loading terminals, are by definition fixed to the
seabed. They remain in the same position until decommissioned. This makes fixed
offshore structures vulnerable to attacks. Mobile offshore petroleum installations, such
as mobile drilling rigs, FSOs and FPSOs, while not permanently attached to the seabed,
are unable to move rapidly. When mobile drilling rigs and drill ships are engaged in
drilling, they are essentially static, and thus, are also vulnerable to assault from
adversaries.78 It should also be noted that, in some cases, access to offshore installations
including FPSOs and FSOs has been gained by perpetrators through offshore supply
vessels moored alongside an installation or tug boats ordered up close.79
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4.1.8 High turnover and diversity of offshore staff

Offshore petroleum installations are vulnerable to acts of sabotage and other malicious
acts by company insiders. The offshore oil and gas industry has a large and diverse
international labour force, and high turnover of staff, which makes it vulnerable to
infiltration by terrorists or other perpetrators posing as offshore workers or as members
of other offshore industry participants.80 As Breemer pointed out, ‘implicit in a high
turnover rate in the offshore workforce is the heightened potential for penetration by
terrorist[s]’.81 A review of previous maritime and petroleum-related security incidents
reveals that a number of attacks were carried out with the assistance of accomplices
who were insiders of the industry.82 A terrorist could potentially sign up and go out for
manual labour by posing as a legitimate offshore worker or could use forged
documents, such as identification cards, to gain access to an offshore installation. For
example, in Saudi Arabia, following the February 2006 attack on the Abqaiq oil refinery
by Al-Qaeda’s affiliates, Saudi security forces carried out a number of raids and
recovered a vehicle allegedly used in the attack along with stolen licence plates, forged
documents, maps, computers and communication equipment.83 The fact that company
vehicles were used in the attack indicates that terrorists at the very least had access to
company assets and that company insiders may have been involved.84
There are also many intermediaries involved in the industry, such as offshore service
providers, that come in contact with offshore petroleum installations, which potentially
increases the vulnerability factor that can be exploited by perpetrators.85 For example,
on 18 March 2003 in Yemen, a carpenter who worked as a contractor at the oil rig,
killed three and wounded one of his colleagues using a gun.86 Although this is not an
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offshore incident, it demonstrates that being an ‘insider’, he was able to carry a gun past
security and onto the site. This vulnerability can be reduced by effective security
screening of employees and contractors prior to their transportation to offshore
installations. Access controls, such as the protection of company supplied identification
cards as well as security of other sensitive information, are critical. 87 In addition, a
vetting process of potential employees and contractors established throughout the entire
industry would reduce the potential exposure of offshore installations to insiders with
hostile intent and other adversaries.88
4.1.9 Cyber vulnerabilities of offshore petroleum installations

Information technology is a very important part of the modern offshore oil and gas
industry. 89 Offshore petroleum installations are very complex structures from a
technological standpoint. Controlling such structures usually requires many pieces of
equipment to be monitored. The increased reliance on computers and networks to
control and maintain offshore installations, coupled with advances in information
technology, represents another area of vulnerability of offshore petroleum
installations.90 The vulnerability of offshore petroleum installations has increased due to
the rapid uptake of information technologies and because different elements of the
offshore petroleum infrastructure are now much more linked with each other. 91 The
interdependencies between various parts of network systems of offshore installations
(e.g. those controlling the distribution and flow of oil and gas) make them relatively
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vulnerable to cyber attacks.92 As mentioned above, there is usually a lot of sensitive
equipment on board offshore installations:93 appropriate balance of flows, temperature
levels, and pressures to be regularly checked and maintained to ensure safe operation of
offshore installations. 94 The interconnected computer networks provide opportunities
for hackers to access these systems more easily, through which they can deactivate
alarms, start or stop equipment, change critical system settings and cause other
interferences.95
The monitoring and controlling operations of many offshore installations are based on
industrial control systems, such as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA),96
which are used in the petroleum industry operations globally. These systems are largely
automated and heavily reliant on computers and networks, which makes them
vulnerable to malicious software and hacker intrusions, including implantation of faulty
data, and to remote access through modems used for maintenance.97 SCADA systems
that are widely used in the offshore petroleum industry have improved system
interconnections and efficiencies, but at the same time this has significantly increased
system vulnerabilities to external electronic attacks.
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periodically by engineers and technical staff through telecommunications links.99 As
noted by East and Bailey, the computer systems used on offshore petroleum
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installations (such as SCADA) were originally developed purely for functional and
operational purposes with little attention paid to security; thus many SCADA networks
are susceptible to misuse and vulnerable to cyber attacks.100
In many cases, it is problematic to implement new security controls to reduce the known
security vulnerabilities. 101 Hackers and cybercriminals with relatively low levels of
hacking skills have taken advantage of easy vulnerabilities in the past, and it is
reasonable to assume that new instances will take place where perpetrators exploit cyber
vulnerabilities in control systems of offshore installations.102 For example, it has been
reported that in December 2006 malicious software that automatically scans for control
system vulnerabilities was made available on the internet for use by cybercriminals,
which can enable individuals with little knowledge about infrastructure control systems
to locate a control system connected to the internet, and quickly identify its security
vulnerabilities. 103 The increasing frequency and severity of hacker attacks and other
cyber attacks, stipulates that the petroleum industry should enhance the cyber security
of its infrastructure despite the lack of industry-mandated cyber security regulations.104
4.1.10 Summary of vulnerabilities of offshore petroleum installations

Offshore installations are intrinsically vulnerable to deliberate attacks. Perpetrators
always look for new ways to exploit vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the existing
security measures, 105 and a well-coordinated attack ‘can exploit a combination of
physical, technological and human weaknesses’.

106

Vulnerabilities of offshore

petroleum installations make them attractive targets for adversaries with offshore
capabilities and experience in conducting maritime attacks.107 It has been asserted that
heightened security awareness can be a major factor in reducing vulnerabilities of
offshore petroleum installations and minimising the likelihood of an attack being
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successfully mounted.108 However, despite the attractiveness of offshore installations as
potential targets and their inherent vulnerabilities, few private or national oil companies
and governments made any significant preparations to enhance security of their offshore
petroleum installations, particularly in terms of physical security arrangements for the
protection of offshore installations.
4.2 Impacts of attacks on offshore petroleum installations (type of effect
factors)

The ‘type of effect’ attractiveness factors are essentially potential impacts or
consequences that may be caused by attacks.109 Consequences can be defined as ‘the
potential adverse impacts to a facility, the local community and/or the nation as a result
of a successful attack.’ 110 Consequences can also be defined as ‘the outcomes of an
event expressed qualitatively and quantitatively, being loss, injury, disadvantage or
gain’.111 The potential consequences of attacks on offshore petroleum installations can
be quite severe and wide-ranging. 112 According to the American Petroleum Institute
(API), ‘[t]he severity of the consequences of a security event at a facility is generally
expressed in terms of the degree of injury or damage that would result if there were a
successful attack’.113
The history of attacks on oil and gas installations indicates that perpetrators usually only
inflict local impacts and disruptions, some of considerable severity, but in many cases
that is quite sufficient for the groups staging them.114 However, to date, there have been
no attacks that have had long-term impacts on the world’s energy market as a whole.115
As Herbert-Burns notes:
Although the large scale impact to the host country and the world oil market of an
attack or hostage-taking on an FPSO would probably be very limited in scale and
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duration in the event production was halted, the destruction of such a facility could
likely cause extensive loss of life on board, have serious consequences for the operating
[company], and send shockwaves through the marine insurance market. Such an attack
would also probably result in a serious environmental problem in the form of an oil
spill.116

Some writers have stated that ‘the impact of attacks on oil interests is limited compared
to other factors such as war and civil conflicts, political instability, regime change,
export restriction [and] the closure of trade routes’.117 Arguably, this is a sceptical view
considering the growing number of offshore attacks and security incidents, as well as
the emerging trends in maritime and offshore security threats (which were discussed in
Chapter 2). The potential consequences of attacks on offshore petroleum installations
discussed in this section could be local, regional and global, and can be quite substantial
in some cases. Terrorist groups today, especially Al-Qaeda, are becoming increasingly
interested in impacts that are potentially global, not local.118 Insurgency groups such as
MEND are also often interested in achieving notable impacts from their attacks against
offshore petroleum installations in the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea.
In this thesis, the potential consequences are grouped into the following categories: 1)
human death and/or injury; 2) damage to or destruction of offshore petroleum
installations; 3) environmental harm; 4) process interruptions and production
shutdowns; 5) petroleum supply disruptions and possible shortages; 6) financial costs
and losses; 7) petroleum price rises and market fluctuations; 8) economic externalities
and interdependency effects; 9) public opinion and confidence; and 10) geopolitical
impacts and foreign relations.
4.2.1 Human death and/or injury

Attacks on offshore petroleum installations can result in loss of human life or injuries. A
number of people have been killed and injured as a result of attacks on offshore
petroleum installations. The analysis of past attacks has shown that at least eight of 60
116
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security incidents involving offshore installations resulted in human casualties.119 For
example, one of the consequences of the attacks on ABOT and Khawr Al Amaya Oil
Terminal (KAAOT) in Iraq on 24 April 2004, was that two US Navy sailors and one US
Coastguardsman were killed and four others were injured. 120 This example indicates
that no substantial human casualties resulted from those offshore attacks. Nevertheless,
attacks on some offshore petroleum facilities present a potential for inflicting more
human casualties. On 10 June 2008, nine Nigerian soldiers were killed and four
civilians wounded in the attack on the oil facility near Port Harcourt in Nigeria.121
Some of the larger offshore petroleum installations (many of which can accommodate
over 200 persons) potentially provide an opportunity for inflicting large number of
casualties,

122

but only a limited number of offshore installations (those that

accommodate large numbers of offshore workers) offer the potential for inflicting
significant human casualties. Although accidental, the Piper Alpha disaster in July 1988
remains the deadliest offshore incident which resulted in 167 deaths. 123 Unmanned
offshore installations provide virtually no potential for inflicting human casualties. In
general, offshore petroleum installations are not ideal targets for causing significant
human casualties due to the relatively small number of persons on board, compared to
some land-based targets.
4.2.2 Damage to or destruction of offshore petroleum installations

A deliberate violent act against an offshore petroleum installation could result in
substantial damage, collapse or complete destruction of that offshore installation. 124
Technically, it is possible and relatively easy to cause considerable damage to an oil
well, offshore storage facility or an FPSO with simple, readily available and easy-to-use
explosive devices.
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Offshore petroleum installations can also be damaged or
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completely destroyed as a result of hydrocarbon ignition and fire. As stated by
Ferguson, the Australian Minister for Resources and Energy, ‘while the safety of people
comes first, the integrity of facilities is also vital to the security of energy supplies for
business and the community’.126
In at least thirteen of sixty offshore security incidents, there was some kind of damage
caused to offshore installations.127 For example, on 29 June 2009 in Nigeria, MEND
insurgents detonated explosives at Forcados offshore terminal causing extensive
damage to the installation. 128 In some cases, offshore installations were almost
completely destroyed. In April 1988, the US Navy attacked and almost completely
destroyed the Iranian Salman and Nasr offshore installations.129 According to Iran, the
attacks caused severe damage to the offshore installations and the activities of the
Salman offshore complex were totally interrupted for four years; the installation’s
regular production resumed only in September 1992.130
4.2.3 Environmental harm

The environmental harm caused by an attack on an offshore petroleum installation
could be quite extensive, especially if a large offshore installation were attacked. Large
offshore installations easily produce in excess of 100 000 barrels of oil per day (bpd)
that could flow for an extended time period. A major oil spill from a damaged offshore
petroleum installation could have devastating effects on the environment and coastal
ecosystems, and in some cases oil discharges can do irreparable damage to the
surrounding marine environment.131 Substances handled on board offshore installations
are harmful to the marine environment and oil spills at sea resulting from attacks would
be very difficult to contain compared to onshore spills.
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As mentioned above, the risk of ignition near or on board an installation is also
present.132 Crude oil fires may cause environmental harm in the form of atmospheric
contamination and incomplete combustion can result in pooled oil.133 While offshore
petroleum installations use sophisticated subsurface safety valves that should
automatically shut off the flow of oil or natural gas in the event of fire or attack on an
installation, 134 sometimes these safety features malfunction and do not work as
designed.
For example, the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico on 20 April
2010, although not caused by a deliberate attack, subsequently resulted in a catastrophic
oil spill and environmental damage.135 During the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, a tanker
collision with an Iranian offshore installation at Nowruz oil field in the Persian Gulf
caused a massive oil slick, which subsequently caught fire as a result of an airstrike by
the Iraqi military in March 1983. 136 Response and containment operations had been
delayed for over two years due to the ongoing war; and the well had spilled nearly two
million barrels of oil into the sea before it was capped in May 1985.137
Environmental damage is a high profile issue in most developed countries, but
developing countries tend to place less emphasis on this issue. Therefore, potential
environmental ramifications from a terrorist attack can vary with localities.138 There are
also dangers posed by certain threat groups (such as eco-terrorists) seeking to further
political, ideological, or other objectives through environmental harm.139 In Nigeria, in
the latest tactic of tackling the insurgency, the authorities are employing an
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environmental motive (i.e. environmental harm) to appeal to local communities to help
stop ‘spillage’ of oil from damaged installations, and they are referring to deliberate
damage to oil installations as ‘vandalism’ rather than insurgency or terrorism carried out
in pursuit of political agendas.140
4.2.4 Process interruptions and production shutdowns

One of the most common impacts of attacks and security incidents involving offshore
petroleum installations is interruptions of offshore petroleum operations and shutdowns
of offshore installations. 141 Offshore production installations often have long and
complex start-up procedures if they were shut down due to emergency. Evacuation of
the offshore crew is usually required in such instances.142
Past attacks indicate that offshore operations can be disrupted as a result of attempted
attacks even when there was no damage caused to offshore installations. For example,
after Chevron’s Oloibiri FSO was attacked on 1 May 2007 in the Gulf of Guinea and
six oil workers were abducted from the installation, the production at fields supported
by this FSO was shut down to avoid any additional security or safety incidents. 143
Operations of offshore petroleum installations could even be shut down as a result of
peaceful interferences with offshore installations, rather than violent attacks. This was
illustrated by the incident on Stena Don offshore drilling rig in Arctic waters offshore
Greenland on 31 August 2010, when Greenpeace activists ‘boarded’ the rig and were
hanging in tents suspended on ropes 15 meters above the water to protest against
drilling operations.144 They remained in their position for two days forcing the company
to suspend drilling operations.145
Shutdowns can also occur due to damage sustained by an offshore installation. If
substantial damage is inflicted to a major offshore production installation as a result of
140
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attack, it could take an extended period time to repair it or its onboard equipment. The
production could be shut down for a considerable period of time before it could be
restored to full pre-attack production rate.146 For example, as a result of the attack on
Bonga FPSO in Nigeria on 19 June 2008, the installation was damaged and the
company was forced to shut down the entire production at the field (which accounted
for 10 per cent of Nigeria’s total petroleum production) for almost a month.147 An attack
on an offshore installation or loading terminal at a major oil field can halt production
and commerce for weeks, causing other indirect impacts such as shortages in fuel and
natural gas, higher petroleum prices, lost opportunity cost, and subsequent economic
damage.148
4.2.5 Petroleum supply disruptions and possible shortages

Attacks on offshore petroleum installations could also cause shortages of oil and gas
supplies. The dependencies and full impacts of supply shortages and production
disruptions are often not apparent until an incident takes place and the production
operations are interrupted.149 Any offshore security incident has the potential for a loss
of some oil and gas supplies to consumers. Even small outages, failures and petroleum
supply disruptions can have much broader consequences that cannot always be
anticipated.
One of the key questions is whether a single attack on an offshore production
installation could upset the supplies or supply lines in a serious way. 150 That would
largely depend on the type of offshore installation and its production rates. According to
the International Energy Agency (IEA), the impacts of disruption in petroleum supplies
for a consuming country or region will also depend on the nature and duration of
disruption, the type of fuel or petroleum products, the fuel-import intensity of the
economy as well as ‘the flexibility and resilience of the economy to respond to and
withstand the physical loss of supply and the higher petroleum prices which may
result’. 151 The attack on Bonga FPSO on 19 June 2008 forced the company to shut
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down production from the entire field, which normally produces approximately 200 000
bpd and 150 million standard cubic feet of gas per day.152 The closing of the production
from the Bonga field alone reduced Nigeria’s oil producing capacity by 10 per cent and
caused fears of supply disruptions in Nigeria, the world’s eighth-largest oil exporter.153
Torhaug argues that it is unrealistic that a single attack on oil and gas infrastructure
could have a real effect on the supplies of oil and gas to the world markets because there
is almost always spare capacity both in production and transportation of oil and gas.154
This is particularly true for IEA member-countries because of the IEA requirements
relating to emergency energy self-sufficiency through national oil storage, demand
restraint, and oil allocation to each member country. 155 Nevertheless, it is possible for a
single (especially non-IEA) country to be badly affected by petroleum supply shortages
if there are no adequate emergency measures in place.
A disruption of petroleum supplies from offshore production can be greater when an
offshore field is serviced by two or more large platforms, or when several offshore
production sites are combined into one large project with several interconnected
production installations. It is possible that damage from one installation can spread to or
affect adjacent offshore installations. This means that a successful attack against one
major offshore petroleum installation, which acts as a hub, could cripple the production
of the entire offshore project.
It is apparent that adversaries know that petroleum is of critical importance to the global
economy, especially to the economies of industrialised western nations, 156 and they
recognise that shortages of supply could have negative economic impacts. The critical
importance of the products produced by offshore petroleum installations to the domestic
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and global economies makes disruption of offshore operations an attractive cause for an
attack.157
4.2.6 Financial costs and losses

Attacks on offshore petroleum installations can result in financial costs and losses.
Offshore petroleum installations are very complex and expensive assets, some costing
over US$1 billion, so any repair or replacement costs are likely to be high. If a major
facility is destroyed, it could potentially have significant financial implications for a
petroleum company and a producing country.158 For example, these implications could
be in the form of immediate lost revenue from oil and gas sales as well as loss of tax
revenues paid by companies. Delays in drilling or production, and other disruptions to
company operations usually involve financial losses. As mentioned above, a properly
coordinated attack on a country’s offshore petroleum installations could have a major
long-range effect on domestic economic stability,159 especially if a country’s economy
depends on petroleum exports. In the attacks on ABOT and KAAOT in Iraq on 24 April
2004, while no damage was inflicted to the facilities, the terminals were immediately
shut down by authorities. 160 The ABOT, capable of exporting up to 900 000 bpd, was
shut down for two days and KAAOT that exports about 700 000 bpd was closed for one
day, which together cost Iraq millions in lost oil export revenues.161 A well-executed
attack on a strategically important offshore petroleum installation can disrupt and affect
the entire economy.162
4.2.7 Petroleum price rises and market fluctuations

The ramifications of offshore attacks can go far beyond the immediate financial costs
and could cause market fluctuations and soaring of oil prices. Considering today’s tight
balance between petroleum supply and demand as well as industry practices based on
‘just in time’ deliveries, taking even a small amount of petroleum off the market could
cause a dramatic rise in oil and gas prices. For example, Schmid has stated that ‘…
disrupting the global energy market can be a very rewarding strategy for those who
157
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wish to damage those whose power depends on their positions in the energy sector’.163
Today, violent non-State actors or perpetrators are able to leverage oil market dynamics
by targeting offshore petroleum installations. 164 Oil markets and prices can also be
influenced by the political situation and security environment of major petroleum
producing countries such as Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Russia and Nigeria.
Attacks on offshore petroleum installations and fears of future supply shortages can
cause rises in prices, 165 particularly when global spare capacity is tight or when
geopolitical tensions are high.166 For example, an attack of even a minor scale against a
major oil loading terminal which is capable of simultaneously filling several tankers,
will have repercussions for the oil markets. The attacks on ABOT and KAAOT in April
2004 consequently led to a spike in oil prices on the world markets which resulted in a
loss of approximately US$6 billion to the global economy.167 Even a threat of attack or
a failed attack could cause oil prices to rise. For instance, a video statement that was
aired on Al-Jazeera in December 2005, in which Al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, Ayman alZawahiri, called for attacks aimed at oil installations in the Middle East, caused crude
oil prices to rise by nearly US$1.168 While an isolated attack on an offshore installation
can cause a rise in petroleum prices, the effects on prices will usually not be longlasting. The evidence suggests that during the past five years shocks to the global oil
economy increased petroleum prices, but in each case market pressures eventually
subsided and oil prices slid back to almost pre-shock values. 169 It is reasonable to
hypothesise that the continuing increase in the price of crude oil may be correlated to
fears of attacks against oil fields, all other issues aside, rather than by actual attacks.
163
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4.2.8 Economic externalities and interdependency effects

Attacking offshore petroleum installations could generate significant economic
externalities.170 Today, attacking offshore petroleum installations is often seen as ‘an
alternative means for potentially causing mass economic destabilization’.171 It offers an
opportunity to adversely influence national and the global economies, and therefore
have the potential to affect a much wider audience. 172 Security incidents involving
offshore petroleum installations add to already existing uncertainties of the petroleum
market. 173 Economic externalities that can result from attacks on offshore petroleum
installations can include higher insurance premiums, 174 rapid increase in government
spending on the protection and security arrangements, additional costs and burdens
placed on the private sector (particularly on the oil and gas industry) in connection with
compliance with new security measures, 175 as well as other interdependency effects
such as the regional balance of trade, international currency position and economic
security generally.176 Some analysts claim the market has a ‘terrorist premium’ on crude
oil in the range from about US$5 to US$15 per barrel. 177 The full economic
consequences and externalities of an offshore attack are very hard to calculate or
estimate.
4.2.9 Public opinion and confidence

The importance of offshore petroleum installations extends beyond purely economic
concerns. Like many economic and business activities, the offshore petroleum industry
is very much susceptible to unquantifiable psychological factors.178 A terrorist attack on
an offshore installation can attract significant public and media attention,179 and have a
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psychological impact by creating a sense of public fear (especially among oil companies
and other offshore industry participants). An attack on an offshore petroleum
installation can negatively impact the stockholder’s and public’s confidence. 180 An
attack can have the effect of delegitimising the State by challenging its ability to protect
its offshore petroleum installations.181 Negative public reaction to an offshore security
incident could lead to the delay of future offshore developments.182
Public confidence in the security of a country’s offshore petroleum installations is an
important factor.183 Public opinion can lead to unfavourable political decisions which, in
turn, could lead to major offshore developments and expansion programs being halted
for months and even years.184 For example, the attack on Bonga FPSO in Nigeria on 19
June 2008 by MEND insurgents is a good example of symbolic attack on a high-profile
target because it was carried out against Shell’s flagship project in Nigeria and reduced
the country’s oil producing capacity by 10 per cent. 185 The attack apparently sent
shockwaves through the oil industry and some security analysts described it as
‘astonishingly bold’.186 It also raised concerns and even fears for the security of deepsea offshore petroleum installations in the region, which had previously been considered
out of the reach of insurgent groups.187 According to MEND, one of the reasons for
attacking Bonga, which is located about 120 kilometres offshore, was to demonstrate
MEND’s capabilities to attack offshore installations far offshore, which were previously
considered to be out of reach of insurgent groups.188
High-profile offshore petroleum installations may be attractive to terrorists and other
adversaries because of their potential for undermining the stakeholder and public
confidence in the security of offshore installations in a given region (in addition to other
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consequences that can be generated).189 An attack can also result in reluctance to work
on offshore installations in the region.
4.2.10 Geopolitical impacts and foreign relations

Attacks on offshore petroleum installations could have some political value.190 Oil and
gas are strategic resources both from the economic and political point of view for the
petroleum producing countries, as well as for their consumers.191 Petroleum exporting
countries always have a strong interest in ensuring that their petroleum is considered a
reliable source of energy so that their consumers do not shift to alternative sources of
supply or alternative fuels. 192 Attacks on offshore petroleum installations may have
geopolitical ramifications and impacts on foreign relations.193 Rudner, in his assessment
of potential impacts of attacks, states that:
The consequential effects of a terror attack on … energy infrastructure would likely
reverberate on public confidence in the ability of government to protect core national
interests, and on neighbouring countries’ willingness to depend on partners for national
security generally, and for energy sourcing in particular’.194

For example, the Australian Government recognises that an attack on its offshore
petroleum installations ‘would have broader ramifications for [its] regional security and
economic wellbeing’.195 The political effects would most likely be both domestic and
international. As al-Shishani has noted, targeting petroleum related interests ‘has an
impact on the economy of states, the prestige of political regimes, and on the confidence
in the economy of the state either locally or externally’. 196 Petroleum exporting
countries often focus on maintaining the ‘security of demand’ for their oil and gas
exports.197 Therefore, the interests of major petroleum consumer nations such as the US,
189
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Japan and China should be respected. 198 An attack or series of attacks on offshore
installations could weaken international confidence and negatively impact on future
foreign investment in a country’s offshore industry.199
4.3 Countervailing and mitigating factors

Despite the factors that make offshore petroleum installations attractive targets, there
are a number of countervailing factors that exist which can make offshore installations
less attractive targets and must be taken into account. The countervailing and mitigating
factors identified in this analysis are: 1) the potential inability to achieve the desired
effect; 2) operational and tactical difficulties in mounting offshore attacks; 3) increased
security measures and deterrents of some installations; and 4) other strategic
considerations of perpetrators that can reduce the attractiveness of offshore petroleum
installations as potential targets.200
4.3.1 Inability to achieve the desired effect

It is possible that an attack on an offshore installation will not achieve the desired effect.
It is arguable that offshore petroleum installations may be less attractive to perpetrators
than some land-based or aviation targets, especially if causing mass human casualties
and public attention are the objectives of the attackers. 201 An attack on an offshore
installation may cause the destruction of the installation and subsequent economic and
financial consequences, but such attack will not necessarily result in large loss of life,202
and might not receive the desired level of media and public attention. Authorities
responsible for security of offshore installations can more easily cut off communications
and isolate an offshore installation from television cameras and media access.203
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A relative scarcity of offshore petroleum installations compared to onshore targets, the
singular nature of most offshore installations, the low probability of mass casualties,
and problems associated with filming such attacks at sea can reduce the desirability of
attacking offshore petroleum installations.204 Even if a successful attack on an offshore
installation is likely to satisfy some objectives of adversaries such as terrorists, ‘tactical
uncertainties and security deterrents may lead terrorist planners to turn their attention’
to other targets.205
4.3.2 Operational and tactical difficulties in mounting offshore attacks

There are several inherent features of offshore petroleum installations that can act as
deterrents to offshore attacks. 206 Offshore petroleum installations are arguably ‘hard
targets’ due to a several factors that make offshore attacks difficult to accomplish.207
Attacks in the offshore environment also pose a number of operational difficulties for
the potential adversaries. 208 Gaining access to offshore installations may be quite
problematic. Some installations are difficult to get to, in terms of long distances from
the shore, and some have very tightly controlled access.209 The sea offers very little
cover and concealment for carrying out surveillance, testing weapons and practising
attack techniques. 210 Offshore petroleum installations usually do not provide many
escape routes and, in most cases, perpetrators are required to deal with severe weather
conditions such as tides, waves, strong currents and winds. This could necessitate
specialised training and relatively sophisticated skills in navigation, coastal piloting, and
ship handling, as well as appropriate clothing, equipment and suitable vessels.211
In addition, structural characteristics of many offshore installations may pose some
difficulties for adversaries. Some offshore installations, such as FPSOs and drill ships,
have a comparatively high freeboard, rendering these facilities less easy to board from
the water line, especially when under way.212 Most offshore installations are extensively
204
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lit along the upper deck or topside. 213 Furthermore, the complexity of installation
topside or upper deck configuration (which accommodates drilling machinery or
production systems as well as auxiliary equipment) means that offshore petroleum
installations are more difficult to secure and control than ships from the point of view of
the adversaries, unless they are in sufficient numbers and adequately familiar with the
topside deck layout. 214 However, while these characteristics pose some potential
difficulties for adversaries, they will not prevent the attacks by determined adversaries
as illustrated by previous security incidents.
4.3.3 Increased security measures and deterrents of some offshore installations

Other countervailing and mitigating factors include: relatively large distance from threat
centres and regions, high density of maritime traffic, significant surveillance levels, and
increased security measures for offshore installations in some areas including frequent
patrols at sea by security forces and aerial surveillance, which make it more difficult to
attack offshore installations in those areas.215 Even the relative close proximity of some
offshore installations to the coastline could be seen as a mitigating factor because short
distance provides faster air and/or water-borne response in case of an attack.216 Some
offshore petroleum installations, especially those operating in severe weather
conditions, have reinforced structures designed for handling the rough climate and to
withstand defined accident scenarios such as fires and explosions during oil and gas
releases, which makes it more difficult to intentionally inflict substantial damage to
such offshore installations.217
4.3.4 Other strategic considerations of perpetrators

Finally, there are also strategic considerations of perpetrators that may serve as
countervailing factors. It has been suggested by security analysts, such as Baev, that
there are other forces at work in limiting the threat to petroleum installations, and some
of those may be related to the political agendas and strategic considerations of
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adversaries.218 In his analysis, Baev refers to the Chechen rebels and argues that they
could have attacked Russian refineries, but did not do so because they did not want to
alienate the western world, which would have viewed such an attack as a potential
threat to their petroleum supplies.219
The above analysis illustrated that whilst there are a number of factors that make
offshore petroleum installations attractive targets, there are also several countervailing
and mitigating factors that make offshore installations less attractive targets.

5. Scenarios of Attacks on Offshore Petroleum Installations
It is important to consider different types of attacks that potential attackers might carry
out against offshore petroleum installations. Adversaries can use a variety of attack
tactics, access methods and weapons to carry out attacks on offshore petroleum
installations. Chapter 2 focused on the question of ‘who’ attacks offshore installations
and this section discusses ‘how’ attacks can be carried out.
As identified by the Australian Government, the possible offshore attack scenarios
could be any one of the following: bomb or explosive device, including suicide
bombings; hijacking and hostage sieges; deliberate infringement of exclusion zones;
sabotage; arson; blockage of transport routes; tampering with supplies, essential
equipment or systems; unauthorised access or use of various equipment; unauthorised
access to secure areas; use of industry transport to carry those intending to cause a
security incident and their equipment; use of a mode of industry transport or industry
facility infrastructure as a weapon or a means to cause damage or destruction; and use
of a ship, helicopter or aircraft to transport explosives, hazardous goods or weapons.220
Some of the possible security incidents and attack scenarios involving offshore
installations are examined in more detail below. Most of these scenarios are real. They
occurred in the past and may occur again in the future. Furthermore, the types of
security incidents and attack scenarios discussed below do not provide an exclusive list
but rather an indication of possible methods of attacks. It should also be noted that
almost all of the scenarios discussed below present a relatively high degree of difficulty
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compared to attacks on land-based targets in terms of the location, size and complexity
of the installations involved.221
5.1 Threat of attack or bomb threat

A threat of attack or a bomb threat is one of the potential incident scenarios involving
offshore petroleum installations. This type of unlawful interference could cause
significant interruptions in petroleum production and subsequent economic costs and
financial losses. One incident that illustrates this scenario took place on 25 August 1975
in Yarmouth, England, when Philips Petroleum Company received three anonymous
telephone calls which warned that underwater explosives had been attached to the
substructures of offshore gas production platforms in the Hewett gas field, some 20
nautical miles offshore to the east of the Norfolk coast. 222 Three platforms were
evacuated immediately, but two days later the results of diving operations carried out
with the support of the Royal Navy, confirmed that the threat was just a hoax, which
cost British taxpayers more than US$600 000.223 In October 1981 in the US, a caller
claimed that a bomb had been placed on one of several attending vessels at the Texaco
platform Habitat, located nine nautical miles offshore south east of Santa Barbara, but
no bomb was found after platform and vessel searches.224 In January 1983 in the US,
there was a bomb threat against the construction barge Challenger I that was involved
in emplacement of Chevron’s Edith oil platform located eight nautical miles offshore
south of the Long Beach harbour entrance in California. A search revealed no bomb, but
the Coast Guard responded as a precautionary measure.225
More recently, on 10 February 2008, Safe Scandinavia oil rig in the North Sea issued a
security alert which resulted in one of the biggest evacuations in the history of the North
Sea offshore industry. It was reported that a catering worker on the rig screamed
‘Bomb!’ in her sleep and apparently she was ‘convinced that her nightmare was about
to come true’. The authorities sent helicopters and evacuated 161 out of over 500
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offshore workers, but it turned out that it was just a dream.226 Making a bomb threat is
easy and does not require any skills or resources on the part of perpetrators, but such
false alerts and threats cause interruptions to offshore operations and prove to be very
costly to both oil companies (in the sense of lost production or delayed operations) and
governments (in terms of expenditure on response efforts).
5.2 Detonation of explosives or bombs

An attack using explosives or bombs is a very popular scenario according to security
experts. There could be various types of explosive-based attacks against offshore
petroleum installations. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) could be delivered to an
offshore installation by a small boat such as fishing or recreational boat, by an offshore
supply/support vessel, by a helicopter servicing an offshore facility, or by a submersible
craft.227 Such an attack can also be conducted by a swimmer or diver or by a person
working on the installation. 228 Mines or explosive charges are not very difficult to
obtain and can be used by perpetrators to carry out an attack against an offshore target.
For example, on 25 June 2009 in Nigeria, MEND insurgents blew up Jacket B wellhead
platform at the Afremo offshore oil field. 229 On 29 June 2009, insurgents detonated
explosives at Forcados offshore loading terminal in Nigeria causing damage to the
installation. 230 Detonating well-placed explosives on the supporting structure of an
offshore installation may cause the entire rig to collapse resulting in possible damage to
the production wells and flow lines, oil spills and probable fire.231 While this tactic may
require a combination of navigation, water-borne assault and demolition skills, some
analysts still believe that explosives will become a weapon of choice for attacks against
offshore installations.232 According to Greenberg et al, ‘onboard bombings present the
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greatest combination of threat and vulnerability’ among various types of attack
scenarios.233
5.3 Underwater attack

Apparently, one of the best locations to cause serious damage to an offshore installation
easily is at or below the water line. 234 It has been suggested that an attack which
involves the use of underwater explosives, such as limpet mines, can inflict massive
damage to an offshore installation or many casualties among offshore crew.235 Such an
attack against an offshore installation could be conducted by a single diver or swimmer
or a group of divers or swimmers, but its degree of difficulty is relatively high. AlQaeda and other terrorist groups are developing underwater capabilities including skills
in diving and the use of underwater explosives to attack subsea petroleum pipelines,
offshore installations and ships. In particular, it has been reported that members of
terrorist organisations have undertaken scuba diving and underwater demolition training
for planned seaborne attacks both inside and outside the Philippines. 236 On 31 July
2003, investigators announced that a scuba diving school in Holland had been used by
suspected Al-Qaeda members. 237 The Al-Qaeda operatives arrested and convicted in
Morocco for planning maritime attacks targeting US ships in the Strait of Gibraltar in
2002 also mentioned the Dutch school. In addition, a diving licence from a scuba diving
school was found in the possession of one suspect terrorist from the Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat (GSPC) who was arrested in May 2003.238

233

Greenberg et al, above n 170, xviii.
Denton, above n 29, 89.
235
Campbell and Gunaratna, above n 66, 84.
236
Eduardo Santos, ‘Abu Sayyaf and Its Capability to Threaten Sea Lanes’ (2008) 23 Papers in
Australian Maritime Affairs 93, 99. See also Campbell and Gunaratna, above n 66, 83–4. The local
security forces believe that the main purpose for taking these courses has been to facilitate underwater
attacks against oil and gas pipelines off the coast of Mindanao, Philippines: Peter Chalk, The Maritime
Dimensions of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States (RAND
Corporation, 2008) 22.
237
Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, Al-Qaeda Claims Responsibility for the Attack on a Western Sea
Vessel in the Region of the Strait of Hormuz (8 August 2010) International Institute for CounterTerrorism, 1
<http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Japanese_Oil_Tanker.pdf> at
16 August 2010; Justin Sparks and Tom Walker, ‘Al-Qaeda Trail Leads to Diving School’, The Times
(online), 7 September 2003 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article1156265.ece> at 30
December 2010.
238
Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, above n 237. In French, GSPC stands for Groupe Salafiste pour la
Prédication et le Combat.
234

127

Chapter 3

Mikhail Kashubsky

To date, there have been no attacks on offshore petroleum installations using
underwater explosives; however, there have been several attacks of this type against
ships. For example, on 4 August 1975, the environmental group called ‘Jaws’ placed a
bomb on the hull below the waterline of the Bahamian vessel Goldfinger II; the
explosion blew a hole and caused the engine room to be flooded.239 On 27 August 1975,
the Argentinean Navy’s destroyer Santisima Trinidad was attacked by the Montoneros
guerrilla group using underwater explosives, which badly damaged the ship. 240 In
addition, there were at least two reported attacks on offshore subsea pipelines. On 13
September 1983, an underwater oil pipeline and part of the oil terminal at Puerto
Sandino on Nicaragua’s Pacific Coast were blown up by a special team of operatives
from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) using underwater explosives. 241 The
same subsea pipeline was blown up again on 14 October 1983.242 These examples can
be applied by analogy to offshore installations.
An underwater attack against an offshore petroleum installation can also be carried out
by using small submarines or unmanned underwater explosive delivery crafts. It is
interesting to mention the offshore platform attack computer video game of 1985, where
submarines attack an offshore rig and the defender is supposed to bomb them from
helicopters to protect the facility. 243 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
insurgents have tested and used submersible craft, but submersibles to which terrorist
and insurgent groups have access are very unstable in rough seas and not suitable for
travelling long distances. 244 While it is expected that underwater capabilities of
adversaries are going to continue to improve,245 it is also arguable that, at present, the
skills and capabilities required to make such an underwater attack successful are fairly
239
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sophisticated, and in relative terms may not be worth the investment by terrorists or
other perpetrators.246 There were speculations that the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig
explosion in the Gulf of Mexico on 20 April 2010 was the result of an attack by a North
Korean submarine. 247 Some conspiracy theorists suspected the involvement of the
Iranian mini submarines, 248 but while these speculations and suspicions are very
improbable, none of them has been officially confirmed or denied.
5.4 Use of stand-off weapons

An offshore attack using ‘stand-off’ weapons such as rockets, rocket-propelled
grenades, shoulder-fired missiles, and mortars is also possible.249 Whilst there have not
been any attacks against offshore installations using stand-off weapons, these kinds of
weapons have been used by insurgents, terrorists and pirates in attacks against maritime
targets. On 2 January 1982, the Lebanese-flagged oil tanker Babanaft was attacked by
rockets while loading Iraqi crude at an oil terminal in the northern Lebanese port city of
Tripoli.250 The tanker sailed out of the range of fire, but not before it was hit and caught
fire, which was quickly extinguished.251 On 19 August 2005, a terrorist group linked to
Al-Qaeda carried out an unsuccessful rocket attack on two US warships, USS Kearsarge
and USS Ashland, when they were visiting the port of Aqaba in Jordan.252 Three rockets
were fired at the ships but narrowly missed them.253 On 16 May 1977, in Angola, the
Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front (CELF) guerrilla movement issued a warning that it
planned to attack the offshore drilling complex of the Gulf Oil Company in the Cabinda
enclave of Angola and intended to use recently acquired ground-to-ground missiles,
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unless the company evacuated its 200 British and American employees within three
days.254
5.5 Armed intrusion and seizure of offshore petroleum installations

Armed intrusion and subsequent seizure of a fixed offshore platform or hijacking of a
mobile offshore rig is one the most common offshore attack scenarios.255 Perpetrators
armed with stand-off weapons and firearms could use a high-speed craft or hijacked
offshore support vessel to reach an offshore site and board an offshore petroleum
installation. Once perpetrators board the installation there are several ways available to
inflict significant damage.256 In the instances of armed intrusions, where perpetrators are
able to get access to an offshore installation, they can engage in armed robbery of
offshore workers and theft of property stored on board offshore petroleum installations,
including removal of some equipment and components.
Hijackings and seizures of offshore petroleum installations are quite difficult to
accomplish and offer few escape opportunities. 257 Such scenarios would require a
significant number of attackers and a lot of effort on their part. Even when (and if) an
offshore installation is seized, holding a large offshore installation against an assault by
authorities would pose major problems for attackers, and authorities can more easily cut
off communication and isolate the offshore installation from the media.258 Nevertheless,
armed intrusion is one of the most frequent types of attack scenarios against offshore
petroleum installations in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, on 12 June 2005 a group of
armed men boarded the FPSO Jamestown in the Warri Region of Nigeria and took
hostage all 45 crew members, but after lengthy negotiations, the attackers released all
hostages unharmed.259 There are several other practical examples of armed intrusion of
offshore petroleum installations in the Gulf of Guinea; however, in such cases,
adversaries do not normally stay on board, but instead they tend to abduct offshore
workers and leave.
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5.6 Hostage taking and abduction of offshore workers

Abduction of offshore workers is a common tactic that is often used by various groups
of adversaries including pirates, insurgents, terrorists and indigenous groups. 260
Hostages could be offshore workers, security guards and personnel of offshore service
providers. In this type of scenario, the crew can be put into one confined area under
guard while terrorists announce their demands to the company and the government by
radio, giving deadlines until they begin killing the hostages one by one.261 For example,
it is estimated that more than 400 oil workers were kidnapped or taken hostage in
Nigeria between 2000 and 2010, but most were released unharmed.262 Militants have
successfully taken hostages from offshore petroleum installations and later exchanged
them for ransom.
Kidnappings are not necessarily fatal and hostages are often released without any
physical harm or injuries within a relatively short period of time, but in some cases
fatalities do occur. On 22 November 2006, the FPSO Mystras was attacked by armed
men while anchored off Port Harcourt in Nigeria. 263 Ten gunmen boarded the
installation and kidnapped seven workers. Their boat was intercepted by the authorities
and engaged in a shoot-out during which one worker was killed, one injured, and five
others were safely rescued.264 On 31 July 2000, armed young men boarded the rig off
Nigeria’s coast and took 165 oil workers hostage including 20 foreigners, but released
them four days later, after the company made a deal with the hostage-takers. 265 An
attack involving many hostages could generate a great deal of media attention.
5.7 Use of transport infrastructure as a weapon
Adversaries can exploit the transportation system to carry out an attack against offshore

petroleum installations. This category includes scenarios such as ramming offshore
petroleum installations by hijacked ship or aircraft and use of small explosive-laden
boats to carry out suicide attacks. The use of a ship or small boat as a weapon is a
scenario which has been widely discussed by maritime security analysts.
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A large vessel such as a very large crude carrier (VLCC), or a liquefied natural gas
(LNG) carrier or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) carrier, or a smaller vessel, could be
hijacked and rammed into a fixed offshore production platform or a mobile drilling
rig. 266 Collision of a large ship with an offshore platform or FPSO could have the
potential to cause significant damage to the installation, disruption in production and
adverse environmental effects. For example, in October 2007, although not caused by a
deliberate act, the collision of Usumacinta jack-up rig with Kab-101 platform in the
Gulf of Mexico caused the rupture of the platform’s production tree, substantial oil spill
and subsequent ignition of leaking hydrocarbons that ultimately resulted in 22 human
casualties and major fire damage to both offshore installations.267 Similarly, a helicopter
or other small aircraft can also be used by perpetrators and crashed into an installation,
which could also have devastating consequences. There are practically no preventive
measures that offshore petroleum installations can reasonably take to prevent attacks by
an aircraft. 268 There have been incidents of hijacked aircrafts by insurgents. For
instance, on 27 June 1999 armed local anti-oil activists stormed an offshore petroleum
installation in Port Harcourt, Nigeria and abducted three oil workers.269 The attackers
then hijacked a helicopter and forced the hostages to fly them to a village near Warri.270
While turning a ship into a floating bomb to ram it into an offshore petroleum
installation may appear to be attractive to terrorists, actually doing so presents a number
of challenges and requires a high degree of sophistication.271 It would be difficult to
hijack a large vessel and then navigate it to an offshore installation to cause a collision.
Murphy argues that ‘any use of large ships is a major challenge to terrorists, as such
vessels are difficult to control, needing a trained crew to operate them effectively…’.272
Accordingly, the probability that perpetrators would try to use a large ship as a weapon
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is low because of the complexity of doing so.273 This type of attack scenario has not
occurred yet in the context of offshore petroleum installations. However, animal rights
activists, particularly the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (SSCS), have carried out a
number of ramming attacks against whalers and trawlers.274 For example, in July 1979,
SSCS’s vessel twice rammed the Cypriot-registered whaler Sierra in harbour in the port
of Leixoes ‘tearing the hull open to the waterline and forcing the ship into port for
repairs’.275
A suicide attack against an offshore petroleum installation using small high-speed boats
is another feasible scenario.276 In this type of scenario perpetrators would usually use a
boat-borne improvised explosive device (BBIED) to carry out the attack. The likely
vessels used in such an attack could be high-speed boats, commercial and recreational
fishing vessels, yachts, and hijacked supply/support vessels servicing offshore
installations.277 It is common for fishing vessels to be in close proximity to offshore
petroleum installations, and sometimes fishing vessels approach offshore installations to
seek assistance or supplies.278 Perpetrators can place an explosive-laden boat alongside
a platform or an FPSO and detonate it, using either a suicide bomber, timing delay
device or radio transmitter.279 The attacks on Iraq’s ABOT and KAAOT on 24 April
2004 are real examples of this type of attack scenario. Terrorists used explosive-laden
boats, two of which exploded in the vicinity of ABOT.280 The third boat was intercepted
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by a coalition forces vessel as it approached the exclusion zone of KAAOT and
exploded soon after it was boarded by US Navy and Coastguard personnel.281
The use of small high-speed craft to attack an offshore installation provides a certain
degree of simplicity compared to attacks using large vessels. 282 It also offers some
tactical advantages in terms of manoeuvrability, speed, and surprise. It has been
suggested that use of speedboats is emerging as the ‘weapon of choice’ for maritime
terrorists, and is likely to remain such for some time. Adversaries can also use
recreational high-speed boats or fishing boats to conduct some reconnaissance activities
for launching future attacks against offshore petroleum installations.283
5.8 Internal attacks against offshore petroleum installations

This type of scenario involves interferences with offshore oil and gas operations and
damage to offshore installations caused by detrimental or malicious actions of ‘insiders’
including unauthorised access, fraudulent activities, disclosure of confidential
information and sabotage. 284 As discussed in Chapter 2, insiders could be either
working individually or passively assisting other perpetrators, for instance, by
disclosing sensitive information to them or working in active collaboration with hostile
third parties. 285 An insider could conceivably sabotage some critical components or
parts of an offshore installation, or assist other adversaries by providing knowledge of
vulnerabilities and/or physical assistance in carrying out an attack.286
The prospect of an internal attack at an offshore installation seems to be a very viable
scenario, which could potentially have devastating consequences. Whilst there have not
been any reported ‘insider’ attacks against offshore installations, there have been many
sabotage and insider attacks against onshore petroleum installations. In December 2005,
in Venezuela, an act of sabotage resulted in nearly 40 per cent of the crude supply to
Paraguana refinery being cut off.287 Arson could be an effective way of carrying out an
internal attack. Fire on board an installation may be started by arson or by damaging
281
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production lines. If an installation fire starts in one location, it could spread to the
adjacent areas and the entire platform can catch fire. 288 It is also possible that
disgruntled insiders could start releasing oil into the sea in a massive destructive slick
with intention to pollute the area. 289 For example, on 6 July 1960 in Trinidad, oil
company workers on strike against Texaco Trinidad Inc, opened storage tank valves in
the Port of Spain, spilling 200 000 gallons of gasoline, kerosene, and oil into the sea.290
Computer-related internal attacks such as network system intrusion, are also a growing
area of concern and cyber attacks are discussed in more detail in section 5.9 below.
A better example of an internal sabotage-type attack scenario is the bombing of Secunda
CTL, the world’s largest coal liquefaction refinery that produces synthetic fuel, diesel,
and other similar petrochemicals from coal gasification.291 Secunda CTL was bombed
by Patrick Chamusso on 21 October 1981, in the town of Secunda in South Africa.
Chamusso used to work at the refinery as a foreman and was wrongly accused of the
earlier bombing of Secunda CTL, which took place on 31 May 1980. He was arrested
and tortured, but was subsequently released due to lack of evidence against him. 292
Following his release, Chamusso became disgruntled with the country’s oppressive
reigning system and joined the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC),
and having the inside knowledge of the refinery, he masterminded and alone carried out
the second bombing of Secunda CTL.293
5.9 Cyber attacks against offshore petroleum installations

Offshore petroleum installations are often interlocked with their underlying information
networks and control systems. The network infrastructure or computer control system
may be one avenue through which an attack against an offshore installation may be
carried out.294 It is possible that if perpetrators considered that a physical attack against
an offshore installation is too difficult, they could turn their attention to cyber attack in
order to disrupt or damage critical information networks or related equipment of the
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installation.295 Studies by global computer security firms indicate that the highest rates
for computer attack activity were directed against critical infrastructures including the
energy sector. 296 There have not been any reported cyber attacks against offshore
installations. Attacks on critical computer systems are being contemplated as an
alternative way of conducting warfare. 297 Cyber attacks are not constrained by
geographical locations or distance, and can be launched from anywhere in the world and
from multiple locations simultaneously, which is a significant advantage of this type of
attack.298 It has been argued that cyber attacks have grown to an unprecedented level of
sophistication. 299 Industrial facilities such as offshore petroleum installations are
amongst the potential targets for cyber attacks.300
A computer network attack offers the potential for significant damage of its own kind.
Such an attack could cause serious damage or disruption to critical infrastructure. The
possible consequences include disruption to oil and gas supplies resulting in financial
and economic loss, and undermined public confidence in the offshore industry and its
information technology systems. 301 In the most extreme cases, a cyber attack can
completely disable an offshore installation. 302 The specific types of cyber attack
scenarios include hacking, system intrusion, break-ins, unauthorised system access, and
disabling of critical components of offshore installations. For example, in August 2003
in the US, the ‘Slammer’ internet computer worm was able to successfully penetrate
and corrupt, for a period of five hours, the critical SCADA network at the Davis-Besse
nuclear power plant located in the State of Ohio.303 A cyber attack may also be mounted
in combination with physical attack to intensify its effects, or it can be used by
perpetrators to provide a decoy or cover for a physical attack.304 The Cyber Storm II
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exercise has demonstrated the borderless nature of cyber attacks, and the speed with
which they can escalate across infrastructure sectors.305
5.10 Protests and demonstrations

Although not an attack scenario, peaceful protests and demonstrations should also be
mentioned in the context of scenarios of attacks. Environmental, indigenous and labour
activists were discussed in Chapter 2 as representing a threat to offshore petroleum
installations. While such protests are not violent in most cases, they can still be viewed
as security incidents because they cause interferences with the operations of offshore
installations. For example, on 25 May 1998 in Nigeria, more than 100 unarmed and
peaceful protesters occupied Chevron’s Parabe oil production platform for two days, to
protest environmental and revenue distribution issues, and to demand monetary
compensation for environmental and economic grievances and jobs.306 On 23 August
2003, also in Nigeria, the local community group of anti-oil activists boarded Shell’s
production platform and the nearby Trident VIII jack-up drilling rig causing the
company to stop operations and evacuate personnel.307
More recently, on 31 August 2010, Greenpeace activists ‘boarded’ the drilling rig Stena
Don operating in Arctic waters offshore Greenland, forcing the company to suspend
drilling.308 On 21 September 2010, Greenpeace activists climbed the anchor chain of the
Chevron-operated drill ship Stena Carron and were hanging suspended from the chain
in a capsule-tent for several days, effectively delaying the company’s drilling
operations. 309 On 22 November 2010, Greenpeace activists climbed Centenario
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deepwater oil rig to protest against offshore drilling.310 The above examples suggest that
peaceful protesting on offshore petroleum installations has also become a relatively
common occurrence.
5.11 Simultaneous offshore attacks and combined scenarios

Also of growing concern is the ability of adversaries to launch simultaneous (or nearsimultaneous) attacks on multiple offshore installations aimed at causing lengthy supply
disruptions and severe consequential economic damage.311 Such multiple attack tactics
have already been demonstrated by insurgent and terrorist groups. 312 Multiple or
simultaneous attacks are more complex, but at the same time they are more difficult to
deal with for authorities or maritime security forces from the response perspective. For
example, it would be more problematic to contain multiple simultaneous fires in several
locations or several simultaneous oil spills.313 It is also possible that while one group of
perpetrators is carrying out the attack offshore, the affiliates on the mainland could tip
off the media to gain publicity, which would achieve one of their objectives. 314
Simultaneous attacks against maritime targets and offshore petroleum installations have
been contemplated and carried out in the past. The attacks on ABOT and KAAOT in
Iraq on 24 April 2004 were near-simultaneous as they were carried out only 20 minutes
apart.315 Al-Qaeda has developed a ‘signature’ by engaging in multiple simultaneous
attacks. 316 If this pattern continues and is applied to the world’s offshore petroleum
installations, it could have severe consequences for the industry and the global
economy.
5.12 Credibility of offshore attack scenarios

All scenarios of attacks on and interferences with offshore petroleum installations that
were discussed above are conceivable. There could potentially be other new methods or
scenarios that terrorists and other adversaries may be developing. However, some of the
310
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attack scenarios are more likely to occur than others and the key aspect relevant to all of
the aforementioned scenarios is the degree of credibility.317 Credibility could be referred
to as something which is ‘within the realm of possibility and, at a minimum, address[es]
known capabilities and intents as evidenced by past events and available
intelligence’. 318 The assessment of credibility of attack scenarios is one of the key
elements in the preparation of offshore security risk assessments. To assess the
credibility and likelihood of attacks, it is important to have a firm understanding of
current and past common tactics of perpetrators because successful attack methods,
strategies and tactics will, in many cases be adopted again (with possible modifications
and improvements) by adversaries.319
For example, Bateman, in his assessment of maritime terrorism threat in Southeast Asia,
categorises possible attack scenarios into those that can be considered ‘less credible’
and ‘more credible’, and he bases these two categories on ‘judgments relating to the
capabilities of known terrorist groups, the ease with which particular types of attack
might be launched, and the probability of a successful outcome for the terrorists’.320
While Bateman’s assessment focuses only on a threat of terrorism to ships and port
facilities, it can also be adopted for the assessment of credibility of attack scenarios on
offshore petroleum installations.
There has been considerable debate among experts about the likelihood of occurrence of
attacks against offshore installations including consideration of some of the specific
attack scenarios (such as those mentioned above). One of the conclusions drawn in the
RAND Corporation study of maritime terrorism is that ‘many perceptions of maritime
terrorism risks do not align with the reality of threats and vulnerabilities’.321 HerbertBurns suggests that ‘a projection of possible future terrorist scenarios can be founded
upon an understanding of strategic intent, the capabilities, and the range of vulnerable
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targets of opportunity that exist within the maritime domain’.322 The bottom line is that
policy makers and government agencies responsible for providing maritime protection
(including the protection of offshore installations) must be able to identify scenarios that
are credible and pose the greatest risk.323
In regard to the offshore attack scenarios discussed above, more credible (more
plausible) scenarios include a threat of attack and bomb threat, detonation of bombs or
explosives, armed intrusion of offshore installations, hostage taking and kidnapping,
internal attacks and disclosure of confidential information, attacks using stand-off
weapons, suicide attacks using of explosive-laden boats, and simultaneous offshore
attacks as well as peaceful protests. These types of offshore attacks have already taken
place in the past against offshore installations and maritime targets. Although there has
been no reported cyber attack specifically directed against offshore installations, this
scenario is nevertheless credible. 324 The low credibility scenarios (less plausible)
include the use of ships to ram an installation, 325 and underwater attacks against
offshore petroleum installations.
Different emphasis can be placed on different attack scenarios.326 Parfomak and Frittelli
note that one of the major challenges for security analysts and key decision-makers is
prioritising maritime security activities among a range of potential attack scenarios.327
The ‘priority scenarios approach’ has the advantage of applying limited maritime
security resources against attack scenarios of greatest relative concern based on
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intelligence and risk assessment. 328 Accordingly, it can be argued that the emphasis
should be placed on more credible scenarios which should be afforded high priority.
On one hand, the diversity of scenarios discussed above is relatively simple, which
should make it fairly easy to establish scenario priorities. On the other hand,
geographical factors including the security environment in a given area, as well as target
attractiveness factors also play an important role in prioritising and must always be
taken into account when assessing the likelihood of an attack.

6. Likelihood of Attacks on Offshore Petroleum Installations
An important part of the security risk assessment process for the offshore petroleum
industry is the assessment of likelihood of an attack or a security incident occurring.329
The API defines likelihood as ‘a function of the chance of being targeted for attack, and
the conditional chance of mounting a successful attack (both planning and executing)
given the threat and existing security measures’.330 Likelihood can also be used as a
general description of probability or frequency.331 It is a function of the degree of threat
posed by the adversary, the attractiveness to the adversary of the target, and the degree
of vulnerability of the target.332 Accordingly, to estimate the probability of risk of an
attack against offshore petroleum targets, it is important to assess information on
offshore security threats including motivations and capabilities of potential perpetrators
(which were discussed in Chapter 2), offshore target vulnerabilities and attractiveness
factors in connection with potential attack scenarios involving offshore installations.333
One of the main considerations in assessing the general likelihood of a maritime attack
or an attack against the offshore petroleum industry is the operational difficulties and
challenges in mounting such an attack, especially compared to land-based attacks that
could also meet the objectives of perpetrators.334 As noted by Parfomak and Frittelli, the
key challenge in determining the overall likelihood of a terrorist attack on a large
offshore platform is reducing uncertainty about specific types and methods of attacks,
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and potential attackers.335 Different threat groups have different intents and capabilities.
Accordingly the likelihood of the attacks occurring also differs.336 Assessing likelihood
is particularly problematic when attempting to define the prospect of an attack. 337
Cordner comments that
in determining the likelihood of a terrorist event occurring, analysts are faced with the
challenge of assessing the intent of actors whose actions, by reasonable standards of
human behavior, are irrational and random. This means that the risk analysis process
must focus more on vulnerabilities than likelihood, and risk treatment options must
338

address vulnerability reduction.

In order to properly estimate the likelihood of attacks against the offshore petroleum
infrastructure in a given country or area, it is important to consider security environment
factors such as geographical aspects, general security environment of the area,339 known
security threats including their capabilities and motivations, social and cultural factors,
relevant regulatory measures that address maritime and offshore security, intelligence
reports, as well as actual physical defence and the protection measures that are in
place.340

7. Conclusions
The nature of the petroleum industry makes offshore petroleum installations attractive
targets for violent non-State actors and hostile nation-States. There are a number of
factors that make offshore oil and gas installations attractive targets but, generally, they
can be divided into the ‘type of target’ factors and ‘type of effect’ factors. The ‘type of
target’ attractiveness factors are closely linked to the inherent physical, technical and
operational vulnerabilities of offshore petroleum installations, which include sensitive
equipment and products on board offshore installations, high turnover and diversity of
offshore workers, as well as location and stationary position of offshore installations.
The ‘type of effect’ attractiveness factors of offshore petroleum installations are
335
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basically potential consequences and impacts that can be generated by attacks. An
attack on an offshore installation may have a range of consequences including
economic, environmental, political and social impacts, the effects of which can extend
beyond the borders of a single country and can have regional and international
ramifications.
Due to their attractiveness, offshore petroleum installations have become more
commonly selected targets for attacks. There is a range of potential scenarios and
methods of attacks on offshore installations that can be employed by perpetrators,
depending on their objectives and desired effect. Armed intrusion of offshore
installations, seizure of installations, and abduction of offshore workers are the most
common attack scenarios.341 The use of explosives to attack offshore installations and
the threat of attacks, including bomb threats, are also common. In general, most of the
attack scenarios present a considerable degree of difficulty for the attackers.
Considering the range of potential consequences that can be generated by attacking
offshore petroleum installations, security of offshore installations has implications for
national security of the coastal State in whose offshore waters petroleum operations take
place. It would be practically impossible to eliminate all attractiveness factors and
protect all offshore installations. Therefore, the emphasis should be placed on protecting
offshore installations that are most vulnerable and those that are more likely to cause the
greatest impacts if attacked.
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CHAPTER 4
LEGAL STATUS OF OFFSHORE PETROLEUM
INSTALLATIONS
1. Introduction
Before analysing the international legal framework for the protection and security of
offshore petroleum installations, it is necessary to discuss the legal status of offshore
petroleum installations in international law.1 One of the principal problems relating to
offshore petroleum installations is their legal status. 2 The legal status of offshore
petroleum installations is of critical importance because their status may have different
legal and practical consequences in a particular situation. The legal status of offshore
petroleum installations may impact on the jurisdiction that States can exercise over
offshore installations,3 and it may also affect the applicability of various maritime law
principles and rules to offshore petroleum installations.4

1

A number of writers have discussed the status of offshore installations in international and municipal
law. See, eg, Nikos Papadakis, The International Legal Regime of Artificial Islands (Leyden Sijthoff,
1977) 174–8; Michael Summerskill, Oil Rigs: Law and Insurance (Stevens & Sons, 1979) 12–85; David
Sharp, Offshore Oil and Gas Insurance (Witherby & Co, 1994) 18–28; Hossein Esmaeili, The Legal
Regime of Offshore Oil Rigs in International Law (Ashgate Dartmouth, 2001) 20–53; Edgar Gold, Aldo
Chircop and Hugh Kindred, Essentials of Canadian Law Series: Maritime Law (Irwin Law, 2003) 73–4,
147–9; Wylie Spicer, ‘Canadian Maritime Law and the Offshore: A Primer’ (1984) 15(4) Journal of
Maritime Law and Commerce 489, 495–504; Wylie Spicer, ‘Canadian Maritime Law and the Offshore: A
Primer’ (1985) 16(1) Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 39; Wylie Spicer, ‘Application of
Maritime Law to Offshore Drilling Units – The Canadian Experience’ in Ian Townsend Gault (ed),
Offshore Petroleum Installations Law and Financing: Canada and the United States (1986) 105. The
legal status of offshore petroleum installations has also been considered by courts and governments. See,
eg, Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v Denmark) (1991) ICJ, 94 ILR (1994) 446; The Memorial
of the Government of the Republic of Finland, filed with the International Court of Justice on 20
December 1991 in the case Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v Denmark) (1991) ICJ. See also
Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Case Concerning Passage Through the Great Belt’ (1996) 27(3) Ocean
Development & International Law 255.
2
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 212.
3
For example, if an offshore installation is considered to be a ‘ship’, it would be under the jurisdiction of
the flag State, but if it is considered to be an ‘installation’, it would be under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the coastal State. Jurisdiction of States over ships and offshore installations is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 5 below. The legal status of offshore petroleum installations also helps to determine the rights of
States in relation to offshore installations and responsibility for activities of offshore installations: Chester
Brown, ‘International Environmental Law in the Regulation of Offshore Installations and Seabed
Activities: The Case for a South Pacific Regional Protocol’ (1998) 17(2) Australian Resources and
Energy Law Journal 109, 113.
4
Such as the application of the law of piracy to offshore petroleum installations (which is discussed in
Chapter 5) or the application of the legal rules relating to port State jurisdiction (which is discussed in
section 4 below). As noted by Gold, Chircop and Kindred, if offshore rigs are considered to be ships, then
traditional maritime law will apply to offshore installations, but if an offshore rig is not considered to be a
ship, different legal rules may have to be applied: Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 212, citing
Summerskill, above n 1; Global Marine Drilling v Triton Holdings Ltd [1999] ScotCS 277.

145

Chapter 4

Mikhail Kashubsky

For the purposes of this chapter, two fundamental issues relating to the legal status of
offshore petroleum installations need to be analysed. The first issue is whether offshore
installations can be regarded as ‘ships’, and if so, in what circumstances. The second
issue is whether offshore installations can be regarded as ‘ports’, and if so, in what
circumstances. To analyse these issues, it is necessary to examine classifications and
physical characteristics of different types of offshore petroleum installations, as well as
the approach taken in various international conventions and legal instruments and
practice of States.

2. Classifications and Types of Offshore Petroleum Installations
Offshore petroleum installations are complex structures. 5 They come in a variety of
types, forms, sizes and configurations.6 In general, offshore petroleum installations are
made up of two separate structures: a) the ‘platform’ (also referred to as ‘substructure’),
which supports the upper deck (topside) and which may float or sit on the seabed; and
b) the ‘topside’ (also referred to as ‘superstructure’) where the production or drilling
equipment and offshore crew are accommodated, and where the operating and support
functions are carried out.7
Offshore petroleum installations may be classified in different ways based on different
criteria.8 For example, offshore installations can be classified based on their purpose,
such as installations for the purpose of drilling, production, export/offloading, or
‘storage’ of oil and gas. They can also be generally classified as ‘floating’9 or ‘bottomsupported’10 structures.11 One of the most common ways to classify offshore petroleum
5

See generally Gunther Clauss, Eike Lehmann and Carsten Ostergaard, Offshore Structures: Conceptual
Design and Hydromechanics (M J Shields trans, Springer-Verlag, 1992-94) vol 1; William Graff,
Introduction to Offshore Structures: Design, Fabrication, Installation (Gulf Publishing Company, 1981).
6
The type and design of offshore installation to be used at a particular offshore field depend on factors
such as water depth, seabed topography, environmental conditions, distance from shore, production
capacity, expected life of the field, and number of wells. See, eg, Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above
n 5, 126.
7
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 72–3.
8
Esmaeili, above 1, 12. See also David Pinder, ‘Offshore Oil and Gas: Global Resource Knowledge and
Technological Change’ (2001) 44 Ocean & Coastal Management 579, 585–91.
9
Floating offshore petroleum installations rest on water by virtue of their own weight, without support:
Esmaeili, above n 1, 13. Floating offshore installations include drillships, semisubmersible units, floating
production storage and offloading units (FPSOs), floating storage and offloading units (FSOs), floating
drilling production storage and offloading units (FDPSOs), and spar platforms.
10
Bottom-supported offshore petroleum installations are those offshore installations that are either sunk
to the seabed or supported by a substructure usually made of steel or concrete. See Esmaeili, above n 1,
14–15. This category includes submersible units, jack-up rigs, jacket structures, gravity-based structures
(GBSs), and tower platforms.
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installations is to include them either in the category of ‘fixed’ offshore petroleum
installations or ‘mobile’ offshore petroleum installations. 12 Categorising offshore
petroleum installations either as ‘fixed’ or ‘mobile’ can have a bearing on their legal
status. In particular, as demonstrated in section 3 below, mobile offshore installations
are more likely to be treated as ships (from a legal standpoint) than fixed offshore
installations. Accordingly, the analysis in section 3 below generally follows
classification of offshore installations as either ‘fixed’ or ‘mobile’.
2.1 Fixed offshore petroleum installations

Fixed offshore platforms are the most common types of offshore production
installations employed in the offshore petroleum industry.13 They are usually fixed steel
or concrete platforms which are used for long-term operations and designed to remain
attached to the seabed at a single offshore location throughout a field’s production life.14
Fixed offshore installations can be manned or unmanned. Unmanned offshore
installations do not require personnel to be permanently stationed on board, but they can
be equipped with accommodation quarters for emergency situations.15
Fixed offshore installations can be used for drilling, production, storage and
export/offloading of oil and gas. The most common types of fixed offshore installations
include jacket structures, gravity-based structures (GBSs), tower platforms and tensionleg platforms (TLPs) (see Figure 5 below). 16 Each of these types of offshore
installations is briefly described below.17

11

Tension-leg platform (TLP) is the exception. TLPs are ‘floating’ and at the same time ‘bottomsupported’ structures. See discussion in subsection 2.1.4 and Figure 4.2 below.
12
It is important to note that ‘floating’ and ‘mobile’ are two different concepts and should not be
confused. While all mobile offshore installations are able to float, not all floating offshore installations
are mobile (such as in the case of a TLP, which is classified as a fixed offshore installation).
13
Some fixed production platforms may also have drilling equipment on board.
14
Sharp, above n 1, 25; Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 5, 47; Pinder, above n 8, 585.
15
Martin Tsamenyi and Kwame Mfodwo, ‘Developing Capacity for Addressing Safety, Security and
Marine Pollution Concerns Arising from the Oil and Gas Industry’ (Paper presented at the National
Conference on Positioning the Transport Sector for the Successful Exploration of Ghana’s Oil & Gas,
Accra, 15 July 2009) 7.
16
Each of these four types of fixed offshore installations has subcategories and design variations. Other,
not so common, types of fixed offshore installations include ‘caisson well-guard platforms’, ‘well-head
platforms’ and ‘platforms on piles’. Platforms on piles are rarely used today because of their limitation
with respect to water depth. See Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 5; Esmaeili, above n 1, 16.
17
It should be noted that each of the categories of offshore petroleum installations discussed below may
have subcategories. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine different subcategories and
technical aspects of different types of offshore petroleum installations. For technical aspects of different
types of offshore petroleum installations see generally Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 5.
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Figure 5: Types of Fixed and Mobile Offshore Petroleum Installations

Source: David Pinder, ‘Offshore Oil and Gas: Global Resource Knowledge and
Technological Change’ (2001) 44 Ocean & Coastal Management 579, 587.

2.1.1 Jacket structures

Jacket structures consist of a steel pyramidal pylon substructure (called ‘jacket’), which
extends from the sea-floor to above the water surface and has a deck on top (i.e.
topside) with operational equipment.18 The jacket substructure is usually floated by a
barge to the desired location where it is then lowered to the seabed in an upright
position,19 and firmly attached to the seabed with steel piles driven through the legs of
the substructure into the seabed.20 The piles fix the substructure in place against lateral
loadings from wind, waves, and currents.21
2.1.2 Gravity structures

Gravity structures, also known as GBSs, usually consist of a large substructure usually
built of reinforced concrete in the form of vertical tubular columns, which are fixed at
the concrete or steel base to ballasted chambers,22 making the entire structure stable on
the seabed and holding it in place through the force of gravity.23 The substructure is
18

Graff, above n 5, 106; Esmaeili, above n 1, 16; Pinder, above n 8, 587.
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 73.
20
Pinder, above n 8, 587; Graff, above n 5, 106.
21
W J Drawe and M D Reifel, ‘Platform Function and Types’ in Bramlette McClelland (ed), Planning
and Design of Fixed Offshore Platforms (Springer, 1986) 11, 18, cited in Esmaeili, above n 1, 16.
22
Harry Whitehead, An A-Z of Offshore Oil and Gas (Gulf Publishing Company, 1983) 180, cited in
Esmaeili, above n 1, 16.
23
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 73; Pinder, above n 8, 587.
19
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usually towed into position and then filled with ballast and lowered to a prepared
foundation on the sea-floor. 24 GBSs rest directly on the seabed by virtue of their own
weight.25 The tubular columns support the topside which itself remains above the water
surface.26 Some GBSs have tanks in the base of the structure that are used to store oil
before it is offloaded or transported.27
2.1.3 Tower platforms

Tower platforms (also known as ‘compliant tower’) are similar to jacket structures to an
extent. They are self-contained buoyancy towers with sufficient buoyancy that the tower
floats above water during transport. 28 Tower platforms consist of a narrow steel
substructure (i.e. tower) attached to a foundation on the seabed and extending up above
the water to the topside.29 The particular feature of tower platforms is that the tower
itself is relatively flexible (as opposed to the more rigid legs of a jacket structure),30
which provides greater resistance to stress and allows it to operate in much deeper
water.31
2.1.4 Tension-leg platforms (TLPs)

TLPs are floating production platforms, which are essentially a modified configuration
of a semisubmersible-type platform fixed (i.e. tethered) to the bottom by a series of
vertical stiff tethers. 32 These tethering lines replace the traditional support structures
(such as the steel jacket and concrete gravity base) and diminish the impact of waves by
maintaining a controlled tension between the platform and mooring template anchored
on the seabed.33 The TLP approach is to retain a structure fixed to the seabed, but to
abandon the traditional concept of bottom-supported structures.

34

A ‘floating

superstructure carrying all operational facilities supports its own weight and applies

24

Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 73.
Graff, above n 5, 261, cited in Esmaeili, above n 1, 16.
26
Pinder, above n 8, 587.
27
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 73.
28
Drawe and Reifel, above n 21, 19, cited in Esmaeili, above n 1, 16.
29
NaturalGas.org, Offshore Drilling <http://www.naturalgas.org/naturalgas/extraction_offshore.asp> at
5 September 2011.
30
Pinder, above n 8, 587.
31
NaturalGas.org, above n 29.
32
Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 5, 83.
33
Wylie Spicer, ‘Application of Maritime Law to Offshore Drilling Units – The Canadian Experience’ in
Ian Townsend Gault (ed), Offshore Petroleum Installations Law and Financing: Canada and the United
States (1986) 105, 106; Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 5.
34
Pinder, above n 8, 587–8.
25
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stabilising upward tension to relatively lightweight tubular fixed legs’. 35 TLPs can
remain attached to the seabed in a single location for extended periods. TLPs are
classified as fixed offshore installations despite the fact that they float on water.36
2.2 Mobile offshore petroleum installations

Mobile offshore installations are also very common in the offshore petroleum industry.
They may be used for drilling, production, export/offloading and storage of oil and gas.
The types of mobile offshore installations include jack-ups (see Figure 5 above),
submersibles, drilling barges, semisubmersibles, drill ships, floating production storage
and offloading units (FPSOs), floating storage and offloading units (FSOs), floating
drilling production storage and offloading units (FDPSOs), and spars (see Figure 6
below). Submersible drilling units, drilling barges as well as FSOs, and FDPSOs are not
shown in Figures 5 and 6.37

Figure 6: Floating Offshore Petroleum Installations

Source: MODEC, About Offshore Oil & Gas Industry
<http://www.modec.com/about/industry/oil_gas.html> at 3 September 2011.

2.2.1 Jack-ups

Jack-up platforms (also known as self-elevating drilling units) comprise a barge-type
rectangular or triangular floating deck (i.e. topside) which rests on several (usually three
35

Ibid 588.
Ibid 589.
37
See Appendix A for illustrations of a submersible, FSO, and FDPSO.
36
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or four) vertical or slightly tilted ‘tubular piles or legs of open lattice truss-type
construction’.38 The topside is equipped with drilling apparatus.39 Jack-ups can be either
towed or carried on heavy-lift ships as cargo to a drilling location, or they can move
under their own means of propulsion.40 The legs are raised while the unit is under tow.
41

Once on location, the legs are lowered to the seabed, and the topside is lifted to the

desired height above the surface of the water by electric or hydraulic jacks,42 to ensure a
safe distance from the water surface.43 When the legs are lifted, the jack-up retains its
floating position.44 Jack-ups are used in relatively shallow water (usually up to 100-150
metres in depth).45
2.2.2 Submersibles

Submersible drilling units consist of the topside ‘supported on a number of vertical or
horizontal pontoons which are flooded when the rig is in position for drilling’.46 When a
submersible is being moved from one place to another, the pontoons are filled with air
which makes the entire structure buoyant. 47 When the rig is submerged (i.e. in the
drilling position), the substructure rests on the seabed and the topside, which contains
the living quarters for the crew and drilling equipment,48 is a few metres above the
water line to provide protection from waves.49 Submersibles are designed to operate in
shallow waters, usually close to shore,50 and they are rarely used today.51
2.2.3 Drilling barges

Drilling barges are drilling units with flat-bottomed ship-shaped hulls which resemble a
barge rather than a ship.52 They have no means of self-propulsion and are towed to an

38

Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 5, 47–8.
Pinder, above n 8, 585.
40
Esmaeili, above n 1, 15; Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 5, 47.
41
Koskenniemi, above n 1, 265.
42
Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 5, 47–8; Esmaeili, above n 1, 15.
43
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 71.
44
The Memorial of the Government of the Republic of Finland, above n 1, para 178.
45
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 71.
46
Whitehead, above n 22, 269, quoted in Esmaeili, above n 1, 15.
47
NaturalGas.org, above n 29.
48
Ibid.
49
Esmaeili, above n 1, 15.
50
Whitehead, above n 22, 269, quoted in Esmaeili, above n 1, 15.
51
According to Rigzone, as of 6 September 2011, there were only five submersibles in the world’s
offshore drilling rig fleet: Rigzone, Rig Report: Offshore Rig Fleet by Rig Type (2011)
<http://www.rigzone.com/data/rig_report.asp?rpt=type> 6 September 2011.
52
Summerskill, above n 1, 3.
39
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offshore drilling location and anchored by tugs.53 Drilling barges can be converted from
former barges.54 A drilling barge has been described as ‘any type of offshore drilling
vessel, but also referring specifically to an earlier type of unpowered, flat-bottomed rig
with a ship-shaped hull’.55 Drilling barges are used mostly for shallow water drilling,56
and are not very common today.57
2.2.4 Semisubmersibles

Semisubmersible drilling units are large structures that consist of the topside supported
by a series of vertical columns that sit on two or more steel pontoons, which can be
lowered below, or raised to, the surface by adjusting the amount of ballast water in the
pontoons. 58 Semisubmersibles are usually used in water depth between 70 and 1000
metres using anchoring systems, or more than 1000 metres if using a dynamic
positioning system (which uses computer-controlled propellers to constantly correct the
unit’s drift to maintain its position).59 They can be towed, carried on heavy-lift vessels
as cargo or able to move under their own power. 60 During drilling operations a large
portion of the hull is under water, which gives a semisubmersible the ability to operate
in rough seas due to its design.61
2.2.5 Drill ships

Drill ships (also known as drilling ships) are ship-shaped drilling units. They are selfpropelled single-hulled (or double-hulled) 62 vessels fitted with a complete drilling
system.63 Sometimes they are referred to as regular ships equipped with a drilling tower
(derrick) and equipment.64 Compared to other floating drilling units, drill ships are the
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Esmaeili, above n 1, 14.
Ibid.
55
Whitehead, above n 22, 88, quoted in Summerskill, above n 1, 3.
56
NaturalGas.org, above n 29.
57
According to Rigzone, as of 6 September 2011, there were only forty-eight submersibles in the world’s
offshore drilling rig fleet: Rigzone, above n 51.
58
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 71; Pinder, above n 8, 586; Koskenniemi, above n 1, 265.
59
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 71; Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 5, 80.
60
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 71. See also The Memorial of the Government of the Republic
of Finland, above n 1, para 172.
61
Spicer, above n 33, 106; Pinder, above n 8, 586.
62
Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 5, 73.
63
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 71; Rupert Herbert-Burns, ‘Tankers, Specialized Production
Vessels, and Offshore Terminals: Vulnerability and Security in the International Maritime Oil Sector’ in
Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security
(CRC Press, 2008) 133, 151.
64
The Memorial of the Government of the Republic of Finland, above n 1, para 168.
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most mobile drilling units.65 A drill ship navigates under a master and crew and is used
for the purpose of drilling exploratory oil and gas wells. 66 Drill ships have a high
storage capacity, especially on the deck area, do not need anchor tugs, and can move
long distances in a relatively short time.67 Drill ships operate in water depths of 200 to
1000 metres using an anchoring system, and over 1000 metres using a dynamic
positioning system. 68 They are suitable for drilling in deep waters and operating in
remote areas independently of service and supply ships.69 Some of the advantages of the
drill ships include mobility at speeds between eight and sixteen knots; ability to pass
through the Suez and Panama Canals, thus minimising transit distance and time; and
superior seaworthiness and survival capability.70 A drill ship can be classified as a type
of a mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU).71
2.2.6 Floating production, storage and offloading units (FPSOs)

FPSOs are double-hulled ship-shaped units that contain production, storage and
transhipment facilities for oil and gas. 72 FPSOs can collect and process oil and gas
produced from nearby offshore installations or underwater production wells, and store it
on board until offloaded to a tanker. 73 FPSOs may be disconnectable or permanently
moored, self-propelled or without their own means of propulsion. 74 An FPSO is usually
connected to the producing wells through an internal turret that is anchored in position
and an FPSO structure than rotates around the turret in response to winds, currents, and
waves.75 Some FPSOs are refitted former tankers while others are purpose-built.76
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Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 71–2.
Sharp, above n 1, 21.
67
Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 5, 72–3. See also The Memorial of the Government of the
Republic of Finland, above n 1, 53.
68
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 71–2.
69
Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 5, 72–3.
70
Ibid 76.
71
Other types of mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs) include submersibles, semisubmersibles,
drilling barges and jack-up rigs.
72
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 73.
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Tsamenyi and Mfodwo, above n 15, 8.
74
International Maritime Organization (IMO), Review of the Code for the Implementation of Mandatory
IMO Instruments: Applicability of IMO Conventions to FPSOs and FSUs, IMO FSI, 16th sess, Agenda
Item 14, IMO Doc FSI 16/14/1 (26 March 2008) 2.
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Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 73.
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Herbert-Burns, above n 63, 149; Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 73.
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2.2.7 Floating storage and offloading units (FSOs)

FSOs, also known as floating storage units (FSUs),77 are ship-shaped single-hulled or
double-hulled floating storage installations.78 They ‘are simplified FPSOs’ which are
used as storage and offloading devices only.79 As Herbert-Burns puts it, FPSOs are ‘the
complex cousins of FSOs (and FSUs), wherein a production capability has been added
on board’.80 FSOs are usually made from old tankers that have been converted and do
not have capabilities for processing the oil and gas.81
2.2.8 Floading drilling, production, storage and offloading units (FDPSOs)

One of the latest innovations in floating production installations design is the FDPSO.82
FDPSOs are ship-shaped offshore installations similar to FPSOs, but with added drilling
capability, 83 which makes them even more complex structures than FPSOs. An FDPSO
is arguably the most multifunctional type of offshore petroleum installation in existence
today,84 but it is not very common.
2.2.9 Spars

Spar platforms consist of a large floating hollow column of cylindrical shape which sits
vertically in the water and is supported by buoyancy chambers at the top.85 The floating
cylindrical column supports the topside above the water and serves to stabilise the
platform in the water (effectively acting as the keel). 86 Stability is provided by the
length of the column itself, which does not extend all the way to the sea-floor but
instead is anchored to the bottom by a series of cables and lines (similarly to
semisubmersibles).87 Functional flexibility and the potential for mobility are inherent
77

The terms ‘FSO’ and ‘FSU’ are often used interchangeably and for the purposes of this thesis, they are
also used interchangeably.
78
Herbert-Burns, above n 63, 149.
79
Tsamenyi and Mfodwo, above n 15, 9.
80
Herbert-Burns, above n 63, 149.
81
Tsamenyi and Mfodwo, above n 15, 9.
82
The world’s first FDPSO commenced operations in August 2009 at the Azurite field offshore the
Republic of Congo: Offshore Magazine, First-ever FDPSO at Work on Azurite Field Development (1
November 2009) <http://www.offshore-mag.com/index/articledisplay/5643690153/articles/offshore/volume-69/issue-11/engineering_-construction/first-everfdpso_at.html> at 10 February 2011.
83
Pinder, above n 8, 589.
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Ibid.
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Ibid 588.
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Lew Skaug, ‘New Designs Advance Spar Technology into Deeper Water’ (1998) 96(44) Oil & Gas
Journal 47; NaturalGas.org, above n 29; B Clewes, ‘Mooring, Subsea Advances Making Rigs More
Competitive for Deepwater: Semisubmersibles Versus Spars and TLPs’ (2007) 7(7) Offshore Magazine
117.
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attributes of spar design. 88 The design allows for movement to absorb the forces of
wind, waves and currents.89 Spar platforms are among the largest offshore installations.

3. Offshore Petroleum Installations as Ships
The first key issue is whether offshore petroleum installations are ships or whether they
can be treated as ships in certain circumstances from the international law perspective.
To address this issue, it is necessary to examine the meaning of the term ‘ship’ in
international law. It is also necessary to consider how international law defines offshore
petroleum installations.90
There is no uniform definition of ‘ship’ or ‘vessel’91 in international law.92 ‘The term
“ship” is used with different meanings in different contexts depending on the purpose
and may be inclusive or exclusive of objects from one context to another.’ 93 The
definitions of ‘ship’ and ‘vessel’ in international conventions and legal instruments have
been made specifically for the purpose of each convention or legal instrument.94 As a
result, there is a variety of definitions of ‘ship’ in international law. For example, the
International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships 1973
(MARPOL) 95 places emphasis on ‘operation in the marine environment’ and defines
ship as ‘a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment and
88

Pinder, above n 8, 588.
NaturalGas.org, above n 29.
90
Brown, above n 3, 113.
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The terms ‘ship’ and ‘vessel’ are often used interchangeably from the international law perspective. For
example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, opened for signature 10 December
1982, 1833 UNTS 3, (entered into force 16 November 1994) (‘LOSC’) uses the terms ‘ship’ and ‘vessel’
interchangeably. See, eg, LOSC arts 17–27; cf LOSC arts 211, 219. However, a report of the Drafting
Committee of the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), having noted
the use of both terms in the draft text of the LOSC, stated that the use of both terms (i.e. ‘vessel’ and
‘ship’) affects only the English and Russian versions since only one word is used in other official
languages (i.e. Spanish, French, Arabic and Chinese): UN Doc A/CONF.62/L.40 (22 August 1979);
UNCLOS III, OR, vol XII, 97, cited in The Memorial of the Government of the Republic of Finland,
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“ship” is limited to a few species of the same genus’: Summerskill, above n 1, 13, citing George
Lazaratos, ‘The Definition of Ship in National and International Law’ (1969) 22 Revue Hellenique du
Droit International 64. See also Esmaeili, above n 1, 22–3. For the purposes of this thesis, the words
‘ship’ and ‘vessel’ are used interchangeably.
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93
Ibid 748.
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includes hydrofoil, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating craft, and fixed or
floating platforms’.96 The International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil
Pollution Damage 2001 (Bunker Convention)97 emphasises the ‘seagoing ability’ and
defines ship as ‘any seagoing vessel and seaborne craft, of any type whatsoever’.98
The International Convention on Salvage 1989 (1989 Salvage Convention) 99 places
emphasis on ‘navigability’ and (although it does not define the term ‘ship’) defines
‘vessel’ as ‘any ship or craft, or any structure capable of navigation’. 100 The
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading
for the Carriage of Goods by Sea 1924 (Hague Rules) 101 places emphasis on the
‘carriage of goods’ and defines the term ‘ship’ as ‘any vessel used for the carriage of
goods by sea’. 102 Other characteristics of ships in international conventions include
‘mechanical self-propulsion’, 103 ‘used in international seaborne trade’, 104 ‘not being
permanently moored’105 and ‘not being permanently attached to the sea-bed’.106
There are no uniform rules or common sets of standards that are used to determine what
structures may qualify as a ship.

107

According to Esmaeili, there are several

characteristics in both municipal and international law that pertain only to ships. These
include: a) moveability, b) seagoing ability, c) ability to transport passengers and/or
goods, d) navigability, and e) navigation. 108 Sometimes it is uncertain whether an
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offshore petroleum installation may be included in the definition of ‘ship’,109 but several
types of offshore petroleum installations (especially mobile offshore installations)
would be able to satisfy most of these characteristics. 110 Many types of offshore
petroleum installations float, they have seagoing ability, they are capable of navigation
(either under their own power or by being towed),111 and, in some cases look like ships;
however, they are designed to engage in operations that are very different from normal
ships.112
The analysis in the following sections (sections 3.1 – 3.3) will illustrate different
approaches taken in different international conventions and legal instruments with
respect to the legal status of offshore petroleum installations and ships. In particular, it
will be demonstrated that: a) at least two international conventions treat all types of
offshore petroleum installations (both fixed and mobile) as ships; b) some international
conventions and legal instruments treat only mobile offshore installations as ships; c)
some international conventions only treat mobile offshore installations as ships in
certain circumstances (e.g. when such installations are not on location and not engaged
in offshore drilling or production operations); and d) some international conventions do
not treat offshore installations as ships at all, but rather place them in a separate
category of their own.
3.1 Fixed offshore petroleum installations as ships

Fixed offshore petroleum installations are not designed to be mobile and are much less
flexible than mobile offshore installations.113 Fixed offshore installations lack certain
characteristics of ships such as moveability, self-propulsion and the ability to transport
passengers and/or goods; however, the legal status of fixed offshore installations in
international law is still not very straightforward because of different approaches
109

Brown, above n 3, 114.
As shown in sections 3.1 and 3.2 below, the most common characteristics/elements used in the
definitions of ship in international conventions are ‘operation in the marine environment’ and ‘seagoing
ability’.
111
A mobile offshore installation without its own means of propulsion can still be regarded as ‘capable of
navigation’. According to the argument of Finland in Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v
Denmark) (1991) 94 ILR (1994) 446, ‘[t]here is no evidence establishing the existence of a general
requirement that a ship, for the purposes of international law, be capable of navigation under its own
power’, which suggests that a mobile offshore installation under tow can still be regarded as ‘navigating’:
The Memorial of the Government of the Republic of Finland, above n 1, para 476. See also Martin
Davies and Anthony Dickey, Shipping Law (LBC Information Services, 2nd ed, 1995) 8.
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Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 74.
113
The Memorial of the Government of the Republic of Finland, above n 1, para 163.
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adopted by international conventions with regard to treatment of fixed offshore
petroleum installations. As mentioned in the preceding section, at least two international
conventions classify fixed offshore installations as ships. MARPOL, which primarily
deals with pollution from ships, and the International Convention on the Control of
Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships 2001 (Anti-fouling Systems Convention), 114
which primarily deals with control of anti-fouling systems on ships, both treat fixed and
mobile offshore installations as ships.
MARPOL defines ship as ‘a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine
environment and includes hydrofoil, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating craft,
and fixed or floating platforms’.115 It is clear that fixed platforms are included in the
definition of ships in MARPOL; however, considering the nature of MARPOL, it can be
argued that it applies to fixed installations only when they are in mobile configuration,
for example, when a fixed platform is under tow from a place of construction to the
place of intended emplacement at an offshore site or for dismantling.116
Similarly to MARPOL, the definition of a ‘ship’ in the Anti-fouling Systems Convention
includes fixed platforms, which makes it clear that the Anti-fouling Systems Convention
treats fixed offshore petroleum installations as ‘ships’. Article 2(9) of the Anti-fouling
Systems Convention defines a ‘ship’ as:
a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment and includes
hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating craft, fixed or floating
platforms, floating storage units (FSUs) and floating production storage and off-loading
units (FPSOs).117

MARPOL and the Anti-fouling Systems Convention appear to be the only two
international conventions that treat fixed offshore platforms (as well as mobile offshore
114

International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships 2001, adopted on 5
October 2001, AFS/CONF/26, (17 September 2008) (‘Anti-fouling Systems Convention’).
115
MARPOL art 2(4).
116
It should be noted that discharges directly arising from normal operations of offshore petroleum
installations (such as exploration, exploitation and associated offshore processing of hydrocarbons) are
not covered by MARPOL. See definition of ‘discharge’ in Article 2(3) of MARPOL. Thus, the application
of MARPOL to offshore petroleum installations is confined to non-operational discharge (i.e. those not
associated with the exploration, exploitation, and associated offshore processing of hydrocarbons).
However, MARPOL requires fixed and floating drilling rigs, when engaged in exploration and
exploitation of hydrocarbons, to comply with the requirements applicable to ships of 400 tons gross
tonnage and above. See MARPOL annex I, reg 21. See also Brown, above n 3, 122.
117
Anti-fouling Systems Convention art 2(9).
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installations) as ships. It is not clear why MARPOL and the Anti-fouling Systems
Convention are the only international conventions that treat fixed offshore petroleum
installations as ships but it could be because of their special scope. For example,
O’Connell argues that ‘in order to make the pollution conventions effective a broad
definition is necessary’. 118 The ultimate purpose of MARPOL and the Anti-fouling
Systems Convention is to minimise maritime environment pollution. Considering the
scope of MARPOL and the Anti-fouling Systems Convention, fixed offshore petroleum
installations can cause similar harm to the marine environment as ships, and that is
probably the reason for including fixed (and mobile) offshore installations in the
definition of ship. 119 According to Esmaeili, the travaux preparatoires of MARPOL
reveal that there was considerable discussion as to whether fixed platforms should be
included within the definition of ‘ship’.120 Some States, including Finland and Canada,
argued that the inclusion of all kinds of platforms and drilling rigs in the definition of
‘ship’ would cause unnecessary confusion; 121 however, the proposals to delete the
expression ‘fixed and floating platforms’ from the definition of ‘ship’ were rejected on
at least five occasions.122
Several regional conventions on marine pollution such as the Convention for the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft 1972 (1972 Oslo
Convention)123 and the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Baltic Sea Area 1974 (1974 Helsinki Convention)124 also include fixed (and mobile)
offshore petroleum installations within the definition of ‘ship’.125 In almost all other
international conventions and legal instruments (including all conventions and legal
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O’Connell, above n 92, 750.
For example, the anti-fouling systems used on fixed offshore installations in principle have the same
adverse effects on the marine environment as those used on ships.
120
Esmaeili, above n 1, 33.
121
IMO Doc MP/CONF/8/7, 3 July 1973; IMO Doc MP/CONF/C.1/WP 5, 10 October 1973, cited in
Esmaeili, above n 1, 33.
122
The Memorial of the Government of the Republic of Finland, above n 1, para 457.
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Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft 1972, adopted
15 February 1972, 11 ILM 262 (entered into force 7 April 1974) (‘1972 Oslo Convention’).
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Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Region 1974, adopted 22
March 1974, 13 ILM 546 (entered into force 3 May 1980) (‘1974 Helsinki Convention’).
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Article 19 of the 1972 Oslo Convention defines the term ‘ships and aircraft’ as ‘seagoing vessels and
air-borne craft, floating craft whether self-propelled or not, and fixed or floating platforms’. Article 2(4)
of the 1974 Helsinki Convention defines ‘vessels and aircraft’ as ‘waterborne or airborne craft of any type
whatsoever. This expression includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating craft
whether self-propelled or not, and fixed or floating platforms’.
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instruments discussed in this chapter), fixed offshore installations are excluded from the
definition of ‘ship’.126 Fixed offshore installations are not normally regarded as ships.127
3.2 Mobile offshore petroleum installations as ships

Mobile offshore petroleum installations may be treated as ships for some but not all
purposes. 128 MODUs are designed to float and be navigated, either under their own
propulsion or under tow, and when transported from one offshore site to another they
can behave like ships.129 Some MODUs are equally designed to be partially or fully
submerged as in the case of semisubmersibles or submersibles. MODUs have seagoing
capability; they can float and some may rest on the seabed while engaged in exploratory
or drilling operations. However, as shown in Figures 5 and 6 above, most types of
MODUs (except drill ships) have little resemblance to conventional ships. It has been
argued that the natural understanding of the term ‘ship’ excludes drilling rigs because
neither their construction nor their use is comparable to the normal shape and purpose
of ships.130
Drill ships have many similarities with conventional ships.131 Drill ships are built with
hulls of conventional ship shape which is slightly modified to allow a drilling tower
(derrick) to be installed on the deck.132 A drill ship navigates under a master and crew
and is used for the purpose of drilling exploratory oil and gas wells.133 Sharp argues that
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Esmaeili, above n 1, 36.
Koskenniemi, above n 1, 266. But, see Spicer, above n 33, 106. Spicer argues that ‘if a jack-up rig can
be considered to be a ship, a TLP production system can certainly fit within the definition of ship’: at 106.
In American case Laffland Brothers Co v Roberts, 386 Feb 2nd 540 (5th Circuit, 1967) a fixed offshore
platform was considered not to be a vessel. See also Olsen v Shell Oil Co, 708 F.2d 976, 1984 AMC 580
(5th Cir.1983); Longmire v Sea Drilling Corp, 610 F.2d 1342, 1980 AMC 2625 (5th Cir.1980); Myrick v
Teledyne Movible Offshore Inc, 516 F.Supp 602 (SD Tex 1981); Hemba v Freeport McMoran Energy
Partners Ltd, 811 F.2d 276, 1988 AMC 304 (5th Cir.1987), cited in Thomas Schoenbaum, Admirality and
Maritime Law (Thomson West, 4th ed, 2004) 41.
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Summerskill, above n 1, 16.
129
See, eg, Papadakis, above n 1, 175.
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The Counter-Memorial of the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, filed with the International
Court of Justice on 18 May 1992 in the case Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v Denmark) (1991)
ICJ para 635.
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Papadakis, above n 1, 175.
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The Memorial of the Government of the Republic of Finland, above n 1, para 434.
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Sharp, above n 1, 21.
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a drillship could be described as a ship just as much as any other vessel performing a
specific function offshore, such as a pipe-laying vessel or a dredger.134
Other ship-shaped installations employed by the offshore petroleum industry include
FPSOs, FSOs and FDPSOs. Some FPSOs and FSOs are refitted former tankers and
from a structural and technical standpoint, FPSOs are a combination of ship and
petroleum production, storage and transhipment functions.135 As Herbert-Burns puts it,
FPSOs are ‘the complex cousins of FSOs (and FSUs), wherein a production capability
has been added on board’.136 Some FPSOs, FSOs (or FSUs) can be permanently moored
with no mechanical means of self-propulsion and some are capable of disconnecting
from their moored position and move under their own power. 137 FPSOs, FSOs and
FDPSOs certainly have seagoing ability, navigability and normally operate in the
marine environment.138
Mobile offshore petroleum installations have most of the characteristics of a ship, such
as movability, seagoing ability and navigability.

139

A number of international

conventions, some of which are examined below, treat mobile offshore installations as
ships, at least in certain circumstances.
As discussed in section 3.1 above, MARPOL defines a ship as ‘a vessel of any type
whatsoever operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil, air-cushion
vehicles, submersibles, floating craft, and fixed or floating platforms’.140 This definition
in Article 2(4) of MARPOL explicitly includes submersibles, floating platforms and
floating craft in the definition of a ‘ship’, which would practically cover all types of
mobile offshore installations including MODUs and other floating offshore installations
such as FPSOs. Similarly, the Anti-fouling Systems Convention treats offshore
petroleum installations as ships because both mobile and fixed installations are
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Ibid. As noted by Sharp, the main difference between a drill ship and other conventional ships is that
the drill ship is temporarily in contact with the seabed; however, he has pointed out other specialised
ships such as dredgers and pipe-laying ships also come in contact with the seabed: at 21.
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Herbert-Burns, above n 63, 149; Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 73.
136
Herbert-Burns, above n 63, 149.
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IMO, above n 74, 2.
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Sharp noted that, like MODUs, floating installations such as FPSOs and FSOs can satisfy most of the
legal characteristics that pertain to ships: Sharp, above n 1, 24.
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Esmaeili, above n 1, 40. See also Summerskill, above n 1, 16.
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MARPOL art 2(4).
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explicitly included in the definition of a ‘ship’ in Article 2(9) of the Anti-fouling
Systems Convention.141
The Bunker Convention defines ‘ship’, in Article 1(1), as ‘any seagoing vessel and
seaborne craft, of any type whatsoever’.142 Mobile offshore units have a seagoing ability
and they can be described as a seaborne craft. The definition of ‘ship in Article 1(1) of
the Bunker Convention is a wide enough definition to include mobile offshore
installations.
The International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of
Ships 2009 (Ship Recycling Convention)143 defines ‘ship’ in Article 2(7) as:
a vessel of any type whatsoever operating or having operated in the marine environment
and includes submersibles, floating craft, floating platforms, self elevating platforms,
Floating Storage Units (FSUs), and Floating Production Storage and Offloading Units
(FPSOs), including a vessel stripped of equipment or being towed.144

It is clear that the Ship Recycling Convention treats virtually all types of mobile offshore
installations as ‘ships’. The definition of ‘ship’ in Article 2(7) does not mention fixed
offshore installations, which suggests that fixed offshore installations are not treated as
ships in the Ship Recycling Convention.
The International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water
and Sediments 2004 (Ballast Water Convention)145 defines a ‘ship’ as ‘a vessel of any
type whatsoever operating in the aquatic environment and includes submersibles,
floating craft, floating platforms, FSUs and FPSOs’.146 The Ballast Water Convention is
clear and explicit in that ‘floating platforms, FSUs and FPSOs’, which would cover
most types of mobile offshore petroleum installations, are treated as ships.
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Anti-fouling Systems Convention art 2(9). Article 2(9) defines a ‘ship’ as:
a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil
boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating craft, fixed or floating platforms, floating
storage units (FSUs) and floating production storage and off-loading units (FPSOs).
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Bunker Convention art 1(1).
143
International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships 2009, adopted 15
May 2009, IMO Doc SR/CONF/45 (not yet in force) (‘Ship Recycling Convention’).
144
Ship Recycling Convention art 2(7).
145
International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments
2004, adopted on 13 February 2004, BWM/CONF/36 (not yet in force) (‘Ballast Water Convention’).
146
Ballast Water Convention art 1(12).
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The Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization 1976 (INMARSAT
Convention) 147 defines ship as ‘a vessel of any type operating in the marine
environment. It includes inter alia hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles,
floating craft and platforms not permanently moored’. 148 Mobile offshore petroleum
installations that are not permanently moored are covered by the definition of ship in the
INMARSAT Convention; however, mobile offshore installations that are permanently
moored (such as permanently moored FPSOs and FSOs)149 are not regarded as ships for
the purposes of the INMARSAT Convention.
The definition of ‘ship’ in the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS
Code) provides that the term ‘ship’ ‘includes mobile offshore drilling units and highspeed craft as defined in regulation XI-2/1’.150 Regulation XI-2/1 of the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS Convention)151 defines the term
‘mobile offshore drilling unit’ as ‘a mechanically propelled mobile offshore drilling
unit, as defined in regulation IX/1, not on location’.152 In turn, regulation IX/1 of the
SOLAS Convention defines ‘mobile offshore drilling unit’ as ‘a vessel capable of
engaging in drilling operations for the exploration for or exploitation of resources
beneath the sea-bed such as liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons, sulphur or salt’.153 Based
on the criteria in Regulation XI-2/1 of the SOLAS Convention that a MODU must be
mechanically propelled and not on location,154 it can be argued the ISPS Code regards
only self-propelled mobile offshore installations not on location as ships, but not
MODUs that are on location, MODUs without their own means of propulsion, and other
mobile offshore installations used for production or storage of oil and gas such as
FPSOs and FSOs. Furthermore, the ISPS Code applies only to ships and MODUs
‘engaged on international voyages’.155
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Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization 1976, adopted 3 September 1976,
1143 UNTS 105 (entered into force 16 July 1979) (‘IMSO Convention’).
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INMARSAT Convention art 1(f).
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See IMO, above n 74, 2.
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ISPS Code s 2.2.
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International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, opened for signature 1 November 1974,
1184 UNTS 2 (entered into force 25 May 1980) (‘SOLAS Convention’).
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SOLAS Convention annex, reg XI-2/1.
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Ibid annex, reg IX/1.
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Ibid annex, reg XI-2/1.
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ISPS Code s 3.1. The term ‘international voyage’ is not defined in the International Ship and Port
Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), but it is defined in regulation I/2(d) of the SOLAS Convention as ‘a
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In the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
1972 (1972 Collisions Regulations Convention),156 the term ‘ship’ is not defined, but
‘vessel’ is defined in Rule 3(a) and ‘includes every description of water craft, including
non-displacement craft and seaplanes, used or capable of being used as a means of
transportation on water’.157 Mobile offshore installations of any kind can be referred to
as ‘water craft’. The meaning of ‘means of transportation on water’ is not clear, but
mobile offshore petroleum installations can carry persons and equipment on board and
are thus capable of being used as a means of transportation on water (even though it is
not their main activity). 158 Accordingly, it can be argued that mobile offshore
installations can be regarded as ships for the purposes of the 1972 Collisions
Regulations Convention.159 However, there is still some doubt about the legal status of
mobile offshore installations under the 1972 Collisions Regulations Convention.
3.2.1 The ‘dual status approach’

Another approach is to treat mobile offshore installations as ‘ships’ when they are in
transit and as ‘installations’ when they are on location engaged in drilling or production
operations. This approach can be referred to as the ‘dual status approach’. Under this
approach, the legal status of a mobile offshore installation can change depending on the
nature of activity being performed by the installation at a given point in time. The
International Maritime Organization (IMO) has adopted this ‘dual status approach’. For
example, the IMO, in its Resolution A.671(16) dealing with safety zones around
offshore installations, clarified that (for the purpose of that resolution) MODUs that are
used for exploratory offshore drilling ‘are considered to be vessels when they are in
transit and not engaged in drilling operation, but are considered to be installations or

voyage from a country to which the present Convention applies to a port outside such country, or
conversely’.
156
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972, adopted 20
October 1972, 1050 UNTS 16 (entered into force 15 July 1977) (‘1972 Collisions Regulation
Convention’).
157
1972 Collisions Regulation Convention regs, rule 3(a).
158
Summerskill, above n 1, 26. Summerskill argues that ‘[i]t does not appear to be essential, in order to
satisfy the requirement as to transportation, that commercial cargoes should be carried’: at 26.
159
Cf Samir Mankabady, Collisions at Sea: A Guide to the Legal Consequences (North Holland
Publishing Company, 1978) 97–8, cited in Esmaeili, above n 1, 31. Mankabady argues that only certain
kinds of drilling rigs, such as drill ships, may be considered as ‘vessels’, while others would not fall
within the definition in Rule 3(a) of the 1972 Collisions Regulation Convention: at 97–8. Similarly,
O’Connell argues that drilling rigs cannot be regarded as ships for the purpose of collisions, at least when
they are attached to the seabed: O’Connell, above n 92, 890.
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structures when engaged in drilling operation’.

160

Such treatment of offshore

installations is significant from a legal perspective. When an offshore installation is
considered to be a ship, it is subject to the jurisdiction of the flag State,161 and when it is
considered to be an offshore installation, it is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
coastal State pursuant to Article 60(2)162 of the LOSC.
The SOLAS Convention does not apply to ships not propelled by mechanical means,
such as non-disconnectable FPSOs and FSUs, 163 but it does, in principle, apply to
disconnectable self-propelled FPSOs and FSUs. 164 According to the IMO, where an
FPSO/FSU is required to transit under its own mechanical propulsion to a port or if the
FPSO/FSU is in a situation where it must temporarily disconnect from the rise at the
operating station, the flag State administrations have discretion under the SOLAS
Convention Regulation I/4(a) to exempt it from requirements of the SOLAS
Convention.165 The IMO’s point of view is that mobile offshore installations such as
FPSOs and FSUs, in their normal mode of operation, do not fall under the application
criteria of the safety provisions of the SOLAS Convention.166
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IMO, Safety Zones and Safety of Navigation around Offshore Installations and Structures, A Res
671(16), Agenda Item 10, IMO Doc A Res.A.671(16) (19 October 1989) 288.
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LOSC art 92(1). Article 92(1) of the LOSC provides:
Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided
for in international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on
the high seas. A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in
the case of a real transfer of ownership or change of registry.
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Article 60(2) of the LOSC states:
The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands, installations and
structures [in the exclusive economic zone], including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal,
health, safety and immigration laws and regulations.
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SOLAS Convention annex, reg I/3(a)(iii). Regulation I/3(a)(iii) of the SOLAS Convention provides that
the convention does not apply to ‘ships not propelled by mechanical means’.
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IMO, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on Its Eighty-Fifth Session, IMO MSC, 85th sess,
Agenda Item 26, IMO Doc MSC 85/26 (19 December 2008) 75.
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Regulation I/4(a) of the SOLAS Convention provides that:
A ship which is not normally engaged on international voyages but which, in exceptional
circumstances, is required to undertake a single international voyage may be exempted by the
Administration from any of the requirements of the present regulations provided that it complies
with safety requirements which are adequate in the opinion of the Administration for the voyage
which is to be undertaken by the ship’.
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IMO, above n 164.
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The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation 1988 (1988 SUA Convention) 167 defines ‘ship’ as ‘a vessel of any type
whatsoever not permanently attached to the sea-bed, including dynamically supported
craft, submersibles, or any other floating craft’,168 which indicates that mobile offshore
petroleum installations are treated as ships for the purposes of the 1988 SUA
Convention.169 However, Article 4(1) provides that the 1988 SUA Convention applies ‘if
the ship is navigating or is scheduled to navigate ...’,170 which suggests that the 1988
SUA Convention will not apply to mobile offshore installations when they are engaged
in offshore operations on location, because such offshore installations would probably
be considered as neither navigating nor scheduled to navigate. Based on such an
interpretation, it can be argued that the 1988 SUA Convention adopts the ‘dual status
approach’ to mobile offshore installations. 171 However, there still seems to be some
ambiguity with respect to the approach of the 1988 SUA Convention to treating offshore
petroleum installations as ships.172
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954
(OILPOL),173 as amended, provides, in Article 1(1), that a ship ‘means any sea-going
167

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988,
opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 201 (entered into force 1 March 1992) (‘1988 SUA
Convention’).
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1988 SUA Convention art 1.
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The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on
the Continental Shelf 1988, opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 304 (entered into force 1
March 1992) (‘1988 SUA Protocol’) defines the term ‘fixed platform’ as ‘an artificial island, installation
or structure permanently attached to the sea-bed for the purpose of exploration or exploitation of
resources or for other economic purposes’: 1988 SUA Protocol art 1(3).
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1988 SUA Convention art 4(1).
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However, as discussed in Chapter 5 below, Treves has pointed out that at the Rome Conference on the
adoption of the 1988 SUA Treaties, the informal consultation group agreed that the term ‘navigation’
should be interpreted as encompassing the operation of mobile offshore drilling units or similar craft
when attached to the seabed, and that those units would be subject to the 1988 SUA Convention: Tullio
Treves, ‘The Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation’ in Natalino Ronzitti (ed), Maritime Terrorism and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff,
1990) 69, 72, citing IMO Doc SUA/CONF/CW/WP.18 para 3. Treves has also noted that such an
interpretation of the word ‘navigating’ is not binding, but ‘[i]ts weight in the travaux preparatoires
seems, nonetheless, quite important’ because the Conference agreed on the definition of ‘ship’ in light of
this interpretation and it was published in the official records of the Conference: at 72. See discussion on
the 1988 SUA Convention in Chapter 5 below.
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See discussion in Chapter 5 below.
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International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954, adopted 12 May
1954, 327 UNTS 3, (entered into force 26 July 1958), as amended in 1962, 1969 and 1971 (‘OILPOL’).
See also Amendments to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
1954, adopted 11 April 1962, 600 UNTS 332 (entered into force 18 May and 28 June 1967); Amendments
to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, adopted 21
October 1969, 1140 UNTS 340 (entered into force 20 January 1978); Amendments to the International
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vessel of any type whatsoever, including floating craft, whether self-propelled or towed
by another vessel, making a sea-voyage ...’. 174 On one hand, it appears that mobile
offshore installations are included in the definition of ship in OILPOL; however, as
noted by Summerskill, the expression ‘making a sea-voyage’ suggests that mobile
offshore installations may be considered as ships only when they are moving or being
towed (i.e. making a sea-voyage), but not when they are operating on location. 175 It
could be argued that OILPOL has adopted the ‘dual status approach’ with respect to the
legal treatment of mobile offshore installations.
The 1989 Salvage Convention does not define the term ‘ship’, but defines ‘vessel’, in
Article 1(b), as ‘any ship or craft, or any structure capable of navigation’. 176 This
definition of ‘vessel’ seems to include mobile offshore installations because they are
‘capable of navigation’, but most likely excludes fixed offshore installations because
they are arguably not capable of navigation.177 However, Article 3 of the 1989 Salvage
Convention specifically provides that the convention does not ‘apply to fixed or floating
platforms or to mobile offshore drilling units when such platforms or units are on
location engaged in the exploration, exploitation or production of sea-bed mineral
resources’. 178 This means that the 1989 Salvage Convention would apply to mobile
offshore installations that are in transit or navigating from one place to another.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the 1989 Salvage Convention also adopts the ‘dual
status approach’.

Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, Concerning Tank Arrangements and
Size, adopted 15 October 1971, 11 ILM 267 (not yet in force).
174
OILPOL art 1(1). It should be noted that the 1954 OILPOL did not define the word ‘ship’, but the
definition of ‘ship’ was adopted in the 1962 amendments to the OILPOL.
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Summerskill, above n 1, 44.
176
1989 Salvage Convention art 1(b).
177
The issue is whether a fixed offshore installation (or a component such as a substructure of a fixed
platform) would be considered as ‘navigating’ when it is being towed from a place of construction to an
intended place of emplacement at an offshore location. According to the Comité Maritime International
(CMI) Working Group on Offshore Mobile Craft which prepared the Draft Convention on Offshore
Units, Artificial Islands and Related Structures Used in the Exploration for and Exploitation of Petroleum
and Seabed Mineral Resources (Draft Offshore Units Convention), a fixed platform or a component (such
as the caisson foundation of a GBS) is unlikely to be regarded as a ship: CMI, Working Group on
Offshore Mobile Craft, ‘Commentary on May 2001 Draft UOC Convention’ (2004) 1 CMI Newsletter 13,
14.
178
1989 Salvage Convention art 3.

167

Chapter 4

Mikhail Kashubsky

Similarly to the 1989 Salvage Convention, the International Convention on the Removal
of Wrecks 2007 (Wreck Removal Convention)179 defines ‘ship’ in Article 1(2) as:
a seagoing vessel of any type whatsoever and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion
vehicles, submersibles, floating craft and floating platforms, except when such
platforms are on location engaged in the exploration, exploitation or production of
180

seabed mineral resources.

It is clear from the above definition of ‘ship’ in Article 1(2) that the Wreck Removal
Convention does not treat offshore installations that are on location and engaged in
offshore operations as ships. All mobile offshore installations in transit or moving from
one location to another can be regarded as ships for the purposes of the Wreck Removal
Convention. Accordingly, the Wreck Removal Convention seems to have adopted the
‘dual status approach’ with respect to mobile offshore petroleum installations.
Some writers disagree with such treatment of mobile offshore installations (i.e. the dual
status approach). For example, Summerskill argues that it is undesirable that a court
would adopt the position that ‘a particular drilling unit was a ship during such times as
it was moving to or from the drilling site, but not when it had arrived at the site or
perhaps when part of the structure (such as legs in the case of a jack-up rig) was in
contact with the seabed’. 181 Gold argues that it would be illogical to treat mobile
offshore installations as ships only when they are actually floating or moving, but not
when they are anchored or on location engaged in offshore operations. 182 Similarly,
Spicer has stated that this approach is a ‘dangerous and illogical argument’.183 However,
neither Gold nor Spicer explained why they considered this approach to be illogical.184
According to Papadakis, an offshore petroleum installation should be considered either
as an installation or a ship, but it cannot be both in the legal sense of the terms used.185
Nevertheless, this ‘dual status approach’ has been adopted by the IMO and by some
international conventions.
179

International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks 2007, adopted 18 May 2007, 46 ILM 694 (not yet
in force) (‘Wreck Removal Convention’).
180
Wreck Removal Convention art 1(2).
181
Summerskill, above n 1, 85.
182
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 74.
183
Spicer, above n 33, 107.
184
Although Spicer has noted that ‘[n]one of the statutory definitions of ships give any support to this
view’: Spicer, above n 33, 107.
185
Papadakis, above n 1, 176.
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3.3 Offshore petroleum installations as a separate category

Another approach is not to treat offshore petroleum installations as ships at all but to
place offshore installations in their own separate category. Summerskill refers to this
approach as ‘the residual approach’.186 Some international conventions have adopted
this approach to the legal status of offshore petroleum installations.187
The Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958 (Continental Shelf Convention)188 and
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC)189 have, to some
extent, created a separate legal category for offshore installations, which are considered
neither ships nor artificial islands. 190 The Continental Shelf Convention refers to
‘installations and other devices’,191 but this term is not defined in the Continental Shelf
Convention.192 The LOSC uses the terms ‘ship’ and ‘vessel’ interchangeably,193 but it
does not define these terms. However, in defining the term ‘dumping’, Article 1(5)(a)(i)
of the LOSC states that dumping means ‘any deliberate disposal of wastes or other
matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea’. This
definition indicates that the LOSC makes a distinction between ‘ships’ and offshore
petroleum installations.194
The Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration
and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources 1977 (CLEE), 195 defines the term
‘installation’ in Article 1(2)(a) as ‘any well or other facility, whether fixed or mobile,
which is used for the purpose of exploring for, producing, treating, storing or
186

Summerskill, above n 1, 16.
See discussion in Esmaeili, above n 1, 44–9.
188
Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 499 UNTS 311
(entered into force 10 June 1964) (‘Continental Shelf Convention’). As at 15 March 2011, there were 58
contracting States to the Continental Shelf Convention. United Nations Treaty Collection, (14 March
2011) <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=XXI4&chapter=21&lang=en#Participants> at 15 March 2011.
189
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833
UNTS 3, (entered into force 16 November 1994) (‘LOSC’).
190
Esmaeili, above n 1, 53.
191
Convention on the Continental Shelf art 5.
192
Papadakis, above n 1, 175.
193
See, eg, LOSC arts 17–27, 211, 219. The Drafting Committee of UNCLOS III has reported that the
words ‘ship’ and ‘vessel’ as used in the LOSC are not interpreted as meaning different things: UN Doc
A/CONF.62/L.40 (22 August 1979); UNCLOS III, OR, vol XII, 97, cited in The Memorial of the
Government of the Republic of Finland, above n 1, para 462.
194
See Esmaeili, above n 1, 20–53. Esmaeili, however, also notes that in international law, offshore oil
and gas installations may be considered as ships in certain instances: at 52.
195
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage resulting from Exploration for and
Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources 1977, adopted 1 May 1977, 16 ILM 1451 (not yet in force)
(‘CLEE’).
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transmitting or regaining control of the flow of crude oil from the seabed or its
subsoil’.196 The term ‘ship’ is not defined in the CLEE, but it is clear that offshore
petroleum installations are treated as a separate category of their own.
Similarly, the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and
Co-operation 1990 (OPRC)197 defines ships and offshore installations separately. Ship
is defined in the OPRC as ‘a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine
environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating
craft of any type’. 198 The term ‘offshore unit’ is defined as ‘any fixed or floating
offshore installation or structure engaged in gas and oil exploration, exploitation or
production activities, or loading and unloading of oil’. 199 Clearly, the OPRC treats
offshore petroleum installations as distinct from ships.
The Draft Convention on Offshore Units, Artificial Islands and Related Structures Used
in the Exploration for and Exploitation of Petroleum and Seabed Mineral Resources
(Draft Offshore Units Convention)200 does not define the terms ‘ship’ or ‘vessel’, but
defines ‘offshore unit’ as:
any structure of whatever nature when not permanently fixed into the sea bed which (i)
is capable of moving or being moved while floating in or on water, whether or not
attached to the sea bed during operations, and (ii) is used or intended for use in
Economic Activities; and (iii) includes units used or intended for use in the
accommodation of personnel and equipment related to the activities described in this
paragraph.201

The above definition of ‘offshore unit’ in the Draft Offshore Units Convention only
includes mobile offshore installations, but not fixed offshore installations.202 In other
words, the Draft Offshore Units Convention places only mobile offshore installations
196

CLEE art 1(2)(a).
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 1990, adopted
30 November 1990, 30 ILM 1991 (entered into force 13 May 1995) (‘OPRC’).
198
OPRC art 2(3).
199
Ibid art 2(4).
200
Draft Convention on Offshore Units, Artificial Islands and Related Structures Used in the Exploration
for and Exploitation of Petroleum and Seabed Mineral Resources 2001, May 2001 draft (not yet adopted
and not in force) (‘Draft Offshore Units Convention’).
201
Draft Offshore Units Convention art I(1)(h).
202
However, the definition of ‘offshore unit’ in Article I(1)(h) of the Draft Offshore Units Convention can
be interpreted to include tension-leg platforms (TLPs) (which are usually considered as fixed offshore
installations) because TLPs are ‘capable of moving or being moved while floating in or on water’.
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into their own separate category of ‘offshore units’. By contrast, the Draft Offshore
Units Convention treats fixed offshore installations as ‘artificial islands’. 203 It is
interesting to note that the drafters of the Draft Offshore Units Convention considered
that the existing international legal framework covering ships would also apply to
mobile offshore installations while in transit, but that a fixed platform or a component
(such as the caisson foundation of a GBS) is unlikely to be regarded as a ship; therefore
they specifically extended the Draft Offshore Units Convention to apply to fixed
offshore installations or components thereof while in transit from a place of
construction to an intended place of emplacement at an offshore location.204
The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other
Matter 1972 (1972 London Dumping Convention)205 defines ‘vessels and aircraft’, in
Article III(2), as ‘waterborne or airborne craft of any type whatsoever. This expression
includes air cushioned craft and floating craft, whether self-propelled or not’.206 The
definition of ‘vessel’ in Article III(2) is very broad. Practically all types of MODUs as
well as FPSOs and FSOs satisfy the criterion of being a ‘floating craft, whether selfpropelled or not’ and are regarded as vessels for the purposes of the 1972 London
Dumping Convention. However, the definition of ‘dumping’ in Article III(1)(a) of the
1972 London Dumping Convention includes ‘any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or
other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms, or other man-made structures at sea’ and
‘any deliberate disposal at sea of vessels, aircraft, platform or other man-made
structures at sea’. 207 The above definition of ‘dumping’ suggests that vessels and
platforms are treated differently in the 1972 London Dumping Convention.208 In other
words, it appears that the 1972 London Dumping Convention treats all floating offshore
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Draft Offshore Units Convention art I(1)(a). Article I(1)(a) defines ‘artificial island’ as:
a permanent installation or structure rigidly affixed to the sea bed and used or intended for use
for Economic Activities, including wellheads and associated equipment, but shall not include
pipelines or installations formed from natural dredged materials or fill of natural origin.
204
CMI, above n 177, 14; Draft Offshore Units Convention art II(3).
205
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter 1972,
adopted 29 December 1972, 1046 UNTS 120 (entered into force 30 August 1975) (‘1972 London
Dumping Convention’).
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1972 London Dumping Convention art III(2).
207
Ibid art III(1)(a).
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See Summerskill, above n 1, 48.
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installations as ‘vessels’ (or ships) and all other offshore installations as ‘platforms’ (i.e.
places them in their own separate category).209
The International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties 1969 (1969 Intervention Convention)210 defines ‘ship’ as ‘(a) any
sea-going vessel of any type whatsoever, and (b) any floating craft, with the exception
of an installation or device engaged in the exploration and exploitation of the resources
of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof’.211 It would appear that both
fixed and mobile offshore installations are excluded from the definition of ‘ship’ in the
1969 Intervention Convention and are treated as distinct from ships.212
The International Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976
(LLMC 1976)213 does not define the word ‘ship’, but provides in Article 15(5)(b) that
the LLMC 1976 ‘shall not apply to ... floating platforms constructed for the purpose of
exploring or exploiting the natural resources of the sea-bed or the subsoil thereof’.214
This suggests that the LLMC 1976 treats offshore installations as distinct from ships and
offshore petroleum installations are not regarded as ships for the purposes of the LLMC
1976.
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (CLC
1969) 215 and the International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 (1971 Fund Convention)216
define ‘ship’ as ‘any sea-going vessel and any seaborn craft of any type whatsoever,
209

However, when a jack-up rig is engaged in drilling operations, it is not in the floating position but rests
on the seabed and its topside is above the water surface. One argument is that a jack-up rig cannot be
considered as a ‘floating craft’ when it is operating on location and is not regarded as a vessel for the
purposes of the 1972 London Dumping Convention. On the other hand, it can be argued that the
expression ‘floating craft’ in the definition of ‘vessel’ in the 1972 London Dumping Convention refers to
the ‘ability to float’ rather than the actual physical act of ‘floating’, in which case a jack-up rig will be
regarded as a vessel.
210
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties 1969, adopted 29 November 1969, 970 UNTS 211 (entered into force 6 May 1975) (‘1969
Intervention Convention’).
211
1969 Intervention Convention art II(2).
212
See also Summerskill, above n 1, 47.
213
International Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976, adopted 19 November
1976, 1456 UNTS 221 (entered into force 1 December 1986) (‘LLMC 1976’).
214
LLMC 1976 art 15(5)(b).
215
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969, adopted 29 November
1969, 973 UNTS 3 (entered into force 19 June 1975) (‘CLC 1969’).
216
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage 1971, adopted 18 December 1971, 1110 UNTS 57 (entered into force 16 October
1978) (‘1971 Fund Convention’).
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actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo’.217 Neither fixed nor mobile offshore petroleum
installations carry oil in bulk as cargo and therefore would not be regarded as ships for
the purposes of the CLC 1969 and 1971 Fund Convention.
The United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships 1986 (Ship
Registration Convention)218 defines ‘ship’ as ‘any self-propelled sea-going vessel used
in international seaborne trade for the transport of goods, passengers, or both with the
exception of vessels of less than 500 gross registered tons’.219 The definition of ‘ship’ in
the Ship Registration Convention is unusual compared to other international
conventions because it contains several criteria (i.e. characteristics) including ‘selfpropulsion’, ‘seagoing ability’, ‘used in international seaborne trade’, ‘transport of
goods or passengers’.220 It is likely that offshore petroleum installations of whatever
kind would not be able to satisfy all of the criteria set out in Article 2 of the Ship
Registration Convention, and therefore it can be argued that offshore petroleum
installations are not regarded as ships under the Ship Registration Convention.
3.4 State practice

State practice in relation to treating offshore petroleum installations as ships appears to
be mixed. According to Esmaeili, various types of national legislation have taken
significantly different approaches with respect to the legal status of offshore petroleum
installations in different contexts depending on the required intention, but generally,
fixed offshore installations are not considered as ships in domestic law,221 and not all
types of mobile offshore installations may be defined as ships,222 although they have
been treated like ships for several municipal law purposes. 223 It is not necessary to
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CLC 1969 art I(1). Article 1(2) of the 1971 Fund Convention provides that the term ‘ship’ has the
same meaning as in Article I of the CLC 1969.
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United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships 1986, adopted 7 February 1986, 26
ILM 1229, (not yet in force) (‘Ship Registration Convention’).
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Ship Registration Convention art 2.
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Other international conventions usually have two or less criteria in the definition of the term ‘ship’.
221
Schoenbaum, above n 127, 41, citing Olsen v Shell Oil Co, 708 F.2d 976, 1984 AMC 580 (5th
Cir.1983); Longmire v Sea Drilling Corp, 610 F.2d 1342, 1980 AMC 2625 (5th Cir.1980); Myrick v
Teledyne Movible Offshore Inc, 516 F.Supp 602 (SD Tex 1981); Hemba v Freeport McMoran Energy
Partners Ltd, 811 F.2d 276, 1988 AMC 304 (5th Cir.1987).
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Esmaeili, above n 1, 27.
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For example, for the purposes of registration, collision regulations: Spicer, above n 33, 106; Esmaeili,
above n 1, 27.
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discuss various statutory definitions of ‘ship’ here,224 but rather, it is useful to briefly
examine how different courts have considered a variety of maritime craft (including
offshore petroleum installations) to determine whether they should be considered as
ships or not, or only in certain circumstances.
3.4.1 Judicial decisions and interpretations

There have been several cases in relation to the legal status of certain maritime craft and
the possible treatment of various types of maritime craft and structures (including
mobile offshore installations) as ships or vessels. Judicial decisions in this regard have
been different in different jurisdictions, but some of the relevant decisions are discussed
below.
In Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v Denmark),225 the issue was whether the
right of innocent passage of ships and the right of transit passage through the Great Belt
(which was considered to be a strait used for international navigation) extended to
offshore installations, particularly to drill ships and drilling rigs.226 Finland argued that
the construction of a fixed bridge over the Great Belt would hamper the passage and is
therefore incompatible with the right of innocent passage and the right of transit
passage.227 In 1992, Finland and Denmark reached settlement and withdrew the case
from the court. Gray has noted that if the ‘issue of the right of passage of drill ships and
oil rigs had come up before the court it seems probable that the court would not have
based its decision on general rules’, but rather on the basis of the relationship between
the parties as it did in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
229

Jurisdiction

cases.

230

228

and the Fisheries

It is also possible that, had the issue come before the court, one

of the determinative factors in the court’s decision on the merits could have been
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Like treaty practice, the approach in national legislation varies from context to context and is
determined by the purpose to be obtained by the individual type of legislation: The Counter-Memorial of
the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, above n 130, para 625.
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Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v Denmark) (1991) ICJ, 94 ILR (1994) 446.
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International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v Denmark)
(Provisional Measures), Summary of the Order of 29 July 1991. See also Christine Gray, ‘Passage
Through the Great Belt (Finland v Denmark), Provisional Measures, Order of 29 July 1991’ (1993) 42(3)
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 705, 706–8.
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Gray, above n 226, 706.
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Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (1951) ICJ Rep 116.
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Fisheries Jurisdiction (1974) ICJ Rep 3.
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whether drill ships and oil rigs are or can be treated as ships for the purpose of innocent
passage or transit passage.
In R v Saint John Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co,231 which is the leading Canadian case
defining ‘ship’ in a non-exclusive manner, 232 the issue was whether a floating crane
barge was a ship. The court decided a floating crane used in a port, without selfpropulsion and not capable of navigation by itself, was nevertheless a ‘ship’ because it
was ‘built to do something on water requiring movement from place to place’ and it
could carry a crew and cargo (e.g. some equipment).233 In deciding that the crane barge
was a ship, the Federal Court of Appeal seems to have decided differently from a
similar English case Merchant’s Marine Insurance Ltd v North of England Protection
and Indemnity Association.234
There has been at least one court decision supporting a proposition that an offshore
installation is a ship when it is moving and not a ship when it is engaged in offshore
operations on location. In Dome Petroleum v Hunt International Petroleum Co,235 the
issue before the court was whether a drill ship constituted a ship.236 The court was of a
view that the towing of the drill ship to the drilling site was incidental to the principal
activity and purpose of the ship, that is, to drill.237 However, the proposition that ‘a
vessel should be considered a ship solely on the basis of its principal function has been
231

R v Saint John Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co (1981), 43 NR 15 (FCA), cited in Gold, Chircop and
Kindred, above n 1, 145.
232
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 145. See also Cyber Sea Technologies Inc v Underwater
Harvester Remotely Operated Vehicle (TD) (2002) FCT 794, [2003] 1 FC 569.
233
R v Saint John Shipbuilding & Drydock Co (1981) 126 DLR (3d) 353 (FCA), quoted and cited in
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 1, 74.
234
Merchant’s Marine Insurance Ltd v North of England Protection and Indemnity Association (1926) 25
Ll LR 446, which concerned a crane placed on a pontoon, which could be moved from place to place. The
English court held that the pontoon was designed and adapted to float and to lift, and not to navigate, so
the movement was the exception, rather than the rule. This decision was upheld on appeal, with the Court
of Appeal further emphasising function. However, in the earlier English case, The Titan (1923) 14 Ll LR
484, the floating crane was regarded as a ship. The nature of a pontoon was also considered in Marine
Craft Constructors Ltd v Erland Blomqvist (Engineers) Ltd [1953] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 514, which concerned a
pontoon fitted with a crane, where it was held that the floating crane was a vessel. See Summerskill,
above n 1, 78–80.
235
Dome Petroleum v Hunt International Petroleum Co [1978] 1 FC 11, cited in Gold, Chircop and
Kindred, above n 1, 74.
236
This case is distinguished from Shibamoto & Co v Western Fish Producers (1989) 63 DLR (4th) 549
(FCA) and explained in the trial division hearing of the same case at (1989) 29 FTR 311. It was also
mentioned in Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd v Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd (1995) 126 DLR (4th) 1 and
Cyber Sea Technologies Inc v Underwater Harvester Remotely Operated Vehicle (TD) (2002) FCT 794,
[2003] 1 FC 569.
237
Dome Petroleum v Hunt International Petroleum Co [1978] 1 FC 11, cited in Gold, Chircop and
Kindred, above n 1, 74.
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criticized as unhelpful’, and this case has been neither followed nor supported in
subsequent Canadian cases.238
In Seafarers’ International Union of Canada v Crosbie Offshore Services Ltd,239 the
court had no difficulty in concluding that dynamically positioned offshore oil rigs that
had their own means of propulsion, but were towed to their drilling location where they
were anchored with the assistance of offshore support vessels are also ships. 240
Similarly, in Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd v Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd,241 the
court decided that Bow Drill III offshore drilling rig was not only a drilling platform,
but also a navigable vessel because it ‘is capable of self-propulsion; even when drilling,
is vulnerable to the perils of the sea; is not attached permanently to the ocean floor and,
can travel world wide to drill for oil’.242
The judicial approach in the United States (US) is to treat MODUs as vessels or ships.
For example, in Claborne McCarty v Service Contracting Inc,243 In re Complaint of
Sedco Inc, 244 Producers Drilling Co v Gray, 245 Marine Drilling Co v Autin, 246 and
Offshore Co v Robinson,247 MODUs were considered to be vessels or ships.248
3.4.2 Approach taken by classification societies

Classification societies, such as the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) and the
Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (LRS), have undertaken classification of MODUs as well
as fixed production platforms and other offshore petroleum installations, such as
FPSOs, FSOs, and tanker loading systems.249 From time to time, classification societies
issue technical standards and recommendations for the construction of offshore
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concluded that a submersible drilling barge was a vessel.
246
Marine Drilling Co v Autin [1966] AMC 2013.
247
Offshore Co v Robinson [1959] AMC 2049.
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petroleum installations. 250 The International Association of Classification Societies
(IACS) has developed guidelines on requirements concerning MODUs.251 Similarly, the
LRS maintains a range of classification rules relating to floating offshore installations at
a fixed location and mobile offshore installations.252 In early 2011, it was announced
that two classification societies, Bureau Veritas and the Russian Maritime Register of
Shipping, have agreed to jointly develop guidelines for offshore floating production
units (FPUs) and liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers.253 In most of the documentation
issued by different classification societies, offshore installations are not treated as ships
but are classified separately.254

4. Offshore Petroleum Installations as Ports
The second key issue in relation to the legal status of offshore petroleum installations is
whether offshore petroleum installations can be treated as ports in certain
circumstances. This is an important issue because ports and ships calling at ports may
be required to comply with security requirements under international law, and coastal
States can exercise jurisdiction over foreign ships visiting their ports.
A ‘port’ can be described simply as ‘a place on a waterway with facilities for loading
and unloading ships’.255 Not many ports in the world can receive large tankers such as
ultra-large crude carriers (ULCCs) due to size and deep draft of such vessels.256 As a
result, many of them call at offshore oil terminals. Offshore terminals that are used for

250
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(LOOP) in 1981, which is located in the Gulf of Mexico about 50 nautical miles south of New Orleans,
there was no US port that could economically handle ultra-large crude carriers (ULCCs): ‘Offshore Port
Offloading Oil’, The Globe and Mail (Toronto), 9 May 1981, B2.
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loading and unloading oil and gas are very common today and sometimes they are
referred to as the deep-water port facilities.
Offshore oil and gas terminals can be in a form of buoy mooring terminals (consisting
of a large floating buoy terminal well anchored to the seabed), 257 which is often
connected to FSUs or onshore storage facilities, and in a form of fixed platform-type
structure securely anchored to the seabed. 258 The examples of fixed offshore terminals
include Al Basrah Oil Terminal (ABOT) and Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT)
in the Persian Gulf,259 and the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) in the US;260 and the
examples of floating terminals are Sea Eagle Terminal 261 and Okono Oil Terminal
(OOT)262 in the Gulf of Guinea. There may be other types and variations in design of
offshore terminals,263 and some offshore terminals ‘to the untrained eye appear to be oil
rigs sticking out of the water’.264
It is common practice today for petroleum to be exported directly from offshore
petroleum installations.265 Oil and gas can be loaded onto tankers directly from FPSOs
and FSOs at offshore locations and then transported ashore to a refinery in the coastal
State or to desired market destinations around the world. In terms of operational
sequence, petroleum is accumulated in sufficient quantities in the FPSO’s storage tanks
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until it can be transferred to a tanker moored astern. 266 In the case of FSOs, ‘the
production platform transfers oil to the FSO by a short pipeline where it is stored until a
tanker comes alongside the FSO and loads directly from it’.267 It should be noted that oil
and gas can also be exported directly from fixed production platforms.268
The use of offshore petroleum installations for or in connection with the export of oil
and gas raises some legal issues. The key issue is whether offshore petroleum
installations from which petroleum is loaded on tankers and exported have the status of
or may be treated as offshore ports or offshore terminals.269 If so, offshore petroleum
installations that have a status of a port should be, in theory, subject to the mandatory
security ISPS Code requirements applicable to port facilities.270 Ships that interact with
such offshore petroleum installations (e.g. for the purpose of loading oil) may be
subjected to conditions of entry and required to comply with a number of security
requirements such as compliance with the security level of the coastal State (or the flag
State, whichever is higher), or the provision of security-related information, such as the
crew list, before entering the safety zones around such offshore installations or mooring
alongside an offshore installation for loading.271
Furthermore, the legal status of waters around such offshore ports or offshore terminals
becomes an important issue, which is analysed in section 4.1.1 below. In particular, the
issue is whether waters around an offshore terminal (regardless of a terminal’s location)
are considered as the ‘internal waters’.This is important because internal waters are
under full sovereignty of a coastal State, 272 they are assimilated to a coastal State’s
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territory,273 and there is no general right of innocent passage of foreign ships through
internal waters.274
The international regulatory framework for matters such as access ports and jurisdiction
over ships in ports or internal waters can be derived from national laws of coastal States
in conjunction with common law and various international conventions including the
LOSC and the IMO conventions on ship safety and marine pollution. 275 In order to
determine whether offshore petroleum installations may be treated as offshore ports or
offshore terminals in international law, it is necessary to analyse the approach taken in
various international conventions and State practice.
4.1 Conventional law

The analysis of international law has shown that the concept of offshore ports and
offshore terminals is only addressed in a few international conventions. In regard to the
international conventions discussed above in the context of the legal status of offshore
installations as ships, only a few of them contain provisions pertaining to the treatment
of offshore petroleum installations as offshore ports or offshore terminals. They include
the LOSC, MARPOL, OPRC, Anti-fouling Systems Convention, Ballast Water
Convention, Ship Recycling Convention, OILPOL, and the SOLAS Convention. These
conventions, together with the Convention and Statute of the International Regime of
Maritime Ports 1923 (1923 Ports Convention) 276 and the ISPS Code, are examined
below in order to determine whether offshore petroleum installations can be considered
to be offshore ports in international law.
The main international convention that deals with maritime ports is the 1923 Ports
Convention, which defines a ‘maritime port’ as one ‘normally frequented by sea-going
vessels and used for foreign trade’.277 The 1923 Ports Convention does not have any
provisions pertaining specifically to offshore terminals, but the definition of a ‘maritime
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port’ is wide enough and can arguably include an offshore petroleum installation which
is used as an offshore terminal for loading of oil onto tankers.
In the LOSC, there is only one provision specifically dealing with ports. Article 11 of
the LOSC, which is entitled ‘Ports’, provides:
For the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, the outermost permanent harbour works
which form an integral part of the harbour system are regarded as forming part of the
coast. Off-shore installations and artificial islands shall not be considered as permanent
278

harbour works.

According to Bernaerts, Article 11 of the LOSC suggests that wherever there is a port,
the baseline is always drawn in such a manner as to include it in the internal waters.279
However, this approach would probably not apply to offshore terminals. Article 11 does
not clarify whether offshore petroleum installations can be considered to be ports, but,
to an extent, it recognises that offshore petroleum installations can be used as offshore
terminals.
The second sentence of Article 11 makes it clear that offshore installations are not
considered as permanent harbour works under the LOSC. As noted by Esmaeili, the
reasoning behind this provision ‘was to make a clear distinction between offshore
loading and unloading points, and permanent harbour works’.280 O’Connell argues that
‘the deepwater port cannot be considered as “permanent harbour works” when the
connection between the shore and the installation is submerged, as in the case of a
pipeline laid on the seabed’. 281 Therefore, offshore installations located within the
territorial sea that are used for the purposes of loading and/or unloading of petroleum
would not be considered as permanent harbour works under the LOSC.282
It is also important to note that the LOSC uses the terms ‘artificial islands’,
‘installations’ and ‘structures’ in many of its provisions.283 These terms are not defined
278
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in the LOSC, but any of them can be interpreted broadly to include offshore ports or
offshore terminals. The LOSC also uses the term ‘devices’,284 which is wide enough to
include offshore terminals.
The OPRC contains several provisions that refer to ‘offshore terminals’. The OPRC
provides that State parties recognise ‘the serious threat posed to the marine environment
by oil pollution incidents involving ships, offshore units, sea ports and oil handling
facilities’. 285 The OPRC defines ‘offshore unit’ and ‘sea ports and oil handling
facilities’ separately. Article 2(4) of the OPRC defines ‘offshore unit’ as ‘any fixed or
floating offshore installation or structure engaged in gas or oil exploration, exploitation
or production activities, or loading or unloading of oil’. 286 Clearly, the definition of
offshore unit in Article 2(4) of the OPRC includes offshore installations used for
loading and unloading of oil (i.e. offshore oil terminals). The term ‘sea ports and oil
handling facilities’ is defined in Article 2(5) of the OPRC as ‘those facilities which
present a risk of an oil pollution incident and includes, inter alia, sea ports, oil terminals,
pipelines and other oil handling facilities’.287 The above two definitions in the OPRC
are relatively broad. On one hand, the definition of ‘offshore unit’ appears to include
offshore terminals.288 On the other hand, the definition of ‘sea ports and oil handling
facilities’ specifically includes oil terminals, although it is not clear whether it includes
offshore oil terminals.
With respect to the ISPS Code and the SOLAS Convention, the IMO Diplomatic
Conference on the adoption of the ISPS Code, which was held in December 2002,
stressed that it is important ‘to safeguard the worldwide supply chain against any breach
resulting from terrorist attacks against ships, ports, offshore terminals or other
facilities’.289 Accordingly, the ISPS Code applies to port facilities serving ships that are
subject to the ISPS Code engaged on international voyages.290 The term ‘port facility’ is
not defined in the ISPS Code. However, in situations where oil or gas is directly
284
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exported or offloaded from an FPSO or FSO, these types of offshore installations could
fall under the category of ‘port facility’ as envisaged in the ISPS Code. Section 4.27 of
Part B of the ISPS Code provides that:
For certain specific port facilities with limited or special operations but with more than
occasional traffic, it may be appropriate to ensure compliance by security measures
equivalent to those prescribed in chapter XI-2 and in part A of this Code. This can, in
particular, be the case for terminals such as those attached to factories, or quaysides
with no frequent operations.291

The Code of Practice on Security in Ports, which was jointly developed by the
International Labour Organization (ILO) and the IMO, although not legally binding,
defines a ‘port’, in paragraph 2.3 as ‘[t]he geographic area defined by the member State
or the designated authority, including port facilities as defined in the International Ship
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, in which maritime and other activities occur.292
This definition in the Code of Practice on Security in Ports suggests that a State may
declare a certain geographic area as a ‘port’.
Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention defines ‘port facility’ as ‘a location, as
determined by the Contracting Government or by the Designated Authority, where the
ship/port interface takes place, [which] includes areas such as anchorages, waiting
berths and approaches from seaward, as appropriate’. 293 It is apparent from this
definition that the SOLAS Convention allows the coastal States to exercise discretion
and designate offshore petroleum installations, from which oil or natural gas can be
exported directly, as ‘port facilities’.
From the above analysis of international conventions it is evident that the legal status of
offshore petroleum installations as ports is not addressed specifically in international
conventions. There is nothing in international conventions that sets the criteria for
maritime ports, and it is arguable that coastal States can designate any place under their
jurisdiction as a port or an offshore terminal.
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4.1.1 Legal status of waters around offshore ports

Having determined that coastal States can designate any place under their jurisdiction as
an offshore port or offshore terminal, another issue that needs to be analysed is whether
waters around offshore terminals are considered as ‘internal waters’. Both, the LOSC
and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1958 (Territorial
Sea Convention) 294 provide that the internal waters of the State are waters on the
landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea. 295 Internal waters include ports,
harbours, bays, fringing reefs, lakes, canals and rivers and their mouths and, to some
extent, other closely related water areas. 296 The coastal State has full territorial
sovereignty over its internal waters.297
There are no specific provisions in the LOSC which indicate that waters around offshore
terminals or offshore ports have the status of internal waters, unless of course an
offshore terminal is located within the internal waters in the first place.298 However,
there are a couple of provisions in the LOSC which seem to suggest that offshore ports
can be located outside internal waters (e.g. in the territorial sea or the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ)). For example, Article 18(1) of the LOSC provides:
Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of: (a) traversing
that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port facility outside
internal waters; or (b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead
or port facility.299

Similarly, Article 25(2) of the LOSC states:
In the case of ships proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port facility outside
internal waters, the coastal State also has the right to take the necessary steps to prevent
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any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to internal waters or
such a call is subject.300

The above provisions of the LOSC use the expression ‘port facility outside internal
waters’, which indicates that a port facility (i.e. offshore terminal) can be located
outside internal waters. This could be interpreted that waters around offshore terminals
or offshore ports do not necessarily have the status of internal waters. In the absence of
any specific provisions in the LOSC or in other international conventions, it is difficult
to accept the argument that waters around offshore terminals are internal waters.301
OILPOL also contains a provision that seems to suggest that offshore ports can be
located outside internal waters. Article VIbis(4) of OILPOL provides that:
If a Contracting Government has clear grounds for believing that a tanker required
under paragraph (1) of this Article to be constructed in accordance with Annex C
entering ports in its territory or using off-shore terminals under its control does not in
fact comply with Annex C, such Contracting Government may request consultation
with the Government with which the tanker is registered ...302

The above provision indicates that OILPOL distinguishes the terms ‘ports in its
territory’ (which appears to refer to ports in internal waters) and ‘offshore terminals
under its control’, which implies that waters around offshore terminals located on the
seaward side of the baselines are not considered nor treated as internal waters for the
purposes of OILPOL.
It can be concluded that if an offshore installation were designated by the coastal State
to be an offshore port or an offshore terminal, this would not affect the legal status of
waters around the offshore installation. In other words, if an offshore installation is
located within the EEZ, the waters around that offshore installation would be the EEZ,
regardless of whether the offshore installation is treated as an offshore terminal or an
offshore port. Furthermore, it can be argued that a coastal State does not have
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sovereignty over offshore ports located in the EEZ, but only sovereign rights and
exclusive jurisdiction.303
Alternatively, even if waters around offshore terminals are considered to be the internal
waters (although this is highly unlikely), it can be argued that for offshore terminals
located in the EEZ or erected on the continental shelf, such ‘internal waters’ can only
extend to a maximum distance of 500 metres around such offshore terminals, which is
the maximum breadth of safety zones in the EEZ allowed under Article 60(5) of the
LOSC.304 The reason is that offshore ports or offshore terminals located in the EEZ or
erected on the continental shelf should be governed by the law of the EEZ and the
continental shelf. 305 As noted in section 4.1 above, the LOSC uses the expression
‘artificial islands, installations and structures’, which are understood to include offshore
terminals.
Regardless of the legal status of waters around offshore terminals, international law and
State practice indicates that foreign ships that call at such offshore ports may still be
subject to port State control measures including requirements relating to compliance
with certain security requirements. It seems that offshore ports and terminals located
outside of the internal waters (i.e. in other maritime zones such as the EEZ or the
territorial sea) have the same legal status as land-based and harbour-type ports (i.e.
which are located in internal waters) due to the internationally recognised legal
principle of port State control.
4.1.2 Port State control and offshore petroleum installations

The principle of the coastal State having jurisdiction to apply its laws to foreign ships in
its ports is well established in international law,306 and it is often referred to as ‘port
State control’.307 In general, a foreign merchant ship which is voluntarily in a port is
fully subject to the administrative civil and criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State (i.e.
303
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port State), unless specifically provided otherwise in applicable international
conventions, bilateral agreements, or common law.308
Some international conventions including the LOSC, MARPOL, OPRC, OILPOL,
Anti-fouling Systems Convention, Ship Recycling Convention, and the Ballast Water
Convention, which are discussed below, have provisions on port State control measures
over foreign ships calling at offshore terminals.
There are a number of provisions in the LOSC which provide that a coastal State (i.e.
port State) can exercise port State control measures over ships calling at offshore
terminals.309 For example, Article 211(3) of the LOSC provides:
States which establish particular requirements for the prevention, reduction and control
of pollution of the marine environment as a condition for the entry of foreign vessels
into their ports or internal waters or for a call at their off-shore terminals shall give due
publicity to such requirements and shall communicate them to the competent
international organization.310

Furthermore, under the LOSC, a coastal State (i.e. port State) may undertake
investigations and take enforcement action against a vessel when a vessel is voluntarily
within its port or at its offshore terminal for violation of its anti-pollution laws and
regulations or in respect of any discharge from that vessel.311 Article 219 of the LOSC
provides that the coastal/port State that has ascertained that a vessel at one of its
offshore terminals is in violation of applicable international standards relating to
seaworthiness of vessels and thereby threatens damage to the marine environment, shall
take measures to prevent the vessel from sailing.312
MARPOL contains several provisions pertaining to offshore terminals and port State
control. Article 5(2) of MARPOL provides that ships may be subject, while in the ports
or offshore terminals under the jurisdiction of a State party, to inspection by officers
duly authorised by that State party. Similarly, Article 6(2) of MARPOL provides that
ships to which MARPOL applies may be subject to inspection for the purpose of
verifying whether the ship has discharged any harmful substances in violation of
308
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MARPOL when the ship is in any port or offshore terminal of a State party. Article 5(3)
of MARPOL indicates that a State party can deny a foreign ship entry to the ports or
offshore terminals under its jurisdiction.
The OPRC, in Article 3(1)(b), provides that a ship which is required to have on board
an oil pollution emergency plan is subject, while in a port or at an offshore terminal
under the jurisdiction of a State party, to inspection by officers duly authorised by that
State party.
The Ship Recycling Convention provides, in Article 8(1), that a ship to which this
convention applies may, in any port or offshore terminal of another State party, be
subject to inspection for the purpose of determining whether the ship is in compliance
with the Ship Recycling Convention’. Article 9(2) of the Ship Recycling Convention
provides that when there is sufficient evidence that a ship is or has been in violation of
any provision in the Ship Recycling Convention, a State party holding the evidence may
request an investigation of this ship when it enters the ports or offshore terminals under
the jurisdiction of another State party.
Under Articles 9(1) and 10(4) of the Ballast Water Convention, a ship to which the
convention applies may be subject to inspection, in any port or offshore terminal of
another State party, for the purpose of determining whether the ship is in compliance
with the Ballast Water Convention. Article 10(2) of the Ballast Water Convention
provides that if a ship is detected to have violated the Ballast Water Convention, the
State party in whose port or offshore terminal the ship is operating, may take steps to
warn, detain, or exclude the ship.
OILPOL provides, in Article VIII(1)(b), that State parties shall take all appropriate steps
to ensure that oil loading terminals are provided with facilities adequate for the
reception of oil residues and oily mixture. Article VIbis(4) of OILPOL provides that a
contracting State can deny a tanker access to ports in its territorial waters or to offshore
terminals under its control if the contracting State is satisfied that such a tanker is not
compliant with OILPOL requirements.
The Anti-fouling Systems Convention also has several provisions dealing with port State
control at offshore terminals. For example, Article 3(1)(c) of the Anti-fouling Systems
188

Chapter 4

Mikhail Kashubsky

Convention provides, inter alia, that this convention applies to ships that enter a port,
shipyard, or offshore terminal of a State party. Article 4(1) of the Anti-fouling Systems
Convention provides that each State party should prohibit and/or restrict the application,
re-application, installation or use of anti-fouling systems on ships, whilst ships are in a
State party’s port or offshore terminal, and should take effective measures to ensure that
such ships comply with the Anti-fouling Systems Convention requirements. Articles
11(1) and 11(4) of the Anti-fouling Systems Convention provide that a ship to which the
Anti-fouling Systems Convention applies may be inspected, in any port or offshore
terminal of a State party, by officers authorised by that State party for the purpose of
determining whether the ship is in compliance with the Anti-fouling Systems
Convention.
4.2 State practice

State practice in relation to treating offshore petroleum installations as ports appears to
be mixed. Different approaches have been taken by States in their national legislation
and practices. In this analysis, the practice of the following States is analysed: Australia,
the US, Canada, Malaysia, Russia, New Zealand and Nigeria. All of these States have
offshore petroleum exploration and exploitation activities taking place under their
jurisdictions.
In Australia, the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003
(MTOFSA 2003) defines the term ‘port’ in section 12 as:
an area of water, or land and water (including any buildings, installations or equipment
situated in or on that land or water) intended for use either wholly or partly in
connection with the movement, loading, unloading, maintenance or provisioning of
ships.313

Section 3 of the Port Statistics Act 1977 provides that a ‘port’ ‘includes any place
(including a place at sea) at or near which facilities are provided for or in connexion
313

Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 (Cth) s 12(1). By contrast, section 4 of
the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 (‘MTOFSA 2003’) defines the term
‘port facility’ as:
an area of land or water, or land and water, within a security regulated port (including any
buildings, installations or equipment in or on the area) used either wholly or partly in connection
with the loading or unloading of security regulated ships.
The definition of ‘port facility’ in the MTOFSA 2003 appears to exclude offshore petroleum installations,
which is indicated by the use of the expression ‘within a security regulated port’.
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with the loading or unloading of cargo into or from ships’.314 The above two definitions
of ‘port’ are wide enough to include offshore petroleum installations from which
petroleum is exported directly such as FPSOs or FSOs; however, the MTOFSA 2003
defines offshore installations separately. The MTOFSA 2003 also uses the term
‘offshore facility’, which is defined as:
a facility, located in an offshore area, that is used in the extraction of petroleum from
the seabed or its subsoil with equipment on, or forming part of, the facility, and
includes: (a) any structure, located in the offshore area, used in operations or activities
associated with, or incidental to, activities of that kind; and (b) any vessel, located in the
offshore area, used in operations or activities associated with, or incidental to, activities
of that kind.315

The MTOFSA 2003 also provides that the term ‘offshore facility’ includes FPSOs and
FSUs,316 but excludes MODUs.317
In the US, the Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002 defines the term ‘facility’ as
‘any structure or facility of any kind located in, on, under, or adjacent to any waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States’, which suggests that both port facilities
and offshore petroleum installations could be included in the definition of ‘facility’.318
The US has also enacted legislation that specifically deals with offshore terminals. The
Deepwater Port Act 1974 authorises and regulates the location, ownership, construction
and operation of deepwater ports in waters beyond the territorial limits of the US for
importing oil and natural gas into the US and transporting oil or natural gas from the
outer continental shelf.319 The term ‘deepwater port’ is defined in section 3(9) of the
Deepwater Port Act 1974 as:
any fixed or floating manmade structure other than a vessel, or any group of such
structures, that are located beyond State seaward boundaries and that are used or
intended for use as a port or terminal for the transportation, storage, or further handling
of oil or natural gas for transportation to any State ...320
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The definition of ‘deepwater port’ in the Deepwater Port Act 1974 also includes ‘all
components and equipment, including pipelines, pumping stations, service platforms,
buoys, mooring lines, and similar facilities to the extent they are located seaward of the
high water mark’.321 It is clear from the above definition that floating structures such as
FSOs could be designated as deepwater ports or offshore terminals under the Deepwater
Port Act 1974. 322 The Deepwater Port Act 1974 extends the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the US to such ports and activities connected, associated, or potentially
interfering with the use or operation of such ports.323 The Deepwater Port Act 1974
establishes the nexus for jurisdictional purposes between US law and foreign ships
calling at or using a deepwater port, and the persons on board such ships.324 The legal
status of waters around deepwater ports is not clarified, but section 19(c)(1) of the
Deepwater Port Act 1974 provides:
The jurisdiction of the United States shall apply to vessels of the United States and
persons on board such vessels. The jurisdiction of the United States shall also apply to
vessels, and persons on board such vessels, registered in or flying the flags of foreign
states, whenever such vessels are (A) calling at or otherwise utilizing a deepwater port;
and (B) are within the safety zone of such a deepwater port, and are engaged in activities
connected, associated, or potentially interfering with the use and operation of the
deepwater port.325

In regard to the earlier discussion of the legal status of waters around offshore terminals,
section 19(c)(1) of the Deepwater Port Act 1974 (quoted above) provides that the US
can exercise jurisdiction not only over foreign ships calling at or utilising deepwater
ports, but also foreign ships that are present within the safety zones around deepwater
ports. However, there is no clarification in the Deepwater Port Act 1974 as to whether
the waters within the safety zones around deepwater ports are considered to be the
internal waters. Section 10(d)(1) of the Deepwater Port Act 1974 provides, inter alia,
that the Secretary of Transportation shall designate, subject to recognised principles of
international law, a zone of appropriate size around any deepwater port for the purpose
321
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of navigational safety. This suggests that the maximum breadth of the safety zones
around deepwater ports located in the EEZ of the US is 500 metres, which is the
maximum breadth of the safety zones currently allowed under the LOSC.326
In Canada, the Canada Marine Act 1998 defines ‘port facility’ in section 2 as:
a wharf, pier, breakwater, terminal, warehouse or other building or work that is located
in, on or adjacent to navigable waters that is used in connection with navigation or
shipping, land incidental to its use and any land adjacent to navigable waters that is
327

used in connection with navigation or shipping.

Section 2 of the Canada Marine Act 1998 defines ‘public port’ as ‘a port designated as
a public port under section 65’, and similarly defines ‘public port facility’ as ‘a port
facility designated as a public port facility under section 65’. 328 Section 65 of the
Canada Marine Act 1998 provides that:
The Governor in Council may, by regulation, (a) designate as a public port any
navigable waters within the jurisdiction of Parliament and any land covered by the
navigable waters, if the land is under the administration of the Minister, including any
related foreshore; (b) define the limits of a public port; and (c) designate any port
facility under the administration of the Minister as a public port facility.329

The above definitions indicate that any navigable waters within Canada’s jurisdiction
may be designated as a public port, which to an extent indicates that an offshore
petroleum installation and waters around it may be designated as a public port. The term
‘port facility’ in section 2 of the Canada Marine Act 1998 includes ‘terminal’ and it is
wide enough to include offshore petroleum installations.
In Malaysia, the Merchant Shipping Ordinance 1952330 defines ‘port’ in section 2 as:
a port or place declared to be a port under any written law in force in the State of Sabah
or Sarawak as the case may be ... and includes all such navigable rivers and channels
leading thereto as are declared to be part thereof.331

326

See LOSC art 60(5). See also discussion on safety zones in Chapter 5.
Canada Marine Act, SC 1998, c 10, s 2.
328
Clearly, the Canada Marine Act 1998 distinguishes the terms ‘public port’ and ‘public port facility’.
329
Canada Marine Act, SC 1998, c 10, s 65(1).
330
Merchant Shipping Ordinance No 70 of 1952.
331
Ibid s 2.
327
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Section 5 of the Merchant Shipping Ordinance 1952 provides that the Minister may
declare any port or place in the Federation and any navigable river or channel leading
into such port or place to be a port within the meaning of this Ordinance.332 Presumably,
in Malaysia, an offshore petroleum installation used for the export of oil can be declared
to be a port.
In Russia, Article 9(1) of the Merchant Shipping Code 1999333 provides that a ‘maritime
port’ is understood to be:
a combination of objects of infrastructure of a maritime port, situated on specially
assigned territories and waters and intended for servicing of ships, used for merchant
shipping, servicing of fishing fleet ships, servicing of passengers, carrying out cargo
operations, including transhipment, and other services usually provided in a maritime
port, as well as interaction with other modes of transport.334

The above definition of ‘maritime port’ Article 9(1) of the Russian Merchant Shipping
Code 1999 can include offshore petroleum installations. In relation to the legal status of
waters around ports, Article 1(2) of the Federal Law on Internal Marine Waters,
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 1998335 of Russia provides that the internal waters
include waters of ports of the Russian Federation, limited by a baseline passing through
the farthest seaward points of hydro-technical structures and other permanent harbour
works. 336 It appears that this provision reaffirms what is stated in Article 11 of the
LOSC requiring that baselines be drawn in such a manner as to include ports in the
internal waters.337
In New Zealand, section 2 of the Maritime Transport Act 1994338 provides that the term
‘port’ ‘includes place and harbour’. The term ‘offshore terminal’ is defined in section
222 as ‘any place in the sea where cargo is loaded or unloaded’.339 This definition of an
‘offshore terminal’ is very broad and it would include offshore petroleum installations.

332

Ibid s 5.
Merchant Shipping Code 1999 No 81-FZ enacted 30 April 1999.
334
Ibid art 9(1).
335
Federal Law on Internal Marine Waters, Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 1998 No 155-FZ
enacted 31 July 1998.
336
Ibid art 1(2).
337
Bernaerts, above n 275, 111.
338
Maritime Transport Act 1994 (NZ).
339
Ibid s 222.
333
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The Maritime Transport Act 1994 also defines the term ‘offshore installation or
installation’ as:
any artificial structure (including a floating structure other than a ship) used or intended
to be used in or on, or anchored or attached to, the seabed for the purpose of the
exploration for, or the exploitation or associated processing of, any mineral; but does
340

not include a pipeline.

Section 225 of the Maritime Transport Act 1994 of New Zealand defines ‘transfer
facility’ as ‘any facility, structure, or building for transferring liquids to or from a ship
or an offshore installation; and includes any storage tanks or pipelines connected to the
facility’. Section 281 of the Maritime Transport Act 1994 defines ‘oil transfer site’ as
‘any land, site, building, structure, or facility (whether on land or above the seabed) that
is used to transfer oil, or at or from which oil is transferred, to, or from, a ship, or
offshore installation’.
In Nigeria, the Nigerian Ports Authority Decree 1999341 provides in section 30(1) that:
The Minister may, by order (a) declare any place in Nigeria and any navigable channel
leading into that place to be a port within the meaning this Decree; (b) specify the limits
of any place declared as a port in accordance with paragraph (a) of this subsection;
(c) declare any navigable channel leading into a port to be an approach to that port
within the meaning of this Decree.342

The meaning of expression ‘any place in Nigeria’ is not clear, but if it could be
interpreted as including Nigeria’s territorial sea and the EEZ, then an offshore
petroleum installation may be declared to be a port or an offshore terminal under the
Nigerian Ports Authority Decree 1999.
In summary, the analysis of national legislation has shown that in Canada, Malaysia,
and Nigeria, governments are authorised to designate any place as a port, and in
Australia, Russia, New Zealand, and the US, the definitions of a ‘port’ are sufficiently
broad to encompass offshore petroleum installations.

340

Ibid.
Nigerian Ports Authority Decree No 38 of 1999.
342
Ibid s 30(1).
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Some FPSOs and FSOs have been designated as offshore oil terminals or offshore ports.
For example, in Nigeria, Pennington Offshore Terminal (POT), which is regulated by
the Nigerian Ports Authority, is situated about 15 nautical miles offshore and consists of
two SPMs and an FSO Oloibiri.343 POT has a three-mile ‘restricted area’344 around it
which all vessels are prohibited from entering without prior permission.345 Antan Oil
Terminal (AOT), which is located about 20 nautical miles off Nigeria’s coast, consists
of a tanker manifold platform and the FPSO Knock Taggart.346 AOT is situated in a
water depth of 38 metres and has a 1.5-mile radius ‘restricted area’, which ships must
have permission to enter. 347 Zafiro Offshore Oil Terminal (ZOOT) in offshore
Equatorial Guinea, which is located about 30 nautical miles offshore, consists of an
FPSO Zafiro Producer, a production platform Jade, a storage tanker Magnolia, and an
SPM. 348 ZOOT is under the jurisdiction of Equatorial Guinea and has a 4.3-mile
‘restricted area’ around it, which all ships must receive permission to enter.349
As discussed in section 4.1 above, the legal status of waters around offshore terminals is
not affected by the fact that an offshore installation is designated as an offshore port or
an offshore terminal, which means that waters around an offshore terminal located in
the EEZ would be part of the EEZ and the terminal itself would be subject to the laws of
the continental shelf and the EEZ. With respect to deepwater ports and offshore
terminals, O’Connell argues that the breadth of ‘safety zones’ around deepwater ports
on the continental shelf is to be the same as that around offshore petroleum installations,
which is 500 metres as specified in Article 60(5) of the LOSC, and foreign ships are not
required to respect more than the 500-metre safety zone unless a larger distance is
authorised by generally accepted international standards or recommended by the
competent international organisation.350

343

Marine World Database, Pennington Terminal (1 February 2009)
<http://www.anchorageworld.com/content/pennington-terminal> at 20 January 2011.
344
It should be noted that the LOSC does not use the term ‘restricted area’, but uses the term ‘safety
zone’.
345
Marine World Database, above n 343.
346
Marine World Database, Antan Oil Terminal (1 February 2009)
<http://www.anchorageworld.com/content/antan-oil-terminal> at 10 August 2011.
347
Ibid.
348
Marine World Database, Zafiro Offshore Oil Terminal (1 March 2009)
<http://www.anchorageworld.com/content/zafiro-offshore-oil-terminal> at 20 January 2011.
349
Ibid.
350
O’Connell, above n 92, 847.
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5. Conclusions
In conclusion, it can be said that offshore petroleum installations (both fixed and
mobile) may be treated as ships in international law in certain contexts. The term ‘ship’
can have different meanings in the international conventions depending on the aims and
purpose of the particular convention. One of the common approaches in international
conventions is to treat mobile offshore installations (especially MODUs, but also
FPSOs and FSOs) as ships when they are in transit from one offshore location to
another, but not when they are engaged in offshore operations on location.351
Fixed offshore installations are generally not treated as ships in international law.
However, the approach adopted in the Anti-fouling Systems Convention and MARPOL
significantly differs from most other international conventions because the Anti-fouling
Systems Convention and MARPOL treat both fixed and mobile offshore petroleum
installations as ships. 352 International conventions, such as the Continental Shelf
Convention, the LOSC and Draft Offshore Units Convention, place offshore
installations into a separate category. To determine the legal status of an offshore
installation in any specific situation, it is necessary to look at relevant definitions and
approaches of applicable international conventions or national legislation.
With respect to treating offshore petroleum installations as ports, the analysis of
international law and State practice has shown that some offshore petroleum
installations, such as FSOs and FPSOs, can be and have been designated and treated as
offshore ports or port facilities. In the context of offshore petroleum security, it can be
concluded that such offshore installations should be subject to the mandatory
requirements of the ISPS Code applicable to ports. All ships calling at or interacting
with such offshore installations may be subjected to certain conditions of entry and
required to comply with security-related measures, including those applicable to ships
entering ISPS Code compliant port facilities. International law recognises that foreign
ships calling at offshore terminals/installations are subject to port State control, but at
the same time, the legal status of waters around such offshore terminals/installations is
not affected.

351
352

See Esmaeili, above n 1, 47–8.
Anti-fouling Systems Convention art 2(9); MARPOL art 2(4).
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CHAPTER 5
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE
PROTECTION AND SECURITY OF OFFSHORE PETROLEUM
INSTALLATIONS BEFORE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001
1. Introduction
Drilling for and production of oil at sea has its beginnings in the late nineteenth
century. 1 In the middle of the twentieth century exploitation of offshore oil and gas
resources has intensified significantly, which has led to the development of international
legal rules that regulate various aspects relating to offshore petroleum exploration and
exploitation. The associated security risks relating to offshore petroleum production
discussed in previous chapters necessitated the development of international legal rules
concerning the protection and security of offshore petroleum installations.
The development of the international legal framework pertaining to security of offshore
petroleum installations can be divided into two distinct phases: before the 11 September
2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks in the United States (US), and after. This chapter focuses
on the international regulatory framework prior to 9/11 and examines international law
that deals with the protection and security of offshore petroleum installations. In
particular, the chapter examines the rights and responsibilities of States under relevant
international conventions and jurisdictional issues relating to the protection and security
of offshore installations. The chapter will analyse the scope of protective measures that
States can implement to safeguard their offshore petroleum installations from deliberate
attacks and interferences, and interactions of these measures with the rights of other
States, including navigational rights. Options available to States under international law
for responding to attacks on offshore petroleum installations and challenges relating to
enforcement of violations of security-related regulations are also examined. The
analysis in this chapter aims to determine whether the pre-9/11 regulatory framework
adequately addresses security aspects of offshore petroleum installations.
As discussed in the introductory chapter, it is not adequate to discuss the international
law for offshore petroleum security and protection of offshore installations in isolation;
1

See Jay Schempf, Pioneering Offshore: The Early Years (PennWell, 2007); Robert Gramling and
William Freudenburg, ‘Attitudes Toward Offshore Oil Development: A Summary of Current Evidence’
(2006) 49 Ocean & Coastal Management 442.
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a discussion about the provisions relating to general international maritime security law
and about its relevance to offshore petroleum installations is equally important. 2
Accordingly, the relevant international legal instruments and other initiatives addressing
maritime security will also be discussed in the context of the protection of offshore
petroleum installations.

2. Pre-1958 Legal Framework
In the early days of the offshore oil and gas industry, the equipment used in offshore
drilling was fairly primitive by today’s standards.3 Offshore operations were conducted
in very close proximity to the land, mostly within the territorial sea of coastal States and
subject only to domestic laws.4 At the time, there was little need to regulate this activity
at the international level because very few offshore petroleum installations existed in
waters beyond the territorial sea. 5 Therefore, prior to the 1940s, there were no
international rules dealing with offshore petroleum installations and operations.
At the end of World War II, technological advances made it feasible to conduct offshore
operations at greater depths. 6 Beginning with the Truman Proclamation in 1945, 7 a
number of States started asserting rights over their adjacent continental shelves with a
view to exploiting valuable seabed resources, particularly oil and gas. Such State
practice ultimately resulted in the development of the legal rules for the continental
shelf, which to some extent determined the legal status of offshore petroleum
installations.8

2

This is because ‘offshore petroleum security’ and ‘maritime security’ are two closely related concepts,
and ‘offshore petroleum security’ forms part of a wider concept of ‘maritime security’. See discussion in
Chapter 1.
3
See generally Schempf, above n 1.
4
Until the mid-twentieth century the three-nautical-mile breadth of the territorial seas was well
established among maritime States and was a generally recognised principle of customary international
law. See William Schachte, ‘The History of the Territorial Sea from a National Security Perspective’
(1990-1991) 1 Territorial Sea Journal 143.
5
Stuart Kaye, ‘International Measures to Protect Oil Platforms, Pipelines, and Submarine Cables from
Attack’ (2007) 31(2) Tulane Maritime Law Journal 377, 379. See also Schempf, above n 1.
6
The first commercial offshore oil well was drilled out of sight of land in October 1947, in some 5.5
metres of water about 12 miles off the Louisiana coast in the Gulf of Mexico: Schempf, above n 1, 3.
7
Presidential Proclamation No 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of
the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 3 CFR 67, 10 Fed Reg 12 303, codified as Executive
Order 9633 (28 September 1945).
8
For a more detailed discussion on the development of the continental shelf rules see Kaye, above n 5,
379–82.
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3. 1958 Geneva Conventions
The first major development in the regulation of the continental shelf and offshore
installations occurred at the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS I) that was held in Geneva in 1958. UNCLOS I adopted several international
conventions known as the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, many
provisions of which corresponded to customary international law at the time of their
adoption.9 Among those conventions, there were three that have some relevance to the
protection of offshore petroleum installations, namely the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1958 (Territorial Sea Convention),10 which codified the
concept of the coastal State sovereignty over its territorial sea and codified rules relating
to innocent passage through territorial sea; 11 the Convention on the High Seas 1958
(High Seas Convention),12 which among other things, codified rules relating to freedom
of navigation, piracy and hot pursuit;13 and the Convention on the Continental Shelf
1958 (Continental Shelf Convention), 14 which recognised the continental shelf as an
international law concept. It is necessary to examine some provisions of these
conventions.
3.1 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1958

The Territorial Sea Convention provides that coastal States have sovereignty over the
territorial sea, air space above, the seabed and subsoil.15 The breadth of the territorial
sea was not specified in the Territorial Sea Convention due to the lack of agreement,16
9

Tullio Treves, 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea: Introduction, Audiovisual Library of
International Law <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/gclos/gclos.html> at 16 June 2010.
10
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1958, opened for signature 29 April 1958,
516 UNTS 205 (entered into force 10 September 1964) (‘Territorial Sea Convention’). As at 7 May 2011,
there were 52 State parties to the Territorial Sea Convention: United Nations Treaty Collection, (7 May
2011) <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=XXI1&chapter=21&lang=en#Participants> at 7 May 2011.
11
Territorial Sea Convention arts 1, 14–22.
12
Convention on the High Seas 1958, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 450 UNTS 82 (entered into
force 30 September 1962) (‘High Seas Convention’). As at 7 May 2011, there were 63 State parties to the
High Seas Convention: United Nations Treaty Collection, (7 May 2011)
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=XXI2&chapter=21&lang=en#Participants> at 7 May 2011.
13
High Seas Convention arts 2, 14–23.
14
Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 499 UNTS 311 (entered
into force 10 June 1964) (‘Continental Shelf Convention’). As at 7 May 2011, there were 58 State parties
to the Continental Shelf Convention: United Nations Treaty Collection, (7 May 2011)
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=XXI4&chapter=21&lang=en#Participants> at 7 May 2011.
15
Territorial Sea Convention arts 1, 2.
16
David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th ed, 2004) 386.
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which reflected the uncertainty in customary international law at the time.17 By virtue of
sovereignty over the territorial sea coastal States can authorise the construction of
offshore petroleum installations in the territorial sea and take measures for their
protection.
The Territorial Sea Convention also codified international rules relating to innocent
passage,18 which is the most relevant aspect of the Territorial Sea Convention as far as
the protection and security of offshore petroleum installations is concerned. Article
14(1) of the Territorial Sea Convention provides that ‘ships of all States, whether
coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea’. The
right of innocent passage is the main limitation on the sovereignty of coastal States over
the territorial sea. In essence, it allows ships to pass freely through the territorial sea.19
Innocent passage is defined in Article 14(4) of the Territorial Sea Convention as
passage that ‘is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
State.’ 20 The right of innocent passage has implications for the security of offshore
petroleum installations because a ship exercising the right of innocent passage may be
used in the attack on an offshore installation.
The right of innocent passage arguably limits the extent of security measures that
coastal States can take in order to protect offshore petroleum installations in the
territorial sea. For example, Article 15(1) of the Territorial Sea Convention provides
that a coastal State has a duty not to hamper innocent passage, which implies that any
measures that a coastal State takes for the protection of offshore installations (such as
establishing navigation exclusion zones around offshore installations) must not hamper
innocent passage.21 According to the International Law Commission (ILC), if offshore
petroleum installations located in the territorial sea hamper innocent passage, they ‘must
not be sited in narrow channels or in sea lanes forming part of the territorial sea and
17

The international practice in regard to the limit of the territorial sea was not uniform at the time, with
some States claiming three nautical miles, others claiming various distances between three and twelve
nautical miles, and some claiming more that twelve nautical miles. The view of the International Law
Commission (ILC) was that international law does not permit an extension of the territorial sea beyond
twelve nautical miles: ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighth
Session (23 April – 4 July 1956)’ [1956] II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 253, 265–6.
See also Harris, above n 16, 386–7.
18
Territorial Sea Convention arts 14–22.
19
See Territorial Sea Convention art 14(2).
20
Territorial Sea Convention art 14(4).
21
See Territorial Sea Convention art 15(1).
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essential for international navigation’. 22 Furthermore, a coastal State must give
appropriate publicity to any known dangers to navigation within its territorial sea, 23
which would include an obligation to publicise location of all offshore petroleum
installations in the territorial sea because offshore installations represent a potential
hazard to navigation.
Whilst the rules on innocent passage appear to limit the powers of coastal States with
respect to the protection of offshore petroleum installations, the rules also allow coastal
States to regulate passage of ships through the territorial sea,24 temporarily suspend the
innocent passage of foreign ships in specified areas of the territorial sea if such
suspension is essential for the protection of a coastal State’s security, 25 and take the
necessary steps in the territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent.26 The
right of innocent passage in the context of the protection and security of offshore
petroleum installations is discussed in more detail in section 4 below, as part of the
analysis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 198227 (LOSC).
The Territorial Sea Convention also established a contiguous zone, which is a zone of
the high seas contiguous to the territorial sea of a coastal State, where coastal States
may exercise the control necessary to prevent and punish infringements of customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within their territory or territorial sea. 28
Despite the views of some coastal States, the ILC did not support the contiguous zone
as a zone which granted special security rights to coastal States.29
3.2 Convention on the High Seas 1958

The Convention on the High Seas 1958 (High Seas Convention) lays down rules under
which freedom of the high seas may be exercised. The High Seas Convention sets out

22

See ILC, above n 17, 273.
Territorial Sea Convention art 15(2).
24
See Territorial Sea Convention art 17.
25
Territorial Sea Convention art 16(3).
26
Ibid art 16(1).
27
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833
UNTS 3, (entered into force 16 November 1994) (‘LOSC’).
28
Territorial Sea Convention art 24(1). The Territorial Sea Convention provides that the contiguous zone
may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured: art 24(2).
29
Donald Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Hart Publishing, 2010) 78. The
ILC’s view was that the enforcement of customs and sanitary regulations is sufficient in most cases to
safeguard the security of the coastal State: ILC, above n 17, 295.
23
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freedoms of the high seas such as freedom of navigation and freedom to lay submarine
cables and pipelines, and provides that no part of the high seas can be subjected to the
sovereignty of any State.30 The High Seas Convention defines the term ‘high seas’ as
‘all parts of the seas that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of
a State’.31
In the context of security of offshore petroleum installations, the High Seas Convention,
to some extent, regulates the interaction of the rights of coastal States relating to
protection of offshore installations with the rights of other States such as the freedom of
navigation on the high seas. The High Seas Convention provides that ships are subject
to the exclusive flag State jurisdiction on the high seas.32 This means that a coastal State
cannot take any enforcement action on the high seas against foreign ships involved in
the attacks on offshore petroleum installations, unless an attack is considered an act of
piracy.
The High Seas Convention codified international rules on piracy. The application of
piracy law to security of offshore petroleum installations is discussed in more detail
below as part of the analysis of the LOSC, but for the purposes of this analysis, it is
sufficient to say that the High Seas Convention defines piracy comprehensively,33 and
provides that ‘all States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of
piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state’.34 The
High Seas Convention provides for universal jurisdiction with respect to piracy, which
is consistent with customary international law, and gives a right to every State to seize,
on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, a pirate ship
or a ship taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, arrest the persons and seize

30

High Seas Convention art 2.
Ibid art 1.
32
Ibid art 6(1).
33
Piracy is defined in Article 15 of the High Seas Convention as consisting of any of the following acts:
‘(1) [a]ny illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends
by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (a) [o]n the
high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or
aircraft; (b) [a]gainst a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State; (2) [a]ny act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (3) [a]ny act of inciting or of intentionally
facilitating an act described in subparagraph 1 or subparagraph 2 of this article’.
This definition of piracy was retained in the LOSC.
34
High Seas Convention art 14.
31
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the property on board, and prosecute the perpetrators under the national laws. 35 The
High Seas Convention also allows boarding of foreign merchant ships on the high seas
if there is reasonable ground for suspecting that the ship is engaged in piracy.36 Overall,
the High Seas Convention is only indirectly relevant to the security of offshore
petroleum installations.
3.3 Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958

The Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958 (Continental Shelf Convention) granted
exclusive sovereign rights to coastal States for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting
the natural resources of the continental shelf.37 The Continental Shelf Convention gave
coastal States jurisdiction over offshore installations located on the continental shelf.38
The continental shelf is defined in the Continental Shelf Convention as ‘the seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial
sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit to where the depth of the superjacent
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas’. 39 While
there is a fixed limit to a depth of 200 metres in the definition of the continental shelf,
which at the time of drafting of the convention was considered sufficient for all
practical needs, the right to exceed that limit was also recognised if it was
technologically possible to exploit the seabed or subsoil at a depth greater than 200
metres.40 This definition left some uncertainty as to the exact limit of the continental
shelf.41
The most relevant provision of the Continental Shelf Convention dealing with the
protection of offshore petroleum installations is Article 5, under which coastal States
have the right to construct and operate offshore petroleum installations, establish safety
zones around such installations, which may extend to a maximum of 500 metres, and
35

Ibid art 19.
Ibid art 22(1)(a).
37
Continental Shelf Convention art 2.
38
According to the ILC, which prepared the draft of the Continental Shelf Convention, the installations
are under the jurisdiction of the coastal State for the purpose of maintaining order and of the civil and
criminal competence of its courts: ILC, above n 17, 299–300.
39
Continental Shelf Convention art 1.
40
ILC, above n 17, 296–7.
41
For example, at the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), a delegate
from Panama argued that ‘if such a definition were accepted for legal purposes it might well be that, if in
twenty-five years’ time technological progress should make it possible to exploit resources at depths of
more than 3000 metres, some State would claim that that area was not a part of the continental shelf’:
United Nations (UN), ‘Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol VI:
Fourth Committee (Continental Shelf)’ UN Doc A/CONF.13/42 (September 1958) 5.
36
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take in those zones measures necessary for the protection of installations.42 The nature
of the protective measures that a coastal State can take within safety zones is not
specified, but the Continental Shelf Convention requires ships of all nationalities to
respect these safety zones. 43 In other words, ships are prohibited from entering the
safety zones without authorisation. It appears that the concept of the safety zones was
introduced for the purpose of protecting offshore installations from accidental collisions
with ships, and not from intentional attacks.44 At the time, the ILC, which prepared the
draft of the Continental Shelf Convention,45 considered a distance of 500 metres to be
appropriate and sufficient.46 According to the ILC’s commentary, although the ILC ‘did
not consider it essential to specify the size of the safety zones, [the ILC] believes that
generally speaking a maximum radius of 500 metres is sufficient for the purpose’.47
The Continental Shelf Convention explicitly states that installations on the continental
shelf should not cause unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing and scientific
research.48 The Continental Shelf Convention also provides that offshore installations do
not have the status of an island and have no territorial sea.49 In addition, a coastal State
is required to undertake, in the safety zones, appropriate measures for the protection of
the marine environment,50 which, as pointed out by Kaye, appears to grant a coastal
State some kind of environmental jurisdiction in the safety zones.51
The Territorial Sea Convention, the High Seas Convention and the Continental Shelf
Convention were important achievements in the development of the law of the sea, but
they did not address many aspects of the law of the sea and they are only indirectly
42

Continental Shelf Convention arts 5(2), (3).
Ibid art 5(3).
44
The ILC’s commentary states that ‘[i]nterested parties, i.e., not only Governments but also groups
interested in navigation and fishing, should be duly notified of the construction of installations, so that
these may be marked on charts. In any case, the installations should be equipped with warning devices
(lights, audible signals, radar, buoys, etc.)’: ILC, above n 17, 299.
45
It should be noted that the ILC also prepared the drafts of the Territorial Sea Convention and the High
Seas Convention.
46
ILC, above n 17, 299.
47
Ibid.
48
Continental Shelf Convention art 5(1). However, the ILC noted that what the article prohibits is not any
kind of interference, but only unjustifiable interference. The ILC further noted that even substantial
interference with navigation and fishing might, in some cases, be justified. On the other hand, even
insignificant interference would be unjustified if not related to reasonably conceived requirements of
exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf: ILC, above n 17, 299.
49
Continental Shelf Convention art 5(4).
50
Ibid art 5(7).
51
Kaye, above n 5, 383.
43
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relevant to the security of offshore petroleum installations. In the context of offshore
petroleum installations, the development of new techniques for offshore exploitation of
hydrocarbons and other mineral resources has made it necessary to reconsider the
continental shelf rules and establish rules for the deep seabed.52 The Continental Shelf
Convention, the Territorial Sea Convention, and the High Seas Convention were later
subsumed into the LOSC,53 which is discussed in the following section.

4. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention Framework
The LOSC was adopted on 10 December 1982 at UNCLOS III.54 The LOSC is the main
international treaty that lays down the legal framework for the uses of the sea including
exploration and exploitation of offshore oil and gas.55 The LOSC resulted in extended
coastal State jurisdiction over the sea. The LOSC also created the width of the territorial
sea, 56 extended the width of the contiguous zone, 57 created archipelagic waters, 58 redefined the continental shelf, 59 created the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 60 and
52

Harris, above n 16, 382.
It should be noted that although the Continental Shelf Convention, the Territorial Sea Convention, and
the High Seas Convention were subsumed into the LOSC, they still remain applicable for States that are
parties to one or more of these conventions, but which have not become parties to the LOSC. There are
only thirteen such States: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Colombia, Ecuador, the
Holy See, Iran, Israel, Peru, Swaziland, Thailand, United States (US), and Venezuela.
54
The conference held eleven sessions between 1973 and 1982. See UN, Office of Legal Affairs
Codification Division, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1973-1982 (2009)
<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/diplomaticconferences/lawofthesea-1982/lawofthesea-1982.html> at 4 August
2010.
55
The provisions of the LOSC generally constitute international law and practice with respect to
traditional uses of the oceans. As at 1 August 2011, there were 162 parties to the LOSC. See UN, Division
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and
Successions to the Convention and the related Agreements as at 3 June 2011 (3 June 2011)
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The%20United%2
0Nations%20Convention%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea> at 10 October 2011.
56
The territorial sea width is now explicitly fixed at a limit of 12 nautical miles, which means that every
State can establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles. See
LOSC art 3.
57
Under the LOSC, the contiguous zone is extended to 24 nautical miles from the baseline, instead of 12
nautical miles which was the limit under the Territorial Sea Convention. See LOSC art 33(2).
58
See LOSC arts 46, 47, 48.
59
The new (more comprehensive) legal definition of the continental shelf in Article 76 of the LOSC
significantly differs from the earlier definition of this concept contained in Article 1 of the Continental
Shelf Convention. The term ‘continental shelf’ is defined in Article 76(a) of the LOSC as comprising ‘the
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer
edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance’. Unlike the Continental Shelf
Convention, the LOSC does not define the shelf in terms of exploitability. The LOSC also differs in
providing that the continental shelf extends to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline whether
it reaches that distance in nature or not. The LOSC retains an advantage for the naturally favoured State in
that the continental shelf extends beyond that distance in law to the ‘outer edge’ of the continental shelf if
geomorphologically that point is more than 200 nautical miles out. However, this advantage is limited in
53
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established rules governing the deep seabed. 61 As discussed in Chapter 4 above, the
LOSC uses the terms ‘installations’ and ‘structures’ in many of its provisions, which are
understood to include offshore petroleum installations (except where specifically stated
otherwise).
The LOSC contains a number of provisions pertaining to the protection of offshore
petroleum installations constructed on the seabed over which a coastal State has
authority. 62 For example, the LOSC contains provisions allowing States to establish
safety zones around offshore installations in the EEZ and on the continental shelf, on
the high seas and on the seabed beyond the limits of the national jurisdiction to ensure
their protection and safety of navigation.63 The LOSC also deals with other securityrelated aspects such as the innocent passage, 64 piracy, 65 right of visit, 66 and rules
relating to hot pursuit.67 The LOSC provides that a coastal State has exclusive right to
regulate and control offshore petroleum installations on the seabed within its
sovereignty and sovereign rights. 68 The coastal State can assert its jurisdiction over
activities taking place aboard offshore installations and in their vicinity.69
The LOSC framework established different maritime zones of jurisdiction.70 The rights,
responsibilities, and jurisdiction of States (including rights, responsibilities and
jurisdiction relating to the protection and security of offshore petroleum installations)
are different in each maritime zone. Accordingly, in the following sections (sections 4.1
to 4.6), the analysis of the LOSC provisions pertaining to security of offshore petroleum
installations is based on six different maritime areas: 1) the internal waters, 2) the
two respects. First, no shelf may in law extend more than 350 nautical miles from the baseline or beyond
the 2500 metres depth plus 100 nautical miles limit set in Article 76(5). See Harris, above n 16, 482.
60
The LOSC established a specific legal regime for the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which is treated
as an intermediate area of the sea between the territorial sea and the high seas with a distinct set of rules
of its own. See Harris, above n 16, 472; LOSC art 55.
61
The framework for the deep seabed contains special provisions dealing with exploitation of natural
resources of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. See LOSC Pt XI.
62
Stuart Kaye, ‘The Protection of Platforms, Pipelines and Submarine Cables under Australian and New
Zealand Law’ in Natalie Klein, Joanna Mossop and Donald Rothwell (eds), Maritime Security:
International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand (Routledge, 2010) 186, 187.
63
LOSC arts 60, 80, 87(1)(d), 147(2).
64
Ibid arts 17–28.
65
Ibid arts 100–107.
66
Ibid art 110.
67
Ibid art 111.
68
Ibid arts 56, 60, 80; Kaye, above n 62, 187.
69
LOSC arts 56, 60, 80.
70
The LOSC maritime zones of jurisdiction are: the internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous
zone, the archipelagic waters, the EEZ, the continental shelf, and the high seas.
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territorial sea, 3) the archipelagic waters, 4) the EEZ and the continental shelf, 5) the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, and 6) the seabed beyond national
jurisdiction. The discussion of offshore installations in the contiguous zone is excluded
from this analysis because the contiguous zone forms part of the EEZ and does not
confer any special security rights on the coastal State to take enforcement measures
against ships involved in violent activities such as terrorism.71
4.1 Installations in the internal waters

The internal waters of the State are waters on the landward side of the baseline of the
territorial sea.72 The internal waters include ports, harbours, bays, fringing reefs, lakes,
canals and rivers and their mouths and, to some extent, other closely related water
areas.73 The coastal State has full territorial sovereignty over its internal waters.74 The
internal waters are assimilated to a coastal State’s territory. 75 There is no right of
navigation or general right of innocent passage of foreign ships through internal
waters,76 which distinguishes the internal waters from the territorial sea.
By virtue of its full territorial sovereignty over the internal waters, the coastal State can
build offshore petroleum installations in the internal waters and take measures necessary
for their protection.77 The construction of offshore installations and their protection is ‘a
matter of internal concern of the coastal State and is governed by its law and
regulations’.78 Esmaeili has noted that ‘in exceptional cases, there might be a right of
innocent passage in internal waters’.79 According to Article 8(2) of the LOSC:

71

See Natalino Ronzitti, ‘The Law of the Sea and the Use of Force Against Terrorist Activities’ in
Natalino Ronzitti (ed), Maritime Terrorism and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1990) 1, 5–6.
72
LOSC art 8(1). See also Territorial Sea Convention art 5(1).
73
Robin Churchill and Alan Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 3rd ed, 1999) 60.
See also Hossein Esmaeili, The Legal Regime of Offshore Oil Rigs in International Law (Ashgate
Dartmouth, 2001) 70.
74
LOSC art 2(1).
75
Churchill and Lowe, above n 73, 60. Churchill and Lowe argue that, in principle, a coastal State is free
to deal with its internal waters as it chooses, just as it is free to deal with its land territory; and for that
reason the internal waters ‘have not been made the subject of detailed regulation’ in any of the
conventions on the law of the sea: at 61.
76
Churchill and Lowe, above n 73, 60.
77
It is possible for offshore installations to be operating in the internal waters. For example, in the State
of Western Australia, there is an application for approval to drill offshore petroleum wells in the internal
waters: Government of Western Australia, Department of Mines and Petroleum, Application for Approval
to Drill an Offshore Petroleum Well (PGERA67) Internal Waters (14 June 2010)
<http://www.dmp.wa.gov.au/documents/PD-PTLA-OPS-121D.pdf> at 7 August 2011.
78
Esmaeili, above n 73, 70.
79
Ibid.
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Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth
in article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously
been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention
shall exist in those waters.80

As discussed in the following section, in areas of the sea where the right of innocent
passage exists under international law, the construction, operation and protection of
offshore petroleum installations should not hamper international navigation and the
right of innocent passage.
The coastal State can exercise jurisdiction over foreign ships in the internal waters. This
principle of the coastal State having jurisdiction to apply its laws to foreign ships in its
internal waters and ports is well established in international law.81 By entering internal
waters, foreign ships put themselves within the territorial jurisdiction of the coastal
State,82 including criminal jurisdiction. In the context of offshore petroleum security,
there is no doubt that a coastal State can take enforcement action in its internal waters
against foreign ships that were involved in unlawful interferences with or attacks on
offshore installations located in the internal waters of that coastal State.83
4.2 Installations in the territorial sea

Coastal States have sovereignty over the territorial sea, the air space above it, and its
seabed and subsoil.

84

This includes authority to construct offshore petroleum

installations and engage in exploitation of petroleum resources on the seabed. 85 The
most relevant aspect of the territorial sea with regard to the protection and security of
offshore petroleum installations is the requirement of innocent passage. First, the
80

LOSC art 8(2).
Michael White, ‘Australia’s Offshore Legal Jurisdiction: Part 1 – History & Development’ (2011)
25(1) Australia and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal 3, 17.
82
Churchill and Lowe, above n 73, 65. Churchill and Lowe note that with the exception of some limited
circumstances, ‘States do not exercise their jurisdiction in respect of the internal affairs of foreign ships in
their ports [and internal waters] even though, as a matter of strict law, they would be entitled to do so
because of the voluntary entry of those ships within their territorial jurisdiction’: at 67–8.
83
Similarly, the coastal State can take enforcement action in its internal waters against foreign ships that
were involved in interferences with or attacks on offshore petroleum installations under the coastal State’s
control regardless of which maritime zone of jurisdiction those offshore installations are located (i.e. for
attacks on offshore installations located in the territorial sea or the continental shelf).
84
LOSC art 2. See also Territorial Sea Convention art 5(2).
85
Although it is not stated expressly in the LOSC, it is implied that a coastal State, by virtue of its
sovereignty over the territorial sea, has the authority to construct and operate offshore oil and gas
installations within its territorial sea: Salah Honein, The International Law Relating to Offshore
Installations and Artificial Islands: An Industry Report (Lloyd’s of London Press, 1991) 4.
81
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concept of innocent passage will be briefly discussed, followed by an analysis of its
relevance to security of offshore installations.
4.2.1 Innocent passage and offshore petroleum installations

The requirement of innocent passage is one of the few accepted limitations on the
coastal State’s sovereignty in the territorial sea.86 The LOSC, by virtue of Article 17,
grants a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea to ships of all States.87
Thus, the construction and operation of offshore installations in the territorial sea should
be done with due regard to the right of innocent passage.88 After adopting a general
definition of ‘innocent’ in Article 19(1), which states that ‘[p]assage is innocent so long
as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State’,89 the
LOSC adds a long list of activities which are considered to be prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security of the coastal State.90 For instance, any act of wilful and serious
pollution or any act aimed at interfering with offshore installations is considered to be
prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the coastal State and by definition is
not innocent.91
A coastal State has a number of powers regarding the innocent passage. In regard to the
security of offshore petroleum installations, the LOSC gives power to the coastal State
to adopt any laws and regulations relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea
in order to protect its offshore installations. 92 Ships exercising the right of innocent
passage through the territorial sea are required to comply with all such laws and
regulations.93 For example, a coastal State may designate and prescribe sea lanes and
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Article 2(3) of the LOSC provides that ‘the sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to
this Convention and to other rules of international law’. See LOSC 2(3).
87
LOSC art 17. The right of innocent passage also exists in customary international law. For example, in
the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that ‘in order to enjoy access to ports,
foreign vessels possess a customary right of innocent passage in territorial waters for the purposes of
entering or leaving internal waters ...’ See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep No 70, 14, 101.
88
Esmaeili, above n 73.
89
LOSC art 19(1).
90
Ibid art 19(2). The list was regarded as ‘exhaustive’ in the USA-USSR Joint Statement on the Uniform
Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage: 1989 USA-USSR Joint
Statement on the Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage, 28
ILM 1444 (adopted on 23 September 1989) para 3.
91
LOSC arts 19(2)(h), (k). In addition, Article 19(2)(l) is a generic clause stating ‘any other activity not
having a direct bearing on passage’, which presumably gives the coastal State the discretion to render the
passage not innocent.
92
LOSC art 21(1)(b).
93
Ibid art 21(4).
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traffic separation schemes for the regulation of passage (particularly in areas of high
concentration of offshore installations) and require foreign ships exercising the right of
innocent passage through its territorial sea to use such sea lanes and traffic separation
schemes.94 The laws and regulations that a coastal State adopts must be in conformity
with the provisions of the LOSC and other rules of international law.95 In particular,
such laws and regulations of the coastal State may not have the practical effect of
denying or impairing the right of innocent passage.96
Interestingly, the LOSC is silent about safety zones around offshore installations located
in the territorial sea.97 Although not expressly stated in the LOSC, it is arguable that the
coastal State, by virtue of its sovereignty and Article 21(1)(b),98 may adopt measures for
the protection of offshore petroleum installations in the territorial sea such as the
establishment of ‘security zones’ or ‘exclusion zones’ around offshore installations, and
take in those zones whatever measures are necessary for the protection of offshore
installations. The breadth of such zones does not have to be limited to 500 metres
(which is the limit for the safety zones in the EEZ and on the continental shelf).99 By
virtue of its sovereignty over the territorial sea, a coastal State can establish safety,
security or exclusion zones (whatever the terminology may be) of any breadth it deems
necessary. The only requirement is that such zones do not hamper the innocent passage
of foreign ships through the territorial sea.100 In other words, there is an obligation on
the coastal State not to cause unreasonable interference with navigation and to prevent
obstruction of international navigation.
It is not clear whether the coastal State needs to seek endorsement of the International
Maritime Organization (IMO)101 to establish safety zones around offshore installations
94

Ibid art 22(1).
Ibid art 21(1).
96
Ibid art 24(1)(a). See also 1989 USA-USSR Joint Statement on the Uniform Interpretation of Rules of
International Law Governing Innocent Passage, 28 ILM 1444 (adopted on 23 September 1989) para 6.
97
Honein argues that the establishment of safety zones around installations in the territorial sea does not
seem necessary because a coastal State may require foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage
through its territorial sea to use such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as it may designate or
prescribe: Honein, above n 85, 46–7.
98
Article 21(1)(b) of the LOSC provides that the coastal State may adopt laws and regulations relating to
innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of the protection of navigational aids and other
facilities or installations.
99
See LOSC art 60(5). This is discussed further below (see discussion on safety zones in section 4.4).
100
LOSC art 24(1).
101
As discussed in subsection 4.4.1 below, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is considered
to be the ‘competent international organisation’ in matters concerning offshore petroleum installations
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in the territorial sea larger than 500 metres. However, considering that the LOSC does
not specify the maximum breadth of the safety zones around offshore installations in the
territorial sea and does not expressly mention the need to seek the IMO endorsement for
safety zones larger than 500 metres,102 it is arguable that such an endorsement is not
required.
Even if a coastal State establishes safety, security or exclusion zones around offshore
installations, it will still be responsible for the preservation of the right of innocent
passage, as well as the requirement of safe navigation.103 A coastal State has a duty to
give appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation within its territorial sea of which
it has knowledge.104 The size of a security zone and nature of the protection measures in
such a zone would probably depend on the type and nature of the offshore installation in
question. For example, strategically important offshore petroleum installations, such as
major offshore petroleum export terminals, may be subjected to security arrangements
of a high order and can have larger safety, security, or exclusion zones around them. In
the Persian Gulf, Iraq’s Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT) and the Al Basrah
Oil Terminal (ABOT) both have warning zones that extend 3,000 metres in all
directions from the outer edges of the terminal structures. 105 In addition, there is an
exclusion zone around each terminal that extends 2000 metres in all directions from the
outer edges of the terminal structures.106
In Australia, section 616 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act
2006 (Cth) provides that safety zones around offshore installations in the ‘offshore area’
may extend to a distance of 500 metres. The term ‘offshore area’ includes part of

and the safety zones around offshore installations: IMO, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, IMO
NAV, 56th sess, Agenda Item 20, IMO Doc NAV 56/20 (31 August 2010) 15.
102
Cf LOSC art 60(5).
103
See Honein, above n 85, 5. However, Ngantcha argues that the exercise of the right of innocent
passage by foreign merchant ships is, to some extent, subordinate to the exercise by the coastal State of its
full territorial sovereignty over the territorial sea: Francis Ngantcha, The Right of Innocent Passage and
Evolution of the International Law of the Sea (Printer Publishers, 1990) 116.
104
LOSC art 24(2).
105
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), Iraq/Khor Al Amaya Warning & Exclusion Zones Around Terminals (23 May 2008)
<https://www.intertanko.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=44143> at 29 January 2011. See also US
Government, US Navy, Coalition Maritime Forces Revise Iraqi Oil Terminal Protection Procedures (6
May 2004) <http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=13177> at 31 January 2011.
106
INTERTANKO, above n 105.
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Australia’s territorial sea (three to 12 nautical miles), 107 which suggests that in
Australia, there is a 500-metre limit for the safety zones around offshore installations in
the territorial sea. In New Zealand, section 8 of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 (NZ)
provides that the Governor-General may make regulations in respect of establishing
safety zones around offshore installations on the continental shelf not exceeding 500
metres.108 In contrast, section 8 of the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, and Exclusive
Economic Zone Act 1977 (NZ) provides that the Governor-General may make
regulations in respect of the establishment of safety zones around offshore installations
in the territorial sea; however, the maximum distance of such safety zones is not
specified in this Act.109 The absence of the specified limit of safety zones indicates that
in New Zealand, safety zones greater than 500 metres may be established around
offshore installations in New Zealand’s territorial sea.
The LOSC permits the coastal State to ‘take the necessary steps’ in its territorial sea to
prevent a passage which is not innocent. 110 As mentioned above, any act aimed at
interfering with offshore installations is considered to be not innocent passage.111 The
meaning of ‘interfering with installations’ is not specified in the LOSC and therefore it
is not clear what kind of interference with offshore installations would be considered to
be prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the coastal State.112 Esmaeili
discusses the issue of interference with offshore installations in the territorial sea in
some detail and concludes that a minor inconvenience to an offshore installation in the
territorial sea is not prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the coastal State,
and that by virtue of its sovereignty over the territorial sea and provisions of Article
21(1)(b) of the LOSC, the coastal State ‘may reasonably force foreign ships to divert
their course or to follow certain instructions which may prolong their passage’, in order
to protect its offshore petroleum installations.113
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The term ‘offshore area’ is defined in section 8 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas
Storage Act 2006 (Cth) and basically refers to an area of the sea between three nautical miles and the
outer limits of the continental shelf (which can be beyond 200 nautical miles), which means that part of
Australia’s territorial sea (three to 12 nautical miles) is included in the term ‘offshore area’.
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Continental Shelf Act 1964 (NZ) s 8.
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Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977 (NZ) s 8.
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LOSC art 25(1).
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Another issue relating to interference of passage of foreign ships with offshore
petroleum installations is whether the interference must be deliberate or not. 114 The
phrase ‘aimed at’ in Article 19(2)(k) of the LOSC suggests that the interference with
offshore installations must be deliberate in order to be prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security of the coastal State. Therefore, unintentional interferences with
offshore petroleum installations would not be considered prejudicial to the rights of the
coastal State.115 However, in practical terms, it may be very difficult, if not impossible,
to verify the nature of the passage and the intent of a ship. The LOSC does not provide
any guidance on how a State can verify the intent of a ship.
To encourage all States to harmonise their national laws and practices relating to
innocent passage, governments of the United States of America (USA) and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) issued the Joint Statement on the Uniform
Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage (USA-USSR
Joint Statement) in 1989, which represented the agreed interpretation and agreed
practices of the US and USSR of innocent passage provisions of the LOSC.116 With
regard to verifying the intent of ships navigating in the territorial sea, the USA-USSR
Joint Statement recommends that
A coastal State which questions whether the particular passage of a ship through its
territorial sea is innocent shall inform the ship of the reason why it questions the
innocence of the passage, and provide the ship an opportunity to clarify its intentions or
correct its conduct in a reasonably short period of time.117

In the context of offshore installations, the coastal State would need to inform the ship
that it is suspected of intending to cause interference with the coastal State’s offshore
installations in the territorial sea. If the ship does not respond to the coastal State’s
request or does not correct its conduct within a reasonably short period of time, the
passage could be deemed non-innocent. However, it is not clear from the USA-USSR
Joint Statement what is considered to be a ‘reasonably short period of time’.

114

Ibid 125.
Ibid.
116
1989 USA-USSR Joint Statement on the Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law
Governing Innocent Passage, 28 ILM 1444 (adopted on 23 September 1989).
117
Ibid para 4.
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It would seem that a coastal State would have discretion to determine what a
‘reasonably short period of time’ is, in the given circumstances and taking into account
the general security environment of the area. In some circumstances an immediate
response may be required, for example, when a ship enters the exclusion zone without
authorisation. The US Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO) in Bahrain has issued a
notice advising ships operating in the Persian Gulf of the warning and exclusion zones
around ABOT and KAAOT, located off the coast of Iraq. 118 The MARLO’s notice
states:
If queried, mariners should clearly identify themselves and state their intentions and, if
given directions from coalition warships, they should immediately execute such
directions so as to make their intentions known ... coalition warships are prepared to
take defensive measures, including, if necessary, the use of deadly force against any
contact whose identity or intentions are unknown and which subjectively poses a threat.
... Vessels attempting to enter the zones without authorization may be subjected to
defensive measures, including when necessary, the use of deadly force. All reasonable
efforts including established pre-planned responses will be taken to warn vessels away
before employing deadly force.119

If the passage was found to be not innocent, the coastal State is authorised under the
LOSC to take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent it.120 The LOSC does
not clarify what ‘necessary steps’ can be taken by a coastal State. According to
Rothwell and Stephens, a number of response options are available to the coastal State
to prevent or deny non-innocent passage, which could include requesting a delinquent
ship to refrain from certain acts, requesting the ship to leave the territorial sea
immediately, the positioning of vessels to prevent the ship from continuing its passage,
or the intervention and boarding of the ship by the coastal State’s authorities to direct it
away from the territorial sea.121
Considering that a non-innocent passage is prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal State and depending on the nature and severity of threat posed by
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Marshall Islands Government, Office of the Maritime Administrator, ‘Warning and Exclusion Zones
around the Khawr Al’Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT) and the Al Basra Oil Terminal (ABOT)’ (Marine
Safety Advisory No 15-08, Office of the Maritime Administrator, 20 May 2008) 1.
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Ibid 2–3 (emphasis added).
120
LOSC art 25(1).
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See Rothwell and Stephens, above n 29, 218.
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the delinquent ship, the coastal State can resort to the use of reasonable force (including
deadly force) as a last resort.122 For example, the MARLO’s notice on the warning and
exclusion zones around ABOT and KAAOT states that ‘[a]ll reasonable efforts
including established pre-planned responses will be taken to warn vessels away before
employing deadly force’.123 On 3 February 2006, a cargo dhow sailed into the KAAOT
exclusion zone after repeated warnings to change course, which included the use of
bridge-to-bridge radio, ship-mounted loud speakers, the firing of flares, and other
means.124 Only after shots were fired, did the dhow finally comply, and fortunately, no
lives were lost in this incident. 125 The permissible response would depend upon the
specific circumstances and should be subject to general principles of international law,
such as necessity and proportionality.126 A coastal State may choose how to protect its
offshore petroleum installations so long as it is in accordance with international law.
Under Article 25(3) of the LOSC, the coastal State also has a right to suspend
temporarily the innocent passage of foreign ships in specified areas of its territorial sea
without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships if such suspension is
essential for the protection of its security.127 Article 25(3) requirements in relation to
suspension of innocent passage are that a) the suspension must be temporary, b) the
suspension must be essential for the protection of its security, c) it can be implemented
only in specified areas of the territorial sea, and d) it must be without discrimination
among foreign ships.128 The exact meaning of the expression ‘suspend temporarily’ in
Article 25(3) of the LOSC is not clear, but one interpretation is that a temporary
suspension could be for any period of time and even indefinitely, as long as it is not
permanent.129

122

See Harris, above n 16, 424; Rothwell and Stephens, above n 29, 218. On the use of reasonable force
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Rothwell and Stephens, above n 29, 218, citing M/V Saiga (St Vincent v Guinea) (Judgement) (ITLOS,
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order to ensure the safety of foreign ships within those waters: Rothwell and Stephens, above n 29, 219.
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In relation to the requirement that the suspension must be essential for the protection of
the coastal State’s security, an argument can be made that ensuring uninterrupted
operation of key offshore petroleum installations is essential to the national security of
the coastal State. Therefore, suspension of innocent passage in order to protect
strategically important offshore installations would satisfy the requirement that the
suspension should be essential for the protection of the coastal State’s security. For
example, according to MARLO, ‘[t]he right of innocent passage is temporarily
suspended in accordance with international law in the KAAOT and ABOT exclusion
zones’.130
The suspension of innocent passage in the vicinity of key offshore installations, such as
major oil export terminals or large production platforms located in the territorial sea,
would seem to be appropriate. 131 A justification for such suspension is the strategic
importance of such installations to the coastal State’s security, including economic
security. On the other hand, other offshore petroleum installations, such as drilling rigs,
may not necessarily warrant the suspension of innocent passage. The determination of
whether the suspension of innocent passage around an offshore installation is essential
for the security of the coastal State is ultimately left to that State.132
Marine pollution, which is arguably of lesser security concern, could and has been used
to justify the suspension of the right of innocent passage in portions of the territorial
sea.133 In the context of offshore petroleum installations, collisions between ships and
offshore installations can result in maritime pollution and cause serious harm to a
coastal State’s interests, which could be viewed as part of the broader concept of
security. Therefore, the prevention of marine pollution could arguably be used as
justification for the suspension of the innocent passage around offshore installations.134
Ngantcha argues the legality of each suspension should be based on ‘reasonableness’
130

Marshall Islands Government, above n 118, 3.
Ngantcha argues that the suspension must be essential and not just one among several options
available to the coastal State: Ngantcha, above n 103, 166.
132
See Ngantcha, above n 103, 165.
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Ibid 166. For example, following the Amoco Cadiz tanker disaster near the coast of France on
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viewed in the light of all the circumstances rather than on the ambiguous concept of
‘security considerations’.135 In any case, the suspension of the innocent passage will
only take effect after being duly published.136
The LOSC emphasises that the coastal States cannot suspend innocent passage in straits
used for international navigation,137 even though such straits are normally considered to
be part of the territorial sea. In the Corfu Channel case,138 the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) recognised that at customary international law, the coastal State cannot
suspend the right of innocent passage on grounds of security in a part of the territorial
sea that is an international strait used for navigation from one part of the high seas to
another.139 There are some offshore petroleum installations located in straits used for
international navigation. For example, there are currently more than 20 offshore
installations in Bass Strait, between Australia’s mainland and the island of Tasmania.140
It is foreseeable that there will be more offshore installations in straits used for
international navigation in the future.
As discussed in Chapter 2, hostile actions of nation-States can pose a threat to offshore
petroleum installations. Accordingly, it seems to be appropriate to mention that
warships and other government ships are also required to comply with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea.141 If any
warship does not comply and disregards any request for compliance, the coastal State
may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately. 142 The LOSC expressly
recognises the international responsibility of the flag State for any loss or damage to the
coastal State resulting from non-compliance by a warship or other government ship
operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
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concerning passage through the territorial sea or with provisions of the LOSC or other
international rules.143
When a foreign flagged ship is traversing the territorial sea in the lateral passage and
exercising the right of innocent passage, the ship cannot be considered to be in breach
of the rules on innocent passage on the basis that it has on board persons who seek to
commit terrorist acts in a country other than a coastal State. It is arguable that such a
ship is not immediately threatening the security of the coastal State, especially if it is
compliant with any established rules and directions of the coastal State relating to
innocent passage. In this case, the rules that could be applied are those relating to
criminal jurisdiction on board foreign ships (contained in Article 27 of the LOSC).144
4.2.2 Enforcement jurisdiction in the territorial sea

Article 27 of the LOSC explicitly deals with criminal jurisdiction and its enforcement on
board foreign ships passing through the territorial sea. There are limitations placed on
the coastal State in relation to exercising criminal jurisdiction on board foreign ships.145
A coastal State can exercise criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship passing
through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in
connection with any crime committed on board the ship during its passage if the
consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State or if the crime is of a kind to
disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea.146 For example,
if a foreign ship deliberately collided with an offshore installation in the territorial sea,
which can result in the loss of life and/or marine pollution, it could be argued that the
consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State or that the crime is of a kind that
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disturbs the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea. In which case,
the coastal State would be able to exercise criminal jurisdiction on board the foreign
ship and arrest persons responsible.
A coastal State cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction or take enforcement action against
a foreign ship passing through its territorial sea for offences committed before entry into
the territorial sea except for violations of laws and regulations in the EEZ, maritime
pollution offences of Part XII of the LOSC,147 or for offences committed in internal
waters.148 It is not clear which laws the expression ‘violations of laws and regulations
adopted in accordance with Part V’ refers to. One argument is that it refers to fisheries
laws. However, an alternative argument is that it also refers to violations of laws and
regulations relating to offshore installations in the EEZ, including the laws dealing with
security-related aspects such as (but not limited to) safety zones. 149 The LOSC also
provides that in considering whether or in what manner an arrest should be made, the
local authorities of the coastal State should have due regard to the interests of
navigation.150
Another relevant question is whether a coastal State has jurisdiction over criminal acts
committed on board offshore installations. As pointed out by Esmaeili, certain types of
offshore rigs, such as drill ships, may be considered to be ships and are therefore subject
to the same principles of international law as ships when they are passing through the
territorial sea of a coastal State.151 However, the situation is different if a drill ship is in
the territorial sea of a coastal State for the purposes of drilling,152 in which case Article
27 is not applicable because that provision explicitly deals with criminal jurisdiction on
board foreign ships passing through the territorial sea. The LOSC does not directly
address the issue of criminal jurisdiction on board offshore installations in the territorial
sea, but it could be argued that a coastal State, by virtue of its sovereignty, is entitled to
regulate activities taking place on board offshore installations located in the territorial
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sea, 153 and can enforce its criminal laws on board offshore installations owned or
flagged by other States.154
A coastal State by virtue of its sovereignty over the territorial sea has the right of hot
pursuit. 155 The right of hot pursuit allows the coastal State to administer justice by
arresting a ship and punishing it according to its laws.156 The right of hot pursuit is
found in Article 111 of the LOSC, which reproduces Article 23 of the High Seas
Convention with some alterations. Under Article 111 of the LOSC, the hot pursuit can
be commenced when the foreign ship is within the territorial sea (or in internal waters,
the archipelagic waters, the contiguous zone or the EEZ) of the coastal State. 157 In
determining whether to undertake hot pursuit, the coastal State has the discretion to
decide whether or not it ‘has good reason to believe’ that a ship has violated its laws,
which basically absolves the coastal State from any error of judgement that might
interfere with or prevent the foreign ship from exercising the right of innocent
passage.158
There seems to be no doubt that the coastal State may take enforcement action against
foreign ships or mobile installations involved in terrorist activities and navigating in its
territorial sea, although in some cases challenges with enforcement may arise. 159
Notwithstanding the right of innocent passage granted to foreign ships within a coastal
State’s territorial sea, 160 the coastal State nevertheless retains significant rights to
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maintain its national security in general and in particular, to protect offshore petroleum
installations in its territorial sea.161
4.3 Installations in the archipelagic waters

Similarly to the territorial sea, archipelagic States exercise sovereignty over archipelagic
waters regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as well as over the air space
above the archipelagic waters, their seabed and subsoil, and the resources contained
therein. 162 Some offshore petroleum drilling and production takes place in the
archipelagic waters. For example, a number of offshore petroleum installations are
currently operating in the archipelagic waters of Indonesia. 163 The LOSC does not
expressly address issues relating to offshore petroleum exploitation and offshore
petroleum installations in the archipelagic waters; however, by virtue of the archipelagic
State’s sovereignty over the archipelagic waters, it can be argued that the archipelagic
State can engage in petroleum exploration and exploitation, construct offshore
petroleum installations in the archipelagic waters and take measures for their protection.
The LOSC rules on the archipelagic waters are almost the same as the LOSC rules
relating to the territorial sea. Shearer has noted that there seems to be no difference
between the status of archipelagic waters and the territorial sea except with respect to
archipelagic sea-lanes passage.164 Accordingly, the same legal issues and arguments as
those relating to the protection and security of offshore petroleum installations in the
territorial sea, which were analysed in section 4.2 above, would apply to the security of
offshore installations in the archipelagic waters.
For example, the archipelagic State can establish safety, security, or exclusion zones
(whatever terminology may be used) around offshore installations in the archipelagic
waters of whatever breadth it deems necessary, 165 and take, within those zones,
measures necessary for the protection of offshore installations. The LOSC innocent
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passage rules also apply in the archipelagic waters. 166 An archipelagic State has the
same rights and responsibilities with respect to innocent passage of foreign ships in the
archipelagic waters as does the coastal State within the territorial sea. This includes ‘the
stopping, detention, arrest and prosecution of vessels engaging in actions which are
contrary to the legitimate laws and regulations of the archipelagic state, and also taking
necessary steps to prevent passage which is not innocent’. 167 For example, the
archipelagic State can temporarily suspend the innocent passage of foreign ships in
specified areas of its archipelagic waters if such suspension is essential for the
protection of its security.168
An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes suitable for the continuous and
expeditious passage of foreign ships through its archipelagic waters and the adjacent
territorial sea.169 In addition to the right of innocent passage, ships of all States enjoy the
right of archipelagic sea-lanes passage in the designated archipelagic sea lanes.170 If an
archipelagic State does not designate sea lanes, the right of archipelagic sea-lanes
passage may be exercised through the routes normally used for international
navigation.171 In the context of offshore petroleum security, ships exercising the right of
archipelagic sea-lanes passage potentially pose a risk to offshore petroleum installations
located in the archipelagic waters in the vicinity of designated archipelagic sea lanes or
routes normally used for international navigation. The archipelagic sea-lanes passage
appears to be more restrictive than innocent passage in the geographical sense, but less
restrictive than innocent passage in the manner in which it may be exercised, as long as
it is exercised ‘in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and
unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas or an [EEZ] and another part of
the high seas or an [EEZ]’.172
The enforcement jurisdiction of archipelagic States in the archipelagic waters is not
expressly addressed in the LOSC. However, it can be assumed that the archipelagic
State’s jurisdiction over and enforcement on board foreign ships is similar to the coastal
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State’s jurisdiction over and enforcement on board foreign ships in the territorial sea as
provided in Articles 27 and 28 of the LOSC. An archipelagic State also has the right of
hot pursuit, which can be commenced when the foreign ship is within the archipelagic
waters, the internal waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the archipelagic
State.173
4.4 Installations in the EEZ and on the continental shelf

Coastal States are now able to claim an EEZ extending to 200 nautical miles from their
territorial sea baseline,174 in which they enjoy the exclusive sovereign right to exploit all
natural resources, including oil and gas reserves.175 Coastal States can also claim the
continental shelf areas up to a maximum distance of 350 nautical miles from the
baseline or 100 nautical miles from the 2500 metres water depth, 176 in which they
exercise exclusive sovereign rights for the purposes of exploiting natural resources of
the seabed including oil and gas.177 The coastal State has exclusive right to authorise
and regulate the construction, operation and use of offshore petroleum installations in its
EEZ and on the continental shelf.178
The protection of offshore petroleum installations in the EEZ is addressed in Article 60
of the LOSC, which applies mutatis mutandis to the continental shelf by virtue of
Article 80 of the LOSC.179 The coastal State has exclusive jurisdiction over offshore
petroleum installations in the EEZ (and on the continental shelf) and activities that take
place on board such installations.180 In particular, the LOSC expressly states in Article
60(2) that the coastal State has exclusive jurisdiction over offshore installations
‘including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, health, safety and immigration
laws and regulations’. 181 Criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State over offshore
173
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installations located in the EEZ and on the continental shelf is not mentioned, but the
wording of Article 60(2) of the LOSC indicates that the coastal State jurisdiction is not
limited only to customs, fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and regulations.
Accordingly, it can be logically concluded that the coastal State is empowered to extend
and apply its laws and regulations, including criminal law, in order to regulate activities
and punish crimes committed on board or against offshore installations within the limits
of the continental shelf.182 For example, in New Zealand, section 7 of the Continental
Shelf Act 1964 (NZ) provides that the criminal law of New Zealand is deemed to
operate aboard and in the vicinity of offshore petroleum installations operating on New
Zealand’s continental shelf.183
Furthermore, it could be argued that the word ‘including’ in Article 60(2) could be
interpreted as permitting coastal States to extend their security-related rights and
jurisdiction to offshore installations in the EEZ and on the continental shelf. Therefore,
a coastal State is allowed to take enforcement action (including any forceful measures it
deems proper and necessary) on board offshore petroleum installations in the EEZ and
on the continental shelf in order to prevent and repress attacks on or interferences with
offshore installations.184
4.4.1 Safety zones around offshore petroleum installations

The main protection measure for offshore petroleum installations available to coastal
States is the right to establish safety zones around offshore installations in the EEZ and
on the continental shelf. Article 60(4) of the LOSC provides that the coastal State may,
where necessary, establish reasonable safety zones around offshore petroleum
installations, in which it may take appropriate measures to ensure the safety of both
navigation and offshore installations.185
The LOSC provisions dealing with safety zones around offshore installations are similar
to the provisions of the Continental Shelf Convention, but there are a few notable
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differences. 186 For example, the LOSC provisions provide that safety zones around
offshore installations must be ‘reasonable’, they should be ‘reasonably related to the
nature and function’ of the offshore installations, and measures in those safety zones
should be ‘appropriate’.187 In contrast, the Continental Shelf Convention provisions do
not have these requirements of ‘reasonable’, ‘reasonably related’ and ‘appropriate’.
Another notable difference is that the Continental Shelf Convention provides that
coastal States can take measure in the safety zones necessary for the protection of
offshore installations, while the LOSC provides that measures should be appropriate to
ensure the safety both of navigation and of offshore installations.188 Furthermore, under
the Continental Shelf Convention, the breadth of safety zones is limited to 500 metres,
but the LOSC provides that, in certain circumstances, the breadth of safety zones may
be extended beyond 500 metres.189 The safety zone rules in Article 60 of the LOSC
appear to be slightly more restrictive than those in the Continental Shelf Convention,
‘although there is a greater scope for change’.190
All ships must respect safety zones around offshore installations. 191 The LOSC also
provides that offshore installations and safety zones around them may not be established
where interference may be caused to the use of recognised sea lanes essential to
international navigation.
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In addition, offshore petroleum installations on the

continental shelf and any safety zone around such installations must not result in any
infringement or unjustifiable interference with navigation or other rights and freedoms
of the high seas.193
The LOSC does not distinguish between fixed and mobile offshore installations nor
does it specify what kind of offshore oil and gas installations could be protected by
safety zones. This issue had been discussed by Esmaeili, who concluded that safety
zones may be established around fixed offshore installations and also around mobile
rigs but only ‘when [mobile drilling rigs] are attached to the seabed or while they are
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involved in drilling activities’.194 As discussed in Chapter 4 above, the IMO considers
mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs) to be vessels when they are in transit and not
engaged in drilling, but considers them to be installations when engaged in drilling
operations.195 Safety zones can also be established around floating petroleum production
installations, such as floating production, storage and offloading units (FPSOs), when
they are on site and engaged in production operations.196
The coastal State is allowed to determine the breadth of the safety zones, but in doing so
it must take into account applicable international standards and ensure that such zones
‘are reasonably related to the nature and function’ of an offshore installation.197 In any
case, the LOSC explicitly limits the breadth of the safety zone around an installation to a
maximum of 500 metres.198
Infringements of safety zones around offshore installations by ships, particularly fishing
vessels, is not unusual.199 According to the IMO, occasionally ships do not respond to
radiotelephone calls initiated by offshore installations and that near misses and
collisions could be avoided if vessels maintained a continuous listening watch.200 Any
unauthorised activities in close proximity to offshore installations (such as fishing
within safety zones) present security risks.201
The problem with the safety zones is that the 500-metre breadth of safety zones may not
be sufficient to protect offshore petroleum installations from deliberate attacks.
References to ‘navigation’ and ‘safety’ in Article 60(4) of the LOSC indicate that the
concept of safety zones was designed to deal with safety of navigation and safety of
194
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installations with the main purpose of preventing accidental collisions between ships
and offshore installations rather than protecting installations from deliberate attacks.202
The 500-metre safety zone around offshore installations is not sufficient to protect
offshore installations from acts of violence such as a terrorist attack, let alone attacks by
hostile States in a time of armed conflict.203
The only exception to the 500-metre limit of safety zone breadth is when a longer
distance is authorised by the generally accepted international standards or as
recommended by the competent international organisation.
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‘authorized by generally accepted international standards’ in Article 60(5) of the LOSC
seems to be a reference to customary international law. In the absence of an
international regulatory body directly concerned with offshore petroleum installations,
the expression ‘competent international organization’ in Article 60(5) of the LOSC is
understood to mean the IMO.205 ‘The fact that the IMO was set up to deal primarily
with merchant shipping issues has not prevented it from tackling important matters in
the field of offshore activity.’206
As discussed in Chapter 6 below, between 2008 and 2010, the IMO was considering the
issue of extending safety zones to more than 500 metres around offshore installations in
the EEZ, 207 but it was ultimately concluded that there was no demonstrated need to
establish safety zones larger than 500 metres.208 To date, no other distance has been
agreed by the international community and the IMO has not made any official
recommendations on the extension of safety zones beyond 500 metres.209
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State practice shows that ‘safety zones’ extending beyond 500 metres have been
established around offshore installations in the EEZ. As discussed in Chapter 4 above,
the FPSO Zafiro Producer (also known as Zafiro Offshore Oil Terminal (ZOOT))210 in
offshore Equatorial Guinea is located about 30 nautical miles offshore. Even though it is
not known where exactly Equatorial Guinea’s territorial sea baseline is, it is most likely
that ZOOT is located outside of the 12-mile territorial sea (i.e. in Equatorial Guinea’s
EEZ). ZOOT has a restricted area of 4.3 miles around it, which all ships are prohibited
to enter without prior authorisation. The LOSC does not use the term ‘restricted area’,
and in any case, the establishment of restricted areas larger than 500 metres around
offshore installations in the EEZ appears to be in contravention of Article 60(5) of the
LOSC. As concluded in Chapter 4, the fact that an offshore installation is designated as
an offshore port or an offshore terminal does not change the legal status of waters
around such an offshore installation. O’Connell argues that foreign ships are not
required to respect more than the 500-metre safety zone around offshore installations in
the EEZ unless a larger distance is authorised by generally accepted international
standards or recommended by the competent international organisation.211
The LOSC does not specify the nature of the protective measures that can be taken in
safety zones, nor does the Continental Shelf Convention. When the safety zone concept
was first introduced in the 1950s, the ILC did not clarify the nature of protective
measures a coastal State can implement in the safety zones around offshore
installations.212 The coastal State is entitled to take appropriate measures of protection
in order to ensure safety of offshore installations and prevent any offence being
committed within safety zones around them.213 It would seem that coastal States have a
‘protective jurisdiction’ within safety zones.214 The question is whether the term ‘may
take appropriate measures’ in Article 60(4) could be interpreted as permission to install
security devices in safety zones around installations. Perhaps such a broad interpretation
of extending safety zones beyond 500 metres was considered in the context of safety of navigation and
safety of installations, but not in the context of security.
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can be adopted in the contemporary maritime security environment. The coastal State
should be able to take appropriate measures to ensure the protection of offshore
installations.
There is a general requirement in Article 78(2) of the LOSC that the exercise of the
rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf (which would include the right to
establish safety zones around offshore installations and take measures for the protection
of offshore installations) must not infringe or result in any unjustifiable interference
with navigation or other rights and freedoms of the high seas.215 As noted by the ILC
with respect to analogous provision in the Continental Shelf Convention, even
substantial interference with navigation may be justified in some cases.216 In addition,
Article 60(5) of the LOSC provides that safety zones ‘shall be designed to ensure that
they are reasonably related to the nature and function’ of the installations, which
indicates that the protective measures in a safety zone could be determined by the type
and function of an installation. In any case, the LOSC requires that the breadth of safety
zones should not exceed 500 metres around offshore installations.
4.4.2 Enforcement jurisdiction in the EEZ and on the continental shelf

The important question is to determine what kind of enforcement jurisdiction a coastal
State has in the EEZ, including jurisdiction over foreign ships. In the EEZ and on the
continental shelf, the coastal State’s enforcement jurisdiction is limited to specific
activities for which such jurisdictional zones are established, such as violation of laws
relating to living and non-living marine resources particularly fisheries, environmental
protection matters, seabed activities and offshore installations.217 Boarding of foreign
ships for enforcement purposes would be limited to those purposes.218 In the context of
offshore petroleum security, the issue is whether a coastal State can enforce against a
foreign ship contraventions of laws and regulations relating to the protection and
security of offshore installations, including any applicable criminal laws. The LOSC is
silent in this regard.
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In the case where a foreign flagged ship is involved in the attack against an offshore
installation located on the continental shelf within the EEZ, it would be considered to
have violated the laws of the coastal State applicable to the continental shelf, and the
coastal State should be able to enforce those laws. There seems to be little doubt that a
coastal State can take enforcement action against a foreign ship involved in the attack
against an offshore installation when such as ship is located within a safety zone
because the coastal State has protective jurisdiction within safety zones. However,
outside of safety zones, the extent of the coastal State’s enforcement powers and
jurisdiction against foreign ships is not clear.219
According to the ILC, the sovereign rights of coastal States over the continental shelf
‘cover all rights necessary for and connected with the exploration and exploitation of
the natural resources of the continental shelf [including] jurisdiction in connexion with
the prevention and punishment of violations of the law’.220 The right of hot pursuit is
included among the sovereign rights of the coastal State. The right of hot pursuit is
permitted in cases of violations in the EEZ or on the continental shelf of the coastal
State’s laws and regulations applicable to the EEZ or the continental shelf including
safety zones around offshore installations.221 Kaye argues that the ability of the coastal
State to respond to an attack against an offshore installation is hampered in that the hot
pursuit can only be initiated against a foreign ship when the ship is still physically
present in the safety zone.222 However, an argument can be made that the hot pursuit
can still be commenced when a foreign ship is already outside of the safety zone as long
as the foreign ship is located within the same ‘maritime zone of jurisdiction’ (i.e. in the
EEZ). A safety zone is simply a protection measure that a coastal State may establish to
minimise the chances of collisions with offshore installations and it is not a separate
maritime zone of jurisdiction under the LOSC.
An attack on an offshore installation can be considered as interference with and/or
infringement of the coastal State’s exclusive sovereign rights to explore and exploit
natural resources of the continental shelf. A ship involved in the attack would be in
219
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violation of not only the regulations in a safety zone, but also in violation of the EEZ
and/or the continental shelf laws. If an attack on an offshore installation causes
pollution, the coastal State can rely on its environmental jurisdiction to exercise the
right of hot pursuit in the EEZ and arrest the ship and perpetrators on board.223 It would
be far more difficult for the coastal State to employ environmental jurisdiction to take
action against ships approaching where perpetrators on board intend to cause damage to
an offshore installation, but the attack has not yet occurred.224
The difficulty with undertaking enforcement in the EEZ is that the LOSC does not
contain any express provisions dealing with boarding and arrest of foreign ships for
violations of coastal State laws and regulations on the continental shelf, particularly
those relating to the protection and security of offshore installations. In any case, as
highlighted by the Saiga,225 enforcement within the EEZ is subject to general principles
on the use of force relating to reasonableness and necessity, as well as other relevant
provisions found in the LOSC. 226 The practice of States in the arrest of delinquent
foreign ships in the EEZ varies.227 Rothwell and Stephens note that since the adoption
of the LOSC and particularly since 9/11, there has been a growing body of State practice
indicating the willingness of coastal States to interfere with navigational rights and
freedoms in the EEZ on the grounds of maritime security, which has the effect of
‘transforming the EEZ regime beyond a resource oriented and pollution protection
zone’ into one where security considerations are also accorded some degree of
recognition.228
The analysis in the preceding paragraphs has confirmed that the coastal State can take
enforcement action to protect offshore installations on its continental shelf, but a more
difficult question is whether third States are allowed to take enforcement action
(including the use of forceful measures) on board an offshore installation without
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having previously obtained the consent of the coastal State.229 Ronzitti argues that it
may be considered admissible and lawful for a third State to conduct a rescue operation
to free its nationals that are held hostages on board an installation whenever the coastal
State on whose continental shelf the installation is located is unable or unwilling to
intervene. 230 In any case, where there is a dispute between States relating to
enforcement action taken in the EEZ, States may rely on Article 59 of the LOSC to
argue that enforcement action against terrorists or other perpetrators was necessary in
the circumstances and that it was in the interests of the international community as a
whole. 231 Considering that importance of offshore petroleum to the international
economy, such an argument seems reasonable.
4.5 Installations on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles

As mentioned earlier, the continental shelf normally extends to a distance of 200
nautical miles from the baseline; however, the continental shelf can extend beyond that
limit, up to a maximum distance of either 350 nautical miles or 100 nautical miles from
the 2500-metre water depth.232 The continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical miles limit
is sometimes referred to as the ‘extended’ or ‘outer’ continental shelf.233
The coastal State has exclusive right to construct, authorise and regulate the
construction and operation of offshore installations on the continental shelf beyond 200
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nautical miles.234 Such installations are under exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State,
including penal jurisdiction, 235 and the coastal State can penalise criminal activities
taking place on board installations located on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles. Importantly, the LOSC provides that status of the continental shelf and the rights
of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the
superjacent waters. 236 The superjacent waters of the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles are in the fullest sense the high seas.237 Thus, an offshore installation
located on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, is also located on that part of
the high seas above the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Therefore, the high
seas provisions of the LOSC will also be applicable.
One of the freedoms of the high seas provided to all States is the ‘freedom to construct
artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law, subject to Part
VI’.238 Part VI of the convention deals with the continental shelf. Therefore, the phrase
‘subject to Part VI’ in Article 87(1)(d) means that the freedom of all States to construct
offshore installations on the part of the high seas above the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles excludes offshore petroleum installations. Rothwell and Stephens have
observed that some of the high seas freedoms listed in Article 87(1) (including the
freedom to construct offshore installations) cannot be considered as ‘freedoms’ because
they are subject to limitations such as the continental shelf rules.239
Offshore petroleum installations located on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles are still under the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State by virtue of Articles
60(2) and 80 of the LOSC. 240 In effect, the same LOSC rules apply to offshore
petroleum installations on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles as to those

234

LOSC arts 60(1), 80.
Ibid arts 60(2), 80.
236
Ibid art 78(1).
237
Under Article 86 of the LOSC, the high seas provisions (of Part VII) apply to all parts of the sea that
are not included in the EEZ, the territorial sea, the internal waters or the archipelagic waters.
238
LOSC art 87(1)(d).
239
Rothwell and Stephens, above n 29, 168. See also Honein, above n 85, 34. In this regard, Honein also
commented that ‘it might now be suggested that such freedom does not extend, in the case of an
installation erected on the continental shelf beyond the 200 miles limit and emerging from the high seas
superjacent to that part of the shelf, to such or any other part of the continental shelf which is subject to an
international legal regime completely different from the “free” regime of the high seas. In other words,
the right of states to exercise their freedom of the high seas does not affect the legal status of the seabed
beneath those waters’: at 34.
240
See Rothwell and Stephens, above n 29, 157.
235

233

Chapter 5

Mikhail Kashubsky

located on the continental shelf within 200 nautical miles. In particular, these include
the ability of the coastal State to exercise criminal jurisdiction on board offshore
installations, the right to establish safety zones not exceeding 500 metres around
installations, 241 and the requirement not to cause any unjustifiable interference with
navigation or other rights and freedoms of the high seas.242 The only notable difference
(not related to security) is that the LOSC contains a special provision that requires
coastal States to make payments or contributions in kind in respect of the exploitation of
the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.243
4.5.1 Enforcement jurisdiction on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles

With respect to the coastal State’s enforcement jurisdiction in waters above the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, the situation is completely different
because these waters are part of the high seas.244 On the high seas, a flag State has
exclusive jurisdiction over ships entitled to fly its flag.245 Coastal States do not have any
specific regulation and enforcement powers. The exception is when a foreign ship has
engaged in behaviour giving rise to universal jurisdiction such as in the case of
piracy,246 whereby all States have a power to stop and inspect ships suspected to have
engaged in piracy. In general, the hot pursuit cannot be initiated by a coastal State on
the high seas, but it can be continued if it was initiated in other maritime zones of a
coastal State and has not been interrupted.247 The coastal State has the competence to
make laws for the regulation of matters connected with exploration and exploitation of
natural resources on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles,248 but as noted by
O’Connell:
the right to make these effective could be regarded as inherent in the power itself. But,
while it is relevant to point out the extent to which the coastal State’s criminal law has
241
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actually been applied to oil rigs, that does not of itself warrant the inference that there is
a right of hot pursuit in the event of their violation.249

It is only within 500-metre safety zones around offshore petroleum installations on the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles that the coastal State has any authority over
these waters, and if an incident occurs outside a safety zone, the question of hot pursuit
might be different from what it would be if it occurred within a safety zone.250 If a
foreign ship involved in the attack is located within 500 metres of an offshore
installation, and especially if the offenders are still on board an installation, the nexus
would be stronger because of the specific provisions in the LOSC about measures that
may be taken in the zones for the protection of the installations.251 If a foreign ship is
outside of the safety zone, enforcement action by the coastal State against such a ship
would require permission of the flag State.252 However, enforcement on the high seas
without permission of the flag State may be legitimate where such action is taken in
order to protect the nationals of the coastal State (or a third State),253 for example, where
nationals of the coastal State (or a third State) are kidnapped from an installation and are
on board a foreign ship that was used in the attack.
It may also be possible for a coastal State to exercise the right of self-defence in order to
protect or respond to attacks against offshore petroleum installations operating under the
coastal State’s jurisdiction, which can include the use of force against a foreign ship
involved in the attack on an offshore installation. The issue of self-defence was
considered by the ICJ in Oil Platforms case.254 The ICJ re-affirmed the requirement that
in order for an action to be justified as one taken in self-defence, the State taking the
action must have been a victim of ‘armed attack’ as provided for in Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations.255 This means that a right of self-defence cannot be used
by the coastal State to take pre-emptive action to protect its offshore installations from
249
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attack, but it can be used to respond to an attack on an offshore installation. In any case,
an action taken in response to an attack must be both necessary and proportional for it to
qualify as an action in self-defence.256
The issue with the right of self-defence is that it is normally exercised in the context of
defensive response against States, not against non-State actors (which is most likely to
be the case in the attack on an offshore petroleum installation). According to Kaye, the
difficulty in using self-defence as a basis for action in connection with attacks on
offshore petroleum installations stems from whether an act of violence (such as
terrorism) has a domestic or international legal characterisation, as the response is
directed towards non-State actors.257 If the legal characterisation is international, then a
right of self-defence may provide a basis to intercept and board the ship used in the
attack against an offshore installation.258
4.6 Installations on the seabed beyond national jurisdiction

The seabed beyond national jurisdiction is referred to in the LOSC as ‘the Area’, which
is defined as ‘the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction’.259 This area is also often referred to as the ‘deep seabed’.260 The
deep seabed has been withheld from the jurisdictional claims of States and declared the
‘common heritage of mankind’. 261 The International Seabed Authority (ISA) is the
international organisation established under the LOSC for the purpose of exercising
overall responsibility for the exploration and exploitation of the resources on the seabed
beyond national jurisdiction.262 However, offshore petroleum production on the seabed
beyond national jurisdiction is not yet economically feasible. As noted by Kaye:
In practical terms, such waters are relatively remote in ocean, being a minimum of 200
nautical miles from the nearest land, and the seabed in such areas is typically oceanic
crust, thousands of metres below the surface of the ocean. This means that there are no
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platforms anywhere in the world beyond national jurisdiction at the present point in
time.263

While this is the case now, it is possible that in the foreseeable future, with
technological advances, there will be offshore petroleum installations operating on the
deep seabed.264 Today, some floating ultra-deepwater installations are able to operate in
water depths of up to 2.5 kilometres. One of the deepest offshore petroleum installations
in the world is Perdido floating spar platform which operates about 200 nautical miles
offshore in the Gulf of Mexico at a water depth of about 2380 metres, producing oil and
natural gas. 265 The new ultra-deepwater drillship Discoverer India, built in 2010, is
equipped to drill in water depths of about 3050 metres and can be upgraded to drill in
water depths up to 3650 metres.266 In April 2011, Transocean Ltd reported that its ultradeepwater drillship Dhirubhai Deepwater KG2 has set what it believes to be a world
record for the deepest water depth by an offshore drilling rig at 3089 metres of water
while working offshore India. 267 As the race for offshore oil and gas resources
accelerates and technology rapidly continues to advance, it may well be that offshore
installations will be able to conquer the depths which at the moment appear to be
unattainable and unfeasible. Therefore, it seems to be appropriate to consider the LOSC
rules for offshore installations on the deep seabed, including those relating to the
protection of such installations and enforcement of interferences with such installations.
Article 135 of the LOSC provides that the legal status of the waters superjacent to the
deep seabed (i.e. the high seas) is not affected by any rights granted or exercised
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pursuant to the legal framework of the deep seabed. All States have a freedom to
construct offshore installations on the high seas, which is one of the freedoms of the
high seas.268 However, installations for the purposes of the exploitation of resources of
the deep seabed, which includes offshore petroleum installations, are subject to
authorisation by the ISA. 269 This means that the freedom of all States to construct
offshore installations on the high seas superjacent to the deep seabed is restricted in that
it excludes offshore petroleum installations,270 which is a similar situation to the high
seas above the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.
Offshore operations beyond national jurisdiction to exploit resources of the deep seabed
must be carried out in accordance with rules, regulations and procedures of the ISA.271
The ISA exercises overall responsibility in regard to the authorisation to construct or
erect offshore installations for the purpose of exploitation of the deep seabed as well as
the exercise of the functions of control and regulation assigned to it under the LOSC.272
However, in practical terms, the jurisdiction over an installation on the deep seabed
would need to be entrusted to and exercised by a particular State because the ISA itself
cannot exercise jurisdiction as it lacks ‘the civil and criminal codes and the system of
courts necessary to give jurisdiction any effective meaning’.273 The question is which
State (the flag State or the nearest coastal State or a third State) should exercise
jurisdiction over installations on the deep seabed, and whether such jurisdiction should
be exclusive. The LOSC does not provide answers to these questions.
Although the LOSC does not deal directly with jurisdiction over offshore installations
on the deep seabed, it appears to grant States jurisdiction with respect to environmental
aspects in order to prevent, reduce and control pollution from activities undertaken by
268
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‘installations, structures and other devices flying their flag or of their registry or
operating under their authority, as the case may be’.274 The LOSC does not contain a
formal requirement for States to maintain the registry of offshore installations, but it
implies that States may maintain a registry of offshore installations on the seabed
beyond national jurisdiction.275
On one hand, it seems to be logical for the State of registry or the flag State to have
exclusive jurisdiction over offshore installations on the deep seabed. 276 On the other
hand, an argument can be made that it is more appropriate for the State that was
authorised to construct the installation to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over it.277 In the
event where a licence or authorisation to construct an installation is granted by the ISA
to a private entity rather than a State (especially if such entity does not have a specific
national character), the ISA might delegate or assign jurisdiction over such installation
to a State with which the entity is associated (which may be different to the State of
registry or the flag State of the installation), 278 and that State would, in effect, be
permitted to exercise exclusive jurisdiction and control over the installation in
question, 279 and the entity would construct and operate the installation under the
jurisdiction of that State. The issue of jurisdiction over offshore installations on the
seabed beyond national jurisdiction is not clarified under the LOSC. A separate issue is
whether a State that exercises jurisdiction over an offshore petroleum installation
(whether it is a State of registry or a State authorised to construct the installation) would
have the capability to protect it.
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In relation to the protection of offshore petroleum installations located on the seabed
beyond national jurisdiction, the LOSC requires the establishment of safety zones
around such installations to ensure safety of navigation and installations.280 In addition,
the location and configuration of such safety zones cannot form a ‘belt’ across the high
seas which would cause interference with navigation.281 The nature of the measures that
a State can take in a safety zone around an offshore installation on the seabed beyond
national jurisdiction is not clear, but the provision explicitly indicates that a safety zone
should have ‘appropriate marking’.282 Similarly, the LOSC does not specify the breadth
of safety zones around such offshore structures,283 but it is arguably that a 500-metre
safety zone may be established. 284 Furthermore, it appears that installations on the
seabed beyond national jurisdiction are required to have safety zones around them
because Article 147(2)(c) of the LOSC uses the words ‘shall be established’. In contrast,
the establishment of safety zones around offshore installations on the continental shelf
is optional because Article 60(4) uses the phrase ‘may, where necessary, establish’. The
nature of jurisdiction within safety zones around installations on the deep seabed is not
clear.
It would seem to be reasonable for a State that exercises jurisdiction over offshore
installations on the deep seabed to extend its criminal laws that would apply on board
such installations and possibly within the safety zone established around installations in
order to punish criminal activities taking place on board and within safety zones.
However, there is no specific provision in the LOSC that authorises States to exercise
criminal jurisdiction on board offshore installations on the deep seabed or within safety
zones around such installations. There is no nexus to the continental shelf and therefore
it is more difficult to establish and exercise criminal jurisdiction. It is clear that hot
pursuit cannot be commenced within a safety zone around an installation on the deep
seabed because Article 111(2) of the LOSC specifically refers to safety zones around
‘continental shelf installations’.
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4.6.1 Enforcement jurisdiction on the seabed beyond national jurisdiction

With regard to enforcement action against foreign ships for attacks on and interferences
with installations located on the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, it will be recalled
that ships on the high seas are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State.285 Some
commentators have argued that enforcement action against foreign ships on the high
seas may be lawful when it is aimed at protecting the nationals of the intervening State
(for example, where nationals are held hostage on board the ship that was used in the
attack on an offshore installation) especially when the flag State is unable or unwilling
to take the necessary steps to protect the human life.286 However, Ronzitti argues that
the very fact that the flag State is not immediately taking enforcement action, but
exploring other ways to free the hostages, does not mean that it is unable or unwilling to
intervene because the flag State has the right to choose the best tactics to deal with the
situation including negotiation with the perpetrators in order to free the hostages.287
It is not clear whether a State other than a State of registry or a State authorised to
construct or operate the installation can respond to an attack and take enforcement
action on board an offshore installation operating on the seabed beyond national
jurisdiction or within a safety zone around such an installation. This would depend on
whether a State of registry (i.e. a flag State) or an operator-State has exclusive
jurisdiction over such installations. However, response action may be permissible
particularly when the operation is aimed at rescuing the nationals of the intervening
State.
Concerning security threats faced by offshore petroleum installations, the LOSC deals
explicitly only with piracy,288 and other offshore security threats are not addressed.289 In
regard to piracy, all States can exercise jurisdiction to prevent and repress piracy on the
high seas. 290 Therefore, ships suspected of being involved in piratical acts against
offshore installations on the seabed beyond national jurisdiction (i.e. the high seas) may
285

LOSC art 92(1).
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be boarded and arrested by any State. Piracy is a complex issue in international law and
it warrants a more detailed analysis.
4.7 The law of piracy and offshore petroleum installations

When considering the application of criminal laws in the context of the protection of
offshore installations, one of the first questions is whether the law of piracy applies.291
Piracy has a long history. The rules on piracy have been developed in customary
international law and found their way into modern conventional law. However, piracy
remains a difficult legal concept.292
The LOSC contains a number of provisions dealing with piracy, and it obliges all
contracting States to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of
piracy.293 The ‘contemporary’ definition of piracy in international law is contained in
Article 101 of the LOSC, which defines piracy as consisting of any of the following
acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and
directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property
in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in
the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship
or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b).294

The LOSC definition of piracy is virtually identical to the definition of piracy in Article
15 of the High Seas Convention.295 The common view is that the positions taken in both
the LOSC and the High Seas Convention are declaratory of customary international law
with regard to piracy.296
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The LOSC definition of piracy contains several elements (criteria) that need to be
satisfied in order for an act to be considered piracy. For instance, an act must be an
‘illegal’ act of ‘violence or detention, or depredation’ committed for ‘private ends’ by
the crew or the passengers of a ‘private ship’ ‘on the high seas’ and ‘against another
ship’ or ‘against property’ in a ‘place outside the jurisdiction of any State’. These issues
have been widely discussed in the literature.297
For the purposes of the analysis of piracy in the context of offshore petroleum security,
the most important question is whether an act of piracy can be committed against an
offshore installation (in the legal sense). This question had been raised by Esmaeili in
his analysis of the legal status of offshore oil rigs,298 but it had not been investigated or
answered. Therefore, this issue requires further analysis.
4.7.1 Whether an act of piracy can be committed against an offshore installation

The significance of the definition of piracy in international law is that, in piracy, a ship
must be involved.299 In particular, one of the criteria in the LOSC definition of piracy is
that the act must be directed against a ship. 300 In applying this criterion to offshore
installations, the key issue is whether an offshore installation has the status of a ‘ship’ in
international law or can be treated as a ship in this context.301 However, it is important
to note that the LOSC does extend the definition of piracy to acts committed against
‘persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State’. 302 The issue is
whether the word ‘property’ in subparagraph (a)(ii) of Article 101 includes offshore
297
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petroleum installations. To answer this question it is necessary to consider the meaning
of the expression ‘a place outside the jurisdiction of any State’.
Article 100 of the LOSC provides that States shall cooperate to the fullest possible
extent in the repression of piracy ‘on the high seas or in any other place outside the
jurisdiction of any State’. The equivalent provision in the High Seas Convention is
Article 14, which is identical to Article 100 of the LOSC. Clearly, both the LOSC and
the High Seas Convention distinguish the term ‘high seas’ from the term ‘a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State’.303 The ILC’s commentary on this provision states:
In considering as ‘piracy’ acts committed in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State,
the Commission had chiefly in mind acts committed by a ship or aircraft on an island
constituting terra nullius or on the shores of an unoccupied territory. But the
Commission did not wish to exclude acts committed by aircraft within a larger
unoccupied territory, since it wished to prevent such acts committed on ownerless
territories from escaping all penal jurisdiction.304

The above comment of the ILC clarifies that the expression ‘in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State’ refers to unoccupied ownerless territories (including certain
islands) which had not been claimed by any State.305 Accordingly, it can be argued that
the expression ‘a place outside the jurisdiction of any State’ does not refer to any area of
the sea at all.306 This view is consistent with the ILC’s explanation set out above. It
appears that in using the expression ‘against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a
place outside the jurisdiction of any State’, the drafters of this provision did not intend
the word ‘property’ to refer to or include offshore petroleum installations. Therefore, it
can be logically concluded that subparagraph (a)(ii) of Article 101, does not apply to
offshore petroleum installations.
In determining whether an act of piracy can be committed against an offshore petroleum
installation, it ultimately comes down to whether an offshore installation can be treated
303
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as a ‘ship’ in this context because of the requirement in subparagraph (a)(i) of Article
101 that an act must be directed against ‘another ship’.307 If so, the definition of piracy
will apply to offshore installations, which would mean that an act of piracy can be
committed against offshore petroelum installations. If not, then an act of piracy cannot
be committed against offshore petroleum installations.
As discussed in Chapter 4 above, even though it is generally accepted that offshore
petroleum installations are not ‘ships’, in some contexts they may be treated as ships
depending on the aims and purpose of a particular international convention or legal
instrument.308 The legal rules on piracy are contained in the LOSC; therefore, the LOSC
is the relevant international convention that should be referred to in order to determine
whether offshore installations are considered to be ships in the context of piracy. The
LOSC does not define the terms ‘ship’ or ‘vessel’, but it treats all types of offshore
petroleum installations (fixed and mobile) as distinct from ‘ships’ or ‘vessels’.309
Furthermore, it is doubtful that when the provisions on piracy were drafted in the 1950s
and adopted at UNCLOS I in 1958, the drafters contemplated that an act of piracy could
be committed against an offshore installation.310 Therefore, it can be concluded that an
act of piracy, as defined in the LOSC, cannot be committed against an offshore
installation (whether fixed or mobile). This appears to be a substantial limitation in the
international legal framework on piracy as far as it relates to the protection of offshore
installations. However, it was also illustrated in Chapter 4 that an alternative approach
to the legal status of offshore installations is to treat mobile offshore installations as
‘ships’ when they are in transit or moving from one place to another, and to treat them
as ‘installations’ when they are operating on location. This approach was referred to in
Chapter 4 as the ‘dual status approach’.
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Applying the ‘dual status approach’ in the context of piracy, it can be argued that an act
of piracy cannot be committed against offshore installations operating on location
because such offshore installations would be considered to be ‘installations’ (or in some
cases they may be considered to be offshore ports),311 but they will not be considered to
be ‘ships’. By contrast, an attack on an offshore installation while it is in transit or
moving from one place to another may be regarded as an act of piracy (provided that all
other criteria in the definition of piracy are satisfied).
4.7.2 Geographical limits of piracy

Assuming that an act of piracy can be committed against a mobile offshore installation
when it is in transit or moving from one place to another, the geographical limits of
piracy (i.e. maritime zones in which an act of piracy may be committed) becomes a
relevant issue. In regard to this issue, it should be noted that a crucial element of the
LOSC definition of piracy is that piracy is an act which occurs on the high seas.
However, by virtue of Article 58(2) of the LOSC, provisions on piracy (including
Article 101) also apply to the EEZ.312 This means that an act of piracy can only be
committed on the high seas and within the EEZ of a coastal State, but it ‘cannot be
committed within the territory of a State or in its territorial sea’. 313 Therefore, ‘an
equivalent act of violence which took place within the territorial sea would not be
piracy for the purposes of international law’. 314 Likewise, an equivalent of violence
committed within the internal waters of the coastal State or the archipelagic waters of
archipelagic State would not be piracy under international law.
It follows that from the international law perspective and in the context of offshore
petroleum installations, an act of piracy cannot be committed against a mobile offshore
installation when the installation is moving in the territorial sea, the internal waters or
the archipelagic waters of the archipelagic State. If committed in the territorial sea, the
internal waters or the archipelagic waters, such an act would not be regarded as piracy
under the LOSC, but would probably be considered to be ‘armed robbery’.315 An attack
311
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against an offshore installation in the territorial sea or the internal waters is a matter for
the coastal States to deal with and subject to the domestic laws of the coastal State (with
respect to to any enforcement operations).316 However, the national laws dealing with
piracy may differ from the international law in some important respects,317 and States
other than the coastal State would have no jurisdiction over acts of piracy in the
territorial sea unless exceptional arrangements have been put in place.318
4.7.3 Jurisdiction over piracy

The LOSC provides for universal jurisdiction with respect to piracy.319 This means that
any State, not merely the flag State or the coastal State, can respond to an attack on a
moving offshore installation and apprehend and punish the perpetrators.320 The question
is whether all States have universal jurisdiction in matters of piracy in the EEZ.321 As
noted by Kaye, ‘the rationale for universal jurisdiction for piracy against shipping
cannot be easily applied to installations’.322 However, considering that an act of piracy
can only be committed against mobile offshore installations when they are moving from
one place to another, such offshore installations will be under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the flag State (i.e. the State of registration) and not under the coastal State’s

or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of “piracy”, directed against a ship or against
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jurisdiction. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the proposition that there is no universal
jurisdiction over piracy committed against an offshore installation in the EEZ. Although
the LOSC ‘does not preclude new customary coastal state rights arising in the EEZ,
there is little practice supporting any rule of exclusive and general coastal state criminal
enforcement jurisdiction in the EEZ’. 323 Article 58(2) clearly provides that piracy
provisions apply in the EEZ; therefore, there will be universal jurisdiction over piracy in
the EEZ involving mobile offshore installations.
4.7.4 The importance of municipal law

Although rights to board, search and seize foreign ships suspected of piracy and persons
on board exist under international law,324 piracy prosecutions are subject to national law
and the national courts would need to determine whether or not a crime of piracy had
been committed.325 Considering that the applicability of piracy to offshore installations
depends on whether an offshore installation can be treated as a ship, this determination
would need to be made by the national courts. If a national court determines that an
attacked offshore installation was a ship or vessel in that context, then an act of violence
committed against an offshore installation could be considered as piracy. It is likely that
a national court would turn to municipal laws (as well as international law) in order to
determine whether an offshore installation is a ship. In some cases, offshore
installations have been treated as vessels or ships under the municipal laws,326 and as
mentioned above, there has been at least one court decision supporting a proposition
that an offshore installation is a ship when it is moving and not a ship when it is
engaged in offshore operations on site. 327 It is possible that a national court may
determine that an offshore installation is a ship in certain circumstances.
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4.7.5 Internal seizures of offshore petroleum installations

Another issue that needs to be considered is whether an internal seizure of an offshore
petroleum installation by the crew or offshore workers while the offshore installation is
in transit (i.e. when an offshore installation is considered to be a ship under the ‘dual
status approach’) may be regarded as piracy. Under Article 101 of the LOSC, to qualify
as piracy, an act must be committed by the crew or passengers of one ship against
another ship.328 This is commonly referred to as the ‘two-ship requirement’.329
The commentary to the Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy argued that piracy should
not be extended to acts committed entirely on board a ship because, under international
law, the ship is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State on the high sea.330 This
view was generally supported by the ILC which commented that acts ‘committed on
board a ship by the crew or passengers and directed against the ship itself, or against
persons or property on the ship, cannot be regarded as acts of piracy’.331 Clearly the
intention of the drafters was to exclude internal seizures from the definition of piracy,
thus there is a ‘two-ship requirement’ in the definition of piracy. Applying this to
offshore petroleum installations, an internal seizure or hijacking of an offshore
installation by the crew while the installation is in transit or moving from one place to
another can never be regarded as piracy in international law, particularly under the
LOSC.
4.7.6 Pirate ships

Most acts of piracy (and most of the attacks against offshore installations) are carried
out using small motorised boats. The question arises whether a motorised boat has the
status of or can be treated as a ‘ship’ in international or municipal law. It is apparent
from the analysis of the definitions of ship in international conventions that motorboats
or speedboats would fall within the meaning of ‘ship’ as defined in a number of
international conventions including the International Convention for the Prevention of
Marine Pollution from Ships 1973 as amended by Protocol of 1978 Relating to the
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International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships 1973
(MARPOL),332 the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response
and Co-operation 1990 (OPRC), 333 the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 (1988 SUA Convention)334 and the
Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005 SUA Convention).335 Speedboats are considered to
be ships in municipal law as well. For example, the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (UK)
defined ‘vessel’ as including ‘any ship or boat, or any other description of vessel used in
navigation’ and defined ‘ship’ as including ‘every description of vessel used in
navigation not propelled by oars’.336 Similarly, the Canada Shipping Act 1985 defines
‘ship’ to ‘include every description of a vessel used in navigation and not propelled by
oars’.337 In Weeks v Ross,338 a motorboat capable of carrying more than 12 passengers
was held to be a ship. In general, it can be concluded that motorboats and speedboats
are considered to be ships in domestic and international law.
Another important aspect of piracy under international law is that the definition of
‘pirate ship’ (and pirate aircraft) in Article 103 of the LOSC is worded in a way that
allows States to take measures against a pirate ship to prevent the intended acts of
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piracy as well as to punish acts of piracy that have already been committed, as long as
the persons who have committed those acts are still in control of the ship in question.339
This means that States can take action against a pirate ship and prevent an attack before
it takes place. However, to prevent piracy attacks that have not been committed will
require ascertaining the intent of the perpetrators.

5. Legal Responses to Achille Lauro Incident
The above discussion has shown that the scope of the LOSC for regulating security of
offshore petroleum installations is relatively narrow. Prior to the 1980s, the general
view was that outside of war-time, there was no threat to the safety of offshore
installations apart from navigational accidents and collisions with ships, and offshore
installations themselves were considered a potential threat to freedom and safety of
navigation, particularly in enclosed sea areas and straits.340 Although security threats
such as maritime terrorism and other violence at sea were known throughout the second
half of the twentieth century, with the exception of piracy, these issues were never given
serious consideration at the time of development and adoption of the LOSC.341 It was
not until the seizure of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro by members of the Palestine
Liberation Front (PLF) on 8 October 1985, while it was in the territorial sea of Egypt,342
that the international community seriously sought to address the issue of ship and
offshore installation security.343
The Achille Lauro incident raised a number of legal questions and generated a great
deal of public and political attention, especially in the Italian legal community.344 One
of the key issues was whether the hijacking of Achille Lauro constituted an act of
‘piracy’. There were significant differences of opinion in that respect and, ultimately, no

339

See also ILC, above n 17, 283.
Kaye, above n 5, 406.
341
Rothwell and Stephens, above n 29, 434.
342
On 7 October 1985, four Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) terrorists hijacked the Italian cruise liner,
Achille Lauro, in the Mediterranean, with 80 passengers and 320 crew members aboard. The hijackers
had killed one American passenger and subsequently surrendered to Egyptian authorities. The airplane
chartered by the Palestinians to flee Egypt was intercepted by US warplanes and forced to land in Italy,
where the hijackers were arrested by the Italian authorities and subsequently tried. See generally Natalino
Ronzitti (ed), Maritime Terrorism and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1990); Tullio Treves, ‘The
Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation’ in
Natalino Ronzitti (ed), Maritime Terrorism and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1990) 69, 69;
Halberstam, above n 296.
343
Halberstam, above n 296.
344
Ronzitti, above n 342, vii.
340

251

Chapter 5

Mikhail Kashubsky

international consensus was reached,

345

which demonstrated the need for an

international legal framework that would enable States to respond to acts of violence
(such as terrorism) against ships and punish the perpetrators of such acts. At the time,
there were no consistent international legal principles relating to the conferral of
jurisdiction on any State other than the flag State to punish those committing acts of
violence outside their territory and the territorial sea.346
In November 1985, the IMO Assembly at its 14th session adopted resolution A.584(14)
on measures to prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and the security
of their passengers and crew.347 The international community’s attention was drawn to
the need for an international convention on maritime terrorism.348 The result was the
rapid adoption of the 1988 SUA Convention349 and the Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf
1988 (1988 SUA Protocol),350 which were adopted at the international conference in
Rome on 10 March 1988.351 The 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol
(1988 SUA Treaties)

352

were the first international anti-terrorism instruments

345

Some States argued that the attack could not be considered piracy for two main reasons. First, the
perpetrators were politically motivated and therefore did not satisfy the ‘private ends’ criterion for piracy.
Second, the attack was an internal seizure and therefore did not satisfy the requirement that piracy should
be committed by one ship against another (i.e. the ‘two-ship requirement’). See High Seas Convention art
15; LOSC art 101.
346
Richard Shaw, ‘News from IMO: Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the SUA Convention and
Protocol’ (2005) 3 CMI Newsletter 8, 8.
347
IMO, Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Which Threaten the Safety of Ships and the Security of Their
Passengers and Crew, A Res 584(14), Agenda Item 10(b), IMO Doc A Res.A.584(14) (20 November
1985).
348
Not surprisingly, it was the Italian government (the flag State of Achille Lauro) that prepared the first
draft text of the convention. The first draft was subsequently refined in collaboration with Austria and
Egypt and in consultation with other States, and it was favourably considered by the IMO which, in turn,
established an ad hoc Committee with the mandate to prepare a draft convention: Treves, above n 342,
69.
349
As at 1 August 2011, there were 157 contracting States to the 1988 SUA Convention representing
approximately 94.73 per cent of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant fleet: IMO, Status of
Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the International Maritime Organization
or Its Secretary-General Performs Depository or Other Functions as at 1 August 2011 (2011) 397.
350
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the
Continental Shelf 1988, opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 304 (entered into force 1
March 1992) (‘1988 SUA Protocol’). As at 1 August 2011, there were 146 contracting State to the 1988
SUA Protocol representing approximately 89.72 per cent of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant
fleet: IMO, above n 349, 413.
351
IMO, Final Act of the International Conference on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation, reproduced in IMO, SUA Convention (IMO, first published 1988, 2006 ed) 1.
352
The term ‘1988 SUA Treaties’ will be used to refer collectively to both the 1988 SUA Convention and
the 1988 SUA Protocol.
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specifically dealing with security of shipping and offshore petroleum installations.353 It
should be noted that at the time of drafting and adoption of the 1988 SUA Treaties
‘piracy and maritime terrorism were clearly considered as separate issues’.354
The main purpose of the 1988 SUA Treaties is to provide an international legal basis for
action to be taken against persons committing unlawful acts against the safety of ships
and offshore petroleum installations outside the limits of the territorial sea of coastal
States, and to ensure prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of such unlawful
acts.355 It is now necessary to examine the provisions of the 1988 SUA Convention and
the 1988 SUA Protocol in more detail.
5.1 SUA Convention 1988

The 1988 SUA Convention deals with unlawful violent acts against ships. The 1988
SUA Convention was specifically drafted and adopted by observing factors relating to
the security of ships and navigation from unlawful violent acts.356
5.1.1 Application to mobile offshore petroleum installations

The term ‘ship’ in the 1988 SUA Convention is defined as ‘a vessel of any type
whatsoever not permanently attached to the seabed, including dynamically supported
craft, submersibles, or any other floating craft’.357 This definition of ‘ship’ in the 1988
SUA Convention is wide enough to include any type of mobile offshore installation and
effectively covers FPSOs, FSOs, drill ships, and MODUs.358

353

Calvin Lederer, ‘Combating Maritime Terrorism: Developments in the Convention on the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Affecting Maritime Navigation’ (2004) CMI Yearbook 401, 401.
354
Ronzitti, above n 71, 2. The fact that the ‘two-vessel requirement and the private end criterion made
rules on piracy inapplicable to maritime terrorism’ was also pointed out by both the Italian Minister for
Justice, Giuliano Vessalli, and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the Law of the
Sea, Satya Nandan, in their statements at the opening of the Rome conference in March 1988:
International Conference on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
IMO Doc SUA/CONF/RD (1-10 March 1988), cited in Ronzitti, above n 71, 2.
355
IMO, above n 351, iii.
356
Esmaeili, above n 73, 134.
357
1988 SUA Convention art 1. Article 2 of the 1988 SUA Convention provides that warships and ships
‘owned or operated by a State when being used as a naval auxiliary or for customs or police purposes’
and ships which have ‘been withdrawn from navigation or laid down’ are excluded from the application
of the 1988 SUA Convention. However, some government ships operated for non-commercial purposes,
such as ice-breakers and research vessels, are covered by the 1988 SUA Convention.
358
On the initial glance at the definition of ‘ship’ in Article 1, it appears that the 1988 SUA Convention
has a wide application in the context of offshore installations and applies to installations that are engaged
in offshore operations on location. However, further analysis of the provisions proves otherwise,
particularly when the definition of a ‘ship’ is read in conjunction with Article 4(1) which deals with
application of the 1988 SUA Convention.
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Article 4(1) provides that the 1988 SUA Convention applies ‘if the ship is navigating or
is scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters beyond the outer limits of the
territorial sea of a single State, or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent
States’.359 From the geographical perspective, this means that the 1988 SUA Convention
applies not only on the high seas and in the EEZ but also in the territorial sea, the
archipelagic waters and the internal waters, as long as the ship is scheduled to navigate
beyond the limits of the territorial sea of a single State.360 Navigation entirely within the
territorial sea without leaving its outer or littoral limits is not covered by the 1988 SUA
Convention as it would be an internal matter exclusive to the coastal State.361
In the context of offshore petroleum installations, the 1988 SUA Convention applies to
all offshore installations that are moving (i.e. navigating) from a port to an offshore site
or from an offshore site to a port or between offshore sites, as long as the offshore site is
located beyond the limits of the territorial sea; or if an offshore unit is moving between
offshore sites both of which are located in the territorial sea of the same State, the
voyage includes navigation beyond the limits of the territorial sea of that State. The
1988 SUA Convention will also apply to offshore installations that are not moving (i.e.
not navigating), but are scheduled to navigate, for instance, in situations where a jackup drilling rig is about to disconnect its legs from the seabed in order to move from one
offshore site to another (as long as at least one of those offshore sites is located outside
the territorial sea or the voyage of an offshore unit includes navigation beyond the limits
of the territorial sea).
It is unclear whether the 1988 SUA Convention will apply to offshore installations that
are not moving under their own means of propulsion but are under tow, because the
word ‘navigating’ usually implies the control of the movement of a craft and does not
necessarily include ‘being towed’. However, it has been suggested that ‘navigation’
359

1988 SUA Convention art 4(1).
Robert Beckman, ‘The 1988 SUA Convention and 2005 SUA Protocol: Tools to Combat Piracy,
Armed Robbery, and Maritime Terrorism’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds),
Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2008) 187, 189. Beckman has also noted that
the 1988 SUA Convention will apply when a ship is exercising the right of transit passage (or innocent
passage) or when a ship is at anchor off the coast of a State: at 189.
361
Although the situation with respect to the archipelagic waters is not clarified, it can be assumed that
navigation within the archipelagic waters is not covered by the 1988 SUA Convention and is exclusive to
the archipelagic State (by virtue of its sovereignty over the archipelagic waters) unless the ship is
transiting through the archipelago (i.e. exercising the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage) and is
scheduled to navigate beyond the limits of the territorial sea of the archipelagic State.
360
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does not necessarily mean independent navigation,362 and an offshore craft may be used
in navigation by external forces, such as by towing.363 For example, the Government of
Finland in Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v Denmark),364 argued that ‘[t]here
is no evidence establishing the existence of a general requirement that a ship, for the
purposes of international law, be capable of navigation under its own power’.365 Under
such an interpretation, offshore petroleum installations that do not have their own means
of propulsion and are not able to navigate independently, may still be considered as
‘navigating’ when they are being towed.366
It appears that the 1988 SUA Convention will not apply to mobile offshore installations
when they are engaged in offshore operations on location, because such installations are
neither navigating nor scheduled to navigate. The 1988 SUA Convention tends to
exclude all offshore installations operating on location (i.e. not navigating nor scheduled
to navigate) that are not permanently attached to the seabed, which appears to be a
significant limitation of the 1988 SUA Convention as far as the security of offshore
petroleum installations is concerned. However, at the Rome Conference on the adoption
of the 1988 SUA Treaties, the informal consultation group agreed that the term
‘navigation’ should be interpreted as encompassing the operation of MODUs or similar
craft when attached to the seabed, and that those units would be subject to the 1988 SUA
Convention.367 This appears to be an odd interpretation of the term ‘navigation’. The
term ‘navigation’ was judicially defined in Steedman v Scofield368 as the ‘nautical art or
science of conducting a ship from one place to another’. In Dome Petroleum Ltd v N
Bunker Hunt,369 Dube J noted in the course of his judgement that a ‘drilling system’ was
not navigating as it performed its main function of drilling.
Treves has pointed out that ‘this interpretation is not binding as “authentic”
interpretation’, but noted that ‘[i]ts weight in the travaux preparatoires seems,
362

Martin Davies and Anthony Dickey, Shipping Law (LBC Information Services, 2nd ed, 1995) 8, cited
in Esmaeili, above n 73, 23.
363
See St John Pilot Commissioners and the Attorney-General for the Dominion of Canada v
Cumberland Railway & Coal Co [1910] AC 208, 218, cited in Esmaeili, above n 73, 23.
364
Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v Denmark) (1991) ICJ, 94 ILR (1994) 446.
365
The Memorial of the Government of the Republic of Finland, filed with the International Court of
Justice on 20 December 1991 in the case Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v Denmark) (1991)
ICJ, para 476.
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See Esmaeili, above n 73, 23.
367
IMO Doc SUA/CONF/CW/WP.18 para 3, cited in Treves, above n 342, 72.
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Steedman v Scofield [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 163, 166, quoted and cited in Esmaeili, above n 73, 23.
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Dome Petroleum Ltd v N Bunker Hunt [1978] 1 FC 11 (TD).
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nonetheless, quite important’ because the Conference agreed on the definition of ‘ship’
in light of this interpretation and it was published in the official records of the
Conference.370 The intention of the Conference was to make the definition of ‘ship’ in
the convention as wide as possible.371 However, the definition of ‘ship’ in the 1988 SUA
Convention, and particularly the wide interpretation of the word ‘navigation’ to include
mobile offshore units that are operating on location, may create difficulties such as the
conflicts of jurisdictions,372 which are discussed below.
Another issue that needs to be considered is whether the 1988 SUA Convention applies
to fixed offshore petroleum installations that are in transit (e.g. under tow) from a place
of construction to the intended place of destination. Although it can be argued that a
fixed offshore installation under tow (which is not ‘permanently attached to the seabed’)
could be considered to be ‘navigating’ and therefore should be covered by the 1988
SUA Convention, it is unlikely that such an argument will succeed because it is highly
unlikely a fixed offshore installation would be regarded as a ship even under the broad
definition of ship in Article 1 of the 1988 SUA Convention.373
5.1.2 Offences

The 1988 SUA Convention lists a number of specific acts that constitute offences under
the convention, and contracting States are obliged to make these acts criminal offences
under their national law, punishable by appropriate (mostly serious) penalties taking
into account the grave nature of the offences. 374 The offences under the 1988 SUA
Convention involve ‘unlawful and intentional’ acts that endanger or are likely to
endanger the safety of navigation including: seizure of or exercise of control over a ship
(or a mobile offshore installation) by force or threat of force or any form of
intimidation; violence against a person on board a ship (or a mobile offshore
370

Treves, above n 342, 72.
Ibid, citing International Conference on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, IMO Doc SUA/CONF/CW/WP.18 (1-10 March 1988).
372
It is also doubtful that a national court would follow such a wide interpretation and treat a mobile
installation engaged in offshore operations on location as a ship engaged in navigation.
373
The CMI Working Group on Offshore Mobile Craft, which prepared the Draft Convention on Offshore
Units, Artificial Islands and Related Structures Used in the Exploration for and Exploitation of Petroleum
and Seabed Mineral Resources (Draft Offshore Units Convention), has noted that while it considered that
the existing international legal framework covering ships would also apply to mobile offshore
installations while in transit, a fixed platform or a component, such as the caisson foundation of a gravitybased structure (GBS) is unlikely to be regarded as a ship: CMI, Working Group on Offshore Mobile
Craft, ‘Commentary on May 2001 Draft UOC Convention’ (2004) 1 CMI Newsletter 13, 14.
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1988 SUA Convention art 5.
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installation); destruction of a ship (or a mobile offshore installation) or the causing of
damage to a ship (or a mobile offshore installation); placement on a ship (or a mobile
offshore installation) of a device or substance that is likely to destroy or cause damage
to that ship (or mobile offshore installation); destruction of, serious damaging of, or
interference with maritime navigational facilities; and injuring or killing a person in
connection with commission of any of the above acts.375 It is also an offence to attempt
to commit any of the acts that constitute offences under the 1988 SUA Convention; abet
the commission of any of those acts; or even threaten to commit an act of violence
against a person on board, or threaten to damage or destroy a ship (or a mobile offshore
installation), or to destroy or seriously damage or interfere with navigational
facilities.376
5.1.3 Jurisdiction

Contracting States to the 1988 SUA Convention have wide jurisdiction to deal with such
offences, which can be based on flag, territoriality, nationality, habitual residence of the
offender who is a stateless person, passive personality (i.e. State of nationality of the
victim), and targeted State (i.e. State whose conduct the offenders seek to affect –
protective principle).

377

The 1988 SUA Convention provides for two types of

jurisdiction: obligatory and discretionary. In some circumstances, States which have a
connection with the offences listed in the 1988 SUA Convention have the obligation to
assert their jurisdiction, while in other circumstances they have the option to assert
jurisdiction. 378 In particular, the flag State (or a State of registry of a mobile
installation), the State of nationality of the offender, and the State in whose territory (or
the territorial sea) the offence is committed are required to establish jurisdiction over
the offence. 379 In contrast, the State of habitual residence of the offender who is a
stateless person, the State of nationality of the victim, or the State whose conduct the
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Ibid art 3(1). See also Beckman, above n 360, 189.
1988 SUA Convention art 3(2). Interestingly, it is not necessary for acts listed in paragraphs 2(a)-(c) of
Article 3 to be ‘unlawful and intentional’ in order to constitute an offence under the 1988 SUA
Convention.
377
1988 SUA Convention art 6. See also Kaye, above n 5, 390–91; Halberstam, above n 296, 295–6.
378
See 1988 SUA Convention art 6. It is important to note that Article 6(1) uses the term ‘shall take such
measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction …’, while Article 6(2) uses the term ‘may also
establish jurisdiction …’ (emphasis added). The same approach to the jurisdiction is taken in the 1988
SUA Protocol. See also Treves, above n 342, 71.
379
1988 SUA Convention art 6(1).
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offenders seek to affect are not required to establish jurisdiction over the offence, but
have the option to do so.380
The 1988 SUA Convention does not specify whether a coastal State can assert
jurisdiction over offences committed on board or against a mobile installation which is
engaged in offshore operations on location. As discussed in subsection 5.1.1 above, the
travaux preparatoires of the 1988 SUA Convention indicate that a mobile installation
operating on location could be considered to be a ship which is navigating (although
this is an unusual interpretation of the word ‘navigation’),381 with the flag State (i.e.
State of registry) required to establish jurisdiction over offences committed against or
on board such an installation.382 At the same time, Article 60(2) of the LOSC provides
that offshore installations operating on the continental shelf are subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the coastal State,383 including criminal jurisdiction. This could result in
the conflict of jurisdictions and the question is whether the rights of the coastal State or
the flag State prevail.
5.1.4 The ‘extradite or prosecute’ requirement

The 1988 SUA Convention also provides that if the alleged offenders are present in the
territory of a State party, that State must take the alleged offenders into custody, and
must either extradite them to another State party which established jurisdiction over the
offence, or prosecute them in its courts.384 This is commonly referred to as the ‘extradite
or prosecute’ requirement, which will also apply in situations where the alleged
offender has taken refuge in a State party. The ‘extradite or prosecute’ requirement is at
the heart of the 1988 SUA Convention.385 Prior to the entry into force of the 1988 SUA
Convention jurisdiction to prosecute unlawful acts, such as those specified in the 1988
SUA Convention, rested solely with the flag State, whose national laws in many cases
did not contain appropriate provisions to pursue prosecutions of such offences.386
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Another important feature of the 1988 SUA Convention is that State parties agreed that
the 1988 SUA Convention itself can provide the legal basis for extradition of alleged
offenders to another State party,387 ‘so that extradition is possible even if there is no
extradition treaty between the two States parties’. 388 State parties to the 1988 SUA
Convention are also obliged to afford one another the greatest measure of cooperation in
connection with criminal proceedings to prosecute the offenders including assistance in
obtaining evidence at their disposal.389
Furthermore, if the offender is found in another State party which is unable or unwilling
to prosecute, and both the coastal State and the flag State request extradition, then the
question is which State the offender should be extradited to, the flag State (i.e. State of
registry) of a mobile installation or the coastal State on whose continental shelf a mobile
installation was operating when the offence was committed. Article 11(5) of the 1988
SUA Convention provides that in considering more than one request for extradition a
State party should ‘pay due regard to the interests and responsibilities of the State Party
whose flag the ship was flying at the time of the commission of the offence’. However,
a coastal State may have equal interests and responsibilities if the attack involves a
mobile offshore installation. One possible avenue may be for the flag State (i.e. State of
registry) and the coastal State to negotiate and cooperate in order to resolve such an
issue.
5.1.5 Enforcement

Importantly, the 1988 SUA Convention does not directly deal with the issue of boarding
ships or mobile offshore installations 390 when the jurisdiction under the 1988 SUA
Convention might be asserted by a State other than a flag State.391 Instead, the issue of
boarding is left ‘to be governed by the rules and principles of general international
law’.392 The 1988 SUA Convention specifically provides that the rules of international
law pertaining to the competence of States to exercise investigative or enforcement
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1988 SUA Convention art 11.
Beckman, above n 360, 189.
389
1988 SUA Convention art 12. Beckman, above n 360, 189.
390
In the context of the 1988 SUA Convention, these would be mobile offshore installations that are
navigating or are scheduled to navigate. See 1988 SUA Convention art 4(1).
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See Kaye, above n 5, 391.
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jurisdiction on board ships not flying their flag are not affected in any way.393 In the
EEZ and on the high seas, this ‘would limit non-flag State intervention to acts covered
under Article 110 of the [LOSC], and in this context, to acts of piracy’.394 Apart from
piracy, if an offence were committed on board a mobile offshore installation while it is
navigating, it would appear the coastal State may only have the right to take
enforcement action when the installation is in its territorial sea, and the enforcement or
boarding must be in accordance with Article 27 of the LOSC.395
In relation to mobile offshore installations operating at an offshore site on the
continental shelf, it can be argued that both the flag State (i.e. the State of registry) and
the coastal State would have a right to take enforcement action or conduct a rescue
operation.396 The issue can be complicated even further when there is a duly established
safety zone around a MODU or an FPSO in question. A coastal State could argue that it
has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with such a situation. If a coastal State is not a party to
the 1988 SUA Convention, then there will be no obligation to extradite the offender to a
flag State even if the coastal State is unable or unwilling to prosecute the offender.
Although the 1988 SUA Convention was adopted to address the unlawful acts against
ships, as demonstrated in the above analysis, it applies to mobile offshore petroleum
installations. What is not clear is whether the 1988 SUA Convention applies to mobile
offshore installations operating on location or only to mobile offshore installations that
are ‘navigating or scheduled to navigate’. This thesis argues that the 1988 SUA
Convention only applies to mobile offshore installations that are navigating or
scheduled to navigate.
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1988 SUA Convention art 9. In this regard, Rothwell and Stephens note that enforcement under the
1988 SUA Convention ‘relies upon the traditional jurisdictional bases of nationality and territoriality’:
Rothwell and Stephens, above n 29, 163.
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Kaye, above n 5, 391. Kaye also notes that this ‘deficiency was to some extent addressed by Article 8’
of the 1988 SUA Convention, which provides a mechanism for the master of a ship to hand the alleged
offenders over to a State party other than the flag State: at 391. In such circumstances, the master should
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pertains to the alleged offence. See 1988 SUA Convention arts 8(1), (4).
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In other words, the LOSC Article 27 rule on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in the territorial sea
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The flag State would have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6(1) of the 1988 SUA Convention and the
coastal State would have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 60(2) of the LOSC.
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5.2 SUA Protocol 1988

Concerns about acts of terrorism also extended to fixed offshore platforms,397 but the
1988 SUA Convention only covered ships and mobile offshore installation and did not
specifically address fixed offshore installations. Accordingly, it was felt necessary to
adopt the 1988 SUA Protocol, which is complementary to the 1988 SUA Convention,
dealing specifically with fixed offshore installations. The 1988 SUA Protocol essentially
extended the requirements of the 1988 SUA Convention to fixed offshore drilling and
production platforms.398
5.2.1 Application to fixed offshore petroleum installations

The 1988 SUA Protocol applies to fixed offshore platforms only, which are defined as
‘an artificial island, installation or structure permanently attached to the seabed for the
purpose of exploration or exploitation of resources or for other economic purposes’.399
This definition effectively covers all types of fixed offshore installation including fixed
offshore oil terminals.400 The term ‘permanently attached to the seabed’ in Article 1(3)
indicates that even those mobile oil rigs that may be fixed to the seabed temporarily to
conduct drilling operations (such as jack-up rigs) are excluded from the application of
the 1988 SUA Protocol.401 Furthermore, fixed offshore platforms that are in transit from
a place of construction to the intended place of destination would also be excluded from
the application of the 1988 SUA Protocol because they are not permanently attached to
the seabed while in transit.
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During the meeting of the IMO ad hoc Committee tasked with the preparation of the draft of the
convention, a number of States, particularly the US and Spain, stressed the fact that offshore petroleum
installations may also become the target of terrorists. Therefore, it was agreed to draft a separate Protocol
specifically covering offshore installations: Natalino Ronzitti, ‘The Prevention and Suppression of
Terrorism Against Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf’ in Natalino Ronzitti (ed), Maritime
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Vulnerability and Security in the International Maritime Oil Sector’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam
Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2008) 133, 140.
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1988 SUA Protocol art 1(3). As discussed in the previous section above, mobile offshore installations
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Esmaeili, above n 73, 132.
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The scope of application of the 1988 SUA Protocol is limited to fixed platforms located
on the continental shelf.402 The 1988 SUA Protocol does not apply to platforms located
in the internal waters, the territorial sea, the archipelagic waters, and on the seabed
beyond national jurisdiction of the coastal State. The reason for excluding platforms
located in the internal waters, the territorial sea and archipelagic waters is probably
because those waters are subject to sovereignty of the coastal State and the offences
committed against such platforms would be dealt with under the domestic law of the
coastal State only.403 The reason for excluding platforms located on the seabed beyond
national jurisdiction is because no such platforms exist, and also due to ‘the difficulty of
determining the State competent to exercise criminal jurisdiction over such
platforms’.404 However, by virtue of Article 1(2), the 1988 SUA Protocol can apply to
fixed offshore installations located in the internal waters or the territorial sea of a
coastal State, in situations where the offender escapes to the territory of another State
party.405 The archipelagic waters are not mentioned, which means that the 1988 SUA
Protocol will not apply where a person commits an offence against an installation in the
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State and then escapes to a territory of another
State party.406
5.2.2 Offences

The 1988 SUA Protocol contains a list of ‘unlawful and intentional’ acts against fixed
platforms that constitute an offence, which are very similar to offences under the 1988
SUA Convention.407 They include seizure of or exercise of control over a fixed platform
by force or threat of force or any form of intimidation; violence against a person on
board a fixed platform; destruction of a platform or the causing of damage to a platform;
placement on a platform of a device or substance that is likely to destroy or cause
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1988 SUA Protocol art 1(1).
However, this logic is confusing because offshore petroleum installations located on the continental
shelf are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State under Article 60(2) of the LOSC, which
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damage to that platform; and injuring or killing a person in connection with commission
of any of the acts aimed at destroying or endangering the safety of a platform.408
It is also an offence to attempt to commit any of the acts that constitute offences under
the protocol; abet the commission of any of those acts; or even threaten to commit an
act of violence against a person on board a platform, or threaten to damage or destroy a
platform. 409 The requirement of the 1988 SUA Convention to make the offences
punishable by appropriate penalties under national law applies, mutatis mutandis, to the
offences of the 1988 SUA Protocol.410
5.2.3 Jurisdiction

The jurisdictional grounds under the 1988 SUA Protocol are also relatively wide, and
can be based on principles of territoriality (i.e. coastal State), nationality, habitual
residence of the offender who is a stateless person, passive personality, and targeted
State (i.e. State whose conduct the offenders seek to affect).411 Similarly to the 1988
SUA Convention, the 1988 SUA Protocol provides for two types of jurisdiction:
obligatory and discretionary.412 The coastal State on whose continental shelf an offshore
installation is located has the obligation to establish jurisdiction over offences, and the
State of nationality of the offender has the obligation to establish jurisdiction over
offences committed (even if the offence has been committed against a platform located
on the continental shelf of another State party).413 The issue is that Article 60(2) of the
LOSC provides that the coastal State has exclusive jurisdiction over offshore
installations on its continental shelf which suggests that there may be a conflict of
jurisdictions between the coastal State and the State of nationality of the offender. The
State of habitual residence of the offender who is a stateless person, the State of
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nationality of the victim, or the State whose conduct the offenders seek to affect are not
required to establish jurisdiction over the offence, but have the option to do so.414
5.2.4 The ‘extradite or prosecute’ requirement

The ‘extradite or prosecute’ requirement and provisions on cooperation in criminal
proceedings of the 1988 SUA Convention apply, mutatis mutandis, to the 1988 SUA
Protocol. 415 It is not clear whether offences against installations located on the
continental shelf of a State which is not a State party to the 1988 SUA Protocol are to be
punished. 416 The 1988 SUA Protocol does not exclude the application of national
criminal laws of the contracting States,

417

which means that grounds for the

establishment of jurisdiction listed in Article 3 of the 1988 SUA Protocol do not exclude
any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law.
5.2.5 Enforcement

Similarly to the 1988 SUA Convention, the 1988 SUA Protocol does not address the
issue of boarding fixed platforms when the jurisdiction might be asserted by a State
other than a coastal State on whose continental shelf a platform is located. 418 The
Preamble affirms that ‘matters not regulated by this Protocol continue to be governed by
the rules and principles of general international law’.419 It is also expressly provided in
Article 4 that the 1988 SUA Protocol does not ‘affect in any way the rules of
international law pertaining to fixed platforms located on the continental shelf’, 420
which means that this issue is regulated primarily by the LOSC. This would also limit
the boarding of a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, making it subject to
exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State.421 Therefore, another State cannot argue that
it has a right to board a platform based on the established jurisdiction over an offence.
This includes a scenario where a State other than the coastal State intends to carry out
an assault and rescue operation to free its nationals held hostage by terrorists. Under the
1988 SUA Protocol and the LOSC, it would not be regarded as a lawful action.

414
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5.3 Issues applicable to both 1988 SUA Treaties

Having analysed the 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol individually, it
is now appropriate to highlight some important aspects of these legal instruments
including their benefits and shortcomings.
The 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol deal with jurisdictional and
enforcement aspects relating to unlawful violent acts against ships or offshore
petroleum installations. The 1988 SUA Treaties were the first international legal
instruments that specifically addressed security of offshore petroleum installations. The
1988 SUA Treaties operate on the basis that State parties are required to legislate
against the unlawful acts described in these treaties and establish jurisdiction to
prosecute in certain situations, despite the fact that the alleged offences were committed
outside their territory.
One of the key advantages of the 1988 SUA Treaties is that the motivation of the
offenders or the purpose for which the acts are undertaken is irrelevant in both the 1988
SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol,422 which makes it possible to invoke the
provisions of these legal instruments to punish various categories of offshore security
threats identified in Chapter 2, including piracy, terrorism, insurgency, organised crime,
vandalism, civil protest (provided that civil protest involves violence or threat of
violence), as well as internal sabotage including supplying sensitive or confidential
information to terrorists or other adversaries.423
In terms of attack scenarios, most of the scenarios of attacks on and interferences with
(fixed and mobile) offshore petroleum installations discussed in Chapter 3 would be
considered as offences under the 1988 SUA Treaties.424 More specifically, these would
include: a bomb threat; detonation of explosives or bombs; underwater attack; use of
422

Kaye, above n 5, 390. Kaye notes that offences under the 1988 SUA Convention to some extent
overlap with what is considered to be acts of piracy, but the convention offences are clearly not limited to
such acts: at 390.
423
Under Article 3(2)(b) of the 1988 SUA Convention, a person supplying confidential or sensitive
information about a mobile offshore installation may be regarded as abetting the commission of an
offence or as an accomplice of a person who commits an offence.
424
It will be recalled that the scenarios of attacks and unlawful interferences discussed in Chapter 3 are:
1) threat of attack or a bomb threat; 2) detonation of explosives or bombs; 3) underwater attack; 4) use of
stand-off weapons; 5) armed intrusion and seizure of offshore installations; 6) hostage taking and
kidnapping of offshore workers; 7) use of transport infrastructure as a weapon; 8) sabotage and disclosure
of information; 9) cyber attacks against offshore infrastructure; 10) protests and demonstrations; and 11)
simultaneous offshore attacks and combined scenarios.
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stand-off weapons; armed intrusion and seizure of an offshore installation; hostage
taking and kidnapping of offshore workers; use of transport infrastructure as a weapon
against an offshore installation; disclosure of confidential information which may assist
perpetrators in carrying out or planning an attack; and even attempted and unsuccessful
attacks. 425 It is not clear whether an act of sabotage on board offshore installations,
cyber attacks against offshore installations, or protests and demonstrations involving
offshore installations would constitute offences under the 1988 SUA Treaties, although
they may if sabotage or cyber attack causes damage to an offshore installation, or if
protests and demonstrations involve violence and are likely to endanger the safety of an
installation or navigation.426
The 1988 SUA Treaties do have some unresolved issues and limitations which could be
exploited by terrorists and other perpetrators. In particular, these limitations relate to the
enforcement action in terms of the international rules on interdiction and boarding of
foreign flagged ships (which includes mobile installations). The 1988 SUA Treaties do
not give any additional powers to States to interdict and board ships and installations
and arrest offenders. The principles of flag State control and coastal State exclusive
jurisdiction appear to be preserved in the 1988 SUA Treaties, which makes them largely
consistent with the LOSC in that regard.427
The fundamental purpose of the 1988 SUA Treaties is ‘to ensure that sufficient and
appropriate action is taken against those who have committed unlawful acts against
vessels and offshore oil and gas infrastructure’; 428 so the ‘extradite or prosecute’
requirement is at the heart of the 1988 SUA Treaties.429 However, 1988 SUA Treaties
do not deal with the protection of offshore petroleum installations as such. Although the
titles of the 1988 SUA Treaties indicate that these legal instruments are for the
425

See 1988 SUA Convention art 3; 1988 SUA Protocol art 2.
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suppression of violent acts against the safety of ships and offshore installations
respectively, they mainly deal with enforcement of offences ‘after the fact’ rather than
prevention of such offences being committed. The 1988 SUA Convention briefly talks
about cooperation between States in adopting effective and practical measures to
combat and prevent unlawful acts against the safety of navigation,430 but their ‘operative
provisions deal not so much with the suppression of such acts, as with the apprehension,
conviction and punishment of those who commit them’.431
Apart from a short remark in the Preamble, there is only one provision that directly
addresses the prevention or suppression. Article 13(1) of the 1988 SUA Convention,
which applies mutatis mutandis to the 1988 SUA Protocol, provides that all contracting
States should cooperate in the prevention of such offences particularly by ‘taking all
practicable measures to prevent preparations in their respective territories for the
commission of those offences within or outside their territories and exchanging
information in accordance with their national law, and co-ordinating administrative and
other measures taken as appropriate to prevent the commission of offences’ set out in
the 1988 SUA Convention.432 The 1988 SUA Convention also provides that any State
party that has reason to believe that an offence will be committed ‘shall, in accordance
with its national law, furnish as promptly as possible any relevant information in its
possession to those States which it believes would be the States having established
jurisdiction’.433
A further issue not directly addressed by the 1988 SUA Treaties is whether activities
attributable to a State, which are committed in a time of peace, fall within the scope of
these treaties.434 In other words, the 1988 SUA Treaties do not directly deal with what
can be referred to as ‘State terrorism’.435 However, the use of the words ‘any person’
with respect to offences listed in the 1988 SUA Treaties, 436 suggests that an
interpretation could be made that an individual who commits an offence acting under
the orders of a State (covert or overt) would be subject to the 1988 SUA Treaties and
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therefore should be punished.437 In such circumstances, it is a person that would be the
offender and there will not be any State responsibility for such actions. This also means
that the threat to offshore installation posed by inter-State hostilities is not addressed by
the 1988 SUA Treaties, but will probably be governed by other principles of
international law such as the law on the use of force.438
Overall, it can be said that the 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol
together represent a significant improvement in the international regulatory framework
for maritime and offshore petroleum security. 439 The rationale behind these legal
instruments is that if a large number of States in a particular region or globally are
parties to the 1988 SUA Treaties, persons who commit an offence will have little or no
place of refuge; and if they enter the territory of any State party they will be taken into
custody and, subsequently, will either be prosecuted in that State party or extradited to
another State party.440
Despite the obvious benefits of the 1988 SUA Treaties in combating maritime security
threats, prior to 9/11 States were slow in becoming parties to these instruments. 441
Presumably, one reason is that the adoption of the 1988 SUA Treaties in response to the
Achille Lauro incident was seen as a ‘political settlement’,442 which made ratification of
these legal instruments a highly sensitive political issue, particularly for some Muslim
countries.443 After the events of 9/11, the IMO urged its members to become parties to
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On 11 September 2001 (9/11), there were only 57 contracting States to the 1988 SUA Convention and
51 contracting States to the 1988 SUA Protocol: IMO, above n 349, 395–413.
442
The hijackers of Achille Lauro (who were members of the PLF) claimed that they were fighting
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the 1988 SUA Treaties, and since then the number of contracting States has increased
significantly.444
The analysis of ratifications of the 1988 SUA Treaties reveals some interesting findings.
Both the 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol have been ratified by most
of the States in which Islam is the majority religion of the population.445 The 1988 SUA
Treaties have also been ratified or acceded to by most of the world’s largest flag States
(by gross tonnage),446 most of the major seafarer-supplying States,447 and most of the
major petroleum producing States. 448 The analysis of ratifications ‘by region’ shows
that the 1988 SUA Treaties are popular in the Middle East (including the Persian Gulf
region),449 and in most of the other main offshore petroleum producing areas such as the
Gulf of Guinea,450 the Gulf of Mexico,451 the North Sea,452 the South China Sea,453 and
the Caspian Sea region.454

interesting to note that when the 1988 SUA Treaties were adopted, the headquarters of the PLF (of which
the hijackers of Achille Lauro were members) were located in Baghdad, Iraq.
444
As of 1 August 2011, there were 157 contracting States to the 1988 SUA Convention and 146
contracting States to the 1988 SUA Protocol: IMO, above n 349, 397–413.
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In the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region, State parties to both the 1988 SUA Convention and the
1988 SUA Protocol include Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kuwait,
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As of 1 August 2011, there were 157 contracting States to the 1988 SUA Convention
representing approximately 94.73 per cent of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant
fleet,

455

and 146 contracting States to the 1988 SUA Protocol representing

approximately 89.72 per cent of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant fleet.456 In
general, ratifications clearly show that the 1988 SUA Treaties have become widely
accepted globally, which (in theory) indicates that the global legal framework for
bringing to justice and punishing those who commit unlawful violent acts against
vessels and offshore petroleum installations is already in place. However, effectiveness
of the SUA framework depends upon individual States complying with their obligations
and making the offences punishable under their national laws.457

6. Other Pre-9/11 Regulatory Developments
In addition to the international legal instruments discussed above, several other
regulatory initiatives with some relevance to the protection and security of offshore
installations had been taken by competent international organisations including the IMO
and the Comité Maritime International (CMI). In the 1970s and 1980s, the IMO adopted
several resolutions relating to the safety of offshore petroleum installations and safety of
navigation, 458 which attempted to address the risks and dangerous consequences of
collisions of ships with offshore installations and emphasised the need for flag States to
451

In the Gulf of Mexico region, Mexico, US, and Cuba are contracting States to both the 1988 SUA
Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol.
452
In the North Sea region, France, Belgium, UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and
Norway are contracting States to both the 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol.
453
In the South China Sea region, the contracting States to both the 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988
SUA Protocol are: Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines, China, and Brunei. Singapore is a party to the
1988 SUA Convention, but not to the 1988 SUA Protocol. Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Laos, and
Taiwan are not parties to either the 1988 SUA Convention or the 1988 SUA Protocol.
454
In the Caspian Sea region, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Iran are all parties to
both the 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol.
455
IMO, above n 349, 395.
456
Ibid 413.
457
According to the IMO’s survey of national laws on piracy conducted in 2009, most contracting States
to the 1988 SUA Convention have legislation in place implementing the compulsory establishment of
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Safety of Navigation around Offshore Installations and Structures.
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take action against ships which are reported to have infringed safety zones.459 In the late
1990s, the CMI started working on the development of measures for the criminal
prosecution of cases of piracy and armed robbery, which ultimately resulted in the
production of the model national law on piracy and other maritime violence in 2001.
Also in the late 1990s, the United Nations (UN) was involved in the preparation of the
international convention on transnational organised crime, which was adopted in 2000.
It is worth discussing briefly each of these initiatives in the context of the protection and
security of offshore petroleum installations.
6.1 IMO Resolution A.671(16)

The principal IMO resolution dealing with safety zones around offshore petroleum
installations is Resolution A.671(16) adopted on 19 October 1989, which contains
recommendations on various measures to prevent the infringement of safety zones
around offshore installations and structures.460 Although not legally binding, Resolution
A.671(16) illustrates the IMO’s standpoint and concern relating to infringements of
safety zones around offshore petroleum installations.
Resolution A.671(16) provides that governments should take all necessary steps to
ensure that ships flying their flags do not enter or pass through duly established safety
zones unless specifically authorised to do so.461 Resolution A.671(16) further provides
that flag States should, if necessary, take appropriate measures to ensure that suitable
procedures exist to take action against owners, masters or other persons responsible for
the conduct of any ship which commits an infringement of duly established safety
zones.462
The Annex to Resolution A.671(16) provides recommendations for coastal States in
relation to dissemination of information essential for the safety of navigation by
appropriate means, including information with respect to the locations or intended
locations of offshore structures including the breadth of safety zones established around
them and rules that apply therein as well as any available fairways and routing
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systems. 463 It is also recommended that coastal States should require offshore
installations, including MODUs, to provide advance notice of any change of their
locations and take certain measures to prevent infringement of safety zones such as
effective lighting, sound signals, radar watch and permanent visual lookout.464
Furthermore, any features of a sufficiently permanent nature, such as permanent
installations or structures, bottom obstructions, pipelines, navigational marks and
prohibited areas, should be shown on all appropriate navigational charts. 465 Vessels
navigating in the vicinity of offshore installations are required, amongst other things, to
use established routing systems, navigate with caution and due consideration to safe
speed and safe passing distances, take into account weather conditions and the presence
of other vessels, and maintain continuous listening watch on the navigating bridge.466
The Annex to Resolution A.671(16) also specifies evidentiary material that can be
provided by a coastal State to a flag State in order to substantiate the allegations of
infringement and assist it in the investigation and prosecution of an infringement.467
Clearly, Resolution A.671(16) pertains to the protection of offshore installations, but its
emphasis is placed on safety rather than security. Resolution A.671(16) does provide
that coastal States can take enforcement action against foreign ships for infringement of
regulations relating to safety zones around offshore installations under its jurisdiction,
but any such action must be in accordance with international law, 468 particularly the
LOSC. The difficulty with this and other IMO resolutions is that they are not legally
binding on States and serve only as recommendations.469 Resolution A.671(16) does not
give any powers to coastal States to take enforcement action against foreign ships for
infringements of safety zones around offshore installations. Overall, Resolution
A.671(16) is only marginally relevant to the protection and security of offshore
installations.
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6.2 Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 2000

In the 1990s, States became increasingly concerned with transnational organised crime
and have sought to develop international legal instruments to counter the threat of
organised crime, 470 including organised crime in the maritime domain. The United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2000 (UNTOC)471 is the
principal international treaty dealing with organised crime. The UNTOC provides the
legal framework for international cooperation in preventing and combating criminal
activities,472 and the growing links between transnational organised crime and terrorist
crimes. 473 The UNTOC applies to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of
serious crimes where the offences are transnational in nature and involve an organised
criminal group.474 As discussed in Chapter 2, the types of organised criminal activities
that are relevant to the offshore petroleum industry and offshore installations include the
theft of oil and its illicit trafficking by organised criminal groups, extortion, armed
robbery, and theft of property.475
The UNTOC requires State parties to criminalise participation in an organised criminal
group including agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious crime,
taking active part in criminal activities of the organised criminal group, and organising,
directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counselling the commission of serious crime
involving an organised criminal group. 476 The UNTOC has an application in the
maritime context and the convention’s provisions on establishing jurisdiction are similar
to the provisions of the 1988 SUA Convention. State parties to the UNTOC are required
to adopt such measures that may be necessary to establish their jurisdiction over the
offences established in accordance with the convention when the offence is committed
470
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in the territory of that State,477 or on board a vessel that is flying the flag of that State at
the time that the offence is committed.478 State parties also have discretion to establish
their jurisdiction over offences in certain circumstances.479
The UNTOC also deals with cooperation between State parties in conducting
investigations, prosecution or judicial proceedings including mutual consultation and
coordination of their actions.480 The UNTOC also has some detailed provisions dealing
with extradition of the offenders.481 The important point is that the UNTOC is widely
accepted. Some States that are not parties to the 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988
SUA Protocol, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia, are parties to the UNTOC. 482
Although the UNTOC is not directly relevant to the security of offshore petroleum
installations and does not specifically cover the acts of maritime violence such as
terrorism, it applies to serious crimes (which would include unlawful violent acts
against offshore petroleum installations) involving an organised criminal group. 483
Therefore, it may be possible to rely on the UNTOC in some circumstances for the
purposes of extradition and prosecution of the offenders. Nevertheless, the UNTOC is
only of limited relevance to the protection and security of offshore petroleum
installations.
6.3 Model National Law on Acts of Piracy and Maritime Violence

For several years, the CMI and the IMO Legal Committee had been working together in
the areas of ‘criminal offences committed on board foreign-flagged ships’ and ‘acts of
piracy and maritime violence’.484 In 1998, the CMI together with other concerned and
interested international organisations formed a Joint International Working Group on
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Uniformity of Laws Concerning Acts of Piracy and Maritime Violence (JIWG)485 with
the aim of developing more effective measures for the criminal prosecution of cases of
piracy and armed robbery. 486 Over a period of three years (1998-2001), the JIWG
produced the document known as the Model National Law on Acts of Piracy and
Maritime Violence (Model National Law).487 The Model National Law was approved by
the constituent organisations of the JIWG in early 2001 and adopted by the CMI
Assembly in February 2001.488
The Model National Law attempts to address the ‘problem of piracy and maritime
violence by proposing a more systematic treatment of these serious problems through
national law’ and provides a series of proposals intended to achieve greater uniformity
in the body of various national legal traditions. 489 The Model National Law was
designed to complement the 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol and to
assist national legislators by bringing their attention ‘to international considerations that
have a direct impact on national jurisdiction and prosecution’.490
The Model National Law contains a number of provisions specifically dealing with
unlawful acts involving offshore installations, 491 some of which are similar to the
provisions of the 1988 SUA Protocol. For example, under the Model National Law the
crime of ‘maritime violence’ is committed when a person seizes or exercises control
over an offshore installation,492 destroys or causes damage to an offshore installation,493

485

The Joint International Working Group on Uniformity of Laws Concerning Acts of Piracy and
Maritime Violence (JIWG) comprised representatives of the CMI, the Baltic and International Maritime
Council (BIMCO), the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL), the International Group of P&I Clubs (IGP&I), the ICC International
Maritime Bureau (IMB), the IMO, the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), and the
International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI).
486
Frank Wiswall, ‘Draft Guidelines for National Legislation: Background Paper’ (2007) 1 CMI
Newsletter 3, 3.
487
Model National Law on Acts of Piracy and Maritime Violence adopted by the Assembly of the CMI in
Singapore in February 2001 (‘Model National Law’). A copy of the Model National Law is reproduced in
the CMI Yearbook (2000) 418–23.
488
Frank Wiswall, ‘Report of the International Working Group on Uniformity of Law Re Maritime
Criminal Acts’ (2007) 1 CMI Newsletter 2, 2.
489
Model National Law Preamble.
490
Ibid. The notes in the Preamble state that the JIWG specifically urges accession to and adoption into
national law of the 1988 SUA Treaties and the LOSC, and provide that care should be taken in the
drafting of appropriate legislation because many existing national laws do not directly track provisions of
the 1988 SUA Treaties and the LOSC: n 2.
491
Model National Law ss I(3)(d), I(3)(j)–(k), I(6), I(7), II(3)(b).
492
Ibid ss I(3)(c), I(3)(k).
493
Ibid ss I(3)(d).
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employs any device or substance which is likely to destroy or cause damage to an
offshore installation,494 engages in any act constituting an offence under the 1988 SUA
Convention or the 1988 SUA Protocol.495 The Model National Law also covers issues
such as jurisdiction, extradition, prosecution, punishment, and reporting of incidents, as
well as restitution provisions and forfeiture of property involved in the commission of
offences.496 In regard to jurisdiction, the Model National Law provides that offences
defined therein should be prosecuted if committed within the territory, internal waters,
and to the degree that the exercise of national jurisdiction is permitted under the High
Seas Convention or the LOSC, within the EEZ, continental shelf, contiguous zone,
archipelagic waters and the high seas.497
The Model National Law was designed as guidance to assist States in drafting national
legislation on piracy and other acts of maritime violence. While the 2001 Model
National Law was meant to cover all violent maritime criminal acts including terrorist
acts, the emphasis was on piracy. This perceived applicability of the Model National
Law to acts of piracy tended to overshadow its broader applicability to other crimes of
maritime violence. 498 Before the Model National Law was able to gain sufficient
momentum, the events of 9/11 brought terrorism into the centre of public and political
attention.499 Although the Model National Law could potentially contribute to achieving
a degree of uniformity among national laws that deal with piracy and maritime violence,
it is not binding in any way and it does not have any bearing on the international
regulatory framework as such.

7. Conclusions
The pre-9/11 international regulatory framework for the protection and security of
offshore petroleum installations consists of three key international legal instruments: the
LOSC, the 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol.
The analysis of the LOSC framework has revealed that the scope of the LOSC for
regulating security of offshore petroleum installations is relatively narrow. The principal
494

Ibid ss I(3)(e), I(3)(k).
Ibid ss I(3)(i)–(j).
496
Ibid ss II, III.
497
Ibid s II(2).
498
See CMI, Report of the Sixth Session of the Joint International Working Group on Uniformity of Laws
Concerning Acts of Piracy and Maritime Violence (2005) 3.
499
Wiswall, above n 488, 2.
495
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protection measure for offshore installations available under the LOSC is the right of the
coastal State to establish safety zones around offshore installations. The concept of
safety zones was designed as a safety measure for offshore installations and navigation
aimed at preventing accidental collisions between ships and offshore installations. The
maximum allowed breadth of safety zones around offshore petroleum installations on
the continental shelf and in the EEZ is 500 metres, which is too narrow to protect
offshore installations from deliberate attacks. The navigational rights of other States and
the principle of the exclusive flag State jurisdiction over ships are well protected and
respected under the LOSC framework, which makes it more difficult for coastal States
to protect offshore petroleum installations and take enforcement actions against foreign
ships involved in attacks on and unlawful interferences with offshore installations.
The analysis has also shown that there may be considerable difficulties in applying
piracy rules to offshore petroleum installations. A strong argument can be made that an
act of piracy cannot be perpetrated against an offshore petroleum installation. Apart
from piracy, the LOSC does not specifically address any offshore security threats or acts
of maritime violence such as terrorism. Violent unlawful acts committed against
offshore petroleum installations are specifically addressed in the 1988 SUA Convention
and the 1988 SUA Protocol.
The 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol can be used to deal with
virtually all types of offshore security threats identified in Chapter 2 and all scenarios of
offshore attacks identified in Chapter 3. The important aspect of the 1988 SUA Treaties
is that they represent the ‘response framework’ rather than the ‘prevention framework’
because they are aimed at ensuring criminal prosecution of the offenders who have
committed, attempted to commit or assisted in commission of violent acts involving
offshore petroleum installations.
The SUA framework has some limitations particularly those relating to the enforcement
action that coastal States can take against foreign flagged ships used in attacks. The
principles of freedom of navigation and the exclusive flag State jurisdiction appear to be
preserved and respected in the SUA framework, and no additional powers are given to
States to interdict and board foreign ships and arrest perpetrators of violent acts against
offshore petroleum installations.
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It can be concluded that there are a number of unresolved and potentially problematic
aspects of the pre-9/11 regulatory framework, particularly those relating to the
enforcement powers under the LOSC and the SUA frameworks. Those issues are
addressed in the concluding chapter (Chapter 7). However, the analysis of the pre-9/11
regulatory framework alone is not enough to assess the overall adequacy of the
international regulatory framework. Therefore, it is also necessary to analyse the post9/11 regulatory framework for maritime security and its application to offshore
petroleum installations, which is the focus of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE
PROTECTION AND SECURITY OF OFFSHORE PETROLEUM
INSTALLATIONS AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 2001
1. Introduction
The unprecedented attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11
September 2001 (9/11) by Al-Qaeda terrorists marked a tremendous change in the
international and national security environment and security regulation. Terrorism ‘has
tragically succeeded in shaping the political agenda worldwide’.1 Following the events
of 9/11, the United States (US) encouraged the relevant United Nations (UN) bodies
such as the UN Security Council (UNSC), the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) to take action to address the
threat of maritime terrorism. 2 The US proposed and led a number of regulatory
initiatives to enhance security of the maritime industry.
The earlier attack on USS Cole in October 2000 3 and a subsequent attack on MV
Limburg in October 20024 confirmed that maritime terrorism had surfaced as the major
security threat to the maritime transport industry, and in the aftermath of 9/11, the focus
of the international maritime community was on devising effective measures to address
that threat and enhance maritime security. As a result, the IMO, which is of course the
organisation charged with such initiatives in the maritime field, undertook a review of

1

Efthimios Mitropoulos, Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), quoted in
IMO, ‘Maritime Security Set for Boost with Entry into Force of 2005 Protocols on Suppression of
Unlawful Acts in July 2010’ (Press Briefing, 20/2010, 30 April 2010).
2
Robert Beckman, ‘International Responses to Combat Maritime Terrorism’ in Victor Ramraj, Michael
Hor and Kent Roach (eds), Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2005)
248, 248. See also Hartmut Hesse, ‘Maritime Security in a Multilateral Context: IMO Activities to
Enhance Maritime Security’ (2003) 18(3) International Journal of Maritime and Coastal Law 327.
3
On 12 October 2000, in Yemen, a small boat loaded with explosives rammed the US destroyer USS
Cole and blew up alongside it, killing 17 and injuring 39 sailors. Affiliates of Al-Qaeda were suspected of
and blamed for the attack: Cindy Combs and Martin Slann, Encyclopedia of Terrorism (Facts on File,
revised ed, 2007) 416.
4
On 6 October 2002, in Yemen, the French tanker MV Limburg, was attacked by an explosive-laden boat
and substantially damaged by the explosion. A Bulgarian crew member was killed by the explosion, and
Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack. See Barry Rubin and Judith Rubin, Chronologies of
Modern Terrorism (M E Sharpe, 2008) 316; Shawn Woodford, ‘Al-Qaeda and Saudi Arabia: A
Chronology’ in Erich Marquardt (ed), Saudi Arabian Oil Facilities: The Achilles Heel of the Western
Economy (Jamestown Foundation, 2006) 35, 38.

279

Chapter 6

Mikhail Kashubsky

measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism which threaten the security of
passengers and crews and the safety of ships.5
The offshore petroleum industry had also inevitably become subjected to new
regulatory security measures; however, the full extent of the application of these new
security measures to offshore petroleum installations is not clear. This chapter examines
post-9/11 maritime security regulatory initiatives, namely the 2002 amendments to the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS Convention),6 the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code),7 the Seafarers’ Identity
Documents Convention (Revised) 2003 (2003 SID Convention),8 the Protocol of 2005 to
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Convention), the Protocol of 2005 to the
1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms located on the Continental Shelf (2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Protocol),
and the 2006 long-range identification and tracking (LRIT) Regulation. The chapter
analyses the application of these regulatory initiatives to offshore petroleum
installations, and assesses whether these new maritime security regulatory measures
have made any improvements to the overall international legal framework for the
protection and security of offshore installations.

5

IMO, Review of Measures and Procedures to Prevent Acts of Terrorism which Threaten the Security of
Passengers and Crews and the Safety of Ships, A Res 924(22), 22nd sess, Agenda Item 8, IMO Doc A
22/Res.924 (22 January 2002). See also Hartmut Hesse and Nicolaos Charalambous, ‘New Security
Measures for the International Shipping Community’ (2004) 3(2) WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 123,
125.
6
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, opened for signature 1 November 1974,
1184 UNTS 2 (entered into force 25 May 1980) (‘SOLAS Convention’). As at 1 August 2011, there were
159 contracting States to the SOLAS Convention, representing approximately 99.16 per cent of the gross
tonnage of the world’s merchant shipping: IMO, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in
Respect of Which the International Maritime Organization or Its Secretary-General Performs Depository
or Other Functions as at 1 August 2011 (2011) 19.
7
Amendments to the Annex to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, opened for
signature 12 December 2002, [2003] ATNIF 11 (entered into force 1 July 2004), annex (International
Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities) (‘ISPS Code’).
8
Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention (Revised) 2003, opened for signature 19 June 2003, 2304
UNTS 121 (entered into force 9 February 2005) (‘2003 SID Convention’). As of 3 May 2011, there were
19 contracting States to the 2003 SID Convention, out of which only two countries, namely Indonesia and
Russia, are in the top ten seafaring nations of the world. For a list of the major country-suppliers of the
world’s seafarers see Martin Tsamenyi, Mary Ann Palma and Clive Schofield, ‘International Legal
Regulatory Framework for Seafarers and Maritime Security Post-9/11’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam
Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2008) 233, 235.
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2. SOLAS Amendments 2002
At its 22nd Assembly meeting in November 2001, the IMO resolved that it was
necessary to develop new measures relating to maritime security of ships and of port
facilities for adoption by a Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security the following
year.9 On 15 January 2002, the US submitted a proposal to the 75th session of the IMO
Maritime Security Committee (MSC) on measures to improve maritime security, which
provided the basis for the security regulation framework and covered a number of issues
including Automatic Identification System (AIS), ship security officers, company
security officers, port security officers, seafarer identification, ship security plans and
other related matters.10 The MSC had decided that new security requirements should be
applicable to mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs) in transit and in port, but should
not apply to fixed and floating installations and MODUs on site.11
After about a year of intense work, the first important result was the adoption of the
2002 amendments to the SOLAS Convention, and the ISPS Code, which were adopted at
the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security held from 9-13 December 2002.12 The
ISPS Code was adopted supplementary to the SOLAS Convention amendments. The
Contracting States to the SOLAS Convention agreed to amend chapter XI of the SOLAS
Convention and create a new chapter, XI-2, on ‘Special Measures to Enhance Maritime
Security’, which obliges States to comply with the ISPS Code.13 Chapter XI-2 of the
SOLAS Convention is aimed at deterring terrorist acts directed against or involving
maritime transport.14 The 2002 amendments to the SOLAS Convention, including the
ISPS Code, were made under the ‘tacit acceptance’ procedure,15 and entered into force

9

IMO, 22nd Assembly: 19-30 November 2001 - Resolutions Adopted
<http://www.imo.org/newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=144&doc_id=1973> at 13 July 2010.
10
IMO, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on Its Seventy-Fifth Session, IMO MSC, 75th sess,
Agenda Item 24, IMO Doc MSC 75/24 (29 May 2002) 78-106.
11
Ibid 85 [17.27].
12
IMO, Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security: 9–13 December 2002 (2002)
<http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=110&doc_id=2515> at 25 July 2011.
13
The Diplomatic Conference adopted a number of other amendments to the SOLAS Convention
concerning enhancement of maritime security, but the ISPS Code was the most far-reaching of them:
IMO, above n 12.
14
Patrick Griggs, ‘News from IMO: 84th Session of the IMO Legal Committee’ (2002) 2 CMI Newsletter
9, 9.
15
‘Tacit acceptance’ means that the amendments automatically enter into force at a particular time unless
before that date a specified number of States object: IMO, Conventions
<http://www.imo.org/conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=148> at 6 June 2010. See also Natalie Klein,
‘Legal Limitations on Ensuring Australia’s Maritime Security’ (2006) 7 Melbourne Journal of
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on 1 July 2004. The 2002 SOLAS Convention amendments included requirements for
companies and ships, ships security alert systems, master’s discretion for ship safety
and security, control and compliance measures, and communication of information,16 as
well as requirements relating to the ship identification number and the carriage of a
Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR).17
One of the most notable amendments to the SOLAS Convention related to accelerating
the implementation of the requirement to fit the AIS aboard ships. 18 Although,
originally adopted as a safety measure, the AIS quickly became a tool for the
enhancement of maritime security,19 which can be used by coastal States to monitor the
movement of ships in their waters for security purposes. 20 The AIS is capable of
automatically providing information about the ship’s identity, type, position, course,
speed, and navigational status to other ships and to coastal authorities; it is also capable
of receiving automatically such information from similarly fitted ships.21 The SOLAS
Convention requires AIS to be fitted aboard all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards
engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not
engaged on international voyages, and all passenger ships irrespective of size.22 There is
no requirement to fit AIS transponders on board offshore petroleum installations;
however, the AIS could be a useful security tool for offshore installations to monitor
and track ships navigating in their vicinity thereby increasing the situational awareness
for offshore installation operators. According to Murphy, ‘the ranges at which the signal
is usually regarded as effective between ships and from ship to shore are 20 miles and

International Law 306, 318; Graeme Hale, ‘Does the ISPS Code Address Post 9/11 Maritime Security
Threats?’ (2005) 116 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 1, 2.
16
SOLAS Convention annex, regs XI-2/4, XI-2/6, XI-2/8, XI-2/9, XI-2/13. See also IMO, Consideration
and Adoption of Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974,
Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
1974, Agenda Item 6, IMO Doc SOLAS/CONF.5/32 (12 December 2002) annex res 1 (‘Amendments to
the Annex to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 as Amended’) 7–18.
17
SOLAS Convention annex, regs XI-1/3, XI-1/5. See also ISPS Code Preamble para 4.
18
IMO, above n 16, 4. See also ISPS Code Preamble para 4.
19
Martin Murphy, ‘Lifeline or Pipedream? Origins, Purposes and Benefits of Automatic Identification
System, Long-Range Identification and Tracking, and Maritime Domain Awareness’ in Rupert HerbertBurns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press,
2008) 13, 14.
20
Steven Jones, Maritime Security: A Practical Guide (The Nautical Institute, 2006) 209.
21
SOLAS Convention annex, reg V-19/2.4.5. See also IMO, AIS Transponders (2010)
<http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Pages/AIS.aspx> at 23 March 2011; IMO, Guidelines
for the Onboard Operational Use of Shipborne Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), A Res 917(22),
22nd sess, Agenda Item 9, IMO Doc A 22/Res.917 (25 January 2002).
22
SOLAS Convention annex, reg V-19/2.4.

282

Chapter 6

Mikhail Kashubsky

40 miles respectively’,23 which seems to be a sufficient distance for an installation to
receive an early ‘warning’ of vessels approaching the installation.24 The problem is that
AIS transponders can be switched off at any time and a vessel can move unnoticed by
the AIS.
It is interesting to mention that the 2002 amendments to the SOLAS Convention were
not the first time such security measures were proposed by the IMO. On 26 September
1986, in the aftermath of the Achille Lauro incident, the MSC issued Circular No. 443
on ‘measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews on board ships’,25
which covered issues that are similar to the 2002 amendments to the SOLAS Convention
and the provisions of the ISPS Code such as appointment of security officers and
adoption of security plans.26 The implementation of that circular was voluntary and its
recommendations were largely ignored by States and shipping companies.27 At the time,
the IMO was focused on the more immediate problem of piracy and armed robbery at
sea.28

3. ISPS Code
As noted above, the ISPS Code was adopted supplementary to chapter XI-2 of the
SOLAS Convention. One the main objectives of the ISPS Code is to detect and assess
security threats, take preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or
port facilities used in international trade, and to ensure the early and efficient collation
and exchange of security-related information.

29

The ISPS Code establishes a

comprehensive international security framework for maritime shipping and is intended
to be a risk management tool whereby security levels and appropriate security measures
are determined by the severity of assessed risks to which a port facility or a ship is
exposed.30

23

Murphy, above n 19, 15.
See Michael Crocker, ‘Platforms, Pipelines, and Pirates’ (2007) 51(6) Security Management 76, 80.
25
IMO, Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts against Passengers and Crew on Board Ships, IMO Doc
MSC/Circ.443 (26 September 1986) annex.
26
Hesse, above n 2, 328.
27
Dennis Bryant, ‘Historical and Legal Aspects of Maritime Security’ (2004-2005) 17(1) University of
San Francisco Maritime Law Journal 1, 5.
28
Ibid.
29
ISPS Code Foreword, iii.
30
IMO, above n 12.
24
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The ISPS Code provides for a number of minimum functional security requirements for
ships and port facilities. The ISPS Code has two parts. Part A contains mandatory
security-related requirements for contracting States, port authorities and shipping
companies. Part B comprises a series of non-mandatory guidelines on how to comply
with the mandatory requirements.31 The main provisions of the ISPS Code relate to the
requirement to carry out security assessments and establish security plans for ships and
port facilities,32 responsibilities of governments and companies with respect to security
levels and security personnel, 33 and the requirement to carry out training, drills and
exercises on ship and port facility security.34 In addition, the requirements for ships and
for port facilities include having certain security equipment, monitoring and controlling
access, monitoring the activities of people and cargo, and ensuring security
communications are readily available.35
The ISPS Code applies to the following types of ships engaged on international
voyages: passenger ships of any size including high speed passenger craft, and cargo
ships of 500 gross tonnage and above including high speed craft, MODUs of any size,36
and port facilities serving such ships. 37 The ISPS Code does not apply to warships,
naval auxiliaries or other government ships used for non-commercial service. 38 The
important requirement of the application of the ISPS Code is that ships and MODUs
must be engaged on international voyages. 39 The term ‘international voyage’ is not
defined in the ISPS Code, but it is defined in the SOLAS Convention as ‘a voyage from
a country to which the present Convention applies to a port outside such country, or
conversely’. 40 This definition tends to suggest that in order for a MODU to be
considered engaged in international voyage it must be navigating to or from a port,41
which means that when a MODU travels from an offshore location in one country
31

Ibid.
ISPS Code ss 8, 9, 15, 16.
33
Ibid ss 7, 11, 12, 17.
34
Ibid ss 13, 18.
35
IMO, above n 12.
36
ISPS Code s 3.1; SOLAS Convention annex, reg XI-2/2.1. The definition of ‘ship’ in regulation XI2/1.2 includes mobile offshore drilling units. The size or tonnage of mobile offshore drilling units
(MODUs) is not specified in the ISPS Code which makes it applicable to all types of MODUs engaged on
international voyages. It should be noted that drill ships can also be considered as MODUs.
37
SOLAS Convention annex, reg XI-2/2.1; ISPS Code s 3.1.
38
ISPS Code s 3.3; SOLAS Convention annex, regs XI-2/2.3, I/3(a).
39
ISPS Code s 3.1.
40
SOLAS Convention annex, reg I/2(d).
41
This indicates that the ISPS Code will also apply to MODUs that are in ports or about to enter ports.
32
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directly to an offshore location in another country without visiting a port, it will not be
subject to the ISPS Code. Similarly, a MODU navigating between offshore locations
within the jurisdiction of a coastal State is not covered by the ISPS Code because it is
deemed to be engaged on a domestic voyage.42 Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 4
above, based on the criteria in Regulation XI-2/1 of the SOLAS Convention that a
MODU must be mechanically propelled and not on location,43 it can be argued that
MODUs that are on location and MODUs that are not mechanically propelled are not
subject to the ISPS Code.44
Other vessels that are not engaged on international voyages are also not subject to the
ISPS Code, which can include offshore supply vessels and shuttle tankers that only
navigate between installations and ports of the same coastal State. Furthermore, the
ISPS Code does not apply to fixed platforms and floating installations such as floating
production, storage and offloading units (FPSOs) and floating storage and offloading
units (FSOs),45 nor does it apply to any fishing vessels of any size or smaller vessels
such as recreational boats and pleasure yachts not engaged in trade.46 The ISPS Code
has a limited scope of application particularly with respect to offshore petroleum
installations. Herbert-Burns notes that the ambiguous status of FPSOs and FSOs ‘as part
vessel and part platform leaves them in somewhat of a “blind spot”’ as far as being
covered by the provisions of the ISPS Code and the SOLAS Convention.47
In relation to offshore petroleum installations, the ISPS Code provides in section 4.19
that contracting States ‘should consider establishing appropriate security measures’ for
42

It should be noted that in practice, MODUs are not usually engaged in international navigation
especially when long distances are involved. Self-propelled MODUs usually have a slow speed and they
are often transported to offshore sites as cargo on specialised heavy-lift vessels or towed. An exception to
this general practice would be drill ships.
43
SOLAS Convention annex, reg XI-2/1.
44
See SOLAS Convention annex, regs XI-2/1, IX/1. Regulation XI-2/1 of the SOLAS Convention defines
a ‘mobile offshore drilling unit’ as ‘a mechanically propelled mobile offshore drilling unit, as defined in
regulation IX/1, not on location’. Regulation IX/1 of the SOLAS Convention defines ‘mobile offshore
drilling unit’ as ‘a vessel capable of engaging in drilling operations for the exploration for or exploitation
of resources beneath the sea-bed such as liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons, sulphur or salt’.
45
See IMO, Guidance Relating to the Implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, IMO
Doc MSC/Circ.1097 (6 June 2003) annex, 1.
46
These types of installations and vessels do not fall within the categories of ships to which the ISPS
Code applies. See SOLAS Convention annex, reg XI-2/2.1; ISPS Code s 3.1. See also Klein, above n 15,
319.
47
Rupert Herbert-Burns, ‘Tankers, Specialized Production Vessels, and Offshore Terminals:
Vulnerability and Security in the International Maritime Oil Sector’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam
Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2008) 133, 150.
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fixed and floating installations and MODUs on location to allow interaction with ships
and port facilities which are required to comply with chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS
Convention and Part A of the ISPS Code.48 There is also an equivalent recommendation
relating to ships which are not required to comply with mandatory provisions of the
ISPS Code.49 As mentioned above, section 4.19 of the ISPS Code simply provides that
States should consider establishing appropriate security measures for fixed and floating
installations and MODUs on location, but the ISPS Code does not clarify what the
‘appropriate measures’ are, and there are no specific guidelines to assist contracting
States in implementing the appropriate security measures for fixed and floating offshore
petroleum installations and ships interacting with such installations.50
There are many FPSOs and FSOs in the world operating with approved and ISPS Code
compliant security plans, but according to Robinson, these security plans often do not
account for the security of mooring systems, subsea equipment, pipelines, adjacent
facilities or interaction with shuttle tankers and offshore supply vessels, nor do they
account for normal operations of offshore petroleum installations on location and ‘there
is currently no requirement in the ISPS Code for compliance at this level’.51
Recognising the need to address and establish security measures for offshore petroleum
installations and vessels to which the ISPS Code and chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS
Convention do not apply, at the time of adoption of the ISPS Code in December 2002,
the Diplomatic Conference also adopted a resolution inviting and encouraging
contracting States to address these matters at the national level.52 In respect of offshore
installations, the resolution specifically stated that the Conference:
[Further encourages] Contracting Governments, when exercising their responsibilities
for mobile offshore drilling units and for fixed and floating platforms operating on their
Continental Shelf or within their Exclusive Economic Zone, to ensure that any security
48

ISPS Code pt B s 4.19 (emphasis added).
Ibid s 4.20. See also Mark Gauthier, ‘The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS
Code): An Overview’ (2005) CMI Yearbook 395, 396.
50
Herbert-Burns, above n 47, 139.
51
Brad Robinson, quoted in Crocker, above n 24, 78-9.
52
IMO, Consideration and Adoption of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code,
Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
1974, Agenda Items 7 and 8, IMO Doc SOLAS/CONF.5/34 (17 December 2002) annex 2 res 7
(‘Establishment of Appropriate Measures to Enhance the Security of Ships, Port Facilities, Mobile
Offshore Drilling Units on Location and Fixed and Floating Platforms not Covered by Chapter XI-2 of
the 1974 SOLAS Convention’) 8.
49

286

Chapter 6

Mikhail Kashubsky

provisions applying to such units and platforms allow interaction with those applying to
ships covered by chapter XI-2 of the [SOLAS] Convention, that serve, or operate in
conjunction with, such units or platforms.53

The IMO had attempted to provide additional guidance to assist contracting States and
the industry with the implementation of the ISPS Code security arrangements for
offshore installations.54 In June 2003, the MSC confirmed that neither FPSOs nor FSOs
or floating storage units (FSUs) were ships subject to the provisions of the ISPS Code,
but decided that these offshore installations should have some security procedures in
place ‘to prevent “contamination” of ships and ports that are subject to the ISPS
Code’. 55 This essentially indicates that States and operators of offshore petroleum
installations are encouraged, but not obliged, to establish security measures for them
because they are not subject to the mandatory requirements of the ISPS Code or
provisions of chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention.56
The use of the word ‘contamination’ by the MSC indicates that the primary aim of
security requirements of the ISPS Code and chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention is to
provide security to ISPS-compliant ships, and it also indicates that there may be a
perceived threat to ISPS-compliant ships from offshore petroleum installations.
However, despite the significance of the potential consequences such as environmental
harm that can be caused by attacks on offshore installations (including attacks involving
the use of ships),57 potential threats posed by ships to offshore installations seem to have
been largely ignored by the ISPS Code and the IMO. The MSC’s Circular No. 1097
states that
[FPSO and FSU] units, when attached to a fixed platform, should be covered by the
security regime in force for the platform. Such units, when engaged in periodic short
voyages between the platform and the coastal State, should not be considered to be
ships engaged on international voyages. The Committee also agreed that single buoy
moorings (SBMs), attached to an offshore facility would be covered by that facility’s
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Ibid 9, para 4.
IMO, above n 45, 1.
55
Ibid annex, 1.
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Herbert-Burns, above n 47, 139.
57
As discussed in Chapter 3, a recent example of the catastrophic environmental pollution involving
offshore petroleum installation is the 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico, although
not caused by a deliberate attack.
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security regime and if it was connected to a port facility it would be covered by the port
facility security plan (PFSP).58

The fact that this circular provides that FPSOs and FSUs should not be treated as if they
were engaged on international voyages when they travel between the coastal State and
an offshore location is consistent with the definition of ‘international voyage’ in the
SOLAS Convention. 59 It is also apparent that MODUs and offshore supply vessels
travelling between ports and offshore locations of the same coastal State will not be
treated as being engaged on international voyages.60 However, the IMO’s circular does
not provide any advice as to the specific security measures or procedures that should be
taken by offshore petroleum installations as well as by ISPS-compliant ships when such
ships are interfacing (i.e. engaged in ‘ship-to-ship’ or rather ‘ship-to-platform’
activities) with offshore installations such as FPSOs and FSOs. Both ships and
installations are considered to be the most vulnerable during ‘ship-to-platform’
activities,61 particularly during berthing when all personnel are engaged in getting the
tanker alongside an FPSO or FSO and little or no manpower is available to function in a
lookout.62 Furthermore, it is known that perpetrators have used vessels in the attack
which look similar to offshore support vessels that routinely provide services to
offshore petroleum installations.63
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IMO, above n 45, 1 (emphasis added).
It will be recalled that the term ‘international voyage’ is defined in SOLAS Convention annex, reg I/2(d)
as ‘a voyage from a country to which the present Convention applies to a port outside such country, or
conversely’.
60
Similarly, it can be assumed that MODUs and floating production, storage and offloading units
(FPSOs) travelling from one offshore location to another offshore location under the jurisdiction of the
same coastal State will not be considered as ‘engaged on international voyages’.
61
Perpetrators are known to board offshore installations, including floating storage and offshore units
(FSOs) and FPSOs, via offshore support vessels that are moored alongside the installations. This was the
case in the attack on Bulford Dolphin mobile offshore drilling rig on 1 April 2007 about 65 kilometres off
the coast of Nigeria: International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
Report for the Period 1 April – 30 June 2007 (2007) 42.
62
Herbert-Burns, above n 47, 152. For example, On 22 June 2007 in Nigeria, three gunmen boarded the
159,000-deadweight tonne tanker Cape Brindisi moored at offshore Pennington Oil Terminal (also
known as FSO Oloibiri) and proceeded to take control of the Pennington terminal, where Cape Brindisi
had been loading: Bergen Risk Solutions, Niger Delta Maritime Security Quarterly Review (9 July 2007)
22 <http://www.bergenrisksolutions.com/index.php?dokument=294> at 2 January 2011.
63
For example, on 22 September 2010 an offshore installation was attacked off the coast of Nigeria
whereby the assailants almost reached the installation by using a vessel which looked like the ships that
routinely provide supplies to offshore installations: Greg Keller, Pirates Attack Offshore Oil Platform
Near Nigeria, Then Kidnap 3 French Employees from Ship (22 September 2010) Fox News
<http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/09/22/pirates-attack-french-marine-services-ship-nigeriaemployees-taken-hostage/> at 19 March 2011. See also Australian Association for Maritime Affairs
(AAMA), ‘Inquiry Set Up Into Sector’s Security’ (2011) 199 Australian Maritime Digest 9, 9.
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According to the IMO, if an ISPS-compliant ship interfaces with an FPSO or an FSU it
is deemed to be equivalent to interfacing with a non-ISPS-compliant ship. 64 In this
regard, the ISPS Code recommends that the ship security plan (SSP) of the ISPScompliant ship should establish details of the procedures and security measures to be
applied when it is interfacing with a ship to which the ISPS Code does not apply, or
with a fixed or floating installation or a mobile drilling rig on location.65 As far as the
security of offshore installations is concerned, the IMO’s position is that the coastal
State on whose continental shelf or within whose exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
offshore oil and gas operations take place should develop ‘appropriate security
measures and procedures under its national law to protect its offshore activities’.66
In 2010, the MSC, at its 87th session, agreed that it is desirable for FPSOs and FSUs to
comply with chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention and the ISPS Code, as applicable.67
The IMO issued an MSC-MEPC.2 Circular No. 9 on guidance for the application of
safety, security and environmental protection provisions to FPSOs and FSUs.68 With
respect to security aspects, the circular only provides that in order to facilitate
interaction of FPSOs and FSOs with other ships, FPSO and FSO units should comply
with chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention and the ISPS Code.69 Still, to date, the IMO
has not provided any clear guidelines for MODUs, fixed production and drilling
platforms, and FPSO and FSO units operating on location, and for situations when these
installations interact/interface with other vessels, including offshore supply vessels and
shuttle tankers. Moreover, whatever little guidance has been provided by the IMO, it is
not mandatory. Clearly, the onus is placed on individual coastal States to address
security aspects of offshore installations operating under their jurisdiction by
developing and establishing ‘appropriate’ security measures at the national level.
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IMO, Guidance Relating to the Implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, IMO Doc
MSC/Circ.1111 (7 June 2004) annex 1, 4.
65
ISPS Code pt B s 9.51. See also IMO, above n 64, 1.
66
IMO, above n 64, 4.
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IMO, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on Its Eighty-Seventh Session, IMO MSC, 87th sess,
Agenda Item 26, IMO Doc MSC 87/26 (25 May 2010) 21.
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Ibid.
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IMO, Guidance for the Application of Safety, Security and Environmental Protection Provisions to
FPSOs and FSUs, IMO Doc MSC-MEPC.2/Circ 9 (25 May 2010) annex, 2. See also IMO, Review of the
Code for the Implementation of Mandatory IMO Instruments: Applicability of IMO Conventions to
FPSOs and FSUs, IMO FSI, 16th sess, Agenda Item 14, IMO Doc FSI 16/14/1 (26 March 2008).
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Another question that remains unanswered is what security requirements apply to
offshore installations operating on the seabed beyond the national jurisdiction.70
Without international regulation defining minimum security standards for FPSOs (as
well as other offshore petroleum installations), countries such as Australia and the US
have become the ‘regulatory pioneers’ in that regard,71 and have established security
requirements for the offshore installations similar to those of the ISPS Code. For
example, in Australia, the Maritime Transport Security Act 2003 was introduced in
2003 to give effect to the ISPS Code and help safeguard Australia’s ships and port
facilities. The Maritime Transport Security Act 2003 was amended in 2005 and renamed
the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 (MTOFSA 2003) to
establish the legislative basis for security requirements for offshore petroleum
installations and offshore service providers operating under Australian jurisdiction.72
The MTOFSA 2003 and the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security
Regulations 2003 (MTOFSR 2003) are two pieces of legislation under which the
Australian Government regulates the security arrangements of Australian ports, ships
and offshore petroleum installations. The MTOFSA 2003 provides for the establishment
of offshore security zones around offshore installations, requires offshore petroleum
installations to have offshore security plans and comply with their security plans to
ensure that security standards are maintained.73 An FPSO or FSU is treated both as a
ship and an offshore installation in the MTOFSA 2003. If the regulatory authority
declares an FPSO to be a security regulated offshore installation, an FPSO ceases to be
a security regulated ship.74 The US has established similar security arrangements for
offshore petroleum installations under the Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002.75
However, it may be more difficult for developing States with limited financial and
operational resources available for security to establish and implement appropriate
70

Lee Cordner, ‘Offshore Oil and Gas Industry Security Risk Assessment: An Australian Case Study’ in
Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security
(CRC Press, 2008) 169, 172.
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Crocker, above n 24, 79.
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See, eg, Australian Government, Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS), Offshore
Oil & Gas Risk Context Statement (2005).
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Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 Parts 5A, 6. See also Australian
Government, Department of Infrastructure and Transport (DIT), Legislation & Regulation (31 January
2011) <http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/security/maritime/legislation/index.aspx> at 24 July
2011.
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Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 ss 16, 17.
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security arrangements for offshore petroleum installations without specific international
guidelines about the minimum security requirements. 76 The problem is that offshore
installations such as FPSOs and FSOs do not fit well into the general ISPS Code-type
requirements and, after numerous discussions with potential FPSO operators, a need has
been identified for specific guidance for offshore petroleum installations.77
The industry associations such as the American Petroleum Institute (API), the Oil
Companies International Maritime Forum (OCIMF), and the International Association
of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) have produced some guidance documents relating to
security measures for offshore installations and their operations. 78 Nevertheless,
considering that the international law does not oblige coastal States to establish
regulatory security measures for their domestic offshore industries, some States may not
necessarily be willing or able to develop their own requirements and this could
potentially leave a gap in the offshore petroleum security framework, which can be
exploited by determined perpetrators. 79 Therefore, some clear guidance would be
desirable. The lack of specific security requirements for offshore installations is a
concern which should be addressed at the international level, and in light of the offshore
petroleum industry’s importance to the global economy, it may be beneficial to establish
mandatory minimum security requirements and guidelines for offshore installations and
offshore service providers.
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Herbert-Burns, above n 47, 140.
Crocker, above n 24, 79. Croker suggests that one approach would be to implement ship security
procedures during transit and installation security procedures when an FPSO or an FSO is operating on
location and a ‘security vulnerability assessment (SVA) would be conducted for each FPSO so that a
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See, eg, American Petroleum Institute (API), Security for Offshore Oil and Natural Gas Operations
(2003); API, Security Guidelines for the Petroleum Industry (3rd ed, 2005); API, Security Vulnerability
Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries (2nd ed, 2004). See also
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP), Guideline for Managing Marine Risks
Associated with FPSOs (2006); Oil Companies International Maritime Forum (OCIMF), Competence
Assurance Guidelines for FPSOs (2009).
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For example, Nigeria was the first African country to implement the ISPS Code, but the attacks against
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As discussed above, in the context of offshore petroleum security, the ISPS Code and
chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention only apply to MODUs engaged on international
voyages.80 The ISPS Code provides a methodology for security assessments so as to
have in place plans and procedures to react to changing security levels; detect and
assess security threats; ensure that adequate and proportionate maritime security
measures are in place; 81 and take preventive measures against security incidents
affecting MODUs and ships.82
In order to reduce vulnerabilities and be prepared to respond to security incidents, the
ISPS Code requires MODUs engaged on international voyages to be ‘subject to a
system of survey, verification, certification, and control to ensure that their security
measures are implemented’.

83

In particular, MODUs must undergo a security

assessment and are required to carry on board an SSP approved by the State of
registration (or the flag State, where applicable).84 A company operating MODUs must
designate a company security officer (CSO) for every MODU, and every MODU is
required to have a designated ship security officer (SSO).85 The CSO and the SSO are
required to undergo training in maritime security in accordance with the guidance given
in Part B of the ISPS Code.86 Upon verification of compliance with chapter XI-2 of the
SOLAS Convention and the ISPS Code, the MODU will be issued an International Ship
Security Certificate (ISSC), 87 valid for a period not exceeding five years. 88 MODUs
subject to the ISPS Code are also required to have a ship security alert system (SSAS)
fitted on board.89 This means that security systems and associated security equipment of
MODUs are subject to verification at least once every five years. There are also a
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ISPS Code Foreword.
82
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Ibid ss 11.1, 12.1.
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Ibid ss 13.1 and 13.2. See also Beckman, above n 2, 250.
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Ibid s 19.3.1.
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SOLAS Convention annex, reg XI-2/6.1.4. See also IMO, Guidance on Provision of Ship Security Alert
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number of procedural security requirements that a MODU will be subjected to as part of
the compliance with the ISPS Code.
The analysis of the ISPS Code has shown that most offshore petroleum installations do
not fall within the scope of the ISPS Code requirements, which is a major limitation of
the ISPS Code security framework with regard to security arrangements for offshore
petroleum installations.

4. Seafarer Identity Security Measures
Another post-9/11 initiative to enhance maritime security (which has some relevance to
the offshore industry security) was taken in the context of seafarer identification. It was
generally recognised that many seafarers carried false documents and that the systems
for identification used for seafarers in many developing countries were not secure.90
This led to the adoption of the 2003 SID Convention on 19 June 2003, which revised the
Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention 1958 (1958 SID Convention). 91 The main
purpose of the 2003 SID Convention is to create an internationally uniform standard for
identity documents of the world’s seafarers and cover security aspects relating to the
issuance and verification process for identity documents which would ultimately
improve the overall security of the global maritime transport industry.92 Seafarers have
been identified as an area of vulnerability in the shipping industry and the 2003 SID
Convention aims to address this vulnerability by introducing measures that make it
more difficult for a terrorist to assume the identity of a seafarer,93 which reduces the
likelihood of infiltration of the maritime industry by adversaries posing as legitimate
seafarers.
The 2003 SID Convention established new international standards for seafarers’ identity
documents (SIDs). State parties are required to comply with requirements for issuing
SIDs to their nationals. The first important aspect of the 2003 SID Convention is that it
requires a lot more information to be included in SIDs compared to the 1958 SID
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Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention 1958, opened for signature 13 May 1958, ILO Convention
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Convention requirements.94 The second, and probably even more significant, aspect of
the 2003 SID Convention is the requirement to use biometric features in SIDs.95 The
2003 SID Convention also requires States to develop national electronic databases on
seafarers and store in the database a record of each SID issued, suspended or withdrawn
by them. 96 The 2003 SID Convention provides for exchange of information between
States where there is a need for additional verification of the details of a seafarer.97
The 2003 SID Convention requires State parties to issue an SID to each of its nationals
who is a seafarer and makes an application to that effect.98 ‘Seafarer’ is defined as ‘any
person who is employed or is engaged or works in any capacity on board a vessel, other
than a ship of war, ordinarily engaged in maritime navigation’.99 The term ‘vessel’ is
not defined in the 2003 SID Convention, but the key criterion appears to be that a vessel
must be ‘ordinarily engaged in maritime navigation’. Offshore petroleum installations
are not ordinarily engaged in maritime navigation, but are ordinarily engaged in
offshore petroleum drilling, production, storage, or export activities, and they remain
stationary when they are operating on location (i.e. not ordinarily engaged in
navigation). 100 Neither fixed nor mobile offshore installations satisfy the ‘ordinarily
engaged in navigation’ criterion and therefore would not be considered as ‘vessels’ for
the purposes of the 2003 SID Convention. Consequently, offshore petroleum installation
workers would not be considered to be seafarers under the 2003 SID Convention, and
therefore do not fall within the scope of the 2003 SID Convention. Article 1(2) of the
2003 SID Convention clarifies that:
In the event of any doubt whether any categories of persons are to be regarded as
seafarers for the purpose of this Convention, the question shall be determined in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention by the competent authority of the
State of nationality or permanent residence of such persons after consulting with the
shipowners’ and seafarers’ organizations concerned’. 101
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One interpretation of this provision is that the question of whether some offshore
workers (such as the crew of a mobile offshore installation) could be considered to be
‘seafarers’ for the purposes of the 2003 SID Convention may be determined by
contracting States at the national level. However, even if a State decided to treat the
crews of mobile offshore installations as ‘seafarers’, it could only issue an SID to its
own nationals or permanent residents as provided for in Articles 2(1) and 2(3) of the
2003 SID Convention. It appears that the 2003 SID Convention framework for seafarers’
identity security measures was not intended to apply to offshore petroleum installation
workers.102
From the offshore petroleum security perspective, the main limitation of the 2003 SID
Convention is that it does not apply to offshore workers and there is no equivalent
international legal instrument dealing with identification documents for offshore
installation workers. The offshore industry employs an international workforce with
workers of diverse nationalities working on board offshore petroleum installations. A
diverse workforce on offshore petroleum installations and high staff turnover rate were
identified in Chapter 3 as an area of vulnerability of offshore petroleum installations;103
however, the international law does not address this vulnerability. In that regard, there is
currently a gap in the international regulatory framework for the protection of offshore
installations whereby security aspects relating to identity documents of offshore
workers and vulnerability relating to possible infiltration of the offshore industry by
adversaries.
Australia and the US have addressed this vulnerability on the national level by
implementing nation-wide systems of an identification document required for all
maritime industry workers including those working on offshore petroleum installations.
For example, in Australia the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security
Regulations 2003 (Cth) provide that persons working on offshore petroleum
installations and on board vessels that supply offshore installations are required to hold
102

See also 2003 SID Convention art 7(2). Article 7(2) provides that
[t]he seafarers’ identity document shall be promptly withdrawn by the issuing State if it is
ascertained that the seafarer no longer meets the conditions for its issue under this Convention.
Procedures for suspending or withdrawing seafarers’ identity documents shall be drawn up in
consultation with the representative shipowners’ and seafarers’ organizations and shall include
procedures for administrative appeal.
103
See discussion on vulnerabilities of offshore petroleum installations in Chapter 3.
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a maritime security identification card (MSIC) and are subjected to background checks
before they are issued with an MSIC. 104 Similarly, in the US, persons that require
unescorted access to offshore installations are required to hold the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). 105 These national security arrangements
relating to identification documents appear to be consistent with the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC) 106 since coastal States exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over offshore petroleum installations on the continental shelf and
can regulate access to offshore installations.107
Although the 2003 SID Convention does not directly apply to identity documents for
offshore workers, it is nevertheless relevant to the protection and security of offshore
petroleum installations. The 2003 SID Convention framework is designed to prevent
and deter the infiltration of the maritime workforce by terrorists and other adversaries
thereby enhancing security of the maritime industry. Enhanced maritime security would
contribute to the security of offshore petroleum installations, for instance, by reducing
the likelihood of a ship being used in the attack against an offshore installation.
Offshore petroleum installations often interact with ships including offshore supply
vessels servicing offshore installations and tankers loading directly from installations
such as FPSOs and FSOs. The 2003 SID Convention is not limited to seafarers working
on board any specific categories of ships,108 and therefore it would be applicable to crew
on board tankers and offshore supply vessels that come in direct contact with offshore
petroleum installations, as well as all other ships including those that may be navigating
in the vicinity of offshore installations. For example, as a protection measure, before a
tanker comes alongside an offshore installation to load its cargo, it may be required to
be boarded by security personnel to check identity documents of each crew member
104

Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Regulations 2003 (Cth) reg 6.07A. See also DIT,
Fact Sheet: Maritime Security Identification Cards (MSICs) (31 January 2011)
<http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/security/maritime/factsheets/msics.aspx> at 28 February
2011.
105
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Credential (TWIC): Program Information
<http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/twic/program_info.shtm> at 28 February 2011. See also
Maritime Transportation Security Act 46 USC §70105 (2002).
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833
UNTS 3, (entered into force 16 November 1994) (‘LOSC’).
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aboard that ship.109 As discussed in Chapter 3 above, fishing vessels sometimes fish in
close proximity to offshore installations and pose a security concern for offshore
installations.110 The 2003 SID Convention addresses this concern to an extent. Article
1(3) provides that the competent authority may apply the provisions of the 2003 SID
Convention to commercial maritime fishing and after consulting the representative
organisations of fishing-vessel owners and persons working on board fishing vessels.111
In practice, however, the success of the 2003 SID Convention framework will depend
on the ratification of the 2003 SID Convention by major maritime and seafaring
nations. 112 To address the threat of ‘internal sabotage’ posed to offshore petroleum
installations, 113 it may be desirable to extend the application of the 2003 SID
Convention to offshore petroleum industry workers or adopt a separate international
convention that would establish international standards for the security of offshore
workers’ identity documents.

5. SUA Amendments 2005
In parallel with the drafting of the ISPS Code and the SOLAS Convention amendments
of 2002, and pursuant to the IMO Assembly resolution A.924(22),114 the IMO Legal
Committee commenced a review of the 1988 SUA Treaties to consider possible
amendments to these instruments.115 A Correspondence Group led by the delegation of
the US was tasked to start work on the revision of the 1988 SUA Treaties.116 At the end
of 2003, the IMO decided to convene the international conference to revise the 1988
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Protocol’ (2005) 3 CMI Newsletter 8, 8. It was intended to bring the 1988 SUA Treaties in line with the
equivalent provisions of the three UN conventions, namely the International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997, the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism 1999, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism 2005: at 8–9.
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SUA Treaties.117 The Diplomatic Conference on the Revisions of the SUA Treaties was
held from 10-14 October 2005, and the texts of the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation118 and
the Protocol of 2005 to the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf 119 (2005 SUA
amendments)120 were officially adopted.121
The 2005 SUA amendments revise the original 1988 SUA Treaties and, according to
the IMO, ‘provide a welcome boost to the fight against terrorism’ and a much
strengthened ‘framework for legal action capable of ensuring that suspected terrorists
are apprehended and brought to trial wherever in the world they may seek to hide’.122
Importantly, all provisions of the 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol
have been retained unchanged and the 2005 SUA amendments simply added new
provisions such as new categories of offences. Accordingly, the analysis in the
following sections focuses only on the main aspects of the 2005 SUA amendments.123
5.1 SUA Convention 2005

The consolidated text of the 1988 SUA Convention and the 2005 Protocol to the 1988
SUA Convention had become known as the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 2005 (2005 SUA Convention).124 As at 1
117

IMO, Work Programme and Budget for the Twenty-Third Financial Period 2004-2005, A Res
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August 2011, there were 20 contracting States to the 2005 SUA Convention representing
approximately 30.14 per cent of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant shipping.125
One of the principal focuses of the new provisions of the 2005 SUA Convention is on
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and non-proliferation of such weapons. 126
Accordingly, a number of new offences specifically relating to WMD and their nonproliferation have been introduced by the 2005 amendments. The 2005 SUA Convention
does not use the terms ‘weapons of mass destruction’ or ‘WMD’, but instead, it adopts
the term ‘BCN weapon’ which consists of biological, chemical and nuclear (BCN)
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.127 Another new concept used in the 2005
SUA Convention is ‘serious injury or damage’, which means serious bodily injury, or
extensive destruction of an infrastructure facility resulting in major economic loss, or
substantial damage to the environment including air, soil, water, fauna and flora.128 The
term ‘infrastructure facility’ includes offshore petroleum installations.129
The 2005 SUA Convention contains three categories of new offences. 130 The first
category of new offences relates to using a ship as a weapon or as a means for
committing terrorist acts.131 The offences in this category include: using against a ship,
on a ship, or discharging from a ship any explosive, radioactive material or BCN
weapon; discharging oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), or other hazardous substances
from a ship in quantities that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or

thereto, shall constitute and be called the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2005 (2005 SUA Convention)’.
125
As at 1 August 2011, the contracting States to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 2005 (2005 SUA Convention) were: Algeria, Austria, Bulgaria,
Cook Islands, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Fiji, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, the
Netherlands, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Serbia, Spain,
Switzerland, Turkey, and Vanuatu: IMO, above n 6, 407.
126
Stuart Kaye, ‘International Measures to Protect Oil Platforms, Pipelines, and Submarine Cables from
Attack’ (2007) 31(2) Tulane Maritime Law Journal 377, 393.
127
See 2005 SUA Convention art 1(1)(d).
128
2005 SUA Convention art 1(1)(c).
129
Article 1(2)(a) of the 2005 SUA Convention provides that the term ‘infrastructure facility’ has the
same meaning as that given in the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
1997, opened for signature 12 January 1998, 2149 UNTS 284 (entered into force 23 May 2001) art 1(2).
The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997 defines ‘infrastructure
facility’ in Article 1(2) as ‘any publicly or privately owned facility providing or distributing services for
the benefit of the public, such as water, sewage, energy, fuel or communications.’
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2005 SUA Convention arts 3bis, 3ter, 3quater. See generally Calvin Lederer, ‘Combating Maritime
Terrorism: Developments in the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Affecting Maritime
Navigation’ (2004) CMI Yearbook 401.
131
2005 SUA Convention art 3bis(1)(a).

299

Chapter 6

Mikhail Kashubsky

damage; and using a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or damage.132
The threat to do any of these acts also constitutes an offence under the 2005 SUA
Convention.133 These offences require a specific knowledge and intent, and they also
require a ‘terrorist motive’ because the acts must be committed for the purpose of
intimidating a population or coercing a State or an international organisation.134
The second category of new offences deals with non-proliferation of WMD on the high
seas and addresses transport on board a ship of any explosives, radioactive substances,
BCN weapons, and other materials or equipment used in the design or manufacture of
WMD or BCN weapons.135 The offences in this category also require that a transporter
must have knowledge that explosives or radiological materials are intended to be used
to cause, or in a threat to cause, death or serious injury or damage for the purpose of
intimidating a population or coercing a State; and in the case of BCN weapons, the
requirement is only that a transporter knows the items to be such prohibited weapons.136
This category of offences appears to have little relevance to offshore petroleum
installations.137
The third category of new offences relates to the prohibition on transporting a person
alleged to have committed an offence under other UN anti-terrorism conventions. In
particular, it is an offence to transport a person on board a ship knowing that the person
has committed any of the offences under the 2005 SUA Convention (which also includes
offences under the 1988 SUA Convention), or an offence under any of another nine antiterrorism treaties listed in the annex, 138 and intending to assist that person to evade
132

2005 SUA Convention arts 3bis(1)(a)(i)–(iii).
Ibid art 3bis(1)(a)(iv).
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Ibid art 3bis(1)(a); Robert Beckman, ‘The 1988 SUA Convention and 2005 SUA Protocol: Tools to
Combat Piracy, Armed Robbery, and Maritime Terrorism’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and
Peter Lehr (eds), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2008) 187, 192.
135
2005 SUA Convention art 3bis(1)(b).
136
Ibid arts 3bis(1)(b), (2). See also Lederer, above n 130, 405.
137
Except for the situations where a mobile offshore installation may be used as a means of transporting
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
138
2005 SUA Convention annex. The annex lists the following nine anti-terrorism conventions:
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970, adopted 16 December 1970, 860
UNTS 12325 (entered into force 14 October 1971); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1971, adopted 23 September 1971, 974 UNTS 14118 (entered into
force 26 January 1973); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 1973, adopted 14 December 1973, 1035 UNTS 15410
(entered into force 20 February 1977); International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979,
adopted 17 December 1979, 1316 UNTS 205 (entered into force 3 June 1983); Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1979, adopted 17 December 1979, 1456 UNTS 24631 (entered
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criminal prosecution.139 This offence also requires ‘knowledge and intent’, which acts
as a safeguard mechanism to protect innocent transporters (including seafarers, masters,
owners, charterers and operators as well as operators of mobile offshore installations),
whereby a transporter must know that the person has committed an offence under any of
the specified conventions and also must intend to assist that person to escape
prosecution. Importantly, the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf 2005 (2005 SUA Platforms
Protocol) 140 is not listed in the annex, which means that it is not an offence to
knowingly transport a person who commits an offence under the 2005 SUA Platforms
Protocol, and intending to assist that person to evade criminal prosecution. 141 For
example, it will not be an offence under the 2005 SUA Convention to transport a person
who unlawfully and intentionally discharges a WMD, large quantities of oil, LNG, or
other hazardous or noxious substance from a fixed platform. However, there is a
provision to allow new UN anti-terrorism conventions to be added to the list in the
annex.142
The 2005 SUA Convention also makes it an offence to attempt to commit an offence
under the 2005 SUA Convention, participate as an accomplice, organise, direct others to
commit an offence under the 2005 SUA Convention, or contribute to the commission of
one or more offences by a group of persons acting with a common purpose,
intentionally and either with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal
purpose of the group, or in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit an
offence under the 2005 SUA Convention. 143 The new offences in the 2005 SUA

into force 8 February 1987); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports
Serving International Civil Aviation 1988 (supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1971), adopted 24 February 1988, 1589 UNTS 473
(entered into force 6 August 1989); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf 1988, opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS
304 (entered into force 1 March 1992); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings 1997, opened for signature 12 January 1998, 2149 UNTS 284 (entered into force 23 May
2001); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, opened for signature
9 December 1999, 39 ILM 270 (entered into force 10 April 2002).
139
2005 SUA Convention art 3ter.
140
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the
Continental Shelf 2005, opened for signature 14 February 2006, IMO Doc LEG/CONF.15/22 (entered
into force 28 July 2010) (‘2005 SUA Platforms Protocol’).
141
Article 3ter of the 2005 SUA Convention does not apply mutatis mutandis to the 2005 SUA Platforms
Protocol. This is a shortcoming of the 2005 SUA Convention.
142
2005 SUA Convention art 22.
143
Ibid arts 3quater(b)–(e).
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Convention go beyond the scope of the 1988 SUA Convention, which focused
exclusively on acts that endangered the safety of maritime navigation.144
The 2005 SUA Convention also provides for contracting States to take necessary
measures to impose civil, criminal or administrative sanctions on legal entities whose
senior managers or individuals in control commit, in that capacity, an offence under the
2005 SUA Convention.145 Such sanctions are to be imposed in accordance with domestic
legal principles of a State where a legal entity in question is located or incorporated, and
can be in the form of monetary sanctions, but will not prejudice criminal liability of
individuals who have actually committed an offence.146 In the context of the offshore
petroleum industry, it means that oil companies or offshore service providers (or any
other companies or organisations) whose senior management may be involved in or
linked to maritime terrorist activities to which the 2005 SUA Convention applies, may
be subject to penalties under domestic law.
Another important aspect of the 2005 SUA Convention is that it establishes a shipboarding framework,147 whereby the boarding provisions afford a limited right to State
parties to board on the high seas, and in the EEZ, ships flying the flag of another State
party, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a ship or a person on board
that ship has been or is about to be involved in the commission of an offence under the
2005 SUA Convention. 148 The purpose of the ship-boarding provisions is to create
boarding arrangements that would enable contracting States to take action in order to
prevent or suppress the commission of offences.149 These ship-boarding provisions are
consistent with existing principles of international law, particularly the LOSC. The
sovereignty of coastal States and jurisdictional rights of flag States are preserved as
boarding can only take place seaward of any State’s territorial sea and only with the
express consent of the flag State.150 There is no obligation on the part of the flag State to
permit the requested action, but if the flag State decides to give its authorisation to the
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See also Beckman, above n 134, 192.
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Ibid art 8bis(5). See also Shaw, above n 116, 9.
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Lederer, above n 130, 408.
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2005 SUA Convention arts 8bis(5)(a)–(c). See also Beckman, above n 134, 194; Lederer, above n 130,
409.
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boarding, it may impose conditions on the boarding State.151 In addition, the boarding
provisions contain a comprehensive set of safeguards designed to prevent undue
interferences with shipping.152
The provisions relating to extradition and cooperation have also been extended by the
2005 amendments. The 2005 SUA Convention explicitly provides that the offences are
not considered to be political offences for the purposes of extradition and extradition
may not be refused solely because the offence may have some political connotation.153
The 2005 SUA Convention also includes an anti-discrimination provision whereby the
extradition and legal assistance obligations do not apply if the request for extradition is
believed to have been made for the purpose of prosecuting a person on the basis of race,
religion, nationality, ethnicity, political opinion or gender. 154 The provisions dealing
with jurisdiction States in the 2005 SUA Convention are identical to those in the 1988
SUA Convention.155
Like in the 1988 SUA Convention, the term ‘ship’ in the 2005 SUA Convention includes
mobile offshore petroleum installations, which makes the 2005 SUA Convention
applicable to violent acts involving all types of mobile offshore installations. 156
However, it is not clear whether the 2005 SUA Convention applies to mobile offshore
installations when they operating on location.157
5.2 SUA Protocol 2005

The consolidated text of the 1988 SUA Protocol and the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA
Protocol had become known as the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf 2005 (2005 SUA
Platforms Protocol).158 As at 1 August 2011, there were 16 contracting States to the
151

2005 SUA Convention arts 8bis(5), (7).
See 2005 SUA Convention art 8bis(10).
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2005 SUA Convention art 11bis.
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Ibid art 11ter.
155
2005 SUA Platforms Protocol art 6. The 2005 SUA amendments did not change the provisions dealing
with the jurisdiction of States.
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2005 SUA Convention art 1(1)(a). The term ‘ship’ is defined in Article 1(1)(a) as ‘a vessel of any type
whatsoever not permanently attached to the seabed, including dynamically supported craft, submersibles,
or any other floating craft’.
157
This is the ambiguity discussed in Chapter 5 above in relation to the 1988 SUA Convention.
158
See 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Protocol art 6(2). Article 6(2) states: ‘Articles 1 to 4 of the 1988
Protocol, as revised by this Protocol, together with articles 8 to 13 of this Protocol shall constitute and be
called the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf, 2005 (2005 SUA Fixed Platforms Protocol)’.
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2005 SUA Platforms Protocol representing approximately 29.4 per cent of the gross
tonnage of the world’s merchant shipping.159 The 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol applies
to fixed offshore installations located on the continental shelf.160 The new provisions in
the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol reflect those in the 2005 SUA Convention and follow
a similar pattern, but are less wide-ranging. 161 Many of the 2005 SUA Convention
provisions including those relating to extradition and prosecution apply mutatis
mutandis to the offences of the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol,162 that is, to the offences
committed on board or against fixed platforms located on the continental shelf.163
The list of offences in the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol has been broadened. In
particular, new offences include using against or on a fixed installation or discharging
from an installation any explosive, radioactive material or BNC weapon in a manner
which causes or is likely to cause death, damage or serious injury; or releasing oil, gas
or other hazardous substances from a fixed installation in such quantities or
concentration that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage.164 The
threat to undertake such acts is also an offence.165 Unlawfully and intentionally injuring
or killing any person in connection with any of the offences,166 attempting to commit an
offence, participating as an accomplice, organising, directing others to commit an
offence, or preparing for the commission of such offences individually or as part of a
group is also considered to be an offence under the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol.167
State parties are required to take necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in
their territories or organised under their laws to be held liable and face civil, criminal or
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As at 1 August 2011, the contracting States to the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol are: Algeria, Austria,
Bulgaria, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Fiji, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Netherlands,
Panama, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Spain, Switzerland and Vanuatu: IMO, above n 6, 420.
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2005 SUA Platforms Protocol arts 1(1), 1(3).
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Kaye, above n 126, 394.
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2005 SUA Platforms Protocol art 1(1).
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Ibid art 1(1). However, by virtue of Article 1(2), the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol can apply to fixed
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administrative sanctions when an individual in control of management of such an entity
has, in that capacity, committed an offence under the Protocol.168
The provisions on jurisdiction remained unchanged in the 2005 SUA Platforms
Protocol,169 and are the same as in the 1988 SUA Protocol. There are two categories of
jurisdiction: obligatory and discretionary. A State party must assert its jurisdiction over
the offences when its nationals are the offenders or the offence is committed on board or
against a fixed offshore petroleum installation located on its continental shelf.170 The
discretionary jurisdiction may be asserted by a State party when the offence is
committed by a stateless person who resides in that State, or against nationals of that
State, or when the offence was committed to intimidate or coerce that State.171
Although there is greater scope for cooperation in dealing with the offences under the
2005 SUA Platforms Protocol, 172 there are no equivalent provisions on boarding of
offshore installations to those ship-boarding provisions established under the 2005 SUA
Convention. The 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol provides that the rules of international
law pertaining to fixed platforms located on the continental shelf are not affected in any
way, 173 which implies that the power to board a fixed platform located on the
continental shelf to respond to an offence or an attack is vested in the coastal State
pursuant to the LOSC.174 The logic ‘seems to be based on the assumption that a coastal
State would always have the capacity to take action with respect to platforms under its
jurisdiction’.175 However, in reality, this may not always be the case.176 Kaye has noted
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International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand (Routledge, 2010) 186, 189.
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that the ‘absence of such [a boarding] provision would not prevent a coastal State from
giving a third State an ad hoc authorization to board its installation’.177
5.3 Issues applicable to both 2005 SUA Treaties

The above analysis of the 2005 SUA amendments has revealed that although the scope
of the 2005 SUA Convention and the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol has generally
expanded, the focus of the amendments was not so much on offshore petroleum
installations. In the context of offshore petroleum security, it appears that the 2005 SUA
amendments do not provide any significant enhancements to security of offshore
installations. Inclusion of new offences relating to discharging of WMD, explosives and
other hazardous or noxious substances such as oil and LNG from ships and offshore
petroleum installations (both mobile and fixed) that cause death or serious injury or
damage to the environment broadens the range of offences involving offshore
installations and represents an improvement.
With the introduction of the ship-boarding provisions, there is now a wider scope for
prevention and enforcement of the offences under the 2005 SUA Convention, 1988 SUA
Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol. However, the limitations of and gaps in the
1988 SUA Convention (identified in Chapter 5 above) have not been addressed by the
2005 amendments and were carried on to the 2005 SUA Convention and the 2005 SUA
Platforms Protocol. There still remain some important loopholes particularly with
respect to enforcement and arrest powers, especially when non-nationals or foreign
flagged ships are involved.178 The SUA framework still remains primarily focused on
the punishment and not on prevention.
As mentioned in regard to the 1988 SUA Treaties, the effectiveness of the SUA
framework, including the 2005 SUA amendments, depends upon individual States
complying with their obligations and making the offences punishable under national
laws. The 2005 SUA Convention and the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol both entered
into force on 28 July 2010;179 however, so far these new SUA instruments have not
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gained much popularity in the international community.180 It remains to be seen how
long it takes for the 2005 SUA Convention and the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol to
receive world-wide acceptance and implementation.181

6. Long-Range Identification and Tracking of Ships
After the adoption of the ISPS Code in December 2002, the IMO began working on the
development of the system for global surveillance of maritime traffic to address the
perceived security threat posed by ships.182 In May 2006, at its 81st session, the MSC
adopted resolution 202(81), which established regulation V/19-1 on LRIT. 183 Also
adopted at the same session were resolution 210(81)184 on performance standards and
functional requirements for the LRIT, and resolution 211(81)185 on arrangements for the
timely establishment of the LRIT system.
LRIT is a multilateral information sharing system for State parties to the SOLAS
Convention, which serves as an additional measure to enhance security in the maritime
arena, complementary to the ISPS Code.186 The system is designed for the purpose of
tracking, identifying and classifying vessels.187 It aims to provide an additional tool for
detecting security threats and taking preventive measures against security incidents
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Security’) 2.
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Agenda Item 25, IMO Doc MSC 81/25/Add.1 (1 June 2006) annex 14 (‘Arrangements for the Timely
Establishment of the Long-Range Identification and Tracking System’).
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IMO, International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974: May 2006 Amendments
LRIT <http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?topic_id=257&doc_id=647#lrit> at 20 September
2010.
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affecting ships, port facilities and offshore installations.188 Ships covered by the LRIT
are required to automatically transmit LRIT information consisting of the ship’s
identity, position (latitude and longitude), and date and time of the position.189 LRIT
information will be made available only to flag States, 190 port States, 191 and coastal
States. Coastal States are entitled to receive LRIT information about ships of other
contracting States navigating within 1000 nautical miles of their coast even when such
ships are not intending to enter a port or place under the jurisdiction of that coastal
State, provided that such ships are not within the internal waters or archipelagic waters
of another contracting State.192 Furthermore, a coastal State is not entitled to receive
LRIT information about ships located within the territorial sea of the contracting State
whose flag the ship is entitled to fly.193 As pointed out by Tsamenyi and Palma, the
legal basis for allowing coastal States to receive LRIT information from a distance
beyond 200 nautical miles from the coast is provided by ‘the prescriptive powers of
coastal states in various maritime zones of jurisdiction under international law’,
particularly the LOSC.194
The LRIT regulation is included in chapter V of the SOLAS Convention as a mandatory
requirement for passenger ships of any size including high-speed passenger craft, cargo
ships including high-speed craft of 300 gross tonnage and above, and MODUs, but only
when these ships and MODUs are engaged on international voyages. 195 The LRIT
system has a limited scope in terms of the types of ships and installations that are
188
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FPSOs and FSOs in cases where tankers load petroleum directly from such offshore installations.
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covered by the LRIT regulation. MODUs that are engaged in drilling operations on
location and other types of mobile offshore installations such as FPSOs and FSOs
(whether they are on location or in transit) are not covered by the LRIT system. Any
vessels that are not engaged on international voyages, regardless of their size, are not
required to transmit LRIT data. This includes offshore supply and support vessels (most
of which are above 300 gross tonnage) and shuttle tankers that only navigate between
installations and ports of the same coastal State. More importantly, the LRIT system
does not apply to fishing vessels and vessels of smaller sizes such as small fishing
boats, recreational motor boats and small yachts. However, these fishing and smaller
vessels often represent the main security concern for offshore installations, considering
the large number of such vessels transiting close to shore and the fact that fishing
vessels sometimes come very close to offshore installations.196In fact, the past attacks
against offshore installations were almost exclusively carried out using small vessels.197
This is a significant limitation of the LRIT system.
In the context of offshore petroleum security, the LRIT system can be useful because it
allows coastal States to assess possible security threats posed by ships to offshore
installations and, if necessary, take certain pre-emptive measures to deter a threat.198
However, there are some doubts as to whether LRIT information is sufficient to enable
States to make a meaningful assessment of a potential security threat posed by a
particular ship.199 Importantly, the LRIT regulation ‘does not create or affirm any new
rights of States over ships beyond those existing in international law’, particularly the
LOSC, ‘nor does it alter or affect the rights, jurisdiction, duties and obligations of
States’ set out in the LOSC.200 In the event that a coastal State has, on the basis of LRIT
information, identified a vessel as a threat to an offshore installation under its

196

Tsamenyi and Palma, above n 188, 217. Tsamenyi and Palma further point out that although some
fishing vessels are under national or regional vessel monitoring systems (VMS) and some are subjected to
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jurisdiction, the right to take enforcement action is regulated by general rules of
international law, particularly the LOSC.201
The LRIT regulation entered into force on 1 January 2008 and the LRIT system
implementation compliance date was 31 December 2008, which gave the contracting
States one year to set up and test the system, and ship operators and MODU operators
one year to fit new equipment or upgrade existing equipment so that their ships and/or
MODUs can transmit LRIT information.202 However, due to a number of unresolved
practical, financial and legal issues, the timely implementation of the LRIT system was
delayed, and the system is not fully operational yet.203

7. Other Post-9/11 Regulatory Initiatives
There have been several other post-9/11 regulatory initiatives which have some
relevance to the protection and security of offshore petroleum installations. These
include Draft Guidelines for National Legislation on Maritime Acts, the completion of
the IMO Guidelines on Security Arrangements of Non-SOLAS Vessels, a proposal to
develop Model National Legislation on Maritime Security, and the IMO consideration
relating to the extension of safety zones around offshore installation beyond 500 metres.
7.1 IMO guidelines on security arrangements of non-SOLAS vessels

Non-SOLAS and non-ISPS vessels also pose a considerable threat to offshore
installations, and non-applicability of the ISPS Code to such vessels leaves a gap in the
regulatory framework. Offshore petroleum operations often take place in areas
frequented by small vessels,204 and the history of attacks against offshore installations
shows that most attacks are carried out using small vessels, particularly speed boats.205
In late 2006, the MSC, at its 82nd session, began consideration of issues relating to
security aspects of ships which do not fall within the scope of the ISPS Code and
chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention.206 It concluded that non-SOLAS vessels operate
in the same maritime environment with vessels that are subject to mandatory security
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requirements, and that ‘the operations of the former affect the security of the latter’.207 It
was also agreed that it was necessary to develop non-mandatory guidelines to address
security aspects of non-SOLAS vessels in order ‘to achieve a tangible enhancement of
the global security net’.208
Accordingly, the IMO established a Correspondence Group to study the scope of the
issues and threats and to develop recommendatory guidelines which would be
complementary to the existing requirements of chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code and
could be utilised by the contracting States at their own discretion.209 In particular, the
Correspondence Group was tasked, inter alia, to define the scope of threat to nonSOLAS ships, threat posed by non-SOLAS ships to SOLAS ships, and threat posed by
non-SOLAS ships to port facilities and onshore and offshore petroleum installations.210
In addition, it was tasked to categorise the types of non-SOLAS ships that the guidelines
are intended for, prepare draft guidelines including a list of possible security measures
and best practices for non-SOLAS ships, and identify what additional guidance, if any,
might be offered to ISPS Code compliant ships and port facilities in relation to the
interface with non-SOLAS ships. 211 It was also subsequently proposed to develop
voluntary guidance addressing issues such as prevention of unauthorised access to or
theft or hijack of non-SOLAS vessels, providing a means for the raising of security
alerts, and reporting suspicious activity, as well as preventing non-SOLAS vessels from
being used to attack ISPS Code compliant ships and port facilities.
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Correspondence Group produced a report with a set of specific guidelines intended for
commercial non-passenger vessels, passenger vessels, fishing vessels, and pleasure
craft, as well as harbour and port authorities.213 These non-mandatory guidelines were
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subsequently approved and adopted by the MSC, but it was stressed that they should not
be interpreted as the basis for regulation of non-SOLAS vessels and related facilities.214
Offshore installations are not mentioned in these guidelines.
There have also been some national and regional initiatives to enhance security of ships
to which the ISPS Code does not apply. For example, in Southeast Asia, the regional
maritime program has concluded a report on fishing boats and security, noting that the
ISPS Code does not apply to fishing vessels.215 Singapore is trying to implement the
Harbour Craft Transponder System (HARTS) for craft operating in the port of
Singapore.216 The US has produced the Small Vessel Security Strategy, which provides
a coherent framework to improve maritime security by enhancing security of small
vessels.217
7.2 Draft Guidelines for National Legislation on Maritime Criminal Acts

In 2005, the Joint International Working Group on Uniformity of Laws Concerning
Acts of Piracy and Maritime Violence (JIWG) on the acts of piracy and maritime
violence was reconstituted by the Comité Maritime International (CMI) to examine
issues of serious maritime crime beyond piracy and armed robbery as well as various
jurisdictional aspects not previously considered.218 After several meetings held on this
topic, which included various representatives of the JIWG, it was resolved that the 2001
Model National Law on Acts of Piracy and Maritime Violence (Model National Law)219
should be revised to bring it up to date with the post-9/11 security environment to cover
terrorism, kidnapping for ransom from ships, piracy, other maritime violent acts and
take into account the ISPS Code.220 The JIWG has also reached the conclusion that the
Model National Law needs to ensure compatibility with the 2005 SUA amendments and
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address jurisdiction over and prosecution of criminal acts that fall outside the scope of
the 2005 SUA Convention and the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol.221
Over the following two years (2005-07), the JIWG worked on this matter and in 2007
produced the Draft Guidelines for National Legislation on Maritime Criminal Acts
(Draft Guidelines for National Legislation),222 which is another non-binding initiative
relating to maritime and offshore security that can be used by States to deal with the
wide range of criminal acts now threatening the international maritime community.223
The Draft Guidelines for National Legislation are largely based on the 2001 Model
National Law, but have a considerably broader scope. 224 They are intended to be a
benchmark against which the content and effect of national law may be measured.225 In
the introductory comments to the Draft Guidelines for National Legislation, the JIWG
noted with appreciation that many States have adopted provisions of the 1988 SUA
Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol in their national law, but pointed out that many
existing national laws do not directly track the provisions of the 1988 SUA Convention
and the 1988 SUA Protocol and stressed the need for uniform legislation clearly
applicable to serious maritime criminal acts as well as acts of piracy and armed
robbery.226 The JIWG also urged States to ratify and adopt into national law the 2005
SUA Treaties.227
The Draft Guidelines for National Legislation contain guidance provisions on offshore
installations. The term ‘maritime structure’ in the Draft Guidelines for National
Legislation includes ‘any floating or fixed artefact that is connected to the seabed, other
than a ship at anchor or temporary moored’. 228 This definition would include most
types of offshore installations; however, it is not clear whether drill ships and FSOs
would fall within the scope of the definition of ‘maritime structure’ because they are
221
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usually temporarily moored or anchored at offshore sites, and they are not usually
connected to the seabed. On the other hand, drill ships and FSOs may fall within the
definition of ‘ship’ which includes ‘any type of vessel or other water craft’.229 The Draft
Guidelines for National Legislation also contain a term ‘maritime criminal act’ which
includes a range of offences such as violence against persons on board an offshore
installation; kidnapping of offshore workers; hijacking of an offshore installation;
damage or destruction of an offshore installation; use of explosives to destroy or
damage an offshore installation; endangering the environment or causing marine
pollution; and even theft of offshore installations or property on board; as well as an act
of and all offences included in the 2005 SUA Treaties. 230 Acts of piracy within the
meaning of the LOSC and under applicable customary international law are also listed
as offences (separate to maritime criminal acts).231
The guiding provisions on jurisdiction and prosecution of the offences are contained in
Article II, which provides, inter alia, that States shall prosecute offences committed on
or against an offshore installation licensed by or operating under the jurisdiction of the
‘enacting State’,232 and if committed within the territory, internal waters or territorial
sea, and to the degree that the exercise of national jurisdiction is permitted by the
Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958,233 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone 1958, 234 the Convention on the High Seas 1958 235 or the LOSC,
within the exclusive economic zone, continental shelf, contiguous zone or archipelagic
waters, and on the high seas or in any place outside the jurisdiction of any State.236
Jurisdiction to prosecute can also be established by the State apprehending or having
custody of the accused person, the State of nationality of the accused person, the State
of nationality of the victim, the port State where it has been requested to intervene by
persons on board the foreign ship when the ship is located in a port, and the State in
229
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whose port or place under national jurisdiction the offence has disturbed the peace and
tranquillity.237The Draft Guidelines for National Legislation also deal with extradition,
punishment for maritime criminal acts and acts of piracy, forfeiture, restitution and
reporting of incidents.238
It is important to stress that the Draft Guidelines for National Legislation are simply a
draft guidance document which can be used by States to assist in development of the
national legislation. The Draft Guidelines for National Legislation have been submitted
to the IMO’s Legal Committee for consideration, but no further action has been taken so
far in that regard by the IMO. 239 Nevertheless, the Draft Guidelines for National
Legislation may provide a useful guide for States in drafting their national legislation
dealing with serious maritime crimes, especially to developing States that may require
assistance in preparing such legislation.
7.3 Model national legislation on maritime security

The MSC at its 82nd session had agreed to recommend the inclusion, as a high-level
action, of the development of model legislation on maritime security,240 but it pointed
out that such model legislation on maritime security would have to be flexible enough
to take into account the diversity of legal systems and the legal status of the operators of
port facilities (i.e. State-owned or private port facilities).241 The MSC noted that the onsite visits conducted by the UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee in relation to the
implementation of the provisions of UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001)242 had revealed in a
significant number of cases that the required national legislation implementing the
provisions of the ISPS Code and chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention ‘was either
absent or inadequate or was based or dependant [sic] on national laws which, in some
cases, were enacted at the beginning of the 1900s’.243 It was agreed that with a view of
237
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assisting contracting States to the SOLAS Convention in order to improve the situation,
model legislation would be very useful.244 It is not clear at this stage whether this model
national legislation will address any security aspects of offshore petroleum installations,
but the inclusion of some provisions dealing with the security of offshore petroleum
installations would be useful.
7.4 Extension of safety zones around offshore installations beyond 500
metres

As discussed in Chapter 5 above, Article 60(5) of the LOSC provides that safety zones
around offshore installations must be limited to 500 metres in breadth unless a larger
distance is authorised by generally accepted international standards or recommended by
the ‘competent international organization’, which is the IMO. 245 In other words, the
IMO can make recommendations relating to the establishment of safety zones larger
than 500 metres around offshore petroleum installations in the EEZ.246 Such an action
by the IMO would not require an amendment to the LOSC because the IMO, being the
competent international organisation, is already authorised, under Article 60(5) of the
LOSC, to make recommendations on the establishment of safety zones larger than 500
metres.
Between 2008 and 2010, the IMO was considering the issue of extension of the safety
zones to more than 500 metres around offshore installations.247 In 2008, Brazil and the
US proposed to the IMO that comprehensive guidelines be developed for the
assessment of requests for safety zones larger than 500 metres around offshore
installations in the EEZ, and provided an example of such guidelines.248 This issue was
included as a high priority item in the work programme of the IMO Sub-Committee on
Safety of Navigation (NAV).249 A Correspondence Group was established to develop
244
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relevant IMO guidelines for recommending safety zones larger than 500 metres around
offshore installations in the EEZ (including multiple structure installations) because
there are currently no international standards to assess the requests by States to the IMO
to recommend safety zones larger than 500 metres.250
It should be noted that the development of guidelines for consideration of requests for
extension of the breadth of safety zones around installations was contemplated in the
context of safety of navigation and safety of offshore installations, and not in the
context of security of offshore installations. 251 However, such guidelines were
ultimately not adopted nor developed, partly because there had been views that
increasing the breadths of safety zones might in fact degrade navigation safety around
multiple installations instead of improving it,252 but mainly because it was felt that there
was no demonstrated need to establish safety zones larger than 500 metres.253 Instead of
developing the guidelines for recommending safety zones larger than 500 metres, in
2010 the NAV prepared a draft safety of navigation circular on Guidelines for Safety
Zones and Safety of Navigation around Offshore Installations and Structures, which
was submitted to the MSC for adoption and circulation to the IMO members.254 The
guidelines are aimed at increasing awareness of the availability and best use of existing
routeing measures to prevent serious damage to installations or to the marine
environment in the event of a collision.255
To date, no other maximum distance other than 500 metres has been agreed by the
international community, and the IMO has not made any official recommendations on
the extension of safety zones beyond 500 metres, but it was recognised that the need for
extension of safety zones beyond 500 metres might be necessary in the future.256
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8. Conclusions
The post-9/11 international legal framework for maritime security primarily consists of
Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention, the ISPS Code, the 2005 SUA amendments,
the LRIT regulation, and the 2003 SID Convention. Other regulatory maritime security
initiatives that have some relevance to security of offshore installations include the
Draft Guidelines for National Legislation, Guidelines on Security Arrangements of
Non-SOLAS Vessels produced by the IMO, and the Model Legislation on Maritime
Security, which is currently being developed by the IMO.
The new (i.e. post-9/11) maritime security measures, including the ISPS Code and the
SOLAS Convention amendments, gave new rights and responsibilities to coastal and
port States and placed new obligations on flag States, shipping companies, and in some
cases oil companies; and these new regulatory measures appear to be consistent and
compliant with the existing rules of international law, particularly the LOSC.
The analysis of the post-9/11 international legal framework for maritime security has
shown that the framework is primarily aimed at enhancing the security of international
shipping. The new regulatory measures for maritime security have only limited
application to offshore petroleum installations and a marginal effect on operators of
offshore petroleum installations. Accordingly, the post-9/11 international regulatory
framework does not adequately address the protection and security of offshore
installations and the onus of implementing regulatory security measures for offshore
petroleum installations appears to have been placed on individual States.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
1. Introduction
This chapter summarises the principal findings of the study. The chapter then provides
several suggestions for regulatory reform in order to improve the international
regulatory framework for the protection of offshore petroleum installations. The chapter
concludes by providing directions for further research in this field of study.
The evolution of the petroleum industry has been traditionally associated with many
controversies. While oil has been a source of prosperity and economic growth in some
countries, in other countries it has generated problems such as environmental
contamination and degradation, corruption, poverty, and social conflicts. In general,
petroleum companies have attracted a negative image, and attitudes of the public
towards oil companies are often adverse. Throughout its history, the oil and gas industry
has been the subject of environmental protests, labour disputes, and tensions with local
communities. It has also been a target of various violent activities, ranging from
vandalism to political violence, which have impinged on the security of oil industry as a
whole.
Offshore petroleum security challenges are only expected to grow in the years ahead1 as
a result of community, social, economic and environmental expectations, and increasing
global competition for access to offshore petroleum resources. Offshore oil and gas
resources are being exploited with greater intensity and the vulnerabilities of offshore
petroleum installations to deliberate attacks correspondingly have greater implications
for the world’s economy and security generally.2 The fact is that the world is still so
much dependent on hydrocarbons that the industry will continue to press on with
offshore drilling and production whatever the security risks, within manageable
proportions.3

1

See Daniel Yergin, ‘Ensuring Energy Security’ (2006) 85(2) Foreign Affairs 69, 79.
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2. The Study
The primary aim of this study was to examine security threats to offshore petroleum
installations, factors that make offshore installations attractive targets, and the
international legal framework for the protection and security of offshore petroleum
installations. The analysis of attractiveness included vulnerabilities of offshore
installations and potential impacts of attacks on offshore installations. Past attacks and
security incidents involving offshore petroleum installations as well as possible
scenarios of offshore attacks were examined as part of the analysis.
The analysis of the international regulatory framework for the protection and security of
offshore installations focused on examination of the rights, obligations and jurisdiction
of States in relation to the protection and security of offshore installations under various
international conventions, legal instruments and other regulatory initiatives. The legal
status of offshore installations in international law was also examined.

3. Principal Findings
A number of observations have been made and the analysis revealed some findings,
which will now be summarised. The introductory chapter (Chapter 1) of the thesis
provided an overview of the global offshore petroleum industry and violence associated
with the petroleum industry generally. It introduced the concept of offshore petroleum
security and highlighted global concerns relating to the security of offshore petroleum
installations. Chapter 1 also outlined the purpose, scope and significance of the thesis.
The discussion in the subsequent chapters focused on the global offshore petroleum
security environment and the international legal framework for the protection of
offshore petroleum installations.
Chapter 2 analysed offshore security threats and their nature. In this analysis, offshore
security threats were grouped into eight categories namely: piracy, terrorism,
insurgency, organised crime, vandalism, civil protest, internal sabotage, and inter-State
hostilities. Each of these categories was discussed in light of the motivations and
objectives of perpetrators, their capabilities and tactics, as well as geographical and
other enabling factors relevant to a particular threat category. This formed the basis of
the risk assessment framework for offshore security threats and helped to evaluate the
risk rating of each category of threats.
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One of the most significant findings in Chapter 2 is that geographical factors play an
important role in the assessment of risks to offshore petroleum installations. Some of
the offshore security threats, such as piracy and insurgency, are geographically specific
(i.e. present a risk only in certain countries or regions) while other threats, such as
terrorism, are not limited by geography and have international scope. Further, different
types of security threats are faced by offshore installations depending on the
geographical area or region where they are located, and some countries or regions may
be considered high-risk areas for offshore installations and petroleum companies
generally. In particular, it was concluded that oil companies operating in economically
and politically unstable countries and in countries with civil unrest or armed conflict are
more likely to be attacked than companies operating in more stable countries.
It was also concluded that insurgency is the most serious threat faced by offshore
petroleum installations. The history of offshore attacks indicates that a substantial
proportion of attacks against offshore installations were carried out by insurgency
groups,4 and that attacks by insurgents could be very destructive. However, insurgency
is geographically specific and is a domestic type of threat, which means that it only
poses a risk in countries where domestic insurgency exists. Terrorism is also a very
significant threat to offshore petroleum installations. Terrorism is not geographically
limited so it poses a risk to offshore installations anywhere in the world, and the impacts
of terrorist attacks on offshore installations can be quite devastating. Piracy and
organised crime pose only minor risks to offshore petroleum installations, and the
threats of internal sabotage, vandalism and civil protest, and inter-Sate hostilities pose
moderate level risk to offshore installations.
Chapter 3 examined the attractiveness of offshore petroleum installations as potential
targets for attack. The analysis identified a number of inherent vulnerabilities of
offshore installations and potential consequences of attacks on offshore installations.
The analysis demonstrated that physical, technical, and operational characteristics of
offshore installations make them very vulnerable to deliberate attacks. These
vulnerabilities, coupled with potential impacts of attacks, make offshore petroleum
installations more attractive targets.

4
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Attacks on offshore installations can generate a range of impacts and may result in
damage or destruction of the installations, human casualties, environmental harm,
disruption of petroleum supplies, and economic and financial losses. Depending of the
type and size of an offshore petroleum installation, its petroleum production rate, and its
importance to national and global petroleum supplies, and the tactics used by
perpetrators, the attack may have local, national, regional and international effects.
However, so far, the study shows that there have not been any offshore security
incidents or attacks that have had profound long-term impacts. It was argued that, in
light of the increasing demand for offshore oil and gas resources and the importance of
the petroleum industry for the global and national economies, attacks on offshore
installations will almost always have some kind of economic impacts, so offshore
installations will continue to be attractive targets for causing economic damage.
The analysis of past attacks and security incidents has revealed that compared to
onshore petroleum installations, attacks involving offshore petroleum installations are
relatively rare.5 However, attacks and security incidents involving offshore installations
have significantly increased in recent years, especially since 2004. 6 The potential
impacts of attacks make offshore petroleum installations more justifiable and commonly
selected targets.7 However, it should be noted that the increase in attacks since 2004 is
largely attributed to the violent campaign of Nigerian insurgents against the offshore
petroleum industry in the Gulf of Guinea.8
Armed intrusion and seizure of offshore installations, abduction of offshore workers,
and attacks using explosives or bombs are the most common attack scenarios on
offshore installations. It was concluded that, in general, all scenarios of attacks on
offshore installations present a relatively high degree of difficulty for perpetrators.
Notwithstanding the attractiveness of offshore petroleum installations as potential
targets, there are a number of mitigating factors making it more difficult to carry out
attacks on offshore installations. One of the main mitigating factors is that the offshore

5
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environment presents some significant operational and tactical difficulties for
adversaries in mounting offshore attacks.9
The protection and security of offshore petroleum installations has national security
implications for coastal States in whose offshore waters offshore operations take place.
This means that security arrangements associated with the offshore industry should not
be overlooked or neglected. Coastal States (together with oil companies) need to
establish appropriate security measures to address the most significant threats in their
offshore environment and reduce vulnerabilities of their offshore petroleum
infrastructure (through development and establishment of adequate maritime security
arrangements at the national level). It was concluded in Chapter 3 that it is practically
impossible to eliminate all vulnerabilities and to protect all offshore installations to the
same degree. Therefore, the emphasis should be on protecting offshore petroleum
installations that are more likely to cause the most severe impacts, if attacked.
Chapter 4 analysed the legal status of offshore petroleum installations in international
law. Two key issues were considered in Chapter 4. The first issue is whether offshore
petroleum installations can be considered as ‘ships’ in certain circumstances. The
second main issue is whether offshore petroleum installations can be considered as
‘ports’ in some circumstances. As part of the analysis of these issues, different types of
offshore petroleum installations were examined in some detail.
In relation to the first issue, the analysis has revealed that the legal status of offshore
petroleum installations in international law is far from clear. There is no uniform
approach in international conventions with regard to the legal status of offshore
petroleum installations and the definitions of ‘ship’ in international conventions have
been adopted specifically for the purpose of each convention. It was also found that
offshore petroleum installations may be treated as ships in certain circumstances and
under some international conventions and that a type of an offshore installation can
have a bearing on its legal status.

9

The analysis of the offshore security threats in Chapter 2 has shown that not many groups of
perpetrators have sufficient capabilities and skills to carry out attacks on offshore petroleum installations.
So far, only a few groups have demonstrated such capabilities.
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It was found that it is not only the type of an offshore petroleum installation that has a
bearing on its legal status; the activity being carried out by an offshore petroleum
installation also has a bearing on its legal status. One of the common approaches in
international conventions was to treat mobile offshore petroleum installations as ships
when they are in transit from one location to another and as offshore installations when
they are on location engaged in petroleum exploration and exploitation. This approach
was referred to as the ‘dual status approach’.10
The analysis in Chapter 4 has also shown that international law does not directly
address the issue of offshore petroleum installations being treated as ‘ports’, but that
offshore petroleum installations may have the legal status of ports. It was concluded that
the coastal States have discretion to designate any place under its jurisdiction including
offshore petroleum installations as offshore ports, and that foreign ships calling at such
offshore ports would be subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal State (which is also the
port State). The practice of States shows that some fixed and mobile offshore
installations that have petroleum export capabilities have been designated and treated as
offshore ports, and coastal States exercising jurisdiction over offshore ports have
imposed certain restrictions or conditions of entry on ships calling at such offshore
petroleum installations.
In the context of offshore petroleum security, clarification of the two issues (i.e.
whether and in what circumstances offshore petroleum installations can be treated as
ships or ports) is important because the legal status of offshore petroleum installations
impacts on applicability of international legal instruments, security requirements (such
as the requirement to be fitted with Automatic Identification System (AIS)
transponders) and protection measures (such as the right to establish safety zones) to
offshore petroleum installations.
The international regulatory framework relating to the protection and security of
offshore petroleum installations was examined in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 focused
on the pre-9/11 international regulatory framework and Chapter 6 focused on post-9/11
regulatory measures. Based on the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, it can be concluded that
the entire international regulatory framework for the protection and security of offshore
10

This approach was adopted by several international conventions and by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO).
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petroleum installations consists of three main facets/layers which can be described as: a)
‘information acquisition framework’, b) ‘prevention and defence framework’, and c)
‘response and enforcement framework’.
The ‘information acquisition framework’ is based on parts of the International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) and the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS Convention) including the requirement for the long-range
identification and tracking (LRIT) system and the AIS. The information acquision
framework provides coastal States with the ability to receive certain security-related
information about the maritime environment to increase situational awareness, and
gives States an opportunity to take pre-emptive measures to prevent attacks or respond
to attacks on offshore petroleum installations. The information acquisition measures are
compliant with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) and can
be utilised by coastal States in practically all maritime zones of jurisdiction.11
Although the ISPS Code, the LRIT and AIS requirements do not apply to offshore
petroleum installations other than self-propelled mobile offshore drilling units
(MODUs) engaged on international voyages, these security measures contribute
indirectly to the protection of offshore petroleum installations. For example, the
requirement for the LRIT system can be useful in the context of offshore petroleum
security because it allows coastal States to assess possible security threats posed by
ships to offshore petroleum installations and, if necessary, take certain pre-emptive
measures to deter a threat.
The ‘prevention and defence framework’ deals with the protection measures that coastal
States and oil companies can establish in order to prevent and deter attacks and
interferences with offshore petroleum installations. The preventive measures are
embodied in the LOSC, which contains a number of provisions pertaining to the
protection and security of offshore petroleum installations; the ISPS Code and chapter
XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention, which establish risk assessment frameworks primarily
for ships and ports; and the Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention (Revised) 2003
(2003 SID Convention), which addresses security aspects relating to identity documents

11

For example, coastal States are entitled to receive long-range identification and tracking (LRIT)
information about ships’ navigation within a distance of 1000 nautical miles.
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of the world’s seafarers and aims to reduce the chances of infiltration of the shipping
industry by terrorists.
The principal protection measure for offshore petroleum installations available to
coastal States under the LOSC is the right to establish 500-metre safety zones around
offshore petroleum installations and in those safety zones take measures necessary for
the protection of offshore installations. As the name suggests, the concept of safety
zones was designed as a safety measure for offshore installations, and aimed at
preventing accidental collisions with ships. The LOSC does not clarify the nature or
scope of the protection measures that a coastal State can implement within safety zones
around offshore installations. In contemporary times, a 500-metre safety zone is
considered too narrow to protect offshore petroleum installations from deliberate
attacks, particularly from intentional ramming by ships.
The LOSC allows coastal States to suspend innocent passage of ships in the vicinity of
offshore petroleum installations in their territorial sea. In addition, to prevent acts of
piracy, States may interdict ships suspected of intending to commit acts of piracy. The
analysis has demonstrated that the scope of the LOSC for regulating security of offshore
petroleum installations is relatively narrow and that overall, the LOSC does not
satisfactorily address the protection and security of offshore peteroleum installations.
The ISPS Code and chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention security risk management
framework applies to all types of offshore security threats, and encourages maritime
industry participants to anticipate various kinds of attack scenarios and take into
consideration various vulnerabilities of potential targets and the potential impacts of the
attacks. However, the major limitation of the ISPS Code and the SOLAS Convention
security framework is that it applies only to self-propelled MODUs engaged on
international voyages. All other offshore petroleum installations, including MODUs
operating on location, are not covered by the ISPS Code or the SOLAS Convention
security framework. In other words, the scope of application of the ISPS Code and the
SOLAS Convention security framework to offshore installations is very narrow. There
are currently comparable international security requirements for offshore petroleum
installations, which is a major gap in the international regulatory framework for the
security of offshore installations.
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The framework applies to most offshore petroleum installations (i.e. offshore
installations other than MODUs engaged on international voyages) only indirectly, in so
far as the interaction of offshore petroleum installations with ISPS-compliant ships,
such as tankers and offshore support vessels, is concerned.
According to the ISPS Code and the IMO, adequate security arrangements for offshore
petroleum installations should be developed and established by coastal States at the
national level, but no guidelines have been provided as to what those arrangements
should entail, which means that they could vary from country to country. The onus of
implementing regulatory security measures for offshore petroleum installations is
placed on individual States, but considering the importance of the offshore petroleum
industry to the global economy, it would only be appropriate to adopt at the
international level regulatory security requirements similar to the ISPS Code that would
specifically apply to offshore petroleum installations, including offshore petroleum
installations operating on location.
Another limitation of the ISPS Code and the SOLAS Convention security framework is
that it does not apply to smaller vessels such as leisure craft, recreational boats, speed
boats, fishing vessels, and smaller offshore support vessels, which represent an area of
risk for offshore petroleum installations because the vast majority of attacks on offshore
installations are carried out using smaller vessels, such as motor boats.12 Although the
IMO has developed guidelines on security arrangements for non-SOLAS vessels, these
guidelines are non-mandatory and do not specifically address the security of offshore
petroleum installations. However, these guidelines are useful for reducing the risk posed
to offshore installations by small vessels.
In relation to the 2003 SID Convention, it was found that it does not directly apply to
the offshore petroleum industry and offshore workers. Nevertheless, it does have some
relevance to the security of offshore petroleum installations as it is designed to prevent
and deter the infiltration of the maritime workforce by terrorists and other adversaries
thereby reducing, to some extent, the likelihood of a ship being used to carry out an
attack against an offshore installation.

12

See Appendix B for details of attacks on offshore petroleum installations.
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The ‘response and enforcement framework’ is based on the LOSC, which includes the
right of hot pursuit and the rules on piracy; the SUA framework, which deals with
punishment of unlawful violent acts against offshore petroleum installations; and rules
of customary international law relating to maritime enforcement.
The analysis of the LOSC has shown that the extent of the coastal State’s jurisdiction
and enforcement powers for responding to attacks on offshore petroleum installations in
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and on the continental shelf (including interdiction
and boarding of foreign ships involved in the attack on offshore installations) is not very
clear. The LOSC does not expressly allow coastal States and other States to take
enforcement action against foreign ships (including interdiction, boarding and arrest)
involved in the attacks on offshore petroleum installations in the EEZ or the high seas.
This appears to be one of the major limitations of the LOSC in relation to the protection
and security of offshore petroleum installations. The enforcement powers of coastal
States seem to be hampered by the longstanding principles of freedom of navigation and
exclusive flag State jurisdiction of its ships.
In relation to security threats faced by offshore petroleum installations, the LOSC deals
only with piracy. Other acts of maritime violence, including terrorism, are not
specifically addressed in the LOSC. The LOSC allows any State to take enforcement
action against ships engaged in piracy, arrest such ships and the perpetrators on board
and prosecute them.13 However, the analysis has shown that international piracy rules
have little application in the context of offshore petroleum security. It was concluded
that an act of piracy cannot be committed against offshore petroleum installations
operating on location.
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation 1988 (1988 SUA Convention) and the Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf
1988 (1988 SUA Protocol) specifically address violent unlawful acts committed against
offshore petroleum installations. The analysis has shown that the 1988 SUA Convention
covers all types of mobile offshore installations that are ‘navigating or scheduled to
navigate’, but does not cover mobile offshore installations operating on location; and
13

Importantly, the LOSC allows States to take action against pirate ships in order to both prevent and
punish acts of piracy.
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the 1988 SUA Protocol applies to all types of fixed offshore installations on location.
The 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol can be used to deal with
virtually all types of offshore security threats identified in Chapter 2 including piracy,
terrorism, insurgency, organised crime, vandalism, civil protest, and internal sabotage
because the motivation of perpetrators is irrelevant for the purposes of the 1988 SUA
Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol.
The 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol can also be used to respond to
practically all scenarios of offshore attacks and interferences identified in Chapter 3
namely: bomb threats; detonation of explosives or bombs; underwater attacks; use of
stand-off weapons; armed intrusions and seizures of offshore petroleum installations;
hostage taking and kidnapping of offshore workers; use of transport infrastructure as a
weapon to attack offshore installations; disclosure of confidential information that may
assist perpetrators in carrying out or planning an attack; sabotage and cyber attacks
which result in damage to an offshore installation, attempted and unsuccessful attacks,
and even protests and demonstrations that involve violence and that are likely to
endanger the safety of an offshore installation or navigation. All of these acts would be
considered to be offences under the 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol.
The SUA framework is designed for punishing those who commit unlawful violent acts
against offshore installations and ensuring that perpetrators of such acts are brought to
justice. Importantly, the 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol represent the
‘response framework’ rather than the ‘prevention framework’ because they are aimed at
ensuring criminal prosecution of the offenders who have committed, attempted to
commit or assisted in commission of violent acts involving maritime and offshore
installations. The SUA framework requires collective implementation by States. The
1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA Protocol have already achieved wide
international acceptance,14 which in theory suggests that persons who commit violent
acts that constitute an offence under these conventions will have little chance of
escaping prosecution.

14

As of 1 August 2011, there were 157 contracting States to the 1988 SUA Convention and 146
contracting States to the 1988 SUA Protocol: IMO, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in
Respect of Which the International Maritime Organization or Its Secretary-General Performs Depository
or Other Functions as at 1 August 2011 (2011) 397–413.
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The 2005 SUA amendments 15 revised the 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA
Protocol, and created the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation 2005 (2005 SUA Convention) and the Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf 2005 (2005 SUA Platforms Protocol). These SUA amendments have
created a number of new offences and expanded the scope of the SUA regulatory
framework. However, the focus of the amendments has not been so much on offshore
installations as on the transportation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), so the
2005 SUA amendments do not appear to make any significant enhancements to the
regulatory framework for the security offshore petroleum installations.
The SUA security framework has some limitations, particularly those relating to the
enforcement action the coastal State can take against delinquent foreign flagged ships
involved in the attacks on or interferences with offshore petroleum installations. The
SUA framework does not give any additional powers (other than those granted under
the LOSC) to States to interdict and board foreign ships and arrest the perpetrators of
violent acts. The principles of freedom of navigation and the exclusive jurisdiction of
the flag State are preserved and respected in the SUA framework. This makes it more
difficult (from the legal point of view) for States to take direct enforcement action
without breaching international law.
In summary, it can be concluded that the existing international regulatory framework for
the protection and security of offshore petroleum installations has a number of
limitations and gaps. Although some positive steps have already been taken to enhance
maritime and offshore petroleum security, there is scope for further improvements.
Accordingly, further regulatory reform is necessary. There is a need to adopt
international rules that provide a solid foundation for the implementation of adequate
offshore petroleum security frameworks at the national level. A number of specific and
general suggestions and proposals for regulatory reform are set out in the following
section.

15

The term ‘2005 SUA amendments’ is used to refer collectively to the 2005 amendments to the 1988
SUA Convention (ie, 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Convention) and the 2005 amendments to the 1988
SUA Protocol (ie, 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Protocol).
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4. Proposals for Reform
The analysis of the international regulatory framework for the protection and security of
offshore petroleum installations has shown that the current international framework is
not satisfactory. Based on the analysis in this thesis, a number of specific and general
suggestions for changes in the regulatory framework are proposed. Eight specific
proposals can be made to improve the international regulatory framework.
4.1 Safety or security zones around offshore petroleum installations

As discussed, the right to establish safety zones around offshore installations is the main
protection measure available to coastal States under the LOSC. It is proposed that any
future amendments to the LOSC should extend the maximum permitted breadth of
safety zones around offshore installations in the EEZ, on the continental shelf and on
the high seas beyond 500 metres. Specifically, a breadth of 3 kilometres radius seems to
be appropriate in today’s maritime security environment. 16 Alternatively, the IMO
should make recommendations on the extension of safety zones around offshore
installations in accordance with Article 60(5) of the LOSC.
Between 2008 and 2010, the IMO considered the issue of extending the maximum
breadth of safety zones beyond 500 metres; however, that proposal was not successful
and so far no other maximum distance has been agreed by the international community,
and nor has the IMO made any official recommendations in that regard. It is clear from
the IMO’s discussions on this topic that any future recommendations on the extension
of safety zones would be done on a case-by-case basis for each individual installation
upon request of the coastal State, and not as a general recommendation for all offshore
petroleum installations.17 Therefore, when the international community determines that
it is necessary to allow the extension of the breadth of safety zones around all offshore
installations in general, it would need to be done as an amendment to the LOSC or
through State practice as part of the development of customary international law. The
16

However, as noted by Kaye, the widening of safety zones beyond 500 metres may not be acceptable
due to traditional concerns over freedom of navigation, in which case Kaye suggests establishment of the
concept of a warning zone three nautical miles in width, rather than a navigation exclusion zone, which
vessels would be advised to avoid and obliged to report information concerning their intentions, cargo,
and destination upon entry into such a zone, and ‘failure to report such information would render the
vessel liable to be boarded’. See Stuart Kaye, ‘International Measures to Protect Oil Platforms, Pipelines,
and Submarine Cables from Attack’ (2007) 31(2) Tulane Maritime Law Journal 377, 421–2.
17
See Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, IMO NAV, 56th sess, Agenda Item 20, IMO Doc NAV
56/20 (31 August 2010) 14–17.
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practice of some States in both the territorial sea and the EEZ shows that ‘exclusion
zones’ or ‘restricted areas’ larger than 500 metres (between 3 and 4.3 nautical miles)
have been established around some offshore installations that have been designated as
offshore oil export terminals, and ships are prohibited from entering without prior
permission.18 Clearly, such State practice in the EEZ is in contravention with the LOSC,
but it seems to be reasonable in today’s maritime security environment, particularly in
the high-risk countries or regions.
It would also be helpful if the nature of protective measures that the coastal State can
take within the safety zones was clarified in future amendments to the LOSC, as well as
jurisdiction of coastal States within safety zones. In particular, it would be useful to
clarify whether coastal States are allowed to install any security devices necessary for
the protection of offshore petroleum installations from deliberate attacks, such as fences
or reinforced floating blast-proof barriers or walls, in order to control access to offshore
installations.
4.2 Enforcement powers of coastal States in the EEZ

The LOSC does not contain any express provisions dealing with boarding and arrest of
foreign ships for violations of coastal State’s laws and regulations on the continental
shelf, particularly those relating to the protection and security of offshore installations.
In contrast, specific provisions have been made for fisheries enforcement (Article 73 of
the LOSC) and marine pollution (Articles 220 and 221 of the LOSC). It is proposed that
the nature of enforcement measures against foreign ships involved in interferences or
attacks against offshore installations in the EEZ and on the continental shelf should be
clarified in future amendments to the LOSC. While it is argued that coastal States have
enforcement jurisdiction over foreign ships used in the attacks on offshore installations
in the EEZ, as long as such ships are still located within the EEZ, this issue could be
clarified in future amendments to the LOSC. In particular, provisions dealing with
enforcement powers of coastal States against foreign ships for violations of laws and
regulations relating to the security and protection of offshore installations should be

18

Examples are: Al Basrah Oil Terminal (ABOT) and Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT), located
in Iraq’s territorial sea and Zafiro Offshore Oil Terminal (ZOOT) in Equatorial Guinea’s exclusive
economic zone (EEZ), all of which have restricted areas around them considerably larger than 500
metres, which ships are prohibited from entering without prior authorisation.
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framed in a similar fashion to those relating to the enforcement of fisheries laws and
regulations or those relating to piracy.
4.3 Jurisdiction over offshore petroleum installations on the deep seabed

The jurisdiction of States over offshore petroleum installations on the high seas and on
the seabed beyond national jurisdiction is not clear in the LOSC. The jurisdiction of
States on board offshore installations located on the high seas and the deep seabed
should be addressed and clarified in future amendments to the LOSC. It is necessary to
clarify which State has jurisdiction and whether such jurisdiction is exclusive. The
nature of jurisdiction within safety zones around such installations should also be
clarified.
4.4 Definition of piracy

It was found that piracy has a very limited scope of application in the context of
offshore petroleum installations and there may be considerable difficulties in applying
piracy rules to offshore installations. It is also proposed that the definition of piracy in
the LOSC should be amended to clarify that an act of piracy may be committed against
an offshore petroleum installation. In particular, paragraph (a)(i) of Article 101 should
read: ‘on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft or artificial island, installation
and structure, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft or artificial
island, installation and structure’. This would eliminate any ambiguity relating to the
application of the piracy rules to offshore petroleum installations.
4.5 Application of the ISPS Code to offshore petroleum installations

The international law currently does not oblige coastal States to establish security
frameworks for their domestic offshore petroleum industries. The ISPS Code applies
only to self-propelled MODUs engaged on international voyages. In the future, it may
be necessary to extend the application of the mandatory provisions of the ISPS Code to
all offshore petroleum installations or at least offshore installations from which
petroleum is exported directly and to treat those offshore installations as port facilities.
Coastal States are encouraged to designate offshore installations from which petroleum
is exported directly as offshore port facilities and require them to comply with the ISPS
Code requirements. This appears to be permissible under the SOLAS Convention and the
ISPS Code framework.
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Alternatively, it is proposed that a new international legal instrument be developed,
similar to the ISPS Code, specifically designed for all types of offshore petroleum
installations. Such an instrument may be called the ‘International Offshore Petroleum
Facilities Security Code’ or the ‘IOPFS Code’, and would contain a set of minimum
security requirements for offshore petroleum installations.
4.6 AIS for offshore petroleum installations

Offshore petroleum installations are currently not required to be fitted with AIS
transponders. It is proposed that a requirement be introduced for offshore petroleum
installations to be fitted with AIS transponders or similar radar equipment, which would
allow operators of offshore installations to monitor and track ships navigating in their
vicinity thereby increasing their situational awareness.
4.7 The SUA framework

It is proposed that the concept of ‘navigation’ should be clarified in future amendments
to the 2005 SUA Convention. In particular, it should be made clear that the provisions of
the 2005 SUA Convention apply to mobile offshore installations that are engaged in
offshore operations on location and are not navigating or scheduled to navigate. It
should also be clarified whether the 2005 SUA Convention applies to fixed offshore
petroleum installations under tow from a place of construction to an offshore
installation because fixed offshore installations under tow could fall within the
definition of ‘ship’ in the 2005 SUA Convention. It is proposed that the 2005 SUA
Convention should be made applicable to fixed offshore installations under tow.
The SUA framework treats mobile offshore installations as ships and requires flag
States to establish jurisdiction over such installations in the event of attack. It is
recommended that mobile offshore installations operating on location should be under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State as per the LOSC, so the jurisdictional
matters in the SUA framework over mobile offshore installations could be clarified to
avoid conflicting jurisdictions.
The 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol does not apply where a person commits an offence
against an offshore petroleum installation in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic
State and then escapes to a territory of another State party. This omission of the
archipelagic waters is a potential loophole and a limitation in both the 1988 SUA
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Protocol and the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol. It is proposed that the application of the
2005 SUA Platforms Protocol be extended to offences committed against offshore
installations in the archipelagic waters.
There is also a need to include the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol in the annex to the
2005 SUA Convention, which would make it an offence under the 2005 SUA
Convention to knowingly transport a person who commits an offence under the 2005
SUA Platforms Protocol and intends to assist that person to evade criminal prosecution.
4.8 Offshore Workers’ Identity
It is also proposed to establish an international identity documents framework, similar to

the 2003 SID Convention, which would be applicable to the offshore petroleum
industry. One option would be to extend the application of the 2003 SID Convention to
offshore workers. Alternatively, it is proposed that a similar international convention be
adopted that would establish international standards for the security of offshore
workers’ identity documents specifically or of all maritime transport and shipping
industry workers generally.

5. Directions for Further Research
The existing body of knowledge on offshore petroleum installations would benefit from
further research, and several areas are suggested. One of the areas for further research
on the topic of the security of offshore petroleum installations is the analysis of national
legal frameworks of various States, particularly States with substantial offshore
petroleum operations. This could include comparative analyses of the national legal
frameworks for the protection and security of offshore petroleum installations.
Further research and comparative analysis of State practice relating to the establishment
of restriction zones or exclusion zones or safety zones around offshore installations
located in the EEZ (particularly those that are treated as offshore oil terminals) would
be a useful contribution to the existing body of knowledge in this field. It would help to
determine how common the practice of establishing exclusion zones larger than 500
metres is and whether it is common enough to be regarded as customary international
law. Additionally, further research about the legal status of offshore petroleum
installations would benefit this field of study, particularly with respect to the treatment
of offshore petroleum installations as offshore ports.
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In the course of this thesis research, only one security incident/attack involving offshore
petroleum installations prior to 1975 was found, namely the 1899 ‘Montecito Mob’
incident. However, it is likely that there had been more incidents and attacks on
offshore petroleum installations in the intervening 75 years. Accordingly, further
research on past offshore attacks and security incidents during the period 1899 to 1975
is necessary to fill the gap in the literature.
Other potential areas for further research include the analysis of patterns of attacks and
interferences with offshore petroleum installations and physical protection measures for
offshore installations implemented by oil companies, and research into the rules of
customary international law that may have relevance to the protection of offshore
petroleum installations.

6. Concluding Remarks
A devastating attack against a major offshore petroleum installation can happen in any
country. It is no longer a question of ‘if’, but a question of ‘when’. The implementation
of measures to reduce or treat vulnerabilities should ultimately achieve the result of
offshore petroleum installations becoming less attractive to perpetrators as potential
targets. These measures can be in the form of enhancements of physical security
arrangements of offshore petroleum installations implemented by operators of offshore
installations and in the form of regulatory security requirements imposed by
governments. Governments and industry need to be working together in order to better
protect the offshore petroleum installations which are inherently vulnerable to deliberate
attacks and, at the same time, so vital to the national and global economy.
The international regulatory framework represents an important piece of the puzzle in
the protection of offshore petroleum installations. It is important to have an international
regulatory framework that has clear security requirements for offshore petroleum
installations and rules relating to the response to attacks, and which provides a basis for
States to implement appropriate regulatory security measures at the national level. This
study has demostrated that there is scope for improvement of the current international
legal framework.
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Appendix A – Types and Physical Characteristics of Offshore Petroleum Installations
Type of Offshore
Installation
Jacket structure

Description

Illustration

Jacket structures consist of a steel pyramidal pylon
substructure (called ‘jacket’), which extends from the
sea-floor to above the water surface and has a deck on
top (i.e. topside) with operational equipment.1 The jacket
substructure is usually floated by a barge to the desired
location, where it is then lowered to the seabed in an
upright position,2 and firmly attached to the seabed with
steel piles driven through the legs of the substructure
into the seabed.3 The piles fix the substructure in place
against lateral loadings from wind, waves, and currents.4

1

William Graff, Introduction to Offshore Structures: Design, Fabrication, Installation (Gulf Publishing Company, 1981) 106; Hossein Esmaeili, The Legal Regime of Offshore Oil
Rigs in International Law (Ashgate Dartmouth, 2001) 16; David Pinder, ‘Offshore Oil and Gas: Global Resource Knowledge and Technological Change’ (2001) 44 Ocean &
Coastal Management 579, 587.
2
Edgar Gold, Aldo Chircop and Hugh Kindred, Essentials of Canadian Law Series: Maritime Law (Irwin Law, 2003) 73.
3
Pinder, above n 1, 587; Graff, above n 1, 106.
4
W J Drawe and M D Reifel, ‘Platform Function and Types’ in Bramlette McClelland (ed), Planning and Design of Fixed Offshore Platforms (Springer, 1986) 11, 18, cited in
Esmaeili, above n 1, 16.
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Gravity structures (also known as GBSs) usually consist
of a large substructure built of reinforced concrete in the
form of vertical tubular columns, which are fixed at the
concrete or steel base to ballasted chambers,5 making the
entire structure stable on the seabed and holding it in
place through the force of gravity.6 The substructure is
usually towed into position and then filled with ballast
and lowered to a prepared foundation on the sea-floor. 7
GBSs rest directly on the seabed by virtue of their own
weight.8 The tubular columns support the topside which
itself remains above the water surface. 9 Some GBSs
have tanks in the base of the structure that are used to
store oil before it is offloaded or transported.10

5

Harry Whitehead, An A-Z of Offshore Oil and Gas (Gulf Publishing Company, 1983) 180, cited in Esmaeili, above n 1, 16.
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 2, 73; Pinder, above n 1, 587.
7
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 2, 73.
8
Graff, above n 1, 261, cited in Esmaeili, above n 1, 16.
9
Pinder, above n 1, 587.
10
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 2, 73.
6
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Tower platforms (also known as a ‘compliant tower’)
are similar to jacket structures to an extent. They are
self-contained buoyancy towers with sufficient
buoyancy so that the tower floats above water during
transport. 11 Tower platforms consist of a narrow steel
substructure (i.e. tower) attached to a foundation on the
seabed and extending up above the water to the
topside. 12 The particular feature of tower platforms is
that the tower itself is relatively flexible (as opposed to
the more rigid legs of a jacket structure), 13 which
provides greater resistance to stress and allows it to
operate in much deeper water.14

11

W J Drawe and M D Reifel, ‘Platform Function and Types’ in Bramlette McClelland (ed), Planning and Design of Fixed Offshore Platforms (Springer, 1986) 11, 19, cited in
Esmaeili, above n 1, 16.
12
NaturalGas.org, Offshore Drilling <http://www.naturalgas.org/naturalgas/extraction_offshore.asp> at 5 September 2011.
13
Pinder, above n 1, 587.
14
NaturalGas.org, above n 12.
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TLPs are floating production platforms, which are
essentially
modified
configurations
of
a
semisubmersible-type platform fixed (i.e. tethered) to
the bottom by a series of vertical stiff tethers.15 These
tethering lines diminish the impact of waves (as opposed
to traditional steel jacket and concrete gravity base
substructures) by maintaining a controlled tension
between the platform and mooring template anchored on
the seabed.16 TLPs retain a structure fixed to the seabed,
but abandon the traditional concept of bottom-supported
structures. 17 A ‘floating superstructure carrying all
operational facilities supports its own weight and applies
stabilising upward tension to relatively lightweight
tubular fixed legs’.18

15

Gunther Clauss, Eike Lehmann and Carsten Ostergaard, Offshore Structures: Conceptual Design and Hydromechanics (M J Shields trans, Springer-Verlag, 1992-94) vol 1, 83.
Wylie Spicer, ‘Application of Maritime Law to Offshore Drilling Units – The Canadian Experience’ in Ian Townsend Gault (ed), Offshore Petroleum Installations Law and
Financing: Canada and the United States (1986) 105, 106; Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 15, 86.
17
Pinder, above n 1, 587–8.
18
Ibid.
16
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Jack-up platforms (also known as self-elevating drilling
units) comprise a barge-type rectangular or triangular
floating hull (i.e. topside) which rests on several (usually
3 or 4) vertical or slightly tilted ‘tubular piles or legs of
open lattice truss-type construction’. 19 The topside is
equipped with drilling apparatus. 20 Jack-up platforms
can be either towed or carried on heavy-lift ships as
cargo to a drilling location, or they can move under their
own means of propulsion.21 The legs are raised while the
unit is being towed. 22 Once on location, the legs are
lowered to the seabed, and the topside is lifted to the
desired height above the surface of the water by electric
or hydraulic jacks,23 to ensure a safe distance from the
water surface.24 Jack-up platformss are used in relatively
shallow water (usually up to 100-150 metres in depth).25

19

Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 15, 47–8.
Pinder, above n 1, 585.
21
Esmaeili, above n 1, 15; Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 15, 47.
22
Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Case Concerning Passage Through the Great Belt’ (1996) 27(3) Ocean Development & International Law 255, 265.
23
Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 15, 47–8; Esmaeili, above n 1, 15.
24
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 2, 71.
25
Ibid.
20
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Drilling barges are drilling units with flat-bottomed shipshaped hulls which resemble a barge rather than a ship.26
They have no means of self-propulsion and are towed to
an offshore drilling location and anchored by tugs. 27
Drilling barges can be converted former barges. 28 A
drilling barge has been described as ‘any type of
offshore drilling vessel, but also referring specifically to
an earlier type of unpowered, flat-bottomed rig with a
ship-shaped hull’.29 Drilling barges are used mostly for
shallow water drilling, 30 and are not very common
today.31

26

Michael Summerskill, Oil Rigs: Law and Insurance (Stevens & Sons, 1979) 3.
Esmaeili, above n 1, 14.
28
Ibid.
29
Whitehead, above n 5, 88, quoted in Summerskill, above n 26, 3.
30
NaturalGas.org, above n 12.
31
According to Rigzone, as of 6 September 2011, there were only 48 drilling barges in the world’s offshore drilling rig fleet: Rigzone, Rig Report: Offshore Rig Fleet by Rig Type
(2011) <http://www.rigzone.com/data/rig_report.asp?rpt=type> 6 September 2011.
27
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Submersible drilling units consist of the topside
‘supported on a number of vertical or horizontal
pontoons which are flooded when the rig is in position
for drilling’.32 When a submersible is being moved from
one place to another, the pontoons are filled with air
which makes the entire structure buoyant.33 When the rig
is submerged (i.e. in the drilling position), the
substructure rests on the seabed and the topside, which
contains the living quarters for the crew and drilling
equipment, 34 is a few metres above the water line to
provide protection from waves. 35 Submersibles are
designed to operate in shallow waters, usually close to
shore,36 and are rarely used today.37

32

Whitehead, above n 5, 269, quoted in Esmaeili, above n 1, 15.
NaturalGas.org, above n 12.
34
Ibid.
35
Esmaeili, above n 1, 15.
36
Whitehead, above n 5, 269, quoted in Esmaeili, above n 1, 15.
37
According to Rigzone, as of 6 September 2011, there were only five submersibles in the world’s offshore drilling rig fleet: Rigzone, above n 31.
33
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Semisubmersible drilling units are large structures that
consist of the topside supported by a series of vertical
columns that sit on two or more steel pontoons, which
can be lowered below, or raised to, the surface by
adjusting the amount of ballast water in the pontoons.38
Semisubmersibles are usually used in water depth
between 70 and 1000 metres using anchoring systems, or
more than 1000 metres if using a dynamic positioning
system (which uses computer-controlled propellers to
constantly correct the unit’s drift to maintain its
position). 39 They can be towed, carried on heavy-lift
vessels as cargo, or are able to move under their own
power. 40 During drilling operations a large portion of
the hull is under water, which gives a semisubmersible
ability to operate in rough seas due to its design.41

38

Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 2, 71; Pinder, above n 1, 586; Koskenniemi, above n 22, 265.
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 2, 71; Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 15, 80.
40
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 2, 71.
41
Spicer, above n 16, 106; Pinder, above n 1, 586.
39
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Drill ships (also known as drilling ships) are ship-shaped
drilling units. They are self-propelled single-hulled (or
double-hulled) 42 vessels fitted with a complete drilling
system.43 Compared to other floating drilling units, drill
ships are the most mobile drilling units.44 A drill ship
navigates under a master and crew and is used for the
purpose of drilling exploratory oil and gas wells.45 Drill
ships have a high storage capacity, especially on the
deck area, do not need anchor tugs, and can cover long
distances in a relatively short time.46 Drill ships operate
in water depths of 200 to 1000 metres using an
anchoring system, and over 1000 metres using a
dynamic positioning system. 47 They are suitable for
drilling in deep waters and operating in remote areas
independently of service and supply ships.48 Some of the
advantages of drill ships include mobility at speeds
between eight and sixteen knots; ability to pass through
the Suez and Panama Canals, thus minimising transit
distance and time; superior seaworthiness, and survival
capability.49

42

Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 15, 73.
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 2, 71; Rupert Herbert-Burns, ‘Tankers, Specialized Production Vessels, and Offshore Terminals: Vulnerability and Security in the
International Maritime Oil Sector’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2008) 133, 151.
44
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 2, 71–2.
45
David Sharp, Offshore Oil and Gas Insurance (Witherby & Co, 1994) 21.
46
Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 15, 72–3.
47
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 2, 71–2.
48
Clauss, Lehmann and Ostergaard, above n 15, 72–3.
49
Ibid 76.
43
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FPSOs are double-hulled ship-shaped units that contain
production, storage and transhipment facilities for oil
and gas. 50 FPSOs can collect and process oil and gas
produced from nearby offshore installations or
underwater production wells, and store it on board until
offloaded to a tanker. 51 FPSOs may be disconnectable or
permanently moored, self-propelled or without their own
means of propulsion. 52 An FPSO is usually connected to
the producing wells through an internal turret that is
anchored in position and an FPSO structure than rotates
around the turret in response to winds, currents, and
waves.53 Some FPSOs are refitted former tankers while
others are purpose-built.54

50

Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 2, 73.
Martin Tsamenyi and Kwame Mfodwo, ‘Developing Capacity for Addressing Safety, Security and Marine Pollution Concerns Arising from the Oil and Gas Industry’ (Paper
presented at the National Conference on Positioning the Transport Sector for the Successful Exploration of Ghana’s Oil & Gas, Accra, 15 July 2009) 8.
52
International Maritime Organization (IMO), Review of the Code for the Implementation of Mandatory IMO Instruments: Applicability of IMO Conventions to FPSOs and FSUs,
IMO FSI, 16th sess, Agenda Item 14, IMO Doc FSI 16/14/1 (26 March 2008) 2.
53
Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 2, 73.
54
Herbert-Burns, above n 43, 149; Gold, Chircop and Kindred, above n 2, 73.
51
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storage and offloading
unit or floating storage
unit)
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FSOs (also known as FSUs) are ship-shaped singlehulled or double-hulled floating storage installations. 55
They ‘are simplified FPSOs’ which are used as storage
and offloading devices only.56 FPSOs are ‘the complex
cousins of FSOs (and FSUs), wherein a production
capability has been added on board’.57 FSOs are usually
made from old tankers that have been converted and do
not have capabilities for processing the oil and gas.58

55

Herbert-Burns, above n 43, 149.
Tsamenyi and Mfodwo, above n 51, 9.
57
Herbert-Burns, above n 43, 149.
58
Tsamenyi and Mfodwo, above n 51, 9.
56
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One of the latest innovations in floating production
installations design is the FDPSO. FDPSOs are shipshaped offshore installations similar to FPSOs, but with
added drilling capability, 59 which makes them even
more complex structures than FPSOs. An FDPSO is
arguably the most multifunctional offshore installation
in existence today,60 but it is not very common.61

59

Pinder, above n 1, 589.
Ibid.
61
The world’s first FDPSO commenced operations in August 2009 at the Azurite field offshore the Republic of Congo: Offshore Magazine, First-ever FDPSO at Work on Azurite
Field Development (1 November 2009) <http://www.offshore-mag.com/index/article-display/5643690153/articles/offshore/volume-69/issue-11/engineering_-construction/first-everfdpso_at.html> at 10 February 2011.
60
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Spar platforms consist of a large floating hollow column
of cylindrical shape, which sits vertically in the water
and is supported by buoyancy chambers at the top.62 The
floating cylindrical column supports the topside above
the water and serves to stabilise the platform in the water
(effectively acting as the keel).63 Stability is provided by
the length of the column itself, which does not extend all
the way to the sea-floor, but instead is anchored to the
bottom by a series of cables and lines (similarly to
semisubmersibles). 64 Functional flexibility and the
potential for mobility are inherent attributes of spar
design.65 The design allows for movement to absorb the
forces of wind, waves and currents.66 Spar platforms are
among the largest offshore installations.

62

Pinder, above n 1, 588.
Lew Skaug, ‘New Designs Advance Spar Technology into Deeper Water’ (1998) 96(44) Oil & Gas Journal 47; NaturalGas.org, above n 12; B Clewes, ‘Mooring, Subsea
Advances Making Rigs More Competitive for Deepwater: Semisubmersibles Versus Spars and TLPs’ (2007) 7(7) Offshore Magazine 117.
64
NaturalGas.org, above n 12.
65
Pinder, above n 1, 588.
66
NaturalGas.org, above n 12.
63

395

Appendix B

Mikhail Kashubsky

Appendix B – A Chronology of Attacks on and Interferences with Offshore Petroleum Installations∗
∗
Date
2 Aug 1899

Location

Type of Facility

USA

Oil derrick

Perpetrators
Local residents

Tactics/Scenario

Impacts/Effects

Details of Attack/Incident

Physical attack

Destruction of
facility
Interference with
operations

When an oil company began to construct an oil
derrick off the shores of Montecito, an affluent
suburb of Santa Barbara, California, United States of
America (USA), a local mob took direct action. They
attacked the rig and demolished it. 1 The next day
these activists were described approvingly on the
front page of the local newspaper as ‘a party of the
best known society men of Santa Barbara armed to
meet any resistance’. 2 The local ‘society men’
responsible for the attack did not suffer any
noteworthy legal repercussions for their actions,
despite having been so well known. 3 The incident
became known as the ‘Montecito Mob’.

∗

This chronology certainly does not list all attacks or incidents that have occurred over the history of the offshore petroleum industry and it does not necessarily reflect the
frequency at which they are happening. Therefore, it does not necessarily provide a reliable base for quantitative analysis. The appearance of a growing number of incidents in
recent years in part simply reflects the growing volume of insurgent activity in Nigeria directed against the offshore petroleum industry. It is important to note that sometimes
different sources report different details of offshore attacks and incidents. In some cases, inconsistent and conflicting facts are reported. Where possible, reasonable effort has
been made to ensure the accuracy of information contained in this chronology. Note: a modified version of this chronology was published in Perspectives on Terrorism Vol 5
No 5-6, December 2011. See also Mikhail Kashubsky, ‘A Chronology of Attacks on and Unlawful Interferences with, Offshore Oil and Gas Installations, 1975-2010’ (2011)
5(5-6) Perspectives on Terrorism 139.
1
Robert Gramling and William Freudenburg, ‘Attitudes Toward Offshore Oil Development: A Summary of Current Evidence’ (2006) 49 Ocean & Coastal Management 442,
442–3; Harvey Molotch, William Freudenburg and Krista Paulsen, ‘History Repeats Itself, But How? City Character, Urban Tradition, and the Accomplishment of Place’
(2000) 65(6) American Sociological Review 791, 804.
2
Santa Barbara Morning Press (Santa Barbara), 3 August 1899, 1, quoted and cited in Molotch, Freudenburg and Paulsen, above n 1, 804.
3
Gramling and Freudenburg, above n 1, 442–3.
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Date
25 Aug 1975
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Location

Type of Facility

UK

Offshore
production
platforms

Offshore drilling
complex

16 May 1977 Angola

Perpetrators

Tactics/Scenario

Impacts/Effects

Details of Attack/Incident

Unknown

Bomb threat
(underwater
explosives)

3 platforms
evacuated
Production
shutdown for 2
days
Search operation
conducted
Financial
expenditure

Philips Petroleum Company in Yarmouth, United
Kingdom (UK), received three anonymous telephone
calls with callers announcing that underwater charges
with delayed-action fuses had been attached to the
legs of offshore production platforms in the Hewett
field, some 20 miles to the east off the Norfolk coast.
Three platforms were evacuated immediately. 4 A
Royal Navy vessel, helicopters, and an expert diving
team were dispatched. Two days later, it was
concluded that the threat was a hoax, and normal
production operations were resumed. The incident
cost the British taxpayers about US$500 000.5

Insurgents
(CELF guerrilla
movement)

Threat of attack
(standoff
weapons)

Unknown

A black guerrilla movement, the Cabinda Enclave
Liberation Front (CELF), said that it planned to blow
up the offshore drilling complex of the Gulf Oil
Company (GOC) in the Cabinda enclave of Angola,
and warned the company to evacuate its 200 British
and American employees within three days. A
spokesperson for the guerrilla group said the warning
must be taken seriously because the movement had
acquired ground-to-ground missiles in exchange for
coffee and uncut diamonds. 6 The guerrilla
spokesperson said the guerrillas were opposed to
GOC because it was giving the ruling pro-Marxist
Angolan Popular Liberation Movement US$2 million
a day in oil royalties.7

4

Jan Breemer, ‘Offshore Energy Terrorism: Perspectives on a Problem’ (1983) 6 Terrorism 455, 455.
Ibid.
6
Brian Jenkins et al, ‘A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks and Other Criminal Actions Against Maritime Targets’ (Rand Paper Series, RAND Corporation, September 1983)
15.
7
Ibid 16.
5
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Date
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Location

Type of Facility

25 Jul 1981

USA

Offshore drilling
platform

Oct 1981

USA

Mar 1983

Iran

Perpetrators

Tactics/Scenario

Impacts/Effects

Details of Attack/Incident

Environmental
activists
(Greenpeace)

Unauthorised
boarding
(attempted)

Attracted media
attention
Minor
interference with
operations

Greenpeace activists attempted to board an oil rig
operated by Shell about 170 nautical miles off the
coast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts, to express their
opposition to drilling during a Shell news conference
on the rig. Shell denied the group access to the
drilling rig. Greenpeace officials sought to explain
their fear that the drilling (which had been delayed
for six years) would result in oil spills, endangering
the nearby Georges Bank, home for much of the
world’s supply of cod, haddock and food fish.8 Shell
denied the group access to the drilling rig and a Shell
spokesperson said Georges Bank is a relatively lowrisk geological formation for oil spills.

Offshore
platform &
attending vessel

Unknown

Bomb threat

Search operation
conducted

Offshore
production
platform

Hostile State
(Iraqi military)

Military attack
(air strike)

Destruction of
facility and slick
fire
Significant
marine pollution

An anonymous caller said that a bomb had been
placed on one of several attending vessels at Habitat
Texaco platform located nine nautical miles offshore,
southeast of Santa Barbara, California. No bomb was
found after platform and vessel searches.9
Iraqi planes attacked the Iranian offshore platform at
the Nowruz oil field; the damaged platform
collapsed, and the oil slick caught fire. 10 The
platform burned and spilled oil at an initial rate of
approximately 5000 barrels per day (bpd). The rate
slowed to about 1500 bpd in the two years before the
well was capped in May 1985. Overall,

8

Jenkins et al, above n 6, 20.
Ibid 21.
10
US Gulf Task Force, Environmental Crisis in the Gulf: The US Response (6 November 1992), cited in Alicia Watts-Hosmer, Colby Stanton, and Julie Beane, ‘Intent to
Spill: Environmental Effects of Oil Spills Caused by War, Terrorism, Vandalism, and Theft’ (Paper presented at 1997 International Oil Spill Conference, Fort Lauderdale,
USA, 7-10 April 1997) 157, 158 <http://www.iosc.org/papers/01058.pdf> at 5 October 2010. See also Larry West, The 10 Worst Oil Spills in History: The World’s Worst Oil
Spills by Amount of Oil Released Into the Environment About.com <http://environment.about.com/od/environmentalevents/tp/worst-oil-spills.htm> 5 December 2010.
9
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Date
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Location

Type of Facility

Perpetrators

Tactics/Scenario

Impacts/Effects

19 Oct 1987

Iran

Offshore
production
platforms

Hostile State
(US Navy)

Navy attack
(using warships
and detonation of
explosives)

Almost complete
destruction of
facility
Another facility
severely
damaged

Apr 1988

UAE

Mobile offshore
drilling rig

Hostile State
(Iranian Navy)

Navy attack
(using patrol
boats)

Unknown

11

Details of Attack/Incident
approximately 1.9 million barrels of oil spilled into
the sea as a result of this incident.11
The US Navy attacked the Iranian R-7 and R-4 oil
platforms in Reshadat (also known as Rostam)
offshore complex blaming Iran for a missile strike on
the US-flagged Kuwaiti oil tanker Sea Isle City near
Kuwait Harbour three days earlier. 12 The Navy
destroyers opened fire on R-7 platform and
subsequently detonated explosives on it, completely
destroying it; and R-4 platform was attacked in a
similar fashion and severely damaged.13 As a result
of the attack, one platform was almost completely
destroyed and another was severely damaged and,
according to Iran, production from the Reshadat and
Resalat offshore complexes was interrupted for
several years. 14 The attacks caused damage to the
nearby Resalat offshore complex, connected by
underwater pipelines to Reshadat.15
In response to the US attack on the Iranian Joshan
missile boat, Iranian patrol boats attacked the
neighbouring United Arab Emirates’s (UAE’s)
Mubarak oil field. The Iranian boats sprayed several
ships and a mobile drilling rig with machine-gun fire
and grenades but caused no casualties.16

US Government, Department of Commerce, Office of Response and Restoration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Nowruz Oil Field
<http://www.incidentnews.gov/incident/6262> at 10 November 2010.
12
Andrew Garwood-Gowers, ‘Case Note: Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) – Did the ICJ Miss the Boat on the Law on
the Use of Force?’ (2004) 5(1) Melbourne Journal of International Law 241, 243.
13
James Green, ‘The Oil Platforms Case: An Error in Judgement’ (2004) 9(3) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 357, 358.
14
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Merits) [6 November 2003] ICJ, Summary of the Judgement of 6 November 2003.
15
Green, above n 13.
16
David Crist, ‘Gulf of Conflict: A History of US-Iranian Confrontation at Sea’ (Policy Focus No 95, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2009) 7–8.
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Location

Type of Facility

18 Apr 1988

Iran

Offshore
production
platforms

30 Apr 1995

UK

13 Dec 1997

Nigeria

Perpetrators

Tactics/Scenario

Impacts/Effects

Details of Attack/Incident

Hostile State
(US Navy)

Navy attack
(using warships)

Severe damage to
facilities
Interruption of
production for 4
years

Floating offshore
oil storage
platform

Environmental
activists
(Greenpeace)

Unauthorised
boarding and
occupation

Interruption of
company
operations

The US military attacked and destroyed Iranian
offshore oil complexes, Salman (aka Sassan) and
Nasr (aka Sirri), shortly after the US frigate, Samuel
B Roberts was damaged by a mine, allegedly
belonging to Iran, in international waters near
Bahrain. 17 According to Iran, the attacks caused
severe damage to the production facilities of the
platforms and the activities of the Salman complex
were totally interrupted for four years, its regular
production being resumed only in September 1992,
and reaching a normal level in 1993. Activities in the
whole Nasr complex were interrupted and did not
resume until nearly four years later.18
Greenpeace activists occupied Shell’s Brent Spar
floating offshore oil storage facility in the North Sea
and occupied it for more than three weeks, ‘as part of
an ongoing campaign to stop ocean dumping’, which
prevented the company from carrying out
decommissioning operations. 19 Shell subsequently
obtained legal permission to evict the protesters from
the platform and the protesters were removed from
Brent Spar on 23 June 1995.20

Unknown

Local anti-oil
activists

Abduction of
workers

At least 13
workers abducted
(hostages later
released)

17

Employees and villagers kidnapped one US citizen,
one Australian, and two British oil workers, and at
least nine Nigerian staff members of Western
Geophysical, a US-owned oil exploration company

Garwood-Gowers, above n 12, 243. See also Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Merits) [6 November 2003] ICJ.
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Merits) [6 November 2003] ICJ, Summary of the Judgement of 6 November 2003.
19
Greenpeace, The Brent Spar (21 June 2007) <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/history/the-brent-spar/> at 8 July 2010.
20
Ibid. See also Simon Mar, The Precautionary Principle in the Law of the Sea: Modern Decision Making in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003) 129–30.
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Perpetrators

Tactics/Scenario

Impacts/Effects

Details of Attack/Incident
off the coast of Nigeria. The victims were released in
stages on 17 and 18 December 1997.21

25 May 1998 Nigeria

Offshore
platform

Local anti-oil
activists

Peaceful protest
Boarding and
occupation of the
platform

Interference with
company
operations
Two protesters
were killed and
some wounded

Over 100 unarmed and peaceful Ilaje protesters went
to Chevron’s Parabe oil production platform about
nine nautical miles offshore. Nigerian Navy and
Mobile Police stationed at the platform, who were
armed, allowed the protesters aboard. 22 The
protesters occupied the platform to protest
environmental and distribution issues, and to demand
monetary compensation for environmental and
economic grievances and jobs. 23 After two days of
negotiations, Chevron used its contracted helicopters
to fly Nigerian security forces to the platform.
Security forces opened fire on the protesters which
resulted in the death of two protesters with several
others wounded.24

27 Jun 1999

Oil platform

Local anti-oil
activists
(EENR)

Armed intrusion
Kidnapping

Damage to
facility
Abducted 3
workers
(later released for
ransom

Armed youth militants (local anti-oil industry
activists) stormed Shell’s oil platform in Port
Harcourt. The attackers caused damage to the
platform and kidnapped three foreign platform
workers, including an Australian. 25 The attackers
then hijacked a helicopter and forced the hostages to
fly them to a village near Warri.26 The hostages were

Nigeria

21

US Government, Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997 (1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1997Report/chron.html> at 25 September
2008.
22
Earth Rights International (ERI), What Happened at Parabe? (10 November 2009) <http://www.earthrights.org/legal/what-happened-parabe> at 11 December 2010.
23
Philippe Le Billon, ‘Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict’ (2005) 45(373) Adelphi Papers 7, 36.
24
ERI, above n 22.
25
Australian Government, Department of Transport of Regional Services (DOTARS), Offshore Oil & Gas Risk Context Statement (2005) 25.
26
Neal Adams, Terrorism & Oil (PennWell, 2003) 11. Brynjar Lia and Ashild Kjok, ‘Energy Supply as Terrorist Targets? Patterns of “Petroleum Terrorism” 1968-99’ in
Daniel Heradstveit and Helge Hveem (eds), Oil in the Gulf: Obstacles to Democracy and Development (Ashgate, 2004) 100, 110.
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unharmed)
Hijacked
helicopter

released unharmed on or about 16 July 1999 for an
undisclosed ransom. A group calling itself Enough is
Enough in the Niger River (EENR) claimed
responsibility.27

20 Jul 1999

Nigeria

Oil rig

Unidentified
gunmen

Armed intrusion
Hostage taking

64 workers held
hostage (later
released
unharmed)

Armed men stormed a Royal Dutch Shell-operated
oil rig in Osoko and held hostage seven British
nationals and 57 Nigerians. On 22 July 1999, the
youths released the hostages unharmed.28

10 Aug 1999

Nigeria

Oil platform

Unidentified
gunmen

Armed intrusion
Kidnapping

3 workers
kidnapped

3 Jun 2000

Guyana/
Suriname

Offshore drilling
rig

Hostile State
(Suriname Navy)

Threat of attack

Operations
interrupted
Facility evicted
from the area

Three British nationals were kidnapped by armed
youths from a US-operated oil platform in the Niger
Delta region. 29 No one was injured, and no one
claimed responsibility. On 11 August 1999 the
youths released the hostages unharmed.30
Gunboats of the Suriname Navy approached an
American-owned and operated offshore oil drilling
rig, CE Thornton, retained by the Canadian
corporation CGX Energy. 31 The Canadian company
had received a licence from the Guyanese
government to conduct exploratory drilling in a
disputed area of the continental shelf claimed by both
Guyana and Suriname. 32 The Surinamese Navy
advised that the rig was in Surinamese waters and

27

US Government, Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999 (2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/appa.html> at 25 September
2008.
28
Ibid.
29
Adams, above n 26, 11.
30
Department of State, above n 27.
31
Patricia Kwast, ‘Maritime Law Enforcement and the Use of Force: Reflections on the Categorisation of Forcible Action at Sea in the Light of the Guyana/Suriname Award’
(2008) 13(1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 49, 49.
32
Donna Nincic, ‘Troubled Waters: Energy Security and Maritime Security’ in Gal Luft and Anne Korin (eds), Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century: A Reference
Handbook (ABC-CLIO, 2009) 31, 32; Michael Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Owl Books, 2002) 231.
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Impacts/Effects

31 Jul 2000

Nigeria

Offshore rigs

Unidentified
gunmen (believed
to be Ijaw
militants)

Armed intrusion
Hostage taking

165 workers
taken hostage
(released later)

23 Aug 2001

Nigeria

Offshore jack-up
drilling rig

Local anti-oil
activists

Unauthorised
boarding

Operations
interrupted

Apr 2003

Nigeria

Offshore
platforms

Striking Nigerian
workers

Hostage taking

About 100
workers held
hostage

33

Details of Attack/Incident
ordered it to stop unauthorised drilling immediately
and clear the area within 12 hours. Fearing that the
Surinamese Navy would use force against it, the oil
rig decided to follow the orders to withdraw.33
About thirty-five armed young men from a village in
Bayela State used a rowboat to reach two oil
platforms off the coast. They boarded the rig and
took 165 oil workers hostage, including 20
foreigners. They demanded that Shell employ more
Nigerian nationals and that it pay a fee to the local
community for exploiting its petroleum resources.
Shell made a deal with the hostage-takers and the
employees were released four days later.34
The local community group of anti-oil activists
boarded Shell’s production platform and the nearby
Trident VIII jack-up drilling rig. The rig’s crew was
safely evacuated to Port Harcourt and the activists
withdrew.35
About 100 oil workers were held hostage aboard
offshore installations off the coast of Nigeria by
striking Nigerian workers complaining about
redundancies and unfair dismissal of Nigerian
employees. The hostages included over twenty
Americans and over thirty British nationals.36

Kwast, above n 31, 50. See also Donald Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Hart Publishing, 2010) 420.
Lia and Kjok, above n 26, 110. See also Martin Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World (Hurst & Co, 2009)
119.
35
Business Wire, Transocean Sedco Forex Confirms Jackup Trident 8 Crew Safely Evacuated and Rig Secured Following Incident of Community Unrest in Nigeria (27
August 2001) High Beam Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-77574501.html> 2 January 2011.
36
John Thackrah, Dictionary of Terrorism (Routledge, 2nd ed, 2004) 185.

34
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Location

Type of Facility

Iraq

Offshore oil
terminal

Perpetrators
Terrorists (AlQaeda affiliated
Zarqawi)

Tactics/Scenario

Impacts/Effects

Details of Attack/Incident

Explosive-laden
boats suicide
attack

Minor damage to
equipment
Terminal
shutdown
Lost revenues
Disruption to oil
supplies
Spike in global
oil prices

Terrorists carried out a suicide boat attack on the
offshore Al Basrah Oil Terminal (ABOT) in the
Persian Gulf. 37 Two zodiac type speedboats piloted
by suicide bombers approached the terminal at high
speed. The lead boat aimed at the platform and was
fired upon, after which it detonated before it could hit
the platform. The second boat was also fired upon,
killing terrorists; the boat still rammed MV Takasuza
oil tanker, but it failed to detonate/explode.38 ABOT,
capable of exporting up to 900 000 bpd, was shut
down for two days, which, combined with a closure
of Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT), cost
nearly US$28 million in lost revenues due to oil not
being exported during that time.39 As a consequence,
this event reportedly led to the spike in oil prices on
the world markets which resulted in a further loss of
approximately US$6 billion to the global economy.40
The attack was allegedly carried out by Zarqawi
network based in Iraq. In addition, the initial security
zone of 2 nautical miles around ABOT was

37

Nicolas Pyke, ‘Suicide Bomber Boats Explode in Attack on Basra Oil Terminal’, The Independent (online), 2004 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middleeast/suicide-bomber-boats-explode-in-attack-on-basra-oil-terminal-756454.html> at 20 September 2008. See also Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, Oil Installations as an
Attractive Target for Terrorism (5 November 2009) International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 11
<http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Oil_Installations_as_a_Target.pdf> at 7 August 2010.
38
Peter Lehr, ‘Maritime Terrorism: Locations, Actors, and Capabilities’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime
Security (CRC Press, 2008) 55, 60. However, Peter Lehr notes that according to the report of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), both boats exploded
before they could reach their targets. See Jonathan Howland, Countering Maritime Terror, US Thwarts Attacks, Builds Up Foreign Navies (17 June 2004) JINSA Online
<http://www.jinsa.org/articles/print.html/documentid/2567>, cited in Lehr, above n 38, 60, n 12.
39
Ali Koknar, ‘Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for NATO’ (2005) Energy Security [18] <http://www.iags.org/n0124051.htm> at 17 March 2009. See also Pyke, above
n 37; John Daly, ‘The Threat to Iraqi Oil’ (2004) 2(12) Terrorism Monitor; Lehr, above n 38, 61.
40
Andrew Forbes, ‘The Economic Impact of Disruptions to Seaborne Energy Flows’ (2008) 23 Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs 57, 65.
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Details of Attack/Incident
supplemented with a 3000-metre warning zone and a
2000-metre exclusion zone.41

24 Apr 2004

Iraq

Offshore oil
terminal

Terrorists (AlQaeda affiliated
Zarqawi)

Explosive-laden
boat suicide
attack

3 servicemen
killed
4 navy personnel
injured
Terminal
shutdown
Disruption to oil
supplies
Spike in global
oil price

Sep 2004

Yemen

Unknown

Insurgents

Unknown

Several offshore
workers abducted

41

Using a dhow, terrorists carried out a suicide boat
attack against offshore KAAOT in the Persian Gulf.42
The dhow was intercepted by a coalition forces
vessel as it approached the exclusion zone around the
platform. Soon after it was boarded by US Navy
personnel, the boat exploded. Two US Navy sailors
and one member of the US Coast Guard were killed
in the attack, and four others were injured. 43 No
damage was reported, but the terminal was
immediately shut down by the authorities.44 KAAOT,
which exports about 700 000 bpd, reopened the next
day following the attacks.45 The attack was allegedly
carried out by Zarqawi network based in Iraq. The
initial security zone of 2 nautical miles around
KAAOT was supplemented with a 3000-metre
warning zone and a 2000-metre exclusion zone.46
Yemeni insurgents abducted several western
nationals on offshore oil installations off the coast of
the Red Sea. After several hours, the workers were
released. Yemeni authorities have increased security
at all sea ports and oil terminals in response to the

US Government, US Navy, Coalition Maritime Forces Revise Iraqi Oil Terminal Protection Procedures (6 May 2004)
<http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=13177> at 31 January 2011.
42
See, eg, John Daly, ‘Terrorism and Piracy: The Dual Threat to Maritime Shipping’ (2008) 6(16) Terrorism Monitor 4.
43
Lehr, above n 38, 61.
44
Pyke, above n 37. See also Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, above n 37, 11.
45
Koknar, above n 39, [18]. See also Pyke, above n 37; Red Orbit, Iraqi Oil Terminal is Closed After Attack (25 April 2004)
<http://www.redorbit.com/news/general/53790/iraqi_oil_terminal_closed_after_attack/> at 20 September 2008.
46
US Navy, above n 41.
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3 Nov 2004

Malacca
Strait

Tug towing
offshore oil rig

Pirates

Attempted
boarding and
armed attack

Damage to
navigation
equipment

12 Jun 2005

Nigeria

FPSO

Unidentified
gunmen

Armed intrusion
Unauthorised
boarding

45 workers taken
hostage (later
released

47

Details of Attack/Incident
attacks and information ‘about the intention of a
foreign terrorist group to carry out sabotage acts on
vital oil facilities on Yemeni shores’. Security
authorities deployed two helicopters around two oil
terminals in the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea to
protect the facilities.47
In the Malacca Strait, outside Malaysia’s and
Indonesia’s territorial seas, several lookalike fishing
boats followed a tug towing the oil rig Ocean
Sovereign, while underway.48 The duty officer alerted
the Master who came to the bridge and observed a
boat heading for the tug. The crew was mustered and
as the pirates came within 250 metres of the tug, they
started shooting, causing extensive damage to
navigation equipment, bridge windows and the
superstructure. The crew switched on lights, activated
fire hoses and fired rocket flares but the pirates
continued to shoot with automatic weapons. When
they were within 50 metres, the crew took evasive
manoeuvres and the pirate boat moved away. There
were no physical injuries to crew.49
A group of armed men boarded the floating
production, storage and offloading unit (FPSO)
Jamestown in the Warri Region and took hostage all

‘Yemen on Alert for Al Qaida Attack on Oil Facilities’, World Tribune (online), 3 September 2004
<http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2004/me_terror_09_03.html> at 22 October 2010. See also Shawn Woodford, ‘Al-Qaeda and Saudi Arabia: A
Chronology’ in Erich Marquardt (ed), Saudi Arabian Oil Facilities: The Achilles Heel of the Western Economy (Jamestown Foundation, 2006) 35, 44.
48
International Maritime Organization (IMO), Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Issued Monthly – Acts Reported During November 2004, IMO
Doc MSC.4/Circ.61 (16 December 2004) annex 2 (‘Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Allegedly Attempted Against Ships Reported by Member States or International
Organizations in Consultative Status’) 1.
49
Ibid.
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unharmed)

45 crew members. After lengthy negotiations, the
gunmen released all hostages unharmed three days
later.50

22 Sep 2005

Nigeria

Offshore
platform

Insurgents
(NDPVF)

Armed intrusion
Occupation of
platform

Production shut
down

More than 100 armed militants, believed to be
members of the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer
Force (NDPVF), stormed a Chevron-operated Idama
oil production platform in the southern Niger Delta in
response to the arrest of an ethnic militia leader on
treason charges and forced it to shut down
operations.51 Armed with assault rifles, the militants
attacked the platform using about eight boats, each
carrying over 10 armed men, and occupied the Idama
flow station. Six government security forces
personnel had their weapons taken from them.
Production of 8000 bpd was shut down.52

10 Jan 2006
or
11 Jan 2006

Nigeria

Offshore
production
platform

Insurgents
(MEND)

Armed intrusion
Hostage taking

Platform shut
down
4 workers
kidnapped

Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta
(MEND) rebels attacked Shell’s EA offshore oil
platform located about 15 kilometres offshore and
kidnapped four foreign oil workers from a support
vessel anchored at the platform.53 The company shut
down the 115 000 bpd EA platform. MEND
demanded the immediate and unconditional release

50

International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report 1 January – 31 December 2005 (2006) 55.
Upstream Online, Delta Rebels Storm Idama Platform (22 September 2005) <http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article98970.ece> at 9 May 2011; Estelle Shirbon,
‘Armed Militants Seize Oil Platform After Leader is Held’, The Scotsman (online), 23 September 2005 <http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/world/Armed-militants-seize-oilplatform.2663710.jp> at 9 May 2011.
52
Shirbon, above n 51.
53
Red Orbit, Gunmen in Kidnap Raid on Oil Platform (2008) <http://www.redorbit.com/news/display/?id=356153> at 18 September 2008. See also Erich Marquardt, ‘The
Niger Delta Insurgency and Its Threat to Energy Security’ in Jonathan Hutzley (ed), Unmasking Terror: A Global Review of Terrorist Activities (Jamestown Foundation,
2007) vol 3, 236, 238.
51
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of
Dokubo-Asari
and
Governor
DSP
Alamieyeseigha.54 Insurgents also blew up crude oil
pipelines, cutting supplies to Forcados offshore
export terminal by 100 000 bpd. 55 Some sources
claim that EA platform was not attacked, but a
support vessel in the vicinity of the platform was
attacked. 56 Hostages were released on or about 30
January 2006.

15 Jan 2006

Nigeria

Flow station

Insurgents
(MEND)

Armed intrusion

At least 16
people killed
Facility damaged
Accommodation
burnt down

MEND insurgents travelling in speedboats attacked
Shell’s Benisede flow station, burnt down staff
accommodation and damaged the processing
facilities,57 killing at least 16 people in the process,
including 14 soldiers and two civilians. 58 Shell’s
operations were reduced by about 106 000 bpd as a
result of the attack and the company was forced to
consider evacuating.59

18 Feb 2006

Nigeria

Offshore oil
loading terminal

Insurgents
(MEND)

Bombing
Abduction

9 workers
abducted

MEND insurgents in speedboats bombed Forcados
offshore oil loading terminal and abducted nine

54

Niger Delta Rising, Timeline of Events (2010) <http://www.nigerdeltarising.org/resources/timeline> at 28 March 2010.
Africa Master Web, Chronology of Nigerian Militants’ Attacks (21 February 2007) <http://www.africamasterweb.com/AdSense/NigerianMilitants06Chronology.html> at
1 November 2010. See also Arild Nodland, ‘Guns, Oil, and “Cake”: Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea’ in Bruce Elleman, Andrew Forbes and David Rosenbert (eds),
Piracy and Maritime Crime (Naval War College Press, 2010) 191, 198.
56
Bergen Risk Solutions, Niger Delta Maritime Security Quarterly Review (9 July 2007) 15 <http://www.bergenrisksolutions.com/index.php?dokument=294> at 2 January
2011.
57
Daniel Howden, Shell May Pull Out of Niger Delta After 17 Die in Boat Raid (17 January 2006) Corp Watch <http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=13121> at 19
August 2008.
58
International Crisis Group, ‘The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria’s Delta Unrest’ (Africa Report No 115, International Crisis Group, 3 August 2006) 1.
59
Jennifer Giroux, ‘Turmoil in the Delta: Trends and Implications’ (2008) 2(8) Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 15, citing Howden, above n 57.
55
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Platform
equipment
damaged

workers from the nearby offshore barge at the
Escravos coast. 60 They also damaged oil platform
equipment.61 Six workers were released on 1 March
2006 and the remaining three on 27 March 2006.62

2 Jun 2006

Nigeria

Offshore
semisubmersible
drilling rig

Insurgents

Armed intrusion
Abduction

8 crew members
abducted
20 personnel
evacuated
Operations halted
Oil prise rise

About 30 armed militants boarded a semisubmersible
rig, Bulford Dolphin, about 65 kilometres offshore,
and abducted eight offshore workers. 63 Hostages
were released a couple of days later.64 About 20 nonessential personnel were evacuated to shore and the
rest of the rig crew was safe, but operations were
temporarily halted. The attack reportedly contributed
to the rise of oil prices by about US$1 to US$71.50
per barrel.65

22 Aug 2006

Iran

Offshore drilling
rig

Hostile State
(Iranian Navy)

Naval strike
attack and
seizure

Facility seizure
and occupation

The Iranian Navy attacked and seized control of
Orizont offshore drilling rig, owned by the Romanian
oil company Grup Servicii Petroliere, in the Salman
field. There were 26 Romanian offshore workers on
board the platform at the time of the incident. Iranian
troops had seized and occupied the rig after firing on
it with machine guns from a ship. The rig was
operated under a deal signed between the Romanian
company, Petrom and the Dubai-based Oriental Oil
Co, and the shooting reportedly happened as the rig

60

IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 January – 31 March 2006 (2006) 25. See also Michael Watts, ‘Sweet and Sour’ in Michael Watts
(ed), Curse of the Black Gold: 50 Years of Oil in Niger Delta (Powerhouse Books, 2008) 36, 37.
61
IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Issued Monthly – Acts Reported During March 2006, IMO Doc MSC.4/Circ.84 (18 April 2006) annex 1
(‘Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Allegedly Committed Against Ships Reported by Member States or International Organizations in Consultative Status’) 1.
62
Bergen Risk Solutions, above n 56; Niger Delta Rising, above n 54.
63
Martyn Wingrove, ‘Nigeria Kidnap Hikes Up Oil Price’, Lloyd’s List DCN (Sydney), 8 June 2006, 14. See also Marquardt, above n 53, 240.
64
Bergen Risk Solutions, above n 56, 19.
65
Wingrove above n 63.
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was being taken outside Iranian waters for a
mandatory overhaul. Iranian armed forces kept the
crew on the rig’s heliport for several hours without
food and water, but later they allowed the crew to
return to their quarters after cutting off all
communications between the workers and the
company. The incident arose due to a commercial
dispute.66

22 Nov 2006

Nigeria

FPSO

Unidentified
gunmen

Armed intrusion
Abduction

7 workers
abducted
1 worker killed
1 worker injured

The FPSO Mystras was attacked by armed men while
anchored off Port Harcourt. Ten gunmen boarded the
facility and kidnapped seven workers. Their boat was
intercepted by the authorities and engaged in a shootout during which one worker was killed, one injured,
and five others were rescued.67

22 Mar 2007

India

Offshore drilling
rig (under tow)

Pirates

Unauthorised
boarding
Theft

Unknown

The mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) Aban VII
(jack-up rig) was attacked by pirates in speedboats
near the south-west coast of India, outside India’s
territorial sea.68 The rig was boarded by three pirates
while under tow. Pirates were noticed while
preparing to transfer some equipment from the rig to
their speedboats and the alarm was raised. Pirates
jumped overboard and escaped in their speedboats.69

31 Mar 2007

Nigeria

Offshore drilling

Unidentified

Armed intrusion

1 worker

Bulford Dolphin mobile offshore drilling rig was

66

Andy Critchlow and Marc Wolfensberger, Iran’s Navy Attacks and Boards Romanian Rig in Gulf: Update3 (22 August 2006) Bloomberg
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=adVreywC1G_k> at 20 August 2009. See also BBC News, Iran ‘Attacks Romanian Oil Rig’ (22 August
2006) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5274374.stm> at 20 August 2009; Jihad Watch, Iran Pre-empted Pending Int'l Court Action to Attack Romanian Oil Rig (27 August
2006) <http://www.jihadwatch.org/2006/08/iran-pre-empted-pending-intl-court-action-to-attack-romanian-oil-rig.html> at 20 August 2009.
67
IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report 1 January – 31 December 2006 (2007).
68
Ibid 53.
69
Ibid.
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rig

gunmen (believed
to be pirates)

Abduction

kidnapped

attacked again by gunmen about 65 kilometres off the
coast of Nigeria. One British expatriate worker was
abducted and taken ashore from the platform. The
attackers, believed to be pirates, boarded the rig via
an offshore support vessel, which was secured
alongside the platform at the time of the incident.71
The hostage was released on 4 April 2007.72

19 Apr 2007

Nigeria

Offshore drilling
rig

Unidentified
gunmen

Armed intrusion
Abduction

3 Nigerian sailors
abducted
6 Nigerian sailors
injured
Weapons and
equipment seized
Rig shut down

An offshore security vessel that was supporting
Trident VIII drilling rig, was attacked and three
Nigerian sailors were abducted and another six were
injured. The gunmen also seized weapons and
equipment. Trident VIII rig was later shut down as a
result of this incident and the staff of Don Walker oil
rig, which was within a 10-minute boat ride of the
incident, requested security reinforcements from the
nearest naval base.73

1 May 2007

Nigeria

FSO

Insurgents
(MEND)

Armed intrusion
Abduction

1 Nigerian sailor
killed
6 workers
abducted
Production at
fields shut down

Chevron’s Oloibiri floating storage and offloading
(FSO) unit was reportedly attacked by MEND at the
offshore Pennington field off southern Bayelsa State.
One Nigerian sailor was killed during the attack and
six other foreign oil workers were abducted, but later
released on 2 June 2007.74 The FSO was moored near
Funiwa platform. The production at the 15 000 bpd

70

Some sources report that the incident took place on 31 March 2007.
IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 April – 30 June 2007 (2007) 42; IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships: Issued Monthly – Acts Reported During April 2007, IMO Doc MSC.4/Circ.102 (19 June 2007) annex 1 (‘Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Allegedly Committed
Against Ships Reported by Member States or International Organizations in Consultative Status’).
72
Bergen Risk Solutions, above n 56, 19.
73
David Pearl and Sarah Aboufasha, Worldwide Threats to Shipping: Marine Warning Information (2007) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
<http://www.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/MISC/wwtts/wwtts_20070502100000.txt> at 22 September 2008.
74
Bergen Risk Solutions, above n 56, 20.
71

411

Appendix B

Date

Mikhail Kashubsky

Location

Type of Facility

Perpetrators

Tactics/Scenario

Impacts/Effects

Details of Attack/Incident
Funiwa field and other fields supported by this vessel
was shut down to avoid any additional security or
safety incidents.75

3 May 2007

Nigeria

FPSO

Unidentified
gunmen (believed
to be pirates)

Armed intrusion
Abduction

8 workers
kidnapped
(released the
following day)
Production at
field shut down

The FPSO Mystras was attacked by gunmen believed
to be pirates, who boarded via the anchor chain. The
intruders kidnapped eight foreign workers, including
an Australian, from the FPSO and an offshore
support vessel. The workers were released the
following day. 76 The FPSO was moored about 55
kilometres off Port Harcourt (however, some sources
report that it was 55 nautical miles offshore). Force
majeure was declared at a field capable of producing
50 000 bpd, and the production was shut down for
several days. 77 Some sources report that this attack
was carried out by MEND, not pirates; and that six
foreign workers were kidnapped, not eight.78

5 May 2007

Nigeria

Offshore drilling
rig

Unidentified
gunmen (believed
to be pirates)

Armed intrusion
Abduction

1 crew member
kidnapped

Trident VIII offshore drilling rig was attacked and
boarded by gunmen, believed to be pirates, near
Brass oil export terminal. One crew member was
kidnapped. 79 The attack triggered a security
lockdown of the Brass crude oil export terminal.80

75

Pearl and Aboufasha, above n 73; Rupert Herbert-Burns, ‘Tankers, Specialized Production Vessels, and Offshore Terminals: Vulnerability and Security in the International
Maritime Oil Sector’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2008) 133, 155.
76
Pearl and Aboufasha, above n 73; IMB, above n 71, 43.
77
Upstream Online, Force Majeure at Okono-Okpoho (6 May 2007) <http://www.upstreamonline.com/incoming/article132853.ece> at 30 October 2010.
78
Bergen Risk Solutions, above n 56, 20.
79
IMB, above n 71, 43.
80
Bergen Risk Solutions, above n 56, 20.
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22 June 2007 Nigeria

FSO

Unidentified
gunmen

Armed intrusion
Seizure of the
control of facility

Operations
interrupted

In the early hours, three gunmen armed with AK-47s
boarded the 159 000-deadweight tonne Cape Brindisi
moored at Pennington Oil Terminal (also known as
FSO Oloibiri) and proceeded to shoot up the vessel.
No injuries to the crew were reported as they
succeeded in going into lock-down mode, after which
the gunmen left the ship. The militants reportedly
took control of the FSO Oloibiri, where the Cape
Brindisi had been loading.81

20 Oct 2007

Nigeria

Unknown

Unidentified
gunmen

Armed intrusion
Abduction

7 workers
abducted

Seven workers, including four Nigerians, a Russian, a
British, and a Croatian were kidnapped at the EA
field (possibly from the FPSO Sea Eagle) about 15
kilometres off the coast of Bayelsa State by gunmen
in speedboats. All workers were released two days
later.82

26 Oct 2007

Nigeria

FPSO

Insurgents
(MEND)

Armed intrusion
Abduction

6 workers
kidnapped

Gunmen in speedboats attacked the FPSO Mystras
about 85 kilometres offshore at an oil production
facility operated by Saipem, taking hostage six oil
workers. MEND claimed responsibility for the
attack.83

10 Feb 2008

UK

Offshore drilling
rig

Insider
(offshore worker)

Bomb
threat/false alert

Workers
evacuated
Operations
interrupted

Safe Scandinavia oil rig in the North Sea issued a
security alert which resulted in one of the biggest
evacuations in the history of the North Sea offshore
industry. It was reported that a catering worker on the
rig screamed ‘Bomb!’ in her sleep and apparently
was ‘convinced that her nightmare was about to come

81

Ibid 22.
David Cutler, Chronology – Attacks in Nigeria’s Oil Delta (4 June 2008) Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL04786711> at 18 October 2010.
83
‘Gunmen in Speedboats Kidnap 6 Oil Workers in Nigeria’, The Hindu (online), 26 October 2007 <http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/003200710261962.htm> 16
August 2010. See also Rigzone, FPSO Mystras Attacked (26 October 2007) <http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=52081> at 20 October 2010.
82
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true’. The authorities sent helicopters to evacuate
more than 500 workers, but it turned out that it was
just a dream. 84 The company reported that 161
workers were evacuated to the neighbouring Alba
and Armada platforms before the operation was
called off.85

10 Jun 2008

Nigeria

Oil platform

Unknown

Armed
attack/shooting

9 soldiers killed
4 civilians
injured

In the early morning, near Port Harcourt, Rivers
State, armed assailants in speedboats fired upon an
oil facility, killing nine naval officers and wounding
four civilians. No group claimed responsibility.86

19 Jun 2008

Nigeria

FPSO

Insurgents
(MEND)

Armed attack
Abduction

Facility damaged
Production shut
down for almost
a month
Workers injured
Support vessel
hijacked
Oil price
fluctuations

Royal Dutch Shell’s Bonga FPSO was attacked by
armed militants about 120 kilometres offshore. It was
reported that at about 1:00 am around two dozen
armed men in speedboats stormed the floating facility
and after failing to get access inside, they started
shooting at the FPSO and those on board. Some
people were wounded, but no lives were lost. The
attack lasted for almost four hours, during which the
militants also encountered and hijacked an offshore
support vessel and kidnapped its US captain, but
released him later that day. 87 The responsibility for
the attack was claimed by MEND, the most highprofile militant group in the region. The facility was
damaged in the attack, which forced the company to

84

Mike Nizza, ‘Another Security Threat: It Was All a Dream’, The New York Times (online), 11 February 2008 <http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/11/anothersecurity-threat-it-was-all-a-dream/> at 20 September 2008.
85
Agence France Presse (AFP), ‘North Sea Oil Rig Evacuated After Hoax’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 11 February 2008 <http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/northsea-oil-rig-evacuated-after-hoax/2008/02/11/1202578630294.html> at 29 March 2009.
86
US Government, National Counterterrorism Center (NCC), Worldwide Incidents Tracking System <https://wits.nctc.gov> at 21 November 2009.
87
Nick Tattersall, Attack Halts Shell’s Bonga Oilfield (2008) Offshore Technology <http://www.offshore-technology.com/news/news5329.html> at 2 July 2008. See also Jeff
Vail, The Significance of the Bonga Offshore Oil Platform Attack (2008) The Oil Drum <http://www.theoildrum.com/node/4196> at 1 July 2008.
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shut down the entire production at its main offshore
oil field in Nigeria, interrupting production of
approximately 200 000 bpd and 150 million standard
cubic feet of gas.88

16 Sep 2008

Nigeria

Offshore
production
platform

Unknown

Unknown

Workers
evacuated
Operations
interrupted

Shooting was reported near the Chevron-operated
Idama offshore production platform, causing
Chevron to evacuate offshore workers as a
precaution.89

26 Dec 2008

Malaysia

Mobile offshore
drilling rig

Unidentified
gunmen (believed
to be pirates)

Armed intrusion

Theft of stores
and property
1 crew member
injured

Six armed robbers boarded the mobile offshore
drilling rig Allied Centurion in Malaysia’s territorial
sea and stole stores and property from the facility.
One crew member suffered head injuries, but
remained in a stable condition. Authorities were
informed and later boarded the rig to investigate.90

21 Jun 2009

Nigeria

Offshore facility

Insurgents
(MEND)

Detonation of
explosives

Unknown

In Rivers State, assailants detonated explosives,
damaging two oil pipelines at Adamakiri and in Kula
respectively as well as an offshore facility at the
Afremo oil fields operated by Shell, but causing no
fatalities or injuries. MEND claimed responsibility.91

25 Jun 2009

Nigeria

Wellhead
platform

Insurgents
(MEND)

Bombing

Damage to
facility

MEND militants rejected the government’s amnesty
offer arguing it did not address the fundamentals of
the crisis in the region. MEND claims to have blown

88

AFX News Limited, Shell's Bonga Still Not at Capacity After Militant Attack (2008) Rigzone <http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=6358> at 2 July 2008.
Austin Ekeinde, Nigerian Militants Sabotage Oil Facilities (16 September 2008) Reuters < http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/09/16/businessproind-nigeria-delta-dcidUKLE51403420080916> at 9 May 2011; Austin Ekeinde, Nigerian Militants Attacked Two Oil Installations in the Heaviest Fighting in the Niger Delta in Two Years,
Security Sources Said on Tuesday (16 September 2008) Reuters <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/09/16/uk-nigeria-delta-idUKLG63750820080916> at 9 May 2011.
90
IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Issued Monthly – Acts Reported During December 2008, IMO Doc MSC.4/Circ.129 (20 March 2009)
annex 1 (‘Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Allegedly Committed Against Ships Reported by Member States or International Organizations in Consultative Status’).
91
NCC, above n 86.
89
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up the second remaining wellhead platform Jacket B
of the Shell Afremo offshore oil fields in Delta
State.92

26 Jun 2009

Nigeria

Offshore oil
terminal

Insurgents
(MEND)

Armed attack

20 soldiers killed
Offshore workers
evacuated

MEND claims at least 20 soldiers were killed in one
of the attacks on Shell’s Forcados offshore terminal
in Delta State. Chevron evacuated hundreds of
workers from the Niger Delta after the attacks.93 At
least six high-profile attacks by MEND on oil
wellheads, offshore platforms, major pipelines and
oil pumping stations were reported.94

29 Jun 2009

Nigeria

Offshore oil
terminal

Insurgents
(MEND)

Explosives attack

Extensive
damage to
facility
Operations
interrupted

At about 3:00 am in Delta State, assailants detonated
explosives, damaging the Shell-operated Forcados
offshore
oil
terminal.
MEND
claimed
responsibility. 95 Clusters 11 and 30 of the terminal
caught fire after a massive explosion. A confrontation
with a military gunboat patrol that stumbled upon
heavily armed fighters resulted in the sinking of the
gunboat with soldiers on board numbering between
20 and 25.96

5 Jul 2009

Nigeria

Offshore
wellhead
platform

Insurgents
(MEND)

Explosives attack

Damage to
facility
Operations shut
down

MEND attacked Shell’s Well Head 20 platform
located at Cawthorn Channel 1. The facility connects
to the Bonny loading terminal in Rivers State. On the
same day, MEND militants attacked and blew up the
strategic Okan manifold which controls about 80 per

92

Niger Delta Rising, above n 54.
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), Nigeria: Timeline of Recent Unrest in Niger Delta Region (2010) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b71214bc.html> at 28 March 2010.
94
Ibid.
95
NCC, above n 86.
96
Niger Delta Rising, above n 54.
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cent of Chevron Nigeria Limited’s offshore crude oil
to its BOP Crude Loading Platform in Delta State.97

12 Jul 2009

Nigeria

Offshore
offloading
facility

Insurgents
(MEND)

Unknown

5 people killed

MEND commits a rare raid on an oil offloading
facility in Lagos. This was the group’s first attack
outside the Niger Delta in several months. Five
people were killed in the attack.98

5 Jan 2010

Nigeria

FSO

Unidentified
gunmen (believed
to be pirates)

Armed intrusion
Theft and
robbery

7 crew members
injured
Theft of cash,
belongings, and
equipment

A group of pirates attacked the FSO Westaf, off
Lagos. Seven crew members were taken to hospital
due to the attack, including the master who was
wounded in the stomach. The attackers stole cash,
crew belongings and expensive ship equipment.99

31 Aug 2010

Greenland Drilling rig

Environmental
activists
(Greenpeace)

Unauthorised
boarding

Interruption of
company
operations

Greenpeace activists ‘boarded’ the drilling rig Stena
Don operating in Arctic waters offshore Greenland
and were suspended 15 metres above the water in
tents to protest against drilling operations. The
activists had to outrun Danish Navy commandos
before climbing up the inside of the rig and hanging
from it in tents suspended from ropes. They remained
on their position for two days, forcing the company
to suspend drilling. 100 The drillship Stena Forth,
which is located about 20 nautical miles away, also

97

Ibid.
Relief Web, Nigeria: Timeline of Recent Unrest in Niger Delta Region (4 February 2010) <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/MUMA82D2AY?OpenDocument> at 22 October 2010; IRIN, above n 93.
99
Chief’s Briefs by Oyibos OnLine, Gulf of Guinea 20th – 26th March 2010 Weekly Intelligence Summary (2010) <http://www.chiefsbriefs.com/?p=3431> at 3 December
2010.
100
Greenpeace, Greenpeace Activists Occupy Arctic Oil Rig (31 August 2010) <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/features/Greenpeace-activists-occupyArctic-oil-rig-100831/> at 15 October 2010; Greenpeace, Greenpeace Activists End Arctic Oil Rig Occupation (2 September 2010)
<http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/features/Greenpeace-Activists-End-Arctic-Oil-Rig-Occupation020910/> at 15 October 2010.
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had to be shut down during the Stena Don
occupation.101

21 Sep 2010

UK

Drill ship

Environmental
activists
(Greenpeace)

Unauthorised
boarding

Interruption of
company
operations

In the waters off the Shetland Islands in the UK,
Greenpeace activists climbed the anchor chain of
Chevron-operated drill ship Stena Carron and were
hanging suspended from the chain in a capsule-tent
for several days effectively delaying the company’s
drilling operations in the Atlantic Frontier.102

22 Sep 2010

Nigeria

Offshore rig

Unidentified
gunmen (believed
to be pirates)

Armed attack
Abduction

4 workers
abducted

Armed men (believed to be pirates) attacked and
attempted to take control of an offshore oil rig at an
oil field operated by Addax Petroleum. 103 The
attackers engaged in sustained gunfire with a
Nigerian Navy patrol boat after it intervened, and
then kidnapped three French employees from an
offshore supply vessel while retreating. 104 A Thai
employee also may have been kidnapped during the
attack. The attackers nearly reached the platform by
using a vessel which looked like the ships that
routinely provide supplies to offshore rig workers.105

101

Ibid.
Greenpeace, Activists Stop Chevron Deepwater Drilling Ship Off the Shetland Islands (21 September 2010)
<http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/features/chevron-shetland-stopped210910/> at 15 October 2010. See also US Government, Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI), Worldwide Threat to Shipping Report (7 October 2010) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
<http://www.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/MISC/wwtts/wwtts_20101007100000.txt> at 15 October 2010.
103
Jon Gambrell, Nigeria: 5 Kidnapped in Offshore Oil Rig Attack (8 November 2010) Desert News <http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700079609/Nigeria-5-kidnappedin-offshore-oil-rig-attack.html?pg=2> at 19 March 2011.
104
Greg Keller, Pirates Attack Offshore Oil Platform Near Nigeria, Then Kidnap 3 French Employees from Ship (22 September 2010) Fox News
<http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/09/22/pirates-attack-french-marine-services-ship-nigeria-employees-taken-hostage/> at 19 March 2011. See also Gambrell, above n
103.
105
Keller, above n 104. See also Australian Association for Maritime Affairs (AAMA), ‘Inquiry Set Up Into Sector’s Security’ (2011) 199 Australian Maritime Digest 9, 9.
102
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7 Nov 2010

Nigeria

Offshore drilling
rig (jack-up)

8 Nov 2010

Nigeria

15 Nov 2010

Nigeria

Perpetrators

Tactics/Scenario

Impacts/Effects

Insurgents
(MEND)

Armed intrusion
Abduction

19 workers
abducted
Drilling
operations
suspended

A group of MEND insurgents attacked High Island
VII offshore drilling jack-up rig at the Okoro offshore
field located about 12 kilometres offshore and
kidnapped 19 crew members, including 12 Nigerians,
two Americans, two Frenchmen, two Indonesians and
one Canadian. The hostages were freed ten days
later.106

Offshore rig

Unidentified
gunmen

Armed intrusion
Abduction

7 workers
abducted
2 workers
injured/wounded

Gunmen attacked an offshore rig operated by Afren
PLC, which was engaged in exploratory work at the
Okoro oil field about 11 kilometres off the coast of
Nigeria. Seven foreigner workers were kidnapped
from an oil rig and the company reported that two
workers were wounded in the attack and were flown
out by helicopter to receive medical treatment.’107

Offshore
production
platform

Insurgents
(NDLF)

Armed intrusion
Abduction

8 workers
abducted
Some workers
injured
Equipment
damaged
Production shut
down

Armed men boarded ExxonMobil’s Oso offshore
platform on Nigeria’s southeast coast and abducted
eight offshore workers. At the time of the attack there
were 74 people aboard the platform. The company
suspended production from the facility which
produces approximately 75 000 bpd.108 The gunmen
allegedly came in five speedboats; they beat up some
crew members and cut electricity to the offshore
facility. 109 A previously unknown group, which

106

Details of Attack/Incident

‘Counter Terrorism Security Response: Energy and Nuclear 15-21 November 2010’ (Weekly Report, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research,
November 2010) 2. See also Upstream Online, Crew Snatched in Okoro Raid (9 November 2010) <http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article236087.ece> at 4 December
2010; Petroleum Africa, Okoro Field Attacked Offshore Nigeria (9 November 2010) <http://petroleumafrica.com/en/newsarticle.php?NewsID=10598> at 4 December 2010.
107
Gambrell, above n 103.
108
Dulue Mbachu and Elisha Bala-Gbogbo, Exxon Mobil Says Offshore Platform in Nigeria Attacked (15 November 2010) Bloomberg Businessweek
<http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-11-15/exxon-mobil-says-offshore-platform-in-nigeria-attacked.html> 4 December 2010.
109
Will Connors, ExxonMobil Shuts Some Output After Nigeria Attack (15 November 2010) Fox Business <http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2010/11/15/exxonmobilshuts-output-nigeria-attack/> at 4 December 2010.
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identified itself as the Niger Delta Liberation Force
(NDLF), claimed responsibility for the attack and
threatened more attacks on oil installations.110

17 Nov 2010

Cameroon Offshore
platform

Insurgents/
criminals (AMC)

Armed assault

6 persons killed
(including one
attacker)

The Africa Marine Commando (AMC) rebel group
carried out a deadly assault on an offshore oil
platform at the offshore Moudi oil terminal
(consisting of a production platform, the FSO Moudi
and a single buoy mooring) located in the Gulf of
Guinea about 50 kilometres off Cameroon’s disputed
Bakassi peninsula. 111 Six people were killed in the
attack, including three members of Cameroon’s
Rapid Intervention Battalion (a national defence
force) involved in the security of offshore petroleum
installations, two Cameroonian civilians and one of
the attackers. 112 The Cameroonian security service
said that the group had threatened further attacks
unless they receive money.113

22 Nov 2010

Mexico

Environmental
activists
(Greenpeace)

Unauthorised
boarding

Operations
interrupted

Four Greenpeace activists took protesting action by
climbing 39 metres over the water at the deepwater
oil rig Centenario, off the coast of the State of
Veracruz. The activists boarded the rig and put up a

Offshore drilling
rig

110

See also ‘Counter Terrorism Security Response: Energy and Nuclear 15-21 November 2010’, above n 106, 1–2.
Radio Netherlands Worldwide, Six Killed in Cameroon Oil Platform Attack: Security Source (17 November 2010) <http://internationaljustice.rnw.nl/africa/bulletin/sixkilled-cameroon-oil-platform-attack-security-source> 4 December 2010.
112
Ibid. See also Andrew McGregor, ‘Cameroon Rebels Threaten Security in Oil-Rich Gulf of Guinea’ (2010) 8(43) Terrorism Monitor 7, 7.
113
See ‘Counter Terrorism Security Response: Energy and Nuclear 15-21 November 2010’, above n 106, 2. See also AFP, Cameroon Rebels Threaten More Oil Attacks:
Security Source (2010)
<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jEs8Jwi8Imy11k0OSNXPsEDfIzpQ?docId=CNG.43a57f15426eed4e3d958f8281348a4b.501> at 4 December 2010.
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large banner stating ‘Go Beyond Oil’ to call for an
end to deepwater drilling.114

21 Apr 2011

Turkey

Offshore drilling
rig

Environmental
activists
(Greenpeace)

Unauthorised
boarding

114

Operations
interrupted

Greenpeace activists intercepted the 53 000 tonne oil
drilling rig Leiv Eiriksson, operated by Cairn Energy,
as it departed Besiktas port near Istanbul and headed
to the Arctic waters off Greenland to begin
exploratory deep sea drilling. 115 Eleven activists
climbed the rig to prevent it from departing Turkish
waters and impede its progress and unfurled a banner
staying ‘Stop Arctic destruction’. 116 Having briefly
halted the rig’s progress, they were only able to
remain on board for one day and were forced by bad
weather to end their protest on board the world’s
second largest oil rig while the rig was navigating the
Dardanelles strait.117

Greenpeace, Activist Occupy Oil Rig in the Gulf of Mexico (22 November 2010) <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/features/Activist-occupycentenario221110/> at 2 January 2011.
115
Greenpeace, Activists Occupy Oil Rig Bound for Arctic Drilling (21 April 2011) <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/features/Activists-/> at 14 May 2011.
116
Ibid.
117
Jess Miller, Deteriorating Weather Conditions Force Activists to End Arctic Oil Rig Protest (22 April 2011) Greenpeace
<http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/makingwaves/deteriorating-weather-conditions-force-activi/blog/34403> at 14 May 2011.

421

Appendix C

Mikhail Kashubsky

Appendix C – Other Selected Security Incidents Involving Petroleum and Maritime Targets
Date

Location

Type of Target

Tactics/Scenario

Details of Attack/Incident

30 Dec 1947

Israel

Oil refinery

IED/Bomb

A bomb attack was carried out in Irgun outside the Haifa oil refineries, killing six
Arabs and wounding 42. Immediately after the attack, Arab refinery workers began a
riot and went on a killing rampage, invading the factory facilities and murdering 41
Jewish workers and injuring another 49.1

4 Mar 1960

Cuba

Vessel
(freighter)

IED/Bomb

A series of explosions aboard a French freighter unloading explosives in Havana
killed almost 100 persons and injured 200. No group claimed responsibility, but the
blasts that blew apart the ship were attributed to attack by anti-Castro exile groups.2

6 Jul 1960

Trinidad

Storage tanks

Sabotage

In the Port of Spain, oil company workers on strike against Texaco Trinidad Inc,
opened storage tank valves, spilling 200 000 gallons of gasoline, kerosene, and oil into
the sea.3

22 Jan 1961

Caribbean

Vessel
(cruise liner)

Hijack/seizure

The Portuguese passenger liner Santa Maria was seized by a group of Portuguese and
Spanish insurgents armed with machine guns and hand grenades, led by Captain
Henrique Galvao, a Portuguese political exile and a leading opponent of Antonio
Salazar’s government.4 The liner was on a holiday cruise with over 600 Portuguese,
American, Dutch, Venezuelan and Spanish passengers on board, among them many
women and children. The perpetrators, who embarked as ordinary passengers, seized

1

Barry Rubin and Judith Rubin, Chronologies of Modern Terrorism (M E Sharpe, 2008) 182.
Brian Jenkins et al, ‘A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks and Other Criminal Actions Against Maritime Targets’ (Rand Paper Series, RAND Corporation, September 1983) 7.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid; Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, ‘Piracy, Terrorism, and the Insurgent Passenger: A Historical Perspective’ in Natalino Ronzitti (ed), Maritime Terrorism and International
Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1990) 43, 56. See also Dennis Bryant, ‘Historical and Legal Aspects of Maritime Security’ (2004-2005) 17(1) University of San Francisco Maritime
Law Journal 1, 1–2.
2
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the ship in the Caribbean Sea on the journey between Curacao and Miami in order to
call the attention of world opinion to the dictatorship then ruling Portugal.5 The third
officer who was on watch at the time and resisted the assault was killed and three
other crew members were injured. An international search involving ships from many
navies was mounted to locate the Santa Maria which was eventually spotted by a US
naval plane and persuaded to alter course for Recife, Brazil. 6 Following Galvao’s
negotiations with the US and Brazilian navies, the liner entered Recife on 2 February
where the passengers and the majority of the crew disembarked. Galvao formally
surrendered the ship to the Brazilian Navy on 3 February, having accepted the
Brazilian government’s offer of asylum for himself and his followers. This was the
first modern hijack at sea and lasted for 11 days.7

27 Feb 1967

Ethiopia

Petroleum plant

Unknown

The Eritrean Liberation Front attacked and severely damaged the Mobil petroleum
plant in Aseb.8

May 1968

Red Sea

Oil tanker

Standoff
weapons attack

In the Red Sea, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) terrorists
carried out an assault on the Liberian-registered oil tanker Coral Sea. Terrorists on a
speedboat fired 10 bazooka shells at the tanker, causing some damage but no
casualties. The attack occurred in the Strait of Bab el Mandeb at the entrance to the
Red Sea. It was intended to discourage tankers from using the Israeli port of Eilat in
the Red Sea.9

14 Mar 1971

Netherlands Fuel tanks

Explosives attack

Fuel tanks in Rotterdam were blown up by Palestinians and their French
sympathisers.10

5

Natalino Ronzitti, ‘The Law of the Sea and the Use of Force Against Terrorist Activities’ in Natalino Ronzitti (ed), Maritime Terrorism and International Law (Martinus
Nijhoff, 1990) 13, n 5.
6
Jenkins et al, above n 2, 7.
7
Ibid 7–8.
8
Cindy Combs and Martin Slann, Encyclopedia of Terrorism (Facts on File, 2002) 255.
9
Jenkins et al, above n 2, 8–9.
10
Combs and Slann, above n 8, 256.
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6 Feb 1972

Netherlands Gas-processing
plants

Explosives attack

Two gas-processing plants in Rotterdam were blown up by Black September
terrorists.11

6 Dec 1973

Argentina

Oil company
worker

Kidnapping for
ransom

Victor Samuel, an American manager with Esso Argentina, was kidnapped in Buenos
Aires by the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP). He was released on 29 April 1974
after payment of US$14.2 million ransom.12

31 Jan 1974

Singapore

Oil refinery &
ferry boat

Explosive attack
(attempted) &
hijacking

Two Japanese belonging to the radical Japanese Red Army (JRA) and two Arabs of
the PFLP tried to blow up a Shell refinery, then seized eight hostages aboard a
ferryboat and threatened to kill themselves and the hostages unless they were given
safe passage to an Arab country. The terrorists had tried to blow up three oil storage
tanks belonging to Shell Eastern Petroleum, a Shell International company, but only
succeeded in setting them on fire.13

2 Feb 1974

Pakistan

Freighter

Seizure

Three gunmen, members of a group called Moslem International Guerrillas, seized a
Greek freighter in the port of Karachi. They threatened to blow up the ship and kill
two hostages unless the Greek government freed two Arab terrorists who were being
held in Athens under sentence of death for the 5 August 1973 attack at the Athens
airport. After lengthy negotiations with Pakistani authorities and three Arab
ambassadors, the attackers accepted a Greek government agreement to commute the
sentences of the Athens terrorists. The three gunmen were flown out of Karachi on a
special PIA flight to Cairo on 3 February and to Libya the following day.14

23 Jun 1974

UK

Fishing vessel

Arson

The Band of Mercy, the group that referred to themselves as ‘animal lovers’, set fire
to the British 32-foot vessel Mizpah and totally destroyed it, later claiming that the
reason for their attack was that the vessel was regularly used to hunt seals. 15

11

Ibid 257.
Ibid 258.
13
Jenkins et al, above n 2, 11.
14
Ibid. See also Ong Kian Seng, 1974 – The Laju Incident (7 January 2002) Singapore Ministry of Defence
<http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/history/birth_of_saf/v06n01_history.html> at 02 October 2010.
15
Jenkins et al, above n 2, 12. The group also threatened to step up their campaign by using explosives unless seal hunting was abolished: at 12.
12
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4 Aug 1975

Bahamas

Fishing vessel

Bombing

A group calling themselves ‘Jaws’ placed a bomb on the hull below the waterline of
the Bahamian vessel Goldfinger II. The explosion blew a hole and caused the engine
room to be flooded. Shortly after the attack, a Spanish-speaking woman claimed that
the ship was bombed to punish the enemy and protest against the Bahamian
government’s attitude towards American fishermen.16

21 Dec 1975

Austria

OPEC
headquarters

Hostages

Eight PFLP terrorists raided the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) headquarters in Vienna during a conference, taking 81 hostages. The
terrorists were led by Carlos ‘the Jackal’, the Venezuelan terrorist chief. After the
terrorists were given US$50 million ransom, they were flown (together with hostages)
safely to Algiers.17

29 May 1978

Colombia

Oil company
worker

Kidnapping and
murder

The Colombian general manager of Texas Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of
Texaco, was kidnapped in Bogota and subsequently killed by his kidnappers on
3 January 1979, when police stumbled upon their hideout while searching for stolen
weapons.18

3 Oct 1978

Israel

Oil tank farms
and pumping
installations

Foiled attack,
explosive-laden
ship and standoff
weapons

The sinking by the Israeli Navy of a bomb-laden freighter off the Sinai coast foiled a
terrorist plot that could have cost the lives of hundreds of vacationers. Apparently, the
terrorists were launching a seaborne assault on Israel’s Red Sea port of Eilat. Oil tank
farms and the big oil pumping installations on the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline to the
Mediterranean may have been the intended target of the unsuccessful operation. The
terrorists had planned to unlesh 42 122-mm katyusha rockets at the port of Eilat and
simultaneously ram the 600-ton boat, crammed with more than three tons of
explosives, onto the packed Eilat beach. The ship’s keel would have exploded on
impact with the land. Seven guerrillas were captured, the heavy armament was seized,

16

Jenkins et al, above n 2, 13.
Jay Nash, Terrorism in the 20th Century: A Narrative Encyclopedia from the Anarchists, Through the Weathermen, to the Unabomber (Evans and Co, 1998) 363; Combs
and Slann, above n 8, 260.
18
Rubin and Rubin, above n 1, 115.
17
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and the ship was sunk after verbal orders to halt from an Israeli gunboat were ignored
and several warning shots had been shot across its bow.19

Jul 1979

Portugal

Whaling ship

Ramming

The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society’s (SSCS’s) vessels twice rammed the
Cypriot-registered whaler Sierra in harbour in the port of Leixoes, ‘tearing the hull
open to the waterline and forcing the ship into port for repairs’.20

23 Jul 1979

Persian
Gulf

Oil tanker

Hijacking and
sinking (intended
blocking of a
choke point)

American warships and security forces from Oman were put on alert to prevent the
hijacking or sinking of an oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, the 50-mile wide
entrance to the Persian Gulf. Authorities believed the attempt might be made on 23
July, the anniversary of the 1952 Egyptian Revolution. The idea would be to disrupt,
and thus threaten, the steady stream of tankers passing through the strait loaded with
oil from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Abadan, Iraq or the UAE. The Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) was suspected of plotting this action.21

Dec 1979

USA

Oil terminal and
tanker

Bomb threat

In Beaumont, Texas, United States of America (USA), there was a bomb threat
against Globe Venus at the Mobil Oil Terminal. After partial search of the terminal
and vessel, the call was evaluated as a hoax.22

Jan 1980

Africa

Tanker

Oil theft

The 215 000-ton Liberian-registered tanker Salem sank off the west coast of Africa in
mysterious circumstances. There was no oil slick making it unlikely that the ship had
sunk with its oil still aboard. It was not until September 1981 that the master of the
tanker and three other men were charged with stealing the tanker’s cargo of crude oil
which had been insured with Lloyds of London for US$56 million. A judiciary
spokesperson in Piraeus, Greece, laid charges against the captain of the tanker, two
crew members and a Piraeus shipping agent.23

19

Jenkins et al, above n 2, 16–17.
Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (SSCS), The History of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and Whaling <http://www.seashepherd.org/whales/sea-shepherdhistory.html> at 5 October 2010.
21
Jenkins et al, above n 2, 17–18.
22
Ibid 18.
23
Ibid.
20
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6 Feb 1980

Portugal

Whaling ship

Explosives attack
(limpet mines)

The SSCS operatives sank the Cypriot-registered whaling ship Sierra in Lisbon
harbour, using limpet mines.24

11 Mar 1980

Mauritania

Tanker

Explosives attack

The 236 000-ton Spanish supertanker Maria Alejandra exploded and sank off
Mauritania, West Africa. Thirty-six of the 43 personnel on board were lost. The ship
was in ballast and was only three years old with modern safety equipment.25

29 Oct 1980

Italy

Ship

Underwater
explosive attack

A Libyan ship in for repairs at the port of Genoa, almost sank after the explosion of a
device that had been attached to the hull below the water line. The Maltese National
Front was suspected of the attack.26

14 Mar 1981

France

Gasoline
storage tank

Vandalism
(suspected arson)

In Chateauroux, an act of vandalism (suspected arson) caused a fire and the release of
740 000 gallons of gasoline from seven storage tanks.27

Oct 1981

USA

Oil platform

Bomb threat
(explosive-laden
boat)

In California, a caller said that a bomb had been placed on one of several attending
vessels at the Texaco platform Habitat, nine nautical miles southeast of Santa Barbara.
No bomb was found after platform and vessel searches.28

21 Oct 1981

South
Africa

Coal
liquefaction
plant

Explosive
attack/sabotage

In the town of Secunda, Patrick Chamusso bombed Secunda CTL, the largest coal
liquefaction refinery in the world, which produces synthetic fuel, diesel, and related
fuels and petrochemicals from coal gasification.29 Patrick Chamusso used to work at
the refinery as a foreman and was wrongly accused of the earlier bombing of Secunda
CTL, which took place on 31 May 1980. Chamusso was arrested and tortured, but was
subsequently released due to lack of evidence against him.30 Following his release,

24

SSCS, above n 20; ‘Sea Shepherd’s Record of Violence’ (10 April 1994) The High North News Extra, No 7 <http://www.highnorth.no/library/movements/sea_shepherd/sesh-re.htm> at 5 October 2010.
25
Jenkins et al, above n 2, 18–19.
26
Ibid 20.
27
Alicia Watts-Hosmer, Colby Stanton, and Julie Beane, ‘Intent to Spill: Environmental Effects of Oil Spills Caused by War, Terrorism, Vandalism, and Theft’ (Paper
presented at 1997 International Oil Spill Conference, Fort Lauderdale, USA, 7-10 April 1997) 157, 161 <http://www.iosc.org/papers/01058.pdf> at 5 October 2010.
28
Jenkins et al, above n 2, 21.
29
See Catch a Fire (Directed by Phillip Noyce, Focus Features, 2006).
30
The Internet Movie Database, Catch a Fire <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0437232/> at 6 June 2010.
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Chamusso became disgruntled with the country’s oppressive reigning system and
joined the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC), and having the inside
knowledge of the refinery, he masterminded and alone carried out the second bombing
on Secunda CTL.31

2 Jan 1982

Lebanon

Oil tanker

Standoff
weapons

A Lebanese-registered oil tanker was rocketed while loading Iraqi crude at an oil
terminal in the northern Lebanese port city of Tripoli. The tanker sailed out of the
range of fire, but not before the shelling caused a fire on the ship’s deck that was
quickly extinguished. One oil storage tank on the 20 778-ton Babanaft had been hit
and was set ablaze. The tanker sailed to Greece to undergo repairs. No group claimed
responsibility for the bombing, but there have been frequent clashes between proIranian and pro-Iraqi Lebanese Moslems since the two countries went to war in
September 1980.32

24 Jun 1982

USA

Oil tanker

Mutiny

Armed Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents and US Coasguardsmen raided
the Liberian-registered oil tanker off the coast of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, arresting
24 crew members who had threatened to kill the ship’s captain and release 290 000
barrels of oil into the ocean unless the shipping compnay paid them union-scale
wages. The raid which occurred in international waters at the request of the Liberian
government, followed 29 days of hostility between the captain and crew that
eventually ended in mutiny. The tanker Ypapanti had been refused entry into the port
of Philadelphia because it lacked proper safety equipment: at that point the crew took
the captain and 11 of the ship’s officers hostage. The 24 mutinous Pakistani and
Indian crewmen were removed from the tanker and placed in custody until they could
be returned to their homeland.33

Jan 1983

USA

Construction
barge

Bomb threat

In California, there was a bomb threat against the construction barge Challenger I,
eight nautical miles south of the Long Beach harbour entrance. The barge was
involved in the installation of the Chevron Oil Platform called Edith. The construction

31

Catch a Fire, above n 29.
Jenkins et al, above n 2, 22.
33
Ibid 24.
32
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of Edith was the subject of a labour dispute between the local pile drivers union and
Chevron because of the use of foreign labour at the construction site. A search
revealed no bomb. The Coast Guard responded as a precautionary measure.34

13 Sep 1983

Nicaragua

Underwater
pipeline

Explosives attack

An underwater oil pipeline at Puerto Sandino was blown up by a special team
allegedly from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) using underwater high
explosives. The same pipeline was blown up again on 14 October 1983.35

24 Apr 1984

Canada

Oil storage tank

Vandalism/oil
theft/sabotage

An act of sabotage or vandalism of a storage tank caused the release of approximately
143 000 gallons of gasoline in Deception Bay, Quebec.36

10 Jul 1985

New
Zealand

Ship

Explosives attack

The flagship of Greenpeace, Rainbow Warrior, was bombed and sunk in Auckland
Harbour by French secret service agents,37 to prevent her from interfering in nuclear
tests in Moruroa in French Polynesia in the southern Pacific Ocean, which had been
used as a nuclear test site by France. Agents had boarded the ship while it was open to
public viewing, and attached two mines to the ship and detonated them 10 minutes
apart. The first mine exploded at around 11:40 pm. Agents intended the first mine to
cripple the ship so that everybody would be evacuated safely when the second mine
was detonated. While the ship was initially evacuated, some of the crew returned to
the ship to investigate the damage. The ship sank four minutes after the second
explosion. One crew member, the ship’s photographer, drowned in the rapid flooding
while trying to retrieve his camera equipment. The New Zealand police reacted
quickly to the first act of terrorism on their soil. Piecing together statements from
members of the public, they soon apprehended two French agents, who were

34

Ibid 25.
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep No 70, 14, 38; Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Oral Arguments) [1986] ICJ Rep No 70, 3, 21.
36
Oil Spills Intelligence Report 1982-1985, International Summary and Review, cited in Watts-Hosmer, Stanton, and Beane, above n 27, 160.
37
George Williams, ‘The Rule of Law and the Regulation of Terrorism in Australia and New Zealand’ in Victor Ramraj, Michael Hor and Kent Roach (eds), Global AntiTerrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 534.
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subsequently convicted and sentenced to 10 and 7 years of imprisonment
respectively.38

7 Oct 1985

Egypt

Cruise liner

Hijacking

Four Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) terrorists hijacked the Italian cruise liner,
Achille Lauro, in the Mediterranean with 80 passengers and 320 crew members
aboard. During the seizure, the terrorists randomly selected and shot a 69-year old
disabled American passenger, Leon Klinghoffer, and then ordered other passengers at
gunpoint to dump his body into the sea. 39 The Egyptian government called in a
negotiator, Abu Abbas, leader of the PLF, the group to which the hijackers claimed to
belong.40 He ordered them to release the ship and come into port, where they were
promised safe passage out of the country. The vessel sailed to Port Said, where
terrorists surrendered to Egyptian authorities on 9 October 1985. 41 The Egyptian
aircraft, aboard which the hijackers were being smuggled out of Egypt, was
intercepted by US fighter planes and forced to land in Italy, where the hijackers were
arrested by the Italian authorities and subsequently tried and convicted.42 The longest
prison sentence of 30 years was given to Yussef Magid Molqui, the killer of Leon
Klighoffer.43

11 Jul 1988

Greece

Cruise ferry

Armed intrusion

Three unidentified gunmen boarded and attacked the 200-foot Greek cruise ferry City
of Poros which was on its way from the island of Aegina to Athens, opening fire with
submachine guns. The ferry was carrying 500 passengers including European and
American tourists. The gunmen randomly discharged their automatic weapons and
tossed hand grenades onto the deck and at the ferry’s smoke stack, killing at least nine
people and wounding about 100. Many passengers jumped overboard and some were

38

Greenpeace, The Bombing of the Rainbow Warrior <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/history/the-bombing-of-the-rainbow-war/> at 8 July 2010; Return to
the Rainbow Warrior (Produced by Damian Comerford, ABC1, 2010).
39
Combs and Slann, above n 8, 2.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid 267.
42
See Natalino Ronzitti (ed), Maritime Terrorism and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1990) vii.
43
Nash, above n 17, 390. The 1990 television miniseries, Voyage of Terror: The Achille Lauro Affair, starring Burt Lancaster in the role of Klinghoffer, and using the actual
ship and its route, recaptures this event.
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dismembered by the ship’s propeller. The gunmen escaped after the attack on a
speedboat that pulled alongside the ferry about 3 nautical miles off the coast of
Aegina.44

25 Jun 1991

USA

Oil storage
tanks

Vandalism

In Baytown, Texas, vandalism of storage tanks caused the release of 84 000 gallons of
waste oil from an undetermined number of aboveground storage tanks. Oil entered a
marshland area and impacted the San Jacinto River.45

26 Feb 1993

UK

Gas installations Bombing

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombed gas works in Warrington.46

10 Oct 1993

USA

Oil production
tanks

Vandalism

In Sandyville, Ohio, oil production tanks were vandalised, causing the release of 19
000 gallons of crude oil. The spill was contained with a boom and recovered with
vacuum trucks and absorbents.47

19 Oct 1993

Ukraine

Pipeline

Oil theft

Thieves left a valve open on a pipeline located in Uzgorod at the main crossing on the
Ukraine-Slovakian border and caused the release of 19 000 gallons of diesel fuel.48

23 Jan 1994

Turkey

Pipeline

Bombing

Kurdish rebels bombed a disused Iraqi oil export pipeline in southeast Turkey. The
ensuing fire at the State-owned facility damaged the pipeline and created a spill of
about 12 000 metric tons of crude oil.49

18 Oct 1994

Algeria

Oil base

Armed intrusion

Approximately 30 Armed Islamic Group (GIA)50 guerrillas carried out an attack on an
oil base, killing French and Italian workers.51

1994

Puerto Rico

Oil storage tank

Oil theft

According to the US Coast Guard investigators, thieves were responsible for the
release of an estimated 130 000 to 150 000 gallons of waste oil from an aboveground

44

Federation of American Scientists (FAS), 1988 Anti-Shipping Activity Messages (ASAM) <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/ASAM-1988.htm> at 8 June 2010.
Watts-Hosmer, Stanton, and Beane, above n 27, 160.
46
Combs and Slann, above n 8, 272.
47
Watts-Hosmer, Stanton, and Beane, above n 27, 160.
48
Ibid 161.
49
Reuter Newswire, ‘Turkey: Rebel Kurds Bomb Iraqi-Turkish Oil Pipeline’ (24 January 1994), cited in Watts-Hosmer, Stanton, and Beane, above n 27, 159.
50
In French, GIA stands for Groupe Islamique Armé.
51
Combs and Slann, above n 8, 277.
45
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storage tank as they tried to steal a pump adjacent to a storage tank and, apparently,
disconnected a hose linking the 20 000-barrel tank to the pump. The waste oil drained
from the tank onto surrounding property and then to nearby Guanica Bay.52

1995

Sri Lanka

Oil storage
facilities

Explosives
attack/suicide
bombing

Sri Lankan security forces launched an operation to reclaim control of the Jaffna
Peninsula. To pre-empt this, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) destroyed
oil storage facilities in Colombo, which were fueling Sri Lankan aircraft, vehicles, and
naval craft. Six suicide bombers were used in this operation.53

19 Apr 1995

Colombia

Oil company
workers

Kidnapping for
ransom

Members of the National Liberation Army (ELN) kidnapped two Italian oil workers
from their car and killed their Colombian driver near Barrancabermeja.54

5 May 1995

Algeria

Oil company
workers

Murder

Suspected members of GIA attacked employees of a pipeline company, killing two
Frenchmen, a Briton, a Canadian, and a Tunisian.55

24 Jun 1995

Colombia

Oil company
workers

Kidnapping for
ransom, murder

An unknown group abducted the son of a British Exxon employee in Formeque, and
demanded a ransom of US$500 000. On 12 August 1995, during the course of
negotiations, the victim’s body was found. 56

Oct 1995

Sri Lanka

Oil and gas
storage facilities

Standoff
weapons/
explosives attack

The LTTE insurgents attacked two oil depots in the suburbs of Colombo. They first
attacked storage facilities at the Kolonnawa oil refinery that holds 100 000 tons of
refined oil products. About 20 rebels took part in the attack, with some rebels entering
the plant and others attacking with rocket-propelled grenades. A second attack then
took place on the nearby Orugodawatta gas storage facility. Five or six tanks at the
Kolonnawa oil refinery holding diesel, kerosene, and other finished products were set
on fire, as were three half-full tanks of crude oil at the Orugodawatta facility. Fire
brigades fought the two fires with several thousand gallons of foam.57

52

Watts-Hosmer, Stanton, and Beane, above n 27, 161.
Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Suicide Terrorism in Sri Lanka’ in Boaz Ganor (ed), Countering Suicide Terrorism (2001) 71.
54
Combs and Slann, above n 8, 278.
55
Rubin and Rubin, above n 1, 278.
56
Combs and Slann, above n 8, 278.
57
Reuter Newswire, ‘Sri Lanka: Suspected Tamil Rebels Blast Fuel Depots, Kill 20’ (20 October 1995), cited in Watts-Hosmer, Stanton, and Beane, above n 27, 159.
53

432

Appendix C

Mikhail Kashubsky

Date

Location

Type of Target

Tactics/Scenario

Details of Attack/Incident

16 Jan 1996

Black Sea

Ferry

Hijacking/seizure

Seven Turkish nationals of Chechen origin hijacked a Russia-bound Panamanian
ferry, Avrasya, that had left the port of Trabzon in Turkey. The hijackers initially
threatened to kill all Russians on board and blow up the ferry unless Chechen rebels
being held under siege in the village of Pervomaiskoye, near the Dagestan-Chechen
border, were released. On 19 January, the hijackers surrendered to Turkish authorities
outside the entrance to the Bosporus. The passengers were unharmed.58

12 April 1996

Sri Lanka

Port

Standoff
weapons/
underwater
explosives

In Port Colombo, the Sri Lankan Navy and Air Force repelled a 12 April 1996 LTTE
‘Sea Tiger’ suicide attack on the port of Colombo. Rocket-propelled grenades and
mortar bombs hit two foreign-owned vessels and a small locally owned ship caught in
the crossfire. The attack consisted of two kamikaze frogmen, followed by two
guerrillas. The first diver blew himself up at the entrance to the port, the Navy killed
the second while he was in the water. The Navy also destroyed one of the intruding
vessels outside the northern entrance to the port.59

16 May 1996

Peru

Warehouse

Vehicle-borne
improvised
explosive device
(VBIED)

A 20-kilogram dynamite bomb was detonated in a stolen car by the Sendero
Luminoso in the La Victoria district of Lima. The bomb went off at 10:35 pm at the
Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum products warehouse and ten people were injured (one
seriously). There was considerable material damage caused to the warehouse and
nearby buildings and cars. The attack was likely meant to derail the proposed signing
of a contract between Shell, Mobil and the government of Peru to begin exploration of
the Camisea gas fields in the Peruvian jungle.60

29 Dec 1996

Yemen

Tourists

Kidnapping for
ransom

Five Polish tourists were kidnapped in Yemen, possibly by members of a Yemeni
tribe hostile to the government and foreign oil companies that have operations in
Yemen. The kidnappers demanded compensation from the government for losses

58

Combs and Slann, above n 8, 280.
FAS, 1996 Anti-Shipping Activity Messages (ASAM) <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/ASAM-1996.htm> at 8 June 2010.
60
Bruce Hoffman and David Claridge, ‘The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism and Noteworthy Domestic Incidents, 1996’ (1998) 10(2) Terrorism
and Political Violence 135, 158.
59
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incurred during the July floods. The five were freed on 31 December and flown home
to Poland.61

12 Nov 1997

Pakistan

Oil company
workers

Murder

Four Union Texas Petroleum employees were murdered.62

10 Dec 1997

Turkey

Oil refinery

Foiled bomb
attack

Authorities defused a powerful time bomb found inside a gas cylinder at a Turkish
facility adjoining Atas oil refinery near Mersin.63

18 Jul 1998

Ecuador

Oil company
workers

Kidnapping
/hostage-taking

The Indigenous Defence Front for Pastaza Province (FDIP) kidnapped three
employees of an Ecuadorian pipeline maker subcontracted by a US oil company in
Pastaza Province. The group accused the company of causing environmental damage
in its oil field developments. On 28 July, the FDIP released one hostage, and the
remaining two hostages the next day.64

5 Oct 1998

Ecuador

Oil company
workers

Kidnapping/
hostage-taking

Three employees of the Santa Fe Oil Company, two US citizens and one Ecuadorian,
were kidnapped, according to local press accounts. One US citizen escaped the next
day.65

17 Jan 2000

Nigeria

Oil company
barge

Armed intrusion/
hijacking

Armed robbers boarded an oil company barge near Port Harcourt and hijacked it.66

12 Oct 2000

Yemen

Warship

Explosive-laden
boat

A small boat loaded with explosives rammed the US destroyer USS Cole and blew up
alongside it, killing 17 sailors and injuring 39 others. Affiliates of Al-Qaeda were
suspected of and blamed for the attack.67

61

Ibid 180.
Combs and Slann, above n 8, 283.
63
US Government, Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997 (1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1997Report/chron.html> at 25 September
2008.
64
Combs and Slann, above n 8, 283.
65
Ibid 284.
66
International Maritime Organization (IMO), Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Issued Monthly - Acts Reported During June 2001, IMO Doc
MSC.4/Circ.3 (30 June 2001) annex 1 (‘Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Allegedly Committed Against Ships Reported by Member States or International Organizations in
Consultative Status’) 1.
62
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12 Oct 2000

Ecuador

Oil company
workers

Kidnapping/
hostage-taking/
murder

In Sucumbios Province, a group of armed assailants led by former members of defunct
Colombian insurgent organisation the Popular Liberation Army (EPL)68 took hostage
10 employees of the Spanish energy consortium Repsol including five US citizens,
one Argentinian, one Chilean, one New Zealander, and two French pilots who escaped
four days later. The kidnappers murdered the American hostage Ronald Sander on 30
January 2001 and the remaining hostages were released on 23 February 2001,
following payment of US$13 million in ransom by the oil companies.69

2001

Nigeria

Oil rig

Armed intrusion/
kidnapping

In Lagos, militant youths overran an oil rig operated by Trans-Ocean Sedco/Trident, a
subcontractor to Shell, kidnapping 19 foreign nationals and 80 nationals, according to
press reports. Five days later the hostages were released unharmed. No one claimed
responsibility.70

Summer 2002

Saudi
Arabia

Offshore oil
terminal and
pipeline

Foiled attack

Saudi authorities arrested over 20 people in connection with a plot to attack major
pipeline and oil terminal, believed to be Ras Tanura, the world’s largest offshore oilloading facility. Most of Saudi Arabia’s oil exports go through shipping terminals at
Ras Tanura (6 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) capacity) and Ras al-Ju’aymah (3
million bpd capacity) on the Persian Gulf, and Yanbu (5 million bpd capacity) on the
Red Sea.71

6 Oct 2002

Yemen

Oil tanker

Explosive-laden
boat

The French tanker MV Limburg was attacked by an explosive-laden boat and
substantially damaged by the explosion. A Bulgarian crew member was killed by the
explosion, and Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack.72

67

Cindy Combs and Martin Slann, Encyclopedia of Terrorism (Facts on File, revised ed, 2007) 416.
In Spanish, EPL stands for Ejército Popular de Liberación.
69
Combs and Slann, above n 67, 416–17.
70
US Government, Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 (2002) 81.
71
James Russel, ‘Maritime Security in the Gulf: Addressing the Terrorist Threat’ (2006) 2 Security & Terrorism Research Bulletin 9, 10; Alex Schmid, ‘Terrorism and
Energy Security: Targeting Oil and Other Energy Sources and Infrastructures’ in James Ellis (ed), Terrorism: What’s Coming – The Mutating Threat (2007) 28, 33.
72
Rubin and Rubin, above n 1, 316. See also Shawn Woodford, ‘Al-Qaeda and Saudi Arabia: A Chronology’ in Erich Marquardt (ed), Saudi Arabian Oil Facilities: The
Achilles Heel of the Western Economy (Jamestown Foundation, 2006) 35, 38.
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18 Mar 2003

Yemen

Oil company
workers

Insider attack/
murder

In Marib, a gunman killed three oil workers at the oil rig and wounded a fourth before
killing himself. The gunman named Naji Al Kumain was a carpenter who worked at
the rig. His motives appear to be personal as colleagues told investigators he was
suffering from depression and had no political interests.73

21 Jul 2003

Saudi
Arabia

Farms and
houses

Foiled attack

Officials pre-empted a terrorist attack on vital installations with the arrest of 16
suspected terrorists in a raid on farms and houses in Riyadh, Qasim, and the Eastern
Province.74

May 2004

Saudi
Arabia

Petrochemical
complex

Armed intrusion

Gunmen attacked a petrochemical complex in Yanbu, on the Red Sea coast.75 Six
foreigners were killed in the attack.76

29 May 2004

Saudi
Arabia

Residential
compound

Armed intrusion/
hostage-taking

Islamic radicals attacked a foreign residential compound and oil installation in AlKhobar, taking 50 people hostage. Most of the hostages were released the next day.
Twenty-two foreigners and seven security men were killed and 25 people injured in
the attack.77

Feb 2005

Australia

Ship

Attack with a
knife

A foreign national working aboard a foreign-flagged tender vessel attacked the
vessel’s captain with a knife whilst it was moored within 500 metres of a platform
about 450 kilometres northwest of Darwin.78

16 Jul 2005

Iraq

Fuel tanker

Suicide bomber

Ninety-eight civilians were killed and 200 wounded when a suicide bomber detonated

73

CNN, Gunman Kills 3 Oil Workers in Yemen (18 March 2003) <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/18/yemen.shootings/> at 8 August 2010. See also Jihadi
Websites Monitoring Group, Oil Installations as an Attractive Target for Terrorism (5 November 2009) International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 11
<http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Oil_Installations_as_a_Target.pdf> at 7 August 2010.
74
Woodford, above n 72, 40.
75
Christopher Boucek, ‘Saudi Security and the Islamist Insurgency’ in Jonathan Hutzley (ed), Unmasking Terror: A Global Review of Terrorist Activities (Jamestown
Foundation, 2007) vol 3, 172, 174.
76
Patrick Clawson and Simon Henderson, ‘Reducing Vulnerability to Middle East Energy Shocks: A Key Element in Strengthening US Energy Security’ (Policy Focus No
49, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 2005) 27.
77
Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, above n 73, 11. See also Woodford, above n 72, 43; Stephen Ulph, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Islamist Insurgency’ in Erich Marquardt (ed), Saudi
Arabian Oil Facilities: The Achilles Heel of the Western Economy (Jamestown Foundation, 2006) 13, 17.
78
Australian Government, Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS), Offshore Oil & Gas Risk Context Statement (2005) 19.

436

Appendix C

Date

Mikhail Kashubsky

Location

Type of Target

Tactics/Scenario

Details of Attack/Incident
explosives near a fuel tanker resulting in a conflagration that spread to a nearby Shiite
mosque in Babil, jammed with those going to evening prayer. Al-Qaeda in Iraq
claimed responsibility for the attack. On 23 July 2005, Iraqi police announced that
they had arrested the man who planned the attack.79

7 Aug 2005

India

Pipeline

Explosives attack

In Assam’s northern district of Sibsagar, United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
rebels attacked and destroyed part of a pipeline of the State-owned company Oil India
Limited. It was reported that about 10 armed rebels overpowered the security guards
at midnight and set off remotely detonated explosives. 80

19 Aug 2005

Jordan

Warships

Standoff
weapons

Two Katyusha rockets exploded in the morning in the port of Aqaba, narrowly
missing USS Ashland and USS Kearsarge, which had been docking at the Aqaba port.
One Jordanian soldier was killed and another injured.81

20 Dec 2005

Nigeria

Pipeline

Explosives attack

Attackers in speedboats threw explosive devices at a Shell oil pipeline. 82 The
explosion killed about 20 civilian adults and eight children and destroyed 20 homes.
No group claimed responsibility, but the Nigerian authorities suspected that the Niger
Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) carried out the attack.83

Jan 2006

India

Pipeline

Explosives attack

Separatist militants attacked three natural gas pipelines in Assam.84

15 Jan 2006

Nigeria

Flow station

Armed attack/
explosives

Militants attacked Shell’s Benisede flow station, burnt down staff accommodation and
damaged the facility, killing 17 people in the process.85

24 Feb 2006

Saudi

Oil refinery

VBIED attack

The Abqaiq Oil Refinery, the world’s largest refinery (through which almost 90 per
cent of the crude oil exported by Saudi Arabia from the Gulf is processed and

79

Rubin and Rubin, above n 1, 349–350.
BBC News, Assam Separatists Admit Oil Raid (8 August 2005) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4129254.stm> at 8 October 2010.
81
See BBC News, Jordan Rockets Miss US Navy Ship (19 August 2005) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4165190.stm> at 11 September 2008.
82
Boaz Ganor, ‘Cooperation is Not Sufficient: A New International Regime is Needed to Counter Global Jihadi Terrorism’ in James Ellis (ed), Terrorism: What’s Coming –
The Mutating Threat (2007) 48, 50.
83
Combs and Slann, above n 67, 423.
84
Herbert Cooper, ‘Addressing Energy Supply Vulnerabilities’ (2006) 102(4) CEP Magazine 24, 25.
85
Daniel Howden, Shell May Pull Out of Niger Delta After 17 Die in Boat Raid (2006) Corp Watch <http://www.corpwatch.org/article/php?id+13121> at 19 August 2008.
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pumped) located in the eastern part of the nation, was attacked by two simultaneous
VBIEDs, but the attack failed because security personnel at the facility were able to
intercept the attackers.86 Two militants were killed when their bomb-laden vehicles
were apparently detonated by gunfire from the facility’s guards. Two more attackers
and four guards were killed during an ensuing two-hour gunfight that ended when the
terrorists escaped. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula took credit for the attack.87 Four
days later, security forces disarmed another two explosive-laden vehicles near the
Abqaiq oil facilities.88 The production at the facility was not affected, but two security
men were killed.

28 Mar 2006

Saudi
Arabia

Oil refinery

VBIED

Saudi security forces discovered two car bombs and weapons in an Aramco
employee’s home near the Abqaiq oil refinery complex. Two days later, the Saudi
Interior Ministry announced the arrest of 40 militants over the previous several days,
including eight individuals suspected in the February attack on Abqaiq oil refinery.89

30 Apr 2006

Iraq

Gas
concentration
unit

Standoff
weapons

In Kirkuk, At Ta’mim militants attacked the Northern Gas Company facility with 11
mortar rounds, burning three vehicles and damaging a natural gas concentration unit.
No group claimed responsibility.90

16 May 2006

Iraq

Oil tanker

VBIED

In northern Baghdad, assailants detonated a probably remote-controlled VBIED next
to an oil tanker, causing the tanker to explode, killing 19 civilians, wounding 36
others, and damaging several civilian vehicles parked nearby. No group claimed
responsibility although authorities suspect sectarian violence.91

86

Oil and Gas Industry Terrorism Monitor, A Synopsis of the Terrorist Threat Facing the O&G Industry (2007) [17] <http://www.ogi-tm.com/ogi_threats_st.php> at 11
December 2008. See also Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, above n 73, 12.
87
Woodford, above n 72, 46–7.
88
Stephen Ulph, Wave of Arrests in Saudi Arabia Thwarts Second Refinery Attack (2006) 3(3) Terrorism Focus
<http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=721&tx_ttnews[backPid]=239&no_cache=1> at 27 February 2009.
89
Woodford, above n 72, 47.
90
US Government, National Counterterrorism Center (NCC), Worldwide Incident Tracking System <https://wits.nctc.gov> at 26 April 2010.
91
NCC, 2006 Report on Terrorism (2007) 52.
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15 Sep 2006

Yemen

Oil export
terminal

VBIED

Ash Shihr oil export terminal in Mukalla (Yemen’s main export terminal in the Gulf
of Aden) was attacked by Al-Qaeda affiliates. The attack involved two VBIEDs; the
first exploded at the external perimeter wall of the facility, while the second exploded
just inside the perimeter after security forces shot and wounded the driver. Only
limited physical damage was inflicted.92

15 Sep 2006

Yemen

Gas/oil
gathering and
separation plant

VBIED

Some 45 minutes after the attack on Ash Shihr oil export terminal, Al-Qaeda affiliates
attacked a 10 000 bpd oil gathering and gas/oil separation plant at the Block 18 site in
Marib province, 150 kilometres east of Sanaa. Terrorists used two VBIEDs in the
attack. The first vehicle rammed the gate and exploded. Before reaching the destroyed
section of the gate, the second VBIED changed course and struck an undamaged
section of chain-link fence before exploding.93

18 Nov 2006

Nigeria

Oil flow station

Armed attack

In Delta State, armed assailants attacked an oil flow station, injuring several soldiers
on duty. No group claimed responsibility.94

14 Dec 2006

Nigeria

Oil flow station

Armed attack/
kidnapping for
ransom

At about 11:00 pm, in Oporoma, Bayelsa, assailants attacked an oil flow station,
taking at least three oil workers hostage, killing two soldiers and wounding several
others. No property damage was reported. No group claimed responsibility.95

15 Jan 2007

Nigeria

Ferry

Armed robbery/
shooting

A ferry was attacked in the vicinity of Kula, in the southern Niger Delta. Western oil
companies evacuated staff from three oilfields, after gunmen opened fire on the ferry
carrying 14 passengers. The gunmen killed twelve crew members and injured two.96
The ferry was carrying a large amount of cash and the attack was an armed robbery. It

92

Tim Pippard, ‘“Oil-Qaeda”: Jihadist Threats to the Energy Sector’ (2010) 4(3) Perspectives on Terrorism 3, 8.
Ibid.
94
NCC, above n 90.
95
Ibid.
96
IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Issued Monthly – Acts Reported During January 2007, IMO Doc MSC.4/Circ.99 (16 May 2007) annex
1 (‘Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Allegedly Committed Against Ships Reported by Member States or International Organizations in Consultative Status’).
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is likely that information about the money being transported was leaked from inside
Hyundai, according to a military source.97

27 Feb 2007

Pakistan

Pipeline

Explosives attack

A bomb damaged the gas line transporting gas from Sui to Baluchistan.98

24 Apr 2007

Ethiopia

Oil company
premises and oil
installation

Armed intrusion,
kidnapping

At about 6:00 am, in Abole, Sumale, approximately 200 militants belonging to the
local rebel movement named the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) attacked
a China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation’s premises and oil installation, killing 74
persons including 65 Ethiopian soldiers and nine Chinese workers. The attackers
damaged the premises and kidnapped seven Chinese oil workers, who were released
several days later.99

8 May 2007

Nigeria

Construction
vessel

Armed attack/
kidnapping for
ransom

About 40 armed men attacked a construction vessel, DLB Cheyenne, at the Okan field
about 10 kilometres offshore near the coast of Escravos.100 The vessel was damaged
and three Nigerian sailors and one civilian were wounded. Four US oil workers were
kidnapped but released on 30 May 2007. The responsibility for the attack was claimed
by Egbema One group.101

23 Oct 2007

Sudan

Oilfield

Armed attack/
kidnapping

Armed men attacked Defra oilfield, killing 20 Sudanese soldiers, kidnapping five oil
workers (3 Sudanese, 1 Egyptian, 1 Iraqi), and damaging the oilfield. The Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) claimed responsibility. The rebels threatened to attack
other oil installations if foreign oil workers did not leave Sudan. All five hostages
were released to local tribal leaders on or about 12 November 2007.102

97

Bergen Risk Solutions, Niger Delta Maritime Security Quarterly Review (9 July 2007) 18 <http://www.bergenrisksolutions.com/index.php?dokument=294> at 2 January
2011.
98
Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, above n 73, 12.
99
NCC, 2007 Report on Terrorism (2008) 59. See also Andrew McGregor, ‘Ethiopia Face Ethnic Fallout from Somalia Intervention’ (2007) 4(17) Terrorism Focus [5]
<http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4208&tx_ttnews[backPid]=240&no_cache=1> at 28 October 2008.
100
NCC, above n 90.
101
Bergen Risk Solutions, above n 97, 21. See also International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 April – 30 June
2007 (2007) 43.
102
NCC, above n 90.
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25 Dec 2007

Iraq

Oil refinery/
truck

VBIED

At about 9:30 am, in Bayji, Salah ad Din, a suicide bomber detonated a VBIED after
ramming a truck carrying cooking gas cylinders near an oil refinery into a line of
civilians waiting at a checkpoint for the gas, killing more than 20 civilians,
paramilitary members, and children, and wounding nearly 90 others, damaging the
checkpoint, the oil refinery, and one vehicle. No group claimed responsibility.103

Jan 2008

Nigeria

Oil tanker

Explosives attack

An oil tanker burst into flames at Port Harcourt after two loud explosions.104

7 Feb 2008

Nigeria

Oil facility

IED

In Port Harcourt, Rivers State, assailants remotely detonated an improvised explosive
device (IED), damaging an oil facility belonging to Shell Petroleum Development
Company, but causing no injuries. No group claimed responsibility.105

14 Sep 2008

Nigeria

Oil flow station
and oil platform

Unknown

Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) attacked Shell’s Alakiri flow
station. 106 Militants also attacked Chevron’s Kula oil platform; however, the
production at this platform was already shut down due to pipeline problems.107

16 Sep 2008

Nigeria

Pumping station
and naval vessel

Explosives
attack/armed
attack

9-15 Jun 2009

Nigeria

Oil flow
stations, oil
wells, gas lifts,

Standoff
weapons/IED

MEND (allegedly in a joint operation with another militant group, the NDPVF)
travelling in eight speed boats bombed with dynamite and hand grenades the Orubiri
pumping station operated by a unit of Royal Dutch Shell causing substantial damage
to the facility but no injuries, and also attacked a nearby naval vessel with 10 people
on board.108
In Warri, assailants fired a rocket-propelled grenade and detonated IEDs near the
Makaraba-Utonana-Abiteye pipeline, damaging four oil facilities. These attacks set
Chevron flow stations, oil wells, gas lifts, and trunk lines on fire at the Makaraba,

103

Ibid 95.
Net Resources International, Nigeria Oil Tankers on Fire (2008) <http://www.offshore-technology.com/news/news3631.html> at 2 July 2008.
105
NCC, above n 90.
106
Karl Maier and Tony Tamuno, Nigeria’s MEND Says It Destroyed Shell Flow Station (Update 1) (2008) Bloomberg
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601116&sid=adNIGlsAhRPM&refer=africa> at 18 September 2008.
107
Randy Fabi, Chevron Confirms Attack on Nigeria Oil Platform (14 September 2008) Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssEnergyNews/idUSLE66706220080914>
at 18 September 2008.
108
Maier and Tamuno, above n 106; NCC, above n 90.
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Utonana and Abiteye facilities, as part of operation ‘Hurricane Piper Alpha’. MEND
claimed responsibility.109
A Japanese oil tanker, M Star, was attacked using an explosive-laden boat in the Strait
of Hormuz, near the entrance to the Persian Gulf, close to Oman. The tanker was
carrying nearly two million barrels of oil. One sailor was lightly injured as a result of
the explosion. The Al-Qaeda affiliated group, Abdullah Azzam Brigades claimed
responsibility for the attack.110

28 Jul 2010

Persian
Gulf

Oil tanker

Explosive-laden
boat

19 Dec 2010

Mexico

Pipeline

Oil theft

A pipeline belonging to Mexico’s State-owned oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos,
exploded. According to the authorities, at least 27 people were killed, 52 others were
injured and 32 houses were destroyed. Oil gushed through the streets and caught fire,
scorching houses and cars and forcing some 5000 people to flee. The preliminary
investigation showed that the explosion was caused by an attempt to illegally extract
fuel from the pipeline.111

25 Feb 2011

Iraq

Oil refinery

Armed intrusion/
explosives attack

Unidentified gunmen carried out an attack on Iraq’s Baiji refinery, the largest oil
refining plant in the country, killing four workers and detonating about 10 explosive
devices around one of the production units. The explosion caused a large fire and the
refinery was forced to shut down its operations completely. 112 Security officials

109

NCC, above n 90.
Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, Al-Qaeda Claims Responsibility for the Attack on a Western Sea Vessel in the Region of the Strait of Hormuz (8 August 2010)
International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 1 <http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Japanese_Oil_Tanker.pdf> at 16 August 2010.
111
‘Counter Terrorism Security Response: Energy and Nuclear 13-19 December 2010’ (Weekly Report, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research,
November 2010) 2. See also BBC News, Deadly Blast on Oil Pipeline in Mexico’s Puebla State (20 December 2010) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america12034038> at 30 December 2010; Jeremy Martin and Sylvia Longmire, ‘The Perilous Intersection of Mexico’s Drug War & Pemex’ (2011) March Journal of Energy Security
<http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=283:the-perilous-intersection-of-mexicos-drug-war-aamppemex&catid=114:content0211&Itemid=374> at 17 March 2011.
112
‘Counter Terrorism Security Response: Energy and Nuclear 20-27 February 2011’ (Weekly Report, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research,
February 2011) 1-2. See also Mohammed Tawfeeq, 4 Killed in Attack on Iraq’s Largest Oil Refinery (26 February 2011) CNN <http://articles.cnn.com/2011-0226/world/iraq.refinery.attack_1_oil-refinery-attacks-on-oil-pipelines-iraq?_s=PM:WORLD> at 5 March 2011.
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blamed the attack on Al-Qaeda operatives, who are believed to be operating in Iraq’s
Salahuddin province, where the refinery is located.113

April 2011

New
Zealand

Seismic survey
vessel

Civil protest

When Brazilian State-owned oil company, Petrobas, commenced oil exploration off
the coast of New Zealand, Greenpeace activists and some local Maori protesters
disrupted its work, fearing that deep sea oil production would threaten the country’s
coastline and livelihood. The company was forced to put the work of its seismic
survey vessel Orient Explorer on hold for several days. Greenpeace told the media
that it wanted to stop deep sea oil drilling in New Zealand waters.114

113

Ben Lando, Iraq’s 310,000 b/d Baiji Refinery Shut After Bomb Attack (26 February 2011) Platts <http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/Oil/8593931> at
6 March 2011.
114
Alert Net, Petrobas Undeterred from New Zealand Oil Search by Protests (12 April 2011) <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/petrobras-undeterred-from-new-zealandoil-search-by-protests> at 17 April 2011; Jess Miller, Military Arrive at Oil Drilling Protest in New Zealand (12 April 2011) Greenpeace
<http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/makingwaves/military-arrive-at-oil-drilling-protest-in-ne/blog/34213> at 17 April 2011.
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